Regulation · Nigeria
Nigeria: CBN Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets
Nigeria’s central bank now licenses and supervises stablecoins and the companies that issue, exchange, hold and move them, wherever they are based, if they serve people in Nigeria. The regulations took effect on 5 November 2026; companies already operating must register within 30 days and apply for a licence within 180. This page covers the 180 requirements that bear on money laundering, sanctions and fraud controls, including the alerts a monitoring system must raise. It takes you through each one: the CBN’s own words, what an examiner will look for, and the detection rules that help you meet it.
- Issued by
- Central Bank of Nigeria (Payments System Policy Department)
- Reference
- PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004
- Issued
- Applies to
- Stablecoin issuers and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) that serve people in Nigeria, with or without a physical presence there
- In force
- Updated
Detection rules for this regulation
24 rules in the library help meet 53 of its 180 requirements. Most of the others are about systems, governance and process, where no detection rule applies.
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Sanctions screening
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Transfers with unlicensed or high-risk counterparty VASPs
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Transaction structuring (smurfing)
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Cumulative amount over a period (threshold aggregation)
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Funnel account (many senders into one account)
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High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch
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Large single transaction
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PEP screening (politically exposed persons)
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Transaction velocity
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Account takeover (ATO)
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Blacklist / internal watchlist match
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Missing originator or beneficiary information (Travel Rule)
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Rapid pass-through (rapid movement of funds)
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Shared identifiers across customers (money mule networks)
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Sudden change from a customer’s baseline
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Third-party funding and payment account name mismatch
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Unhosted wallet exposure (self-hosted wallets)
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Mixer, tumbler, and privacy-coin exposure
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Unlicensed virtual asset business (crypto trading through an ordinary account)
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Adverse media screening (negative news)
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Chain-hopping and cross-chain bridge use
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New account activity (mule accounts)
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New beneficiary, high-value payment
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Refused or failed identity verification, and false KYC data
Before the requirements
What the regulations are
On 5 November 2026 the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) issued the Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, under circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004, addressed to virtual asset service providers in Nigeria and stakeholders in the financial services industry. The circular is signed by the Director, Payments System Policy Department. The Regulations set “a risk-based framework for the licensing, regulation, supervision, and oversight of Non-Security Virtual Assets, including stablecoins, Deposit Money Tokens (DMTs), and related Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs)” (Introduction). Security tokens and other virtual assets that are securities stay with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (Exclusions, (b); Section 4).
The Regulations are issued under the CBN Act 2007, the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act 2020, the Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, the Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 (MLPPA), the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 (TPPA) and other applicable laws, “in accordance with the Presidential Executive Order on Virtual Assets Coordination, 2026” (Legal Basis). They have eleven Parts: general provisions; definitions (Section 1); prohibitions, designation and exemptions (Sections 2 to 5); licensing and authorisation, including platform-facilitated peer-to-peer (P2P) services and Class 2 stablecoins (Sections 6 to 11); supervisory powers (Sections 12 to 14); operational requirements, including capital, reporting, agents, outsourcing, issuance, redemption and reserves (Sections 15 to 25); AML/CFT/CPF obligations (Section 26); customer protection and conduct (Sections 27 to 34); governance, risk and technology (Sections 35 to 38); deposit money tokens (Sections 39 to 50); and enforcement, administrative sanctions and transition (Sections 51 to 56). Eight schedules and an annex of application documents follow. The text calls itself both “Guidelines” and “Regulations”; it defines “shall” as imposing an obligation and “may” as conferring a discretion (Section 55.2).
Part 7 (Section 26) holds the AML, counter-terrorist financing, counter-proliferation financing and sanctions obligations. Its section 26.7.1 requires every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP to “deploy and maintain an automated transaction monitoring system, supported by blockchain analytics”, configured to raise alerts on eight kinds of activity, and section 26.7.2 sets the time to review each alert: five business days, or 24 hours “where the alert indicates a possible sanctions match or terrorist financing”. Other sections that bind AML or fraud controls sit in the P2P rules (Section 10), the Class 2 stablecoin and cross-border rules (Section 11), the use of agents (Section 21), customer protection (Sections 27 and 33), technology risk (Sections 36 and 37, including fraud detection in 37.13), deposit money tokens (Section 46), the transition (Section 54) and the reporting templates (Schedule 7).
For a breach of AML/CFT/CPF obligations, “including failure to file STRs, failure to apply CDD, or Travel Rule non-compliance”, the CBN may impose “a fine of not less than fifty million naira (₦50,000,000) per breach, plus restitution of any amounts processed in violation of the obligation” (Section 51.1(d)), on the entity and, where the law allows, on its directors, senior management, officers or key function holders (Section 51.1).
Two duties start at “USD/EUR 1,000 or its naira equivalent”: due diligence on an occasional transaction (Section 26.3.2(b)) and the full originator and beneficiary information of the Travel Rule (Section 26.14.3, which Section 26.15.2 applies to unhosted wallets). The Regulations do not say whether the USD or the EUR figure applies, or which exchange rate converts it to naira; their valuation rule, “valued at the time of the transaction”, is stated only for the reports of Section 26.11.1 (Section 26.11.2). A licensee has to choose the currency and the rate itself, and an examiner will expect the choice written down, for example in the risk assessment.
Who they apply to
The Regulations apply to any person performing a Regulated Activity “whether or not that person maintains a physical presence in Nigeria”: issuers, foreign issuers whose tokens are made available to persons in Nigeria, distributors, exchanges and conversion providers, wallet providers, custodians, payment, gateway, merchant-acquiring, stored-value, remittance, clearing and settlement providers, payment system infrastructure providers, and agents and intermediaries (Applicability, II). “An overseas location does not remove an activity directed at Nigerian persons from the scope of these Guidelines.” (Applicability)
Section 26 “applies to every Licensed Issuer to every holder of Other Services Licence, Other Services Authorisation or Approval to Extend Permitted Activities, including a provider of a P2P Service (each a “VASP” for the purposes of this Part)”. The licences behind those terms (Section 6.2):
- Licensed Issuer: holds a Naira-referenced Issuer Licence (Class 1 stablecoins) or a Foreign Currency Issuer Licence (Class 2 stablecoins).
- Other Services Licence: a non-issuance VASP licence for a person without an SEC licence.
- Other Services Authorisation: for a person holding an SEC licence for securities-related virtual asset services.
- Approval to Extend Permitted Activities: for a financial institution already licensed by the CBN under a Principal Licence (a bank, payment service bank, mobile money operator, payment solution service provider, international money transfer operator or switch, among others) that adds virtual asset payment activities. Such an institution “shall continue to comply with the AML/CFT/CPF regulations applicable to it under its Principal Licence and shall, in addition, comply with Sections 26.14 to 26.16 and any other requirement of this Section specific to virtual assets” (Section 26.1).
The Travel Rule (Section 26.14) also applies “to any financial institution licensed by the Bank when it sends or receives a virtual asset transfer on behalf of a customer” (Section 26.14.1). Deposit Money Tokens are issued only by Deposit Money Banks, and their AML and fraud duties are in Section 46.
For a bank or other financial institution offering these services under an Approval to Extend Permitted Activities, the CBN’s Baseline Standards for Automated AML Solutions (March 2026) already apply under its principal licence, since they apply to “all banks and other financial institutions operating under the regulatory purview of the CBN” (Baseline Standards, section 4). Neither text says whether the Baseline Standards also bind a VASP licensed only under these Regulations.
Banks and other financial institutions that hold accounts for virtual asset service providers also have the CBN’s Guidelines on Operations of Bank Accounts for Virtual Assets Service Providers (circular FPR/DIR/PUB/CIR/002/003, dated 22 December 2023). They set the terms of those accounts: designated accounts opened with senior management approval, transaction limits, monthly returns to the CBN, and due diligence, monitoring and suspicious transaction reporting on the accounts. The 2026 Regulations do not mention them, and say that “Any amendment to another CBN instrument shall be made expressly through the applicable process” (Section 53.2).
Dates
- 5 November 2026: the circular issuing the Regulations. Its section 4.0 says: “The Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria shall take effect from November 5, 2026.” The Regulations themselves are dated “NOVEMBER 2026” and leave the date to the circular: “The Bank shall publish these Regulations and specify its commencement date in the issuing instrument. The transition period in Section 54 shall run from that commencement date.” (Section 56.1)
- Persons already operating at commencement (Section 54.1) may continue “only at its existing scale and subject to the Bank’s interim conditions”, provided they register with the CBN “within thirty days”, comply “with AML/CFT/CPF requirements from commencement”, begin supervisory reporting “within sixty days or an earlier prescribed period”, and submit a complete application within 180 calendar days of commencement. A P2P operator applies for the Section 10 approval within the same period. The Regulations give only these numbers of days, not dates. They call the 180 days calendar days, and do not say whether the 30 and 60 days are calendar days or business days (“Business Day” is a defined term in Section 1, and neither period uses it). The CBN can also set an earlier reporting date: reporting starts within sixty days “or an earlier prescribed period”. Counting calendar days from 5 November 2026, this library’s own count gives 5 December 2026 for registration, 4 January 2027 for reporting and 4 May 2027 for the application. These are not dates the CBN has stated. 5 December 2026 is a Saturday, and the Regulations do not say whether a period that ends on a weekend moves to the next business day.
The guidance
No CBN guidance specific to these Regulations has been published with them. The CBN “may issue guidance, circulars and directions for the interpretation and implementation of these Regulations” (Section 55.1), shall publish or communicate, “by circular or otherwise”, the countries that call for enhanced due diligence and “concerns about weaknesses in the AML/CFT/CPF systems of other countries” (Section 26.6.4), may specify the Travel Rule data standard by circular (Section 26.14.12), and may prescribe the reporting channels and formats (Section 56.2).
The examiner lines below rest on what the Regulations themselves say the CBN will see: the monthly return’s AML/CFT/CPF and sanctions metrics (Schedule 7, Part C), the P2P return (Schedule 7, Part F), the reporting calendar in Schedule 7, the records the institution must keep (Section 26.12.3), the compliance documents of the licence application (Schedule 1, Section F), and, for P2P providers, the documents and the pre-licensing testing listed in the Annex. In a line that cites them, only the words in quotation marks and the item cited are the CBN’s. The rest of that line, and every line that cites none of them, is our reading of the evidence that fits the clause, not CBN guidance.
What this page covers and leaves out
One requirement per obligation that binds a licensee’s AML, sanctions or fraud controls, in the order of the Regulations. Where a numbered clause lists separate duties or separate detection scenarios (the alerts of 26.7.1, the enhanced due diligence cases of 26.3.11, the two duties of 26.3.8), each item has its own requirement and the clause’s opening words have one. Where a list holds the parts of one obligation (the data to collect in 26.3.4, the parts of the compliance programme in 26.2.1, the controls in 10.7.2), the obligation is one requirement. 180 requirements in all.
Left out, because they set no obligation on a licensee’s AML or fraud controls:
- The Introduction, Objectives, Scope, Legal Basis, Applicability, Exclusions and Principles of Interpretation, and Section 1 (definitions): described above; requirements quote the definitions they depend on.
- Sections 3 to 9 (designation, the delineation with the SEC, exemptions, licence categories, issuer licensing, other services licensing), Sections 12 to 19 (supervisory powers, restrictions on tokens, suspension and revocation, capital, fit and proper assessment, principal business), Section 20 except 20.9 (notifications, returns and annual compliance; the AML and fraud items of the returns are in Schedule 7, and 20.11 only points P2P providers back to Sections 10.7 and 10.8, which have requirements), Section 22 (outsourcing; its 22.4 says reliance on a third party for due diligence follows Section 26), Sections 24 and 25 (reserves and safeguarding), Sections 28 to 32 and 34 (whitepapers, customer agreements, disclosures, data protection, finality), Section 35 (corporate governance), Section 38 (business continuity), Sections 39 to 45 and 47 to 50 (deposit money tokens, except their AML and fraud clauses in Section 46), Sections 51 to 53 (penalties, supervision, other frameworks), Section 55 (interpretation) and Section 56 (commencement). Section 9.14 is kept, because it lists the AML duties of a cross-border transfer or remittance provider. The application documents of Sections 8 and 9, Schedule 1 (its Section F asks for an “AML/CFT/CPF compliance programme document” and a “Transaction monitoring system description”) and the Annex (the P2P documentation, including the monitoring framework) are licensing requirements; the examiner lines cite them where the CBN describes what it reviews.
- The foreign-exchange rules of Sections 10.6 and 11.10, except the two that require monitoring for structuring (10.6.4 and 11.10.15) and the counterparty and Travel Rule conditions of 11.10.9.
- Duties and powers of the CBN, not of the licensee: 10.8.2 and 10.8.3 (the P2P reporting the CBN may require; what it requires today is Schedule 7, Part F), 10.11.1 and 10.11.2 (conditions and restrictions it may impose on a P2P approval), 12.5 (risk-based supervision), 26.6.4 (publishing the high-risk countries), the second 26.14.15 (supervisory testing of Travel Rule systems), 52.6 (the list of unauthorised persons, which 26.16.8 uses).
- Provisions that only permit or explain: 26.1.6 and 26.3.13 are kept because they limit simplified measures; 26.5.4 (reliance within a group may be treated as meeting 26.5.2 and 26.5.3), 26.10.1 (protection for reporting in good faith), 26.10.3 (disclosures 26.10.2 allows), 26.11.4 (other reports do not replace an STR), 26.14.1 (who the Travel Rule applies to, described above), 26.14.2 and 26.14.13 (the Travel Rule read with Nigerian law and the Nigeria Data Protection Act), 26.14.14 (counterparty due diligence under 26.16, which has its own requirements) and 26.23 (control of a decentralised arrangement counts as providing the service).
- Repeated text: 26.16.7 repeats 26.16.6 word for word, and 26.18.1 repeats 26.17.1; each has one requirement, under the first. The clause printed as 11.3.1, under the Operational Liquidity heading of Section 11, repeats 10.11.3 word for word; it has one requirement, 10.11.3. 26.8.3 says the screening and freezing duties of 26.8.1 and 26.8.2 cover terrorist financing and proliferation financing sanctions; it is given in the note to 26.8.
- The rest of the sections with requirements: of Sections 2, 10, 11, 21, 23, 26, 27, 33, 36, 37, 46 and 54, only the clauses with requirements are kept. The other clauses of those sections set licensing, settlement, foreign-exchange, prudential or conduct terms, restate a duty that has a requirement (10.5.2’s conditions for direct settlement repeat 10.3 and 10.4), or are listed above.
- The schedules: Schedules 1 to 6 and 8 (the application letter, the fit and proper questionnaire, fees, the reserve deposit account agreement, the whitepaper requirements, the reserve attestation format, and the CBN and SEC delineation matrix) set no obligation on AML or fraud controls; Schedule 1’s compliance documents are cited where the CBN describes what it reviews. Of Schedule 7, the eight AML and fraud items below have requirements; Part F items 19, 23 and 29 are cited in the requirements they evidence (10.4.1(c), 10.3.5, 10.6.4) rather than given requirements of their own, and the reporting calendar’s rows are cited in the requirements they time. Its other items report circulation, reserves, liquidity, governance and P2P volumes.
Every requirement
All 180, in the regulation’s own order. Open a part to read it.
About this page
This page lists every obligation in the Regulations that binds a licensee’s anti-money laundering, sanctions or fraud controls, in the Regulations’ own order and quoted from the CBN’s text, with what an examiner will look for, what meeting it can look like and, where one exists, a detection rule from this library that helps. Section 26.7.1 requires an automated transaction monitoring system and names the alerts it must raise; each alert is listed on its own.
The sections on licensing, capital, reserves and the other terms that set no obligation on those controls are left out; “What this page covers and leaves out” lists them.
The CBN has published no guidance specific to these Regulations. Where an examiner note cites the Regulations’ reporting templates, records list or application documents, only the words in quotation marks and the item cited are the CBN’s. The rest is our reading of the evidence that fits the clause, not CBN guidance.
Section 2 Prohibitions on Activities and Promotions
1 requirement
Section 2.2 opens: “The following categories of token are Prohibited Tokens and shall not be issued, offered, distributed or traded in Nigeria:”.
2.2(c) No tokens of sanctioned issuers or jurisdictions
tokens issued by, or on behalf of, a sanctioned person or a person located in a sanctioned jurisdiction;
- What an examiner will look for
- The list of tokens the licensee supports, with a check of each issuer, and anyone issuing on its behalf, against the sanctions lists, done before a token is listed and again when the lists change. Section 13.1 repeats that such tokens “shall remain prohibited”.
- What this can look like
- Before a token is listed, its issuer is screened against the UN and Nigeria sanctions lists and the lists the licensee chose under 26.8.4; a listed issuer’s token is removed.
Section 9 Other Non-Security Virtual Asset Services
1 requirement
9.14 Cross-border transfer and remittance providers: the full AML set
An approved person shall comply with all applicable requirements relating to foreign-exchange administration in Nigeria, AML/CFT/CPF obligations, customer due diligence and enhanced due diligence, sanctions screening, originator and beneficiary information under the Travel Rule, transaction monitoring, suspicious transaction and other regulatory reporting, record keeping, consumer disclosures, and complaints handling and redress, including Sections 11.7 and 26.
- What an examiner will look for
- The CBN’s approval for the cross-border activity, and evidence that each AML duty the clause names (due diligence, sanctions screening, Travel Rule data, monitoring, reporting, records) covers the cross-border flows. Expect the same controls as for domestic transfers, plus the corridor and counterparty conditions of 11.10.9.
- What this can look like
- Cross-border transfers run through the same screening, monitoring and Travel Rule checks as domestic ones, with country risk added, and are reported as Section 11.10.12 requires.
Section 10 Platform-Facilitated Peer-to-Peer Services
5 with rules 19 requirements
A Platform-Facilitated Peer-to-Peer Service (P2P) is “a service through which a person facilitates transactions between customers for the purchase, sale or exchange of a Regulated Token against Naira or another permitted form of value, including by providing matching, order display, escrow, payment facilitation, settlement support, transaction verification or dispute resolution” (Section 1). A P2P service needs a VASP licence or authorisation and the CBN’s express approval for P2P within it (Section 10.2.2). The Annex lists what a P2P applicant submits, including controls for “matching a customer’s verified identity, name and Bank Verification Number with the relevant payment”, for “attributing every account, wallet and transaction to the appropriate customer and counterparty” and for “preventing the use of third-party, nominee, mule, fictitious or improperly attributed accounts or wallets” (P2P documentation, item iii), and says the pre-licensing assessment includes “operational testing of customer attribution, payment-account verification, transaction matching, escrow and release controls, reconciliation of the virtual-asset and payment legs, transaction monitoring, regulatory reporting, dispute handling and supervisory data access” (paragraph 10B).
10.3.1 Every P2P customer identified and verified before transacting
A provider of a P2P Service shall ensure that every customer using the service is subject to applicable customer identification, verification, customer due diligence and ongoing monitoring requirements before being permitted to transact.
- What an examiner will look for
- The Annex asks P2P applicants for their “customer identification, verification, customer due-diligence, ongoing-monitoring and access-control framework” (P2P documentation, item iii). Expect onboarding records showing that no customer could place or take an order before due diligence was complete.
- What this can look like
- The order book is closed to an account until identity verification and due diligence are complete.
10.3.2 Every P2P transaction attributed to its customers, wallets and payment accounts
The provider shall maintain sufficient information to identify each customer and counterparty participating in a P2P transaction and to attribute each transaction to the relevant customer accounts, wallets, payment accounts and settlement arrangements.
- What an examiner will look for
- The Annex asks for controls for “attributing every account, wallet and transaction to the appropriate customer and counterparty” (P2P documentation, item iii(b)), and the pre-licensing assessment tests “customer attribution” (paragraph 10B). Expect any P2P trade to be traced to both customers, their wallets and the bank accounts that paid.
- What this can look like
- Each trade record holds both customers’ IDs, the wallets on each side and the bank accounts the naira came from and went to.
10.3.3 No release of tokens unless the naira account’s name and BVN match the customer
A provider shall not release or credit a Regulated Token in a P2P transaction unless it has verified that the name and the Bank Verification Number of the account from which the Naira payment was made, or to which it was made, match the verified customer on whose behalf the provider acts. The Bank may prescribe further requirements relating to payment-account verification, permitted customer categories, transaction and customer limits, and other controls.
- What an examiner will look for
- The Annex asks for controls for “matching a customer’s verified identity, name and Bank Verification Number with the relevant payment” (P2P documentation, item iii(a)), and the pre-licensing assessment tests “payment-account verification” (paragraph 10B). Expect the matching logic, the release blocked when the name or BVN differs, and a log of the trades held for a mismatch.
- What this can look like
- Before the escrow releases, the platform compares the name and BVN on the paying bank account with the verified buyer; a mismatch holds the trade and opens a review.
- Rules that help
- Third-party funding and payment account name mismatch
10.3.4 No third-party, nominee or mule accounts or wallets
A provider shall not knowingly permit the use of third-party, nominee, mule, fictitious or otherwise improperly attributed accounts or wallets for the purpose of concealing the identity of a customer, counterparty, beneficiary or source or destination of funds or value.
- What an examiner will look for
- The Annex asks for controls for “preventing the use of third-party, nominee, mule, fictitious or improperly attributed accounts or wallets” (P2P documentation, item iii(c)). The monthly P2P return reports “transactions involving third-party, nominee, mule, fictitious or improperly attributed payment accounts or wallets, including the action taken by the Licensee” (Schedule 7, Part F, item 26).
- What this can look like
- Detection of one bank account or wallet used by several customers, accounts that collect from many unrelated people and pass the money on, and payments from accounts in another name, each followed by a recorded action.
10.3.5 Customers trading as a business: board-approved criteria, enhanced due diligence, limits, report to the CBN
Business users: A provider shall maintain criteria, approved by its board and notified to the Bank, for identifying a customer that buys, sells or exchanges Regulated Tokens on the P2P Service as a business, having regard to transaction volume, frequency, number of counterparties and advertising of rates. The provider shall apply enhanced due diligence and transaction limits to such customer and report the customer to the Bank under Section 10.8.
- What an examiner will look for
- The P2P return counts “business users identified under Section 10.3.5” (Schedule 7, Part F, item 23), and the Annex asks P2P applicants for “the criteria and procedures for identifying customers conducting P2P activity as a business” (P2P documentation, item iv). Expect the board-approved criteria and the notice to the CBN, the customers identified, and the enhanced due diligence and limits applied to them.
- What this can look like
- Customers above set levels of monthly volume, trade count or distinct counterparties, or who advertise rates, are flagged, reviewed under enhanced due diligence, given lower limits and listed in the monthly return.
10.4.1(b) Link each virtual-asset leg to its naira leg
maintain systems and records sufficient to link and reconcile the virtual-asset leg of each transaction with the corresponding Naira, payment or settlement leg;
- What an examiner will look for
- The Annex asks for “the reconciliation methodology for linking each virtual-asset leg to its corresponding Naira, fiat, payment or settlement leg, including unique transaction identifiers and exception-management procedures” (item viii), and the pre-licensing assessment tests that reconciliation (paragraph 10B).
- What this can look like
- Every trade has one identifier carried on the token transfer and on the bank payment, and unmatched legs go to an exceptions queue.
10.4.1(c) Record the parties, value, rate, references and wallets of each P2P trade
record the relevant customers and counterparties, transaction value, exchange or conversion rate, payment or settlement reference, wallet addresses or account identifiers and such other information as the Bank may prescribe;
- What an examiner will look for
- The P2P return asks, for each reportable transaction, for “the transaction identifier, payment or settlement reference, wallet address or account identifier, transaction hash, exchange or conversion rate and time of settlement” (Schedule 7, Part F, item 19). That list leaves out the customers, counterparties and value the clause names, and adds the hash and the settlement time. Expect a sample of trade records holding each field the clause lists, and the return’s fields for each.
- What this can look like
- The trade record stores both parties, amount, rate, the bank payment reference and both wallet addresses or account identifiers.
10.4.1(d) Transaction monitoring, fraud prevention, sanctions screening and AML controls for P2P
maintain transaction-monitoring, fraud-prevention, sanctions-screening and AML/CFT/CPF controls appropriate to the P2P Service;
- What an examiner will look for
- The Annex asks for “the transaction-monitoring, blockchain-analytics, sanctions-screening, fraud-prevention and suspicious-activity detection framework applicable to the P2P Service” (item v), and the P2P return reports “transaction-monitoring alerts, sanctions-screening alerts, wallet-monitoring alerts and suspicious or anomalous P2P patterns identified” (Schedule 7, Part F, item 25).
- What this can look like
- P2P trades, and the wallets and bank accounts behind them, pass through the same screening and monitoring as the rest of the platform, with scenarios written for P2P (see 10.7.5).
10.4.1(e) Procedures to identify failed, disputed, fraudulent or anomalous trades
maintain procedures for identifying failed, incomplete, disputed, fraudulent or anomalous transactions;
- What an examiner will look for
- The P2P return counts “disputed, fraudulent, anomalous or unauthorised transactions, together with complaints received, amounts affected, resolution status and average resolution time” (Schedule 7, Part F, item 24). Expect the written procedures, and the cases they produced behind those figures.
- What this can look like
- Trades that fail, are disputed or are reported as fraud are tagged, investigated and counted for the monthly return.
10.6.4 No P2P transaction structured, split or routed to get around controls or reporting
No person shall structure, split, route, facilitate or use a P2P transaction or series of transactions for the purpose or effect of circumventing: a) CBN oversight; b) applicable foreign-exchange or capital-flow requirements; c) transaction, customer, volume or other limits prescribed by the Bank; d) documentation or permitted-purpose requirements; e) AML/CFT/CPF or sanctions controls; or f) regulatory reporting requirements.
- What an examiner will look for
- The P2P return reports “breaches or attempted circumvention of transaction, customer, volume, geographic, foreign-exchange, documentation or other limits imposed by the Bank” (Schedule 7, Part F, item 29). Expect monitoring that finds series of trades split under the CBN’s limits or the reporting thresholds, and the action taken.
- What this can look like
- A scenario that adds up a customer’s trades, and trades between the same pair of customers, over a period and alerts when the parts stay under a limit the whole would cross.
- Rules that help
- Transaction structuring (smurfing)
10.7.1 P2P providers follow Section 26
A provider of a P2P Service shall comply with all applicable AML/CFT/CPF, targeted financial sanctions and financial-integrity requirements under Section 26 and applicable law.
- What an examiner will look for
- The Annex asks for “the P2P AML/CFT/CPF, sanctions and Travel Rule framework” (item xi). Expect the Section 26 programme to name the P2P service in its scope.
- What this can look like
- The AML programme, risk assessment and monitoring scenarios each have a P2P part.
10.7.2 The controls a P2P provider must maintain
Without limiting paragraph 10.7.1, the provider shall maintain controls covering: a) Customer due diligence and ongoing monitoring; b) beneficial-ownership identification where applicable; c) sanctions and watchlist screening; d) transaction and wallet monitoring; e) suspicious transaction identification and reporting; f) record keeping; g) higher-risk customers, transactions, jurisdictions and counterparties; and h) such other controls as may be prescribed by the Bank or the NFIU.
- What an examiner will look for
- A map from each listed control to the procedure and system that carries it out for P2P. The detail of each is in Section 26.
- What this can look like
- One table listing due diligence, ownership, screening, monitoring, reporting, records and higher-risk handling, each with its owner and procedure for P2P.
10.7.3 Travel Rule data on every trade between two customers, whatever the amount
Where both parties to a P2P transaction are customers of the provider, the provider shall obtain, hold and retain the originator and beneficiary information required by Section 26.14.3 for the transfer, regardless of amount, and shall make it available to the Bank and the NFIU on request. Where a P2P transaction involves another VASP, Section 26.14 applies in full; where it involves an unhosted wallet, Section 26.15 applies.
- What an examiner will look for
- Trade records holding the originator and beneficiary information of 26.14.3 for trades of every size between two customers, and evidence that trades with another VASP or an unhosted wallet follow 26.14 or 26.15.
- What this can look like
- Each internal P2P trade carries the full originator and beneficiary fields, even a small one.
10.7.4 Travel Rule information handled where the rule applies
Where the Travel Rule applies, the provider shall obtain, hold, verify where required, transmit and retain the prescribed originator and beneficiary information in accordance with applicable law and regulatory requirements.
- What an examiner will look for
- The Travel Rule procedure for P2P trades and records of the information obtained, verified, sent and kept.
- What this can look like
- P2P transfers to or from another VASP go through the same Travel Rule solution as other transfers.
10.7.5 Detect suspicious P2P patterns: structuring, rapid movement, layering, mules, concentration
A provider shall maintain appropriate controls to identify suspicious or anomalous P2P activity, including structuring, rapid movement of value, layering through multiple wallets or accounts, use of mule or third-party accounts, transaction splitting, unusual counterparty concentration, attempts to obscure the relationship between the fiat and virtual-asset legs, or activity structured to evade applicable requirements or reporting.
- What an examiner will look for
- The Annex asks for the treatment of “suspicious or anomalous P2P patterns” (item xi(e)), and the P2P return reports the “suspicious or anomalous P2P patterns identified” (Schedule 7, Part F, item 25). Expect a scenario, or a stated reason for none, for each pattern the clause names.
- What this can look like
- Scenarios for split trades, money passed straight through, chains of wallets or accounts, accounts collecting from many counterparties, and naira payments from someone other than the trading customer.
10.8.1 Records that reconstruct each P2P trade, both legs
A provider shall maintain complete and accurate transaction-level records sufficient to reconstruct and reconcile each P2P transaction, including its virtual-asset and fiat, payment or settlement legs.
- What an examiner will look for
- The Annex asks for “the proposed data model, record-keeping arrangements and regulatory-reporting architecture demonstrating the applicant’s ability to reconstruct and report each P2P transaction” (item xii). Expect a sample of trades rebuilt from the records, both legs.
- What this can look like
- From a trade ID, the reviewer sees the order, the match, the escrow, the token transfer and the bank payment.
10.9.3 Cross-border P2P trades: foreign-exchange, AML, sanctions, Travel Rule, reporting and records
Cross-border P2P activity shall comply with all applicable foreign-exchange, capital-flow, AML/CFT/CPF, sanctions, Travel Rule, reporting, record-keeping and consumer-protection requirements.
- What an examiner will look for
- The P2P return reports “domestic and cross-border P2P activity by jurisdiction, corridor, token, settlement channel and transaction purpose” (Schedule 7, Part F, item 27). Expect the CBN’s approval for the cross-border activity (10.9.2 sends it to 9.14), and cross-border trades run through the same screening, monitoring, Travel Rule and reporting as domestic ones, with country risk added.
- What this can look like
- A P2P trade with a counterparty outside Nigeria goes through the same screening, monitoring and Travel Rule checks as a domestic one, and the counterparty’s country is recorded for the return.
10.10.3 Procedures for disputes and fraud claims
The provider shall maintain procedures for complaints, disputes, fraud claims, erroneous transactions and escalation to the Bank in accordance with the applicable customer-protection requirements under these Regulations.
- What an examiner will look for
- The Annex asks for “the complaints, fraud-claim, dispute-resolution and escalation procedures applicable to the P2P Service” (item xiv). Expect the procedure and a log of fraud claims with their outcome.
- What this can look like
- A customer who says the other side did not pay, or paid from a stolen account, can file a claim; the escrow is held while it is investigated.
10.11.3 Follow CBN directions on the P2P service, and be able to restrict, monitor more closely and report
A provider shall comply promptly with any lawful direction issued by the Bank in respect of its P2P Service and shall maintain the operational and technical capability to implement restrictions, enhanced monitoring, reporting or other supervisory measures prescribed by the Bank.
- What an examiner will look for
- A log of CBN directions on the P2P service and how each was carried out, and evidence that the platform can apply a restriction, closer monitoring or a new report when directed: limits and scenarios that can be set per customer, token, counterparty, corridor or settlement channel (the kinds of restriction 10.11.2 lists). The same text is printed again as 11.3.1, under Section 11.
- What this can look like
- A CBN direction to cap a corridor or watch a group of customers is carried out the same day by changing a limit or switching on a scenario, without new code.
Section 11 Additional Requirements for Class 2 Stablecoins
2 with rules 5 requirements
11.5(a) Class 2 distributors: KYC, AML and sanctions screening
conduct KYC, AML/CFT/CPF and sanctions-screening measures in accordance with applicable law;
- What an examiner will look for
- For each distributor or service provider of a Class 2 stablecoin, its KYC, AML and screening procedures, and the issuer’s due diligence on them (see 26.21.1).
- What this can look like
- The distributor screens and monitors its customers as Section 26 requires, and the issuer has checked that it does.
11.5(b) Class 2 distributors: the Travel Rule
comply with applicable Travel Rule requirements;
- What an examiner will look for
- Evidence that the distributor sends and receives Travel Rule information on Class 2 transfers (see 26.14).
- What this can look like
- The distributor’s transfers carry originator and beneficiary information through a Travel Rule solution.
11.10.9(b) Cross-border only with counterparties licensed and supervised for AML
with counterparties that are licensed or registered, and supervised for AML/CFT/CPF purposes, in their jurisdiction under Section 26.16; and
- What an examiner will look for
- For each foreign counterparty, the licence or registration and AML supervision checked under 26.16.1(b).
- What this can look like
- A counterparty register showing each foreign VASP’s licence, regulator and the date it was checked; transfers to unlisted counterparties are blocked.
- Rules that help
- Transfers with unlicensed or high-risk counterparty VASPs
11.10.9(c) Cross-border: Travel Rule information whatever the value
with originator and beneficiary information transmitted under Section 26.14 [irrespective of the value of the transfer].
- What an examiner will look for
- Cross-border transfer records showing Travel Rule information sent for transfers of every size, including those below the 26.14.3 threshold. The square brackets are in the CBN’s text.
- What this can look like
- The Travel Rule threshold is switched off for cross-border transfers, so every one carries the information.
11.10.15 Monitor for transactions structured to avoid the cross-border rules; report; file an STR
No person shall structure, split or route a transaction, including through a P2P Service, an affiliate, an offshore entity or an Unhosted Wallet, to avoid this Section. A Licensee shall monitor for such conduct, report it to the Bank, and file a suspicious transaction report with the NFIU where required.
- What an examiner will look for
- Scenarios that look for splitting or routing to avoid Section 11.10, the cases they raised, reports to the CBN and STRs filed.
- What this can look like
- Alerts on a customer’s cross-border transfers split into smaller ones, moved through a P2P trade or an unhosted wallet, or sent through an affiliate.
- Rules that help
- Transaction structuring (smurfing)
Section 20 Notification Reporting and Annual Compliance Requirements
1 requirement
20.9 Class 2 monthly transaction reports include suspicious patterns
A provider distributing or facilitating Class 2 Stablecoins shall submit monthly transaction reports within ten Business Days after month-end unless otherwise prescribed, including volumes and values, Naira inflows and outflows, aggregated user demographics and suspicious patterns.
- What an examiner will look for
- The reporting calendar lists “Class 2 provider transaction returns”, monthly, within “Ten Business Days after month-end” (Schedule 7). Expect the returns filed on time, with the suspicious patterns filled from the monitoring system.
- What this can look like
- Each month’s Class 2 return lists the patterns the monitoring found (for example split transfers or rapid in-and-out), without the contents of individual STRs (Schedule 7, general rule 5).
Section 21 Use of Agents and Distributors
1 requirement
21.3 The principal stays responsible for its agents, monitors and trains them
The principal shall remain responsible for the regulated service, monitor the agent, ensure appropriate training and qualifications, maintain records and access rights, and require the agent to disclose to customers the principal on whose behalf it acts. Customer complaints and asset protection shall remain subject to these Regulations.
- What an examiner will look for
- The register of agents, the monitoring of each agent’s activity and controls, their training records, and the records and access rights the principal keeps. The submission for each agent describes its “AML/CFT/CPF controls” (21.1), and an issuer’s distributors fall under 26.21.
- What this can look like
- Transactions an agent handles run through the principal’s own screening and monitoring, alerts can be grouped by agent, and agents are trained and reviewed on a set schedule.
Section 23 Issuance and Redemption of Stablecoins
1 requirement
23.1 Issuance and redemption subject to due diligence and sanctions
Issuance and redemption shall be subject to CDD and sanctions requirements in Section 26 and the continuous reserve and reconciliation requirements in Section 24.
- What an examiner will look for
- Evidence that every mint and redemption is preceded by due diligence and screening of the customer (see 26-17).
- What this can look like
- The mint and redeem flows check the customer’s due diligence status and screening result before they run.
Section 26 Anti Money Laundering, Counter Terrorist Financing Counter Proliferation Financing and Sanctions
42 with rules 128 requirements
Section 26 binds “every Licensed Issuer” and every licensed or authorised VASP (see “Who they apply to”). Its clauses use MLPPA, TPPA, CDD (customer due diligence), EDD (enhanced due diligence), NFIU (the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit) and the Travel Rule as defined in Section 1.
26.1 Banks and other CBN-licensed firms keep their own AML rules and add 26.14 to 26.16
A financial institution holding an Approval to Extend Permitted Activities shall continue to comply with the AML/CFT/CPF regulations applicable to it under its Principal Licence and shall, in addition, comply with Sections 26.14 to 26.16 and any other requirement of this Section specific to virtual assets. All controls shall be applied consistently with the MLPPA, TPPA, NFIU requirements and lawful sanctions directions.
- What an examiner will look for
- For an institution with an Approval to Extend Permitted Activities: its existing AML programme extended to the virtual asset service, with the Travel Rule, unhosted wallet and counterparty VASP controls of 26.14 to 26.16 added.
- What this can look like
- A bank’s AML programme gains a virtual-asset annex covering the Travel Rule, unhosted wallets and counterparty VASPs.
26.1.1 Comply with the MLPPA, TPPA, these Regulations and CBN directives
Every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP shall comply with all obligations imposed on such institutions under MLPPA, TPPA, these Regulations and any directive, circular or guideline issued by the Bank.
- What an examiner will look for
- The register of AML obligations the licensee has mapped from the MLPPA, TPPA, these Regulations and CBN circulars, each with its control.
- What this can look like
- An obligations register, kept current as the CBN and NFIU issue circulars.
26.1.2 Identify and assess ML, TF and PF risks, including P2P, unhosted wallets and DeFi
Every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP shall take appropriate steps to identify, assess and understand its money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing risks, having regard to its customers, countries or geographic areas, products, services, transactions, delivery channels, counterparties, including VASPs outside Nigeria, P2P activity, unhosted wallets and decentralised arrangements, and the virtual assets and blockchain networks it issues or supports.
- What an examiner will look for
- 26.12.3 requires “records of risk assessments” to be kept for at least five years. Expect the risk assessment, with a section for each factor the clause names.
- What this can look like
- A risk assessment scoring customers, countries, products, channels, counterparty VASPs (domestic and foreign), P2P activity, unhosted wallets, decentralised arrangements and each supported token and network.
26.1.3 The risk assessment: documented, uses the national risk assessment, covers PF, reviewed yearly, sent to the CBN
The risk assessment under 26.1.2 shall: a) be documented; b) consider all relevant risk factors, including the national risk assessment and any risk assessment, typology or guidance issued by the Bank or the NFIU, before determining the overall level of risk and the level and type of mitigation to be applied; c) include an assessment of proliferation financing risk, being the risk of breach, non-implementation, or evasion of targeted financial sanctions relating to proliferation financing; d) be reviewed at least annually and whenever there is a material change in the institution’s business, products, technology, or risk environment; and e) be provided to the Bank.
- What an examiner will look for
- The clause names the evidence: the documented assessment, its use of the national risk assessment and CBN or NFIU typologies, a proliferation financing section, annual and event-driven reviews, and proof it was sent to the CBN.
- What this can look like
- A dated risk assessment, reviewed every year and after each new product or network, with a PF sanctions-evasion section, sent to the CBN.
26.1.4 Assess new products, networks, bridges and smart contracts before launch
Every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP shall identify and assess the AML/CFT/CPF risks that may arise from the development of new products, new business practices, new delivery mechanisms, and the use of new or developing technologies, including any new virtual asset, blockchain network, bridge, smart-contract function or Travel Rule solution. The assessment shall be completed and documented before the launch or use of the product, practice or technology, and the institution shall take appropriate measures to manage and mitigate the risks identified.
- What an examiner will look for
- A documented assessment dated before each launch: each new token, network, bridge, smart-contract function or Travel Rule solution. For issuers, 26.20.2 adds a 30-day notice to the CBN before a new network or bridge.
- What this can look like
- A launch checklist that cannot be signed off without the AML risk assessment and the controls it calls for.
26.1.5 Board-approved policies, monitored, with enhanced measures for higher risk
Every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP shall: a) have policies, controls and procedures, approved by its board of directors or senior management, that enable it to manage and mitigate the risks identified under 26.1.2 and those identified by the Bank, the NFIU or in the national risk assessment; b) monitor the implementation of those policies, controls and procedures and enhance them where necessary; and c) take enhanced measures to manage and mitigate the risks where higher risks are identified.
- What an examiner will look for
- The board approval of the policies, reviews of how they work in practice and the changes that followed, and the enhanced measures written for higher-risk cases.
- What this can look like
- Policies approved by the board, a yearly review of their effectiveness, and a list of higher-risk cases with the extra measures for each.
26.1.6 Simplified measures only for lower risk, never on suspicion
A Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP may take simplified measures to manage and mitigate risks only where lower risks have been identified under 26.1.2 and the simplified measures are consistent with these Regulations. Simplified measures shall not be permitted where there is a suspicion of money laundering, terrorist financing, proliferation financing or sanctions evasion.
- What an examiner will look for
- Where simplified measures are used: the lower risk they rest on in the risk assessment, and the rule that switches them off when there is a suspicion.
- What this can look like
- A lower-tier account that is moved to full due diligence as soon as an alert is escalated.
26.2.1 A compliance programme with the seven parts listed
Every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP shall implement a compliance programme which is proportionate to its AML/CFT/CPF risks and the size of its business, and which shall include: a) a written AML/CFT/CPF policy approved by the board of directors and reviewed at least annually; b) the risk assessment required under Section 26.1; c) compliance management arrangements, including the appointment of a Chief Compliance Officer at management level in accordance with 26.2.2;compliance management arrangements, including the appointment of a Chief Compliance Officer at management level in accordance with 26.2.2; d) policies, procedures and controls for customer due diligence, ongoing monitoring, transaction and wallet monitoring, Travel Rule compliance, targeted financial sanctions, suspicious transaction reporting, record keeping and escalation; e) screening procedures to ensure high standards when hiring employees and appointing directors, agents and persons performing outsourced compliance functions; f) an ongoing employee training programme in accordance with 26.2.4; and g) an independent audit function to test the compliance programme in accordance with 26.2.5.
- What an examiner will look for
- The programme document with each of the seven parts. 26.2.3 requires it to be documented and made available to the CBN.
- What this can look like
- A board-approved AML policy, the risk assessment, a Chief Compliance Officer, procedures for each control area, staff screening, training and independent audit.
26.2.2 The Chief Compliance Officer is the MLRO, with access and independence
The Chief Compliance Officer: a) shall be a fit and proper person at management level with sufficient independence, authority and resources; b) shall act as, or supervise, the compliance function responsible for receiving internal suspicion reports and filing reports with the NFIU; c) shall have timely and unrestricted access to customer, transaction, wallet and other relevant information, and direct access to the board of directors; and d) shall be the money laundering reporting officer for the purposes of the Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act, 2022.
- What an examiner will look for
- The appointment of the Chief Compliance Officer, approved by the CBN for an issuer (Section 35.1), their role as money laundering reporting officer, their access to customer, transaction and wallet data, and their line to the board.
- What this can look like
- The CCO receives internal suspicion reports, files with the NFIU, can see all customer and wallet data and reports directly to the board.
26.2.3 The programme documented and available to the CBN
The compliance programme shall be documented and made available to the Bank.
- What an examiner will look for
- The programme document as provided to the CBN.
- What this can look like
- One current programme document, versioned, ready to send.
26.2.4 Training at onboarding and every year, including VA typologies and tipping off
Training under 26.2.1(f) shall be provided at onboarding and at least annually to directors, senior management, employees, agents and relevant outsourced personnel, and shall cover AML/CFT/CPF obligations, targeted financial sanctions, virtual asset and stablecoin typologies, Travel Rule requirements, suspicious transaction reporting and the prohibition on tipping off.
- What an examiner will look for
- Training records for directors, senior management, staff, agents and outsourced personnel, at joining and yearly, with the topics the clause lists.
- What this can look like
- A training log showing each person’s onboarding and annual course, covering stablecoin and virtual asset typologies, sanctions, the Travel Rule, STRs and tipping off.
26.2.5 Independent AML audit every year, findings to the board and the CBN within 30 days
The independent audit function under 26.2.1(g) shall be carried out at least annually by internal audit or a qualified external party independent of the compliance function, and its findings and remediation actions shall be reported to the board of directors and submitted to the Bank within thirty (30) days of completion.
- What an examiner will look for
- The reporting calendar lists “AML/CFT/CPF independent audit findings”, annual, “Within 30 days of completion”, to the board and the CBN (Schedule 7). Expect the yearly audit report by internal audit or an outside party independent of compliance, the remediation plan, and proof it reached the board and the CBN within 30 days.
- What this can look like
- An annual AML audit, its findings tracked to closure, sent to the CBN within a month of completion.
26.3.1 No anonymous accounts or wallets
A Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP shall not open, keep or provide anonymous accounts, accounts in obviously fictitious names, anonymous wallets, or any facility that prevents the identification and verification of the customer.
- What an examiner will look for
- Evidence that every account and wallet is tied to an identified customer, and that no product allows anonymous use.
- What this can look like
- No account or hosted wallet can hold or move value before the customer is identified.
26.3.2 When due diligence is required, including linked occasional transactions of USD/EUR 1,000
Every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP shall undertake customer due diligence (CDD) measures: a) when establishing a business relationship, and before permitting a customer to mint, purchase, hold, transfer or receive stablecoins or other virtual assets through its platform; b) when carrying out an occasional transaction, including a virtual asset transfer, with a value equal to or above USD/EUR 1,000 or its naira equivalent, whether conducted as a single operation or in several operations that appear to be linked; c) when there is a suspicion of money laundering, terrorist financing, proliferation financing or sanctions evasion, regardless of any exemption or threshold; and d) when it has doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data.
- What an examiner will look for
- The due diligence triggers in the procedures, and for occasional transactions, how operations that appear linked are added up against USD/EUR 1,000 or its naira equivalent. The Regulations do not say whether the USD or the EUR figure applies or which rate converts it to naira, so expect the licensee’s choice of currency and rate written down.
- What this can look like
- Due diligence before the first mint, purchase, transfer or receipt; for walk-in transfers, a check that adds up a person’s linked transfers and asks for due diligence once they reach 1,000 in the currency the licensee chose, converted at the rate it chose.
26.3.3 What due diligence covers, including a low, medium or high risk rating
CDD measures shall include: a) identifying the customer and verifying the customer’s identity using reliable, independent source documents, data or information; b) verifying that any person purporting to act on behalf of the customer is so authorised, and identifying and verifying the identity of that person; c) identifying the beneficial owner and taking reasonable measures to verify the identity of the beneficial owner, using relevant information or data obtained from a reliable source, such that the Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner is; d) understanding and, as appropriate, obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship; and e) assigning and documenting a risk classification of low, medium or high to each customer.
- What an examiner will look for
- Customer files showing each element, and every customer with a documented low, medium or high rating.
- What this can look like
- Each customer record holds verified identity, any representative and beneficial owner, the purpose of the relationship and a risk rating of low, medium or high.
26.3.4 Data to obtain and verify for individuals, including NIN, BVN and source of funds
For a customer who is a natural person, the Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP shall obtain and verify at a minimum: a) full legal name, date of birth and nationality; b) residential address; c) a valid government-issued identity document, such as an international passport, driver’s licence or permanent voter’s card; d) the National Identification Number (NIN) and, where the customer holds one, the Bank Verification Number (BVN); and for a foreign national without a NIN or BVN, an equivalent identifier; and e) the source of funds and, where appropriate, the source of wealth.
- What an examiner will look for
- A sample of individual customer files with each item obtained and verified, including the NIN and, where held, the BVN (or an equivalent identifier for a foreign national).
- What this can look like
- Onboarding collects name, date of birth, nationality, address, an ID document, NIN and BVN, and the source of funds, and verifies each.
26.3.4(e) Blockchain analysis of the customer’s wallets, above all funds from many unrelated wallets
risk-based blockchain analysis of relevant wallet histories, including identifying exposure to illicit or high-risk wallet addresses and assessing the origin and destination of funds, particularly where funds are received from multiple unrelated wallets.
- What an examiner will look for
- The blockchain analytics results kept with the customer file, and how the licensee decides which wallet histories to analyse. 26.3.4 has two items lettered (e); this is the second.
- What this can look like
- When a customer links or first uses a wallet, its history is scored for exposure to illicit addresses; inflows from many unrelated wallets raise a review.
- Rules that help
- Funnel account (many senders into one account)
26.3.5 Identify and verify companies and legal arrangements
For a customer that is a legal person or legal arrangement, the Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP shall understand the nature of the customer’s business and its ownership and control structure, and shall identify the customer and verify its identity through: a) its name, legal form and proof of existence; b) the powers that regulate and bind it, and the names of the relevant persons holding senior management positions; and c) the address of its registered office and, if different, its principal place of business.
- What an examiner will look for
- A sample of business customer files with each item and the understanding of the business and its control structure.
- What this can look like
- Business onboarding collects incorporation documents, the rules that bind the company, senior managers and addresses, and records what the business does.
26.3.6 Beneficial owners of a legal person
For a legal person, the Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP shall identify the beneficial owner and take reasonable measures to verify the identity of: a) the natural person who ultimately has a controlling ownership interest in the legal person; b) to the extent there is doubt under (a) as to whether the person with the controlling ownership interest is the beneficial owner, or where no natural person exerts control through ownership interests, the natural person exercising control of the legal person through other means; and c) where no natural person is identified under (a) or (b), the natural person who holds the position of senior managing official.
- What an examiner will look for
- For each business customer, the beneficial owners identified at each of the three steps and how they were verified.
- What this can look like
- An ownership chart for each business customer, ending in named individuals, with the senior managing official recorded where no owner is found.
26.3.6 Enhanced verification of owners where a company uses a wallet or acts out of profile
Where the legal person operates or uses a virtual asset wallet, or conducts transactions that are inconsistent with its declared business activities or business profile, the Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP shall undertake enhanced verification of the identity of the beneficial owner and the ownership and control structure of the legal person.
- What an examiner will look for
- For business customers that use a wallet, or whose activity has not matched their declared business, the enhanced verification done and its result.
- What this can look like
- Every business customer with a wallet gets enhanced verification of its owners; a company whose activity departs from its declared business is re-verified.
26.3.7 Parties to a trust or similar arrangement
For a legal arrangement, the Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP shall identify and take reasonable measures to verify the identity of: a) for a trust, the settlor, the trustee, the protector (if any), the beneficiaries or class of beneficiaries, and any other natural person exercising ultimate effective control over the trust, including through a chain of control or ownership; and b) for other types of legal arrangement, persons in equivalent or similar positions.
- What an examiner will look for
- For each trust or similar customer, the settlor, trustee, protector, beneficiaries and controllers identified and verified.
- What this can look like
- Trust customers have every party to the trust recorded and verified.
26.3.8(a) Scrutinise transactions and wallet activity against what is known of the customer
Every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP shall conduct ongoing due diligence on the business relationship, including: a) scrutinising transactions and wallet activity throughout the relationship to ensure that they are consistent with its knowledge of the customer, the customer’s business and risk profile, including, where necessary, the source of funds; and
- What an examiner will look for
- Monitoring that compares each customer’s transactions and wallet activity with their profile, and the alerts and reviews it produced.
- What this can look like
- Scenarios compare activity with the customer’s own history and declared income or business, and an unexplained change leads to a source-of-funds request.
26.3.8(b) Keep customer data current: high risk every year, others every three years
ensuring that documents, data and information collected under the CDD process are kept up to date and relevant by reviewing existing records, particularly for higher-risk customers, at intervals determined by risk and at least every one year for high-risk customers and every three years for other customers.
- What an examiner will look for
- Review dates by customer risk, showing high-risk customers reviewed at least yearly and others at least every three years, and overdue reviews followed up.
- What this can look like
- A review calendar driven by the risk rating, with a report of overdue reviews.
26.3.9 Verify before or during onboarding; if later, no withdrawal, external transfer or redemption until done
A Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP shall verify the identity of the customer and beneficial owner before or during the course of establishing a business relationship or conducting an occasional transaction. It may complete verification after establishing the business relationship only where: a) this occurs as soon as reasonably practicable; b) this is essential not to interrupt the normal conduct of business; c) the AML/CFT/CPF risks are effectively managed; and d) it has adopted risk management procedures, including limits on the number, type and amount of transactions, and does not permit any withdrawal, transfer to an external wallet or redemption until verification is completed.
- What an examiner will look for
- Where verification is completed after onboarding: the limits applied, and system settings that block withdrawals, transfers to external wallets and redemptions until it is done.
- What this can look like
- A new account can deposit within set limits but cannot withdraw, send to an outside wallet or redeem until verification is complete.
26.3.10 Due diligence on existing customers by materiality and risk
Every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP shall apply CDD requirements to existing customers on the basis of materiality and risk, and shall conduct due diligence on existing relationships at appropriate times, taking into account whether and when CDD measures have previously been undertaken and the adequacy of data obtained.
- What an examiner will look for
- A plan for bringing existing customers up to these requirements, by risk, and its progress. For operators already active at commencement, Section 54.1 requires AML/CFT/CPF compliance from 5 November 2026.
- What this can look like
- Existing customers are re-verified in order of risk, starting with high-risk and high-volume accounts.
26.3.11 Enhanced due diligence where risk is higher
Every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP shall apply enhanced due diligence (EDD), proportionate to the risks, where higher AML/CFT/CPF risks are identified, including in relation to:
- What an examiner will look for
- The enhanced due diligence procedure, the triggers that apply it, and the customers under it. The cases the clause lists are 26.3.11(a) to 26.3.11(g).
- What this can look like
- A list of enhanced due diligence triggers, each switching the customer to the measures in 26.3.12.
26.3.11(a) Enhanced due diligence: PEPs, their family and close associates
politically exposed persons, their family members and close associates, in accordance with Section 26.4;
- What an examiner will look for
- PEP customers, family members and close associates identified (see 26.4), and the enhanced measures applied to each foreign PEP and to each domestic or international-organisation PEP whose relationship is higher risk (26.4.2, 26.4.3).
- What this can look like
- A foreign PEP match moves the customer to enhanced due diligence; a domestic or international-organisation PEP match is risk-rated first, and a higher-risk relationship gets the same measures.
- Rules that help
- PEP screening (politically exposed persons)
26.3.11(b) Enhanced due diligence: countries the FATF calls out
customers, transactions and counterparties connected with countries referred to in Section 26.6:
- What an examiner will look for
- Customers, transactions and counterparties linked to the countries of 26.6, and the enhanced measures applied.
- What this can look like
- Residence, nationality, IP country and counterparty VASP country are checked against the FATF lists, and a match raises enhanced due diligence.
- Rules that help
- High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch
26.3.11(c) Enhanced due diligence: activity out of line with stated funds or business, unusually large or complex
customers whose transactions are inconsistent with their stated source of funds or business profile, or which are complex, unusually large or follow an unusual pattern with no apparent economic or lawful purpose;
- What an examiner will look for
- The scenarios that find such activity and the enhanced due diligence done on the customers they flagged.
- What this can look like
- A customer whose monthly volume far exceeds their declared income, or who suddenly makes one very large transfer, is reviewed under enhanced due diligence.
- Rules that help
- Sudden change from a customer’s baseline, Large single transaction
26.3.11(d) Enhanced due diligence: complex ownership, nominee shareholders, bearer shares
legal persons or arrangements with complex ownership structures, nominee shareholders or bearer shares;
- What an examiner will look for
- Business customers with complex ownership, nominee shareholders or bearer shares, and the enhanced due diligence on each.
- What this can look like
- Ownership charts with nominees or several layers send the customer to enhanced due diligence.
26.3.11(e) Enhanced due diligence: significant exposure to unhosted wallets
customers with significant exposure to unhosted wallets, as determined by the institution’s risk assessment and any guidance issued by the Bank;
- What an examiner will look for
- The definition of “significant exposure” in the risk assessment, and the customers above it with their enhanced due diligence.
- What this can look like
- The share of a customer’s flows to and from unhosted wallets is measured, and above a level set in the risk assessment the customer gets enhanced due diligence.
- Rules that help
- Unhosted wallet exposure (self-hosted wallets)
26.3.11(f) Enhanced due diligence: mixers, privacy coins, high-risk counterparty VASPs
transactions involving mixers, tumblers, privacy-enhancing coins or other anonymity-enhancing technologies, or high-risk counterparty VASPs; and
- What an examiner will look for
- Blockchain analytics findings of mixer, tumbler or privacy-coin exposure and of high-risk counterparty VASPs, and the enhanced due diligence that followed.
- What this can look like
- A deposit traced to a mixer, or a transfer to a high-risk exchange, sends the customer to enhanced due diligence.
26.3.11(g) Enhanced due diligence: other higher-risk factors
any other higher-risk factor identified by the institution or prescribed by the Bank.
- What an examiner will look for
- The other higher-risk factors in the risk assessment and in CBN directions, each with its trigger.
- What this can look like
- The licensee’s own extra triggers, each written into the risk assessment with the reason it raises risk, and each factor the CBN prescribes added once it is published.
26.3.12 What enhanced due diligence includes, including blockchain analysis of the path
EDD measures shall include, as appropriate: obtaining additional information on the customer, beneficial owner and intended nature of the relationship; establishing the source of funds and source of wealth; obtaining senior management approval to commence or continue the relationship; conducting enhanced monitoring through more frequent reviews and more controls; and analysing the transaction path using blockchain analytics.
- What an examiner will look for
- Enhanced due diligence files showing which measures were taken: more information, source of funds and wealth, senior management approval, more frequent reviews and blockchain path analysis.
- What this can look like
- An enhanced due diligence checklist, with senior management sign-off and a blockchain trace of the funds.
26.3.13 Simplified due diligence only within 26.1.6, including approved tiered KYC
A Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP may apply simplified due diligence only in accordance with 26.1.6, including for customers onboarded through a tiered KYC framework approved by the Bank. Simplified measures shall be commensurate with the lower-risk factors and shall not apply where there is a suspicion of AML/CFT/CPF or sanctions evasion, or where specific higher-risk scenarios apply. Any reliance on another institution for CDD information shall comply with Section 26.5.
- What an examiner will look for
- The tiered KYC framework approved by the CBN, if used, and the triggers that move a customer out of simplified due diligence.
- What this can look like
- Low tiers with tight limits, lifted to full due diligence on a suspicion or a higher-risk trigger.
26.3.14 Due diligence not possible: refuse or end the relationship, consider an STR
Where a Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP is unable to comply with the relevant CDD measures, it shall not open the account, commence the business relationship or perform the transaction, or shall terminate the business relationship, and shall consider filing a suspicious transaction report with the NFIU in relation to the customer.
- What an examiner will look for
- Records of onboardings refused, transactions not performed and relationships ended for incomplete due diligence, each with the decision on an STR.
- What this can look like
- A customer who cannot complete verification is offboarded, and the compliance team records whether to file.
26.3.15 Stop due diligence that would tip off; file an STR instead
Where a Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP forms a suspicion of AML/CFT/CPF or sanctions evasion and reasonably believes that performing the CDD process will tip off the customer, it shall not pursue the CDD process and shall instead file a suspicious transaction report with the NFIU.
- What an examiner will look for
- A procedure that tells staff when to stop a due diligence request, and STRs filed in those cases.
- What this can look like
- Analysts can pause an outreach to a customer under suspicion and send the case to the CCO to file.
26.4.1 Find PEPs, family and associates at onboarding, ongoing and on change
Every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP shall have appropriate risk management systems to determine whether a customer, beneficial owner or person acting on behalf of a customer is a politically exposed person, a family member or a close associate of a politically exposed person. Such determination shall be made at onboarding, on an ongoing basis, and whenever there is a material change in customer information or activity.
- What an examiner will look for
- PEP screening at onboarding, on an ongoing basis and when customer information or activity changes, covering customers, beneficial owners and representatives.
- What this can look like
- Customers, beneficial owners and representatives are screened against PEP data at onboarding, when the data or list changes, and on a schedule.
- Rules that help
- PEP screening (politically exposed persons)
26.4.2 Foreign PEPs: senior approval, source of wealth and funds, enhanced monitoring
In relation to a foreign politically exposed person, a Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP shall, in addition to the measures in Section 26.3: a) obtain senior management approval before establishing or, for existing customers, continuing the business relationship; b) take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds of customers and beneficial owners identified as foreign politically exposed persons; and c) conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship.
- What an examiner will look for
- For each foreign PEP: the senior management approval, the source of wealth and funds established, and the enhanced monitoring applied.
- What this can look like
- A foreign PEP cannot be onboarded without senior management sign-off, and their account is reviewed more often with tighter thresholds.
26.4.3 Domestic and international-organisation PEPs; foreign PEP measures where higher risk
In relation to a domestic politically exposed person or a person who is or has been entrusted with a prominent function by an international organisation, a Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP shall take reasonable measures to determine whether a customer or beneficial owner is such a person and, in cases of a higher-risk business relationship, shall apply the measures in 26.4.2(a) to (c).
- What an examiner will look for
- Screening data that covers Nigerian PEPs and senior officials of international organisations, and the risk assessment of each relationship found.
- What this can look like
- Domestic PEPs are identified through screening and a risk review decides whether foreign PEP measures apply.
- Rules that help
- PEP screening (politically exposed persons)
26.4.4 The PEP rules cover family members and close associates
The requirements in 26.4.1 to 26.4.3 shall apply to family members and close associates of all types of politically exposed persons.
- What an examiner will look for
- Screening that returns family members and close associates, and their treatment as PEPs.
- What this can look like
- The PEP data includes relatives and associates, and a match is handled like a PEP match.
- Rules that help
- PEP screening (politically exposed persons)
26.4.5 Document every PEP decision
A Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP shall document the basis for identifying a politically exposed person, the risk classification assigned, the approvals obtained, the enhanced measures applied, and any decision to continue, restrict or terminate the relationship.
- What an examiner will look for
- The clause names the evidence: for each PEP, the basis, the risk rating, the approvals, the enhanced measures and the decision. 26.11.3 adds periodic returns “on business relationships with politically exposed persons” where the CBN or NFIU prescribes them.
- What this can look like
- A PEP register with the match, the rating, the approver, the measures and the decision for each.
26.5.1 Reliance on a third party for due diligence: responsibility stays with the licensee
A Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP may rely on a third party to perform the CDD measures in 26.3.3(a) to (d) or to introduce business, provided that the conditions in this section are met. Ultimate responsibility for the CDD measures shall remain with the Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP relying on the third party.
- What an examiner will look for
- A list of the third parties relied on, what each does, and the licensee’s own checks of their work.
- What this can look like
- Due diligence done by a partner is reviewed by the licensee, which answers for it.
26.5.2 Conditions of reliance: get the data at once, copies on request, a supervised third party
A Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP relying on a third party shall: a) immediately obtain from the third party the necessary information concerning the CDD measures in 26.3.3(a) to (d); b) take adequate steps to satisfy itself that copies of identification data and other relevant documentation relating to the CDD requirements will be made available by the third party upon request without delay; and c) satisfy itself that the third party is regulated, supervised or monitored for, and has measures in place for compliance with, CDD and record-keeping requirements in line with Section 26.3 and Section 26.12.
- What an examiner will look for
- For each third party relied on: the due diligence data received at the time, the agreement to provide copies without delay, and the assessment of its regulation and supervision.
- What this can look like
- The partner sends the due diligence data with each customer, and the contract gives copies on request.
26.5.3 No reliance on third parties in high-risk countries
When determining in which countries a third party that meets the conditions may be based, a Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP shall have regard to information available on the level of country risk, and shall not rely on a third party based in a country referred to in 26.6.1.
- What an examiner will look for
- The country of each third party relied on, checked against the 26.6.1 list.
- What this can look like
- The reliance register shows each partner’s country, and none is on the FATF call-for-action list.
26.5.5 Outsourced AML functions are part of the licensee
This section does not apply to outsourcing or agency relationships. Where a Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP outsources any CDD or other AML/CFT/CPF function, the outsourced provider shall be treated as part of the institution, which shall remain fully responsible for compliance and shall ensure that the Bank and the NFIU have access to the relevant information and records.
- What an examiner will look for
- The outsourcing agreements for any AML function, with access rights for the CBN and the NFIU. Section 22 adds the general outsourcing rules.
- What this can look like
- An outsourced screening or KYC provider works under a contract that gives the licensee, the CBN and the NFIU access to its records.
26.6.1 Enhanced due diligence for countries the FATF calls for
Every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP shall apply enhanced due diligence, proportionate to the risks, to business relationships and transactions with natural and legal persons, financial institutions and VASPs from countries for which this is called for by the FATF.
- What an examiner will look for
- The country list in use, matched to the FATF’s current call for action and the CBN’s circulars (26.6.4), and the enhanced due diligence on relationships and transactions with those countries.
- What this can look like
- The FATF list is loaded into screening and monitoring, and a match on a customer, a transaction or a counterparty VASP raises enhanced due diligence.
- Rules that help
- High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch
26.6.2 Countermeasures when the FATF or the CBN calls for them
Every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP shall apply countermeasures, proportionate to the risks, when called upon to do so by the FATF, and independently of any call by the FATF when directed by the Bank. Countermeasures may include: a) enhanced reporting or systematic reporting of transactions; b) limiting business relationships or transactions with the country or persons in it; c) prohibiting reliance on third parties located in the country; d) reviewing, amending or, if necessary, terminating counterparty VASP or distributor relationships in the country; and e) any other measure prescribed by the Bank.
- What an examiner will look for
- The countermeasures applied after each FATF call or CBN direction, such as blocked corridors, limits, systematic reporting or ended relationships.
- What this can look like
- When the CBN directs a countermeasure, transfers to the country are blocked or reported, and counterparties there are reviewed.
- Rules that help
- High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch
26.6.3 Countries under FATF increased monitoring in the risk assessment
For countries under FATF increased monitoring, every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP shall take the FATF’s findings into account in its risk assessment and apply enhanced measures where the risks warrant.
- What an examiner will look for
- The risk assessment’s treatment of the FATF grey list, and the measures applied where the risk warranted them.
- What this can look like
- Grey-list countries score higher in the customer and transaction risk model.
- Rules that help
- High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch
26.7.1 An automated transaction monitoring system with blockchain analytics
Every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP shall deploy and maintain an automated transaction monitoring system, supported by blockchain analytics, configured to detect and generate alerts for:
- What an examiner will look for
- The monthly return reports “AML/CFT alerts generated, escalated, closed, and outstanding; STR count filed with the NFIU; sanctions screening hits; and material typologies identified” (Schedule 7, Part C, item 12), 26.12.3 requires “monitoring alerts and their disposition” to be kept for five years, and the licence application includes a “Transaction monitoring system description” (Schedule 1, Section F). Expect the system, its blockchain analytics source and a scenario for each item (a) to (h).
- What this can look like
- An automated system that reads every transaction and the blockchain analytics for its wallets, with one or more scenarios for each of the eight items.
26.7.1(a) Alert: transactions over a threshold
transactions exceeding thresholds prescribed by the Bank or set in its risk assessment;
- What an examiner will look for
- The thresholds in use, those prescribed by the CBN and those set in the risk assessment, each traced to its source.
- What this can look like
- Alerts on single transactions above the reporting line and above the licensee’s own risk-based amounts by customer segment.
- Rules that help
- Large single transaction
26.7.1(b) Alert: wallets on the deny-list, a sanctions list or linked to illicit activity
transactions involving wallet addresses on its deny-list, on any sanctions list referred to in Section 26.8, or associated with illicit activity;
- What an examiner will look for
- The monthly return reports wallets “frozen, blocked, deny-listed, or otherwise restricted” (Schedule 7, Part C, item 13). Expect the deny-list and sanctions wallet lists loaded, the blockchain analytics categories treated as illicit, and the alerts raised.
- What this can look like
- Every counterparty wallet is checked against the licensee’s deny-list, sanctioned addresses and the analytics provider’s illicit categories before a transfer goes through.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening, Blacklist / internal watchlist match
26.7.1(c) Alert: virtual asset typologies, including structuring, rapid layering, P2P anomalies and mixing
transactions consistent with known virtual asset and stablecoin typologies, including structuring to avoid reporting thresholds, rapid layering through multiple wallets, suspicious or anomalous peer-to-peer patterns, including activity structured to evade applicable controls or reporting requirements, and mixing or tumbling;
- What an examiner will look for
- The monthly return reports “material typologies identified” (Schedule 7, Part C, item 12). Expect a scenario for each typology the clause names.
- What this can look like
- Scenarios for amounts split under the reporting lines, funds moved through several wallets within hours, unusual P2P patterns (see 10.7.5) and exposure to mixers in the analytics.
26.7.1(d) Alert: transactions with countries of 26.6
transactions originating from or directed to countries referred to in Section 26.6;
- What an examiner will look for
- The country list used by the scenario and the alerts it raised. For virtual asset transfers the country is usually that of the counterparty VASP, from the Travel Rule data, or from the analytics.
- What this can look like
- A transfer whose counterparty VASP, originator or beneficiary is in a 26.6 country raises an alert.
- Rules that help
- High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch
26.7.1(e) Alert: large or rapid-succession transactions out of line with the customer’s profile
large-value or rapid-succession transactions inconsistent with the customer’s profile;
- What an examiner will look for
- Scenarios that compare value and frequency with the customer’s own profile and history, and their alerts.
- What this can look like
- Alerts when a customer’s single transaction or number of transactions in an hour is far above their usual level or what they declared.
26.7.1(f) Alert: cross-chain bridging or chain-hopping
cross-chain bridging or chain-hopping activity that may obscure the origin or destination of funds; and
- What an examiner will look for
- The analytics coverage of the networks and bridges the licensee supports, and the alerts raised on bridging or chain-hopping.
- What this can look like
- The analytics provider follows funds across bridges, and deposits that arrive after several chain hops are flagged.
- Rules that help
- Chain-hopping and cross-chain bridge use
26.7.1(g) Alert: patterns or indicators the CBN or the NFIU prescribes
any other pattern or indicator prescribed by the Bank or the NFIU.
- What an examiner will look for
- The indicators the CBN and the NFIU have prescribed, each with its scenario, and the date each was added.
- What this can look like
- A register of CBN and NFIU indicators, each mapped to a scenario within a set time of publication.
26.7.1(h) Alert: a customer acting as an undisclosed VASP
activity indicating that a customer is a VASP or is providing virtual asset services to third parties without disclosure, including volumes, frequency or numbers of counterparties inconsistent with retail use, pooled or omnibus flows, or links to platforms not licensed in Nigeria;
- What an examiner will look for
- Scenarios on volume, frequency, number of counterparties, pooled flows and links to unlicensed platforms, and the cases handled under 26.7.4. Item (h) follows item (g), which ends with a full stop, in the CBN’s text; it is part of the same list.
- What this can look like
- Alerts on a retail customer with hundreds of counterparties a month, volumes like a business, or flows to and from an exchange not licensed in Nigeria.
26.7.2 Review each alert within five business days, or 24 hours for sanctions or terrorist financing
Each alert shall be reviewed and its disposition documented within five (5) Business Days, or within twenty-four (24) hours where the alert indicates a possible sanctions match or terrorist financing.
- What an examiner will look for
- The monthly return reports alerts “outstanding” (Schedule 7, Part C, item 12). A Business Day is “a day other than a Saturday, Sunday or public holiday declared by the Federal Government of Nigeria” (Section 1). Expect alert ageing reports showing each alert reviewed and its disposition recorded within five business days, and each alert indicating a possible sanctions match or terrorist financing within 24 hours.
- What this can look like
- Queues with a five-business-day deadline, a separate 24-hour queue for possible sanctions and terrorist financing alerts, and a report of alerts past their deadline. The 24 hours run in clock time, weekends and holidays included, and apply to every possible sanctions match, false positives included, so the tuning of name and wallet screening decides how much work the 24-hour queue gets.
26.7.3 Calibrate and test the monitoring every year and on material change
The monitoring system shall be calibrated and tested at least annually, and whenever there is a material change in the institution’s products, customers or risk environment, to ensure that alerts reflect its current risks.
- What an examiner will look for
- A dated calibration and testing report at least yearly and after each material change in products, customers or risks, with the threshold changes it made.
- What this can look like
- Each year, and after a new product or customer segment, scenarios are tested on recent data and thresholds are reset, with the analysis kept.
26.7.4 A customer acting as an undisclosed VASP: counterparty rules, restrict or end, STR, tell the CBN
Where a customer appears to be acting as an undisclosed VASP, the Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP shall apply Section 26.16, restrict or terminate the relationship where the customer is not licensed or registered as required, file a suspicious transaction report where appropriate, and inform the Bank.
- What an examiner will look for
- For each such customer: the 26.16 due diligence, the restriction or termination, the decision on an STR and the notice to the CBN.
- What this can look like
- A customer flagged under 26.7.1(h) is reviewed as a counterparty VASP, restricted if unlicensed, and reported to the CBN.
26.8.1 Screen customers, owners, counterparties and wallets: at onboarding, before each transaction, on list updates
Every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP shall screen its customers, beneficial owners, persons acting on behalf of customers, counterparties and wallet addresses, at onboarding, before processing each transaction and whenever the lists are updated, against: a) the United Nations Security Council Consolidated List; and b) the Nigeria Sanctions List.
- What an examiner will look for
- 26.12.3 requires “sanctions screening results” to be kept for five years, and the monthly return reports “sanctions screening hits” (Schedule 7, Part C, item 12). Expect screening logs showing each party and wallet screened at onboarding, before each transaction and after each list update, against the UN Security Council Consolidated List and the Nigeria Sanctions List. Section 26.8.3 applies 26.8.1 and 26.8.2 to terrorism, terrorist financing and proliferation financing sanctions.
- What this can look like
- Every transfer screens the customer, the counterparty and the wallet address before it is processed, and the whole customer base is rescreened when either list changes.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
26.8.2 Freeze without delay or notice, make nothing available, report to the Sanctions Committee and the NFIU
Where a Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP identifies virtual assets or other funds owned or controlled, wholly or jointly, directly or indirectly, by a designated person, or by a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of a designated person, it shall without delay and without prior notice: a) freeze the virtual assets or funds; b) not make any virtual assets, funds or financial or related services available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of the designated person; and c) report to the Nigeria Sanctions Committee and the NFIU the assets frozen and actions taken, including any attempted transactions.
- What an examiner will look for
- 26.12.3 requires “freezing actions” to be kept for five years, and the monthly return reports wallets “frozen, blocked, deny-listed, or otherwise restricted” (Schedule 7, Part C, item 13). Expect, for each confirmed match, the freeze, its time against the time of identification, and the report to the Nigeria Sanctions Committee and the NFIU, including attempted transactions.
- What this can look like
- A confirmed match freezes the account and wallet balances at once, blocks every service, and the CCO reports the frozen assets and any attempted transfers.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
26.8.4 Decide, and document, whether to screen OFAC, EU and UK lists; a match triggers enhanced due diligence
Every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP shall, as part of its risk management and having regard to its correspondent relationships, stablecoin infrastructure and cross-border exposure, assess whether to screen against other sanctions lists, including the OFAC Specially Designated Nationals List, the European Union Consolidated List and the United Kingdom Consolidated List, and shall document that assessment. A match against such a list shall trigger enhanced due diligence and a documented decision, which may include refusing or terminating the relationship or transaction and filing a suspicious transaction report.
- What an examiner will look for
- The documented assessment of which other lists to screen, and for matches against them, the enhanced due diligence and the decision recorded.
- What this can look like
- A written decision to screen the OFAC SDN, EU and UK lists because of banking partners and US dollar stablecoins, and a procedure for matches on them.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
26.8.5 Procedures to resolve matches before release, unfreeze, and give effect to authorised access
Every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP shall maintain procedures for: a) promptly resolving potential matches, including false positives, before releasing any held transaction; b) unfreezing assets upon delisting, or upon instruction of the competent authority where a person is confirmed not to be a designated person; and c) giving effect to authorisations from the competent authority for access to frozen assets for basic or extraordinary expenses.
- What an examiner will look for
- The three procedures, and cases showing held transactions released only after the potential match was resolved.
- What this can look like
- A held transfer stays held until an analyst clears or confirms the match; unfreezing and authorised payments from frozen funds follow written steps.
26.8.6 Subscribe to list updates and apply them without delay
Every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP shall subscribe to updates of the lists in 26.8.1 and implement them without delay.
- What an examiner will look for
- The subscriptions to the UN and Nigeria Sanctions List updates, and logs of when each update was published and loaded.
- What this can look like
- List updates load automatically within hours of publication and trigger a rescreen.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
26.9.1 STR to the NFIU within 24 hours of forming the suspicion
Where a Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP suspects, or has reasonable grounds to suspect, that funds, virtual assets, a transaction, an attempted transaction or any wallet activity are the proceeds of criminal activity or unlawful activity as defined in the MLPPA, or are related to terrorist financing, proliferation financing or sanctions evasion, it shall report its suspicion to the NFIU promptly, and in any case within twenty-four (24) hours of forming the suspicion.
- What an examiner will look for
- The reporting calendar lists STRs as “Promptly and within 24 hours of forming suspicion under Section 26.9.1, through the NFIU’s prescribed channel” (Schedule 7), and 26.12.3 requires “decisions on whether to file a report” and “reports filed with the NFIU” to be kept for five years. Expect STRs with the time the suspicion was formed and the time of filing.
- What this can look like
- The case records when the analyst or CCO formed the suspicion, and the STR is filed within 24 hours of it.
26.9.2 Whatever the amount, and for attempted, rejected or abandoned transactions
The obligation in 26.9.1 applies regardless of the amount involved, and whether the transaction was completed, attempted, rejected, suspended or abandoned.
- What an examiner will look for
- STRs filed on attempted, rejected, suspended or abandoned transactions and on small amounts.
- What this can look like
- A blocked or abandoned transfer stays in the case, and the decision whether to file covers it.
26.9.3 STR content: owners, wallet addresses, transaction hashes, counterparty VASPs, grounds and action
A report under 26.9.1 shall be filed in the form and through the channel prescribed by the NFIU, and shall include all relevant information available to the institution, including customer and beneficial ownership information, wallet addresses, transaction hashes, counterparty VASP details, the grounds for suspicion and any action taken.
- What an examiner will look for
- A sample of STRs holding each item the clause lists, filed through the NFIU’s channel.
- What this can look like
- STRs that give the wallet addresses, transaction hashes and counterparty VASP for each transfer, not only the fiat details.
26.9.4 After filing: enhanced monitoring and compliance with NFIU directions
After filing a report, the Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP shall take appropriate risk-based action, including enhanced monitoring, and shall comply with any directive of the NFIU or other competent authority made under the MLPPA, including any instruction to postpone or stop a transaction.
- What an examiner will look for
- For customers reported: the actions taken after filing, such as enhanced monitoring, and any NFIU direction and how it was carried out.
- What this can look like
- Filing an STR puts the customer on a watch list with tighter thresholds and records any NFIU instruction to stop a transaction.
26.9.5 Answer NFIU requests promptly
A Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP shall respond promptly to any request by the NFIU for additional information relating to a report.
- What an examiner will look for
- A log of NFIU requests with the date received and the date answered.
- What this can look like
- NFIU requests are tracked with a deadline and answered from the case file.
26.9.6 Staff report suspicions to the CCO without delay
Every employee, agent and officer of a Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP shall report any knowledge or suspicion under 26.9.1 to the Chief Compliance Officer without delay.
- What an examiner will look for
- 26.12.3 requires “internal suspicion reports” to be kept for five years. Expect the internal reporting channel and the internal suspicion reports received.
- What this can look like
- Staff and agents raise a suspicion through one form that reaches the CCO, and each report is logged.
26.10.2 No tipping off
A Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP and its directors, officers, employees and agents shall not disclose to the customer or any other person the fact that a suspicious transaction report or related information is being, or has been, filed with the NFIU, or that an analysis or investigation is being carried out.
- What an examiner will look for
- The tipping-off policy, training on it (26.2.4) and customer communication scripts for accounts under review. 26.10.3 allows disclosure to the CBN, the NFIU or another competent authority, within the institution or group for AML purposes, or as the law requires.
- What this can look like
- Support staff see that an account is restricted but not why, and use a set reply.
26.10.4 STR information restricted to authorised staff
Every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP shall restrict access to information relating to suspicious transaction reports to authorised personnel and shall keep such information confidential.
- What an examiner will look for
- Access rights to STR records and the people who hold them.
- What this can look like
- Only the CCO and named compliance staff can open STR drafts and filings.
26.11.1(a) Threshold reports under the MLPPA
Every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP shall submit to the NFIU, and to the Bank where prescribed, reports of: a) cash and other transactions equal to or exceeding the thresholds prescribed under the MLPPA; and
- What an examiner will look for
- The threshold reports filed, matched to the transactions over the MLPPA lines, with virtual assets valued at the time of the transaction (26.11.2).
- What this can look like
- Transactions over the MLPPA lines are reported automatically, valued in naira at the time of the transaction. The wording “equal to or exceeding” differs from the MLPPA’s “in excess of”; alerting at the amount itself covers both. The MLPPA’s wording is that of its section 11(1) (Sources).
- Rules that help
- Large single transaction
26.11.1(b) Reports of transfers to or from a foreign country over the thresholds
transfers of funds or virtual assets to or from a foreign country equal to or exceeding the thresholds prescribed under the MLPPA or by the NFIU, within the time and in the form prescribed.
- What an examiner will look for
- The cross-border reports filed, matched to the transfers over the MLPPA or NFIU thresholds, including virtual asset transfers.
- What this can look like
- Virtual asset transfers to or from a counterparty in a foreign country (for example a foreign VASP, known from the Travel Rule data) are valued and reported like foreign fund transfers. For a transfer with an unhosted wallet the country may not be known; the procedure says how the licensee decides it, for example from the customer’s declaration or the analytics.
- Rules that help
- Large single transaction
26.11.2 Value at the time of the transaction; aggregate linked or structured transactions
For the purposes of section 26.11.1, virtual assets shall be valued at the time of the transaction in Naira or the applicable foreign currency, as the case may be. Transactions that appear to be linked or structured to avoid an applicable reporting threshold shall be reported individually and aggregated for the purpose of determining whether the reporting threshold has been met.
- What an examiner will look for
- The valuation source and time used, and the aggregation logic for linked transactions, with reports filed on aggregated series.
- What this can look like
- A rule adds up transactions that appear linked and, where the total reaches the line, each one is reported.
26.11.3 Periodic AML returns, including on PEP relationships
Every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP shall submit such periodic returns on AML/CFT/CPF compliance, including returns on business relationships with politically exposed persons, as the Bank or the NFIU may prescribe.
- What an examiner will look for
- The monthly return has a Part C, “AML/CFT/CPF and Sanctions Metrics” (Schedule 7). Expect the returns filed as prescribed, including any PEP return the CBN or the NFIU prescribes.
- What this can look like
- A monthly return drawn from the monitoring and case systems, with alert, STR and screening counts.
26.12.1 Transaction records for five years, enough to reconstruct each transaction
Every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP shall maintain all necessary records on transactions, both domestic and international, for at least five (5) years after the completion of the transaction, in a manner sufficient to permit the reconstruction of individual transactions, including where applicable the amount and type of virtual asset, date and time, wallet addresses, transaction hashes, counterparty VASP, required information under Section 26.14, mint and redemption records, and exchange rates applied, so as to provide, if necessary, evidence for prosecution of criminal activity.
- What an examiner will look for
- Retention settings of at least five years after completion, and a sample of transactions rebuilt from the records with each listed field.
- What this can look like
- Transaction records hold amount, asset type, time, wallet addresses, hashes, counterparty VASP, Travel Rule data, mint and redemption records and exchange rate, kept five years or more.
26.12.2 Due diligence records and analysis for five years after the relationship ends
Every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP shall keep all records obtained through CDD measures, account files and business correspondence, and the results of any analysis undertaken, including inquiries to establish the background and purpose of complex or unusual transactions, for at least five (5) years after the business relationship is ended or after the date of the occasional transaction.
- What an examiner will look for
- Retention settings for customer files, correspondence and the analysis of unusual transactions, five years after the relationship ends.
- What this can look like
- Closed customers’ files and case analyses stay retrievable for five years after closure.
26.12.3 Keep risk assessments, alerts and dispositions, screening results, STR decisions and freezes for five years
Every Licensed Issuer and licensed or authorised VASP shall keep records of risk assessments, monitoring alerts and their disposition, sanctions screening results, internal suspicion reports, decisions on whether to file a report, reports filed with the NFIU, and freezing actions, for at least five (5) years.
- What an examiner will look for
- The clause names the evidence: each record type it lists, retrievable for at least five years.
- What this can look like
- Alerts, case decisions, screening results, internal reports, file or no-file decisions, STRs and freezes are kept in one store for five years or more.
26.12.4 Records secure and produced in Nigeria without delay, wherever held
Records shall be kept securely, protected against unauthorised access, alteration or loss, and shall be made available swiftly to the Bank, the NFIU and other competent authorities upon appropriate authority. Where records are held electronically, outside Nigeria or by an outsourced provider, the Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP shall remain responsible for ensuring that they can be produced in Nigeria without delay.
- What an examiner will look for
- Access controls and integrity protection on the records, and the arrangements to produce records held abroad or by a provider in Nigeria without delay.
- What this can look like
- Records held by an overseas provider can be exported on request the same day.
26.12.5 Do not destroy records under request, investigation or order
A Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP shall not destroy records that are the subject of a request, investigation, court order or supervisory direction, even after the retention period has expired, until it is notified that they are no longer required.
- What an examiner will look for
- A legal hold procedure and the holds in place.
- What this can look like
- Records under a request or order are flagged so deletion jobs skip them.
26.13.1 Group-wide programme with information sharing and safeguards
A Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP that is part of a financial group shall implement group-wide AML/CFT/CPF programmes, applicable to all branches and majority-owned subsidiaries, which include the measures in Section 26.2 and: a) policies and procedures for sharing information required for CDD and AML/CFT/CPF risk management; b) the provision, at group-level compliance, audit and AML/CFT/CPF functions, of customer, account, wallet and transaction information from branches and subsidiaries when necessary for AML/CFT/CPF purposes, including information and analysis of unusual or suspicious transactions, and the receipt of such information by branches and subsidiaries when relevant to risk management; and c) adequate safeguards on the confidentiality and use of information exchanged, including safeguards to prevent tipping off.
- What an examiner will look for
- For a licensee in a financial group: the group programme, the information-sharing procedure and its confidentiality safeguards.
- What this can look like
- Group compliance can see the Nigerian entity’s alerts and customers, and the entity receives group findings on shared customers.
26.13.2 Foreign branches and subsidiaries apply these measures where the host country is less strict
A Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP shall ensure that its foreign branches and majority-owned subsidiaries apply AML/CFT/CPF measures consistent with these Guidelines where the requirements of the host country are less strict, to the extent permitted by host-country law.
- What an examiner will look for
- For each foreign branch or majority-owned subsidiary, a comparison of host-country rules with these Regulations and the stricter measures applied.
- What this can look like
- A gap analysis per country, with the Nigerian standard applied where it is stricter.
26.13.3 Where the host country prevents it: additional measures and tell the CBN
Where the host country does not permit the proper implementation of measures consistent with these Regulations, the Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP shall apply appropriate additional measures to manage the AML/CFT/CPF risks and shall inform the Bank without delay.
- What an examiner will look for
- The additional measures and the notice to the CBN for each such country.
- What this can look like
- A notice to the CBN describing the host-country obstacle and the extra controls applied.
26.14.3 Originator and beneficiary information at USD/EUR 1,000 or more
For a virtual asset transfer equal to or above USD/EUR 1,000 or its naira equivalent, the originating licensed or authorised VASP shall obtain and hold required and accurate originator information and required beneficiary information, comprising: a) the name of the originator; b) the originator’s account number or wallet address used to process the transfer or, where there is no account, a unique transaction reference number that permits traceability; c) the originator’s address, or NIN or customer identification number, or date and place of birth, and, for a legal person, its Legal Entity Identifier where available; d) the name of the beneficiary; and e) the beneficiary’s account number or wallet address used to process the transfer or, where there is no account, a unique transaction reference number that permits traceability.
- What an examiner will look for
- A sample of outgoing transfers at or above the threshold holding each item, with the originator information verified. Section 26.14 applies to domestic and cross-border transfers (26.14.1). The Regulations do not say whether the USD or the EUR figure applies or which rate converts it to naira, so expect the licensee’s choice written down.
- What this can look like
- Transfers of 1,000 or more, in the currency and at the rate the licensee chose, carry the originator’s name, wallet or reference, address or NIN or ID number or date and place of birth, and the beneficiary’s name and wallet.
26.14.4 Below the threshold: names and wallet addresses; verify on suspicion
For a virtual asset transfer below the threshold in 26.14.3, the originating licensed or authorised VASP shall obtain and hold the name of the originator and the beneficiary, and the wallet address or unique transaction reference number of each. This information need not be verified for accuracy unless there is a suspicion of AML/CFT/CPF or sanctions evasion, in which case it shall be verified.
- What an examiner will look for
- A sample of smaller transfers holding both names and wallet addresses or references, and verification where a suspicion arose.
- What this can look like
- Every transfer under the threshold still carries both names and wallet addresses.
26.14.5 Send the information immediately and securely, before or with the transfer
The originating licensed or authorised VASP shall submit the information in 26.14.3 or 26.14.4 to the beneficiary VASP or financial institution immediately and securely, before or simultaneously with the transfer, and shall make it available on request to the Bank, the NFIU and other competent authorities.
- What an examiner will look for
- Travel Rule messages with their send times against the transfer times.
- What this can look like
- The Travel Rule message is sent before the transfer is broadcast.
26.14.6 No transfer without the Travel Rule information, even where the counterparty’s country has no Travel Rule
The originating licensed or authorised VASP shall not execute a virtual asset transfer if it cannot comply with 26.14.3 to 26.14.5. The obligations in Sections 26.14.3 to 26.14.5 apply regardless of whether the jurisdiction of the counterparty VASP has implemented the Travel Rule.
- What an examiner will look for
- System settings that stop a transfer when the information cannot be sent, and records of transfers stopped for that reason.
- What this can look like
- A transfer to a VASP that cannot receive Travel Rule data is refused, whatever its country.
- Rules that help
- Missing originator or beneficiary information (Travel Rule)
26.14.7 Beneficiary VASP: obtain and hold the information
The beneficiary licensed or authorised VASP shall obtain and hold required originator information and required and accurate beneficiary information, and shall make it available on request to the Bank, the NFIU and other competent authorities.
- What an examiner will look for
- A sample of incoming transfers with originator information received and beneficiary information verified.
- What this can look like
- Each incoming transfer is matched to its Travel Rule message and to the verified customer receiving it.
26.14.8 Beneficiary VASP: detect missing information and decide to execute, reject, suspend or return
The beneficiary licensed or authorised VASP shall take reasonable measures, which may include post-event or real-time monitoring where feasible, to identify virtual asset transfers that lack required originator or required beneficiary information, and shall have risk-based policies and procedures for determining: a) when to execute, reject, suspend or return a transfer lacking required information, including withholding the virtual assets from the customer’s account pending receipt of the information; and b) the appropriate follow-up action, including requesting missing information, restricting or terminating the relationship with the counterparty, and filing a suspicious transaction report.
- What an examiner will look for
- The monitoring that finds incoming transfers with missing information, the risk-based policy, and the decisions and follow-up recorded for each.
- What this can look like
- An incoming transfer without a Travel Rule message is held in the customer’s account until the information arrives; repeated gaps from one VASP lead to a review of that counterparty.
- Rules that help
- Missing originator or beneficiary information (Travel Rule)
26.14.9 Intermediary VASP: keep the information with the transfer, records for five years
An intermediary licensed or authorised VASP shall ensure that all originator and beneficiary information that accompanies a virtual asset transfer is retained with it. Where technical limitations prevent the information from accompanying a related transfer, the intermediary shall keep a record of all information received for at least five (5) years. The intermediary shall take reasonable measures to identify transfers lacking required information and apply risk-based policies equivalent to 26.14.8.
- What an examiner will look for
- For an intermediary: the information passed on with each transfer, the five-year record where it could not be, and the 26.14.8-style handling of gaps.
- What this can look like
- The intermediary forwards the Travel Rule message unchanged and keeps a copy.
- Rules that help
- Missing originator or beneficiary information (Travel Rule)
26.14.10 Batch transfers carry full information
Where several individual virtual asset transfers from a single originator are bundled in a batch file, the batch file shall contain required and accurate originator information and full beneficiary information that is fully traceable within the beneficiary country, and the originating licensed or authorised VASP shall include the originator’s account number, wallet address or unique transaction reference number for each transfer.
- What an examiner will look for
- A sample batch file with the originator and beneficiary information and each transfer’s reference.
- What this can look like
- A batch payout file lists the originator once and each beneficiary with its own wallet and reference.
26.14.11 Screen originator, beneficiary and wallets on every transfer
In processing virtual asset transfers, every licensed or authorised VASP shall screen the originator, beneficiary and wallet addresses and shall take freezing action and prohibit transactions with designated persons in accordance with Section 26.8.
- What an examiner will look for
- Screening logs for originator, beneficiary and wallet addresses on transfers, and freezes or refusals on matches.
- What this can look like
- The names in the Travel Rule message and both wallet addresses are screened before the transfer is processed.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
26.14.12 A secure, interoperable Travel Rule solution using a standard such as IVMS101
Every licensed or authorised VASP shall use a Travel Rule solution that enables the secure and immediate transmission of required information, is interoperable with the solutions used by its counterparties, and uses a recognised data standard such as IVMS101, as may be further specified by the Bank by circular.
- What an examiner will look for
- The Travel Rule solution, its data standard, and the counterparties it can exchange with.
- What this can look like
- A Travel Rule solution that sends IVMS101 messages and connects to the protocols the licensee’s main counterparties use.
26.14.15 Test and audit Travel Rule compliance; report material deficiencies to the CBN
Every licensed or authorised VASP shall conduct periodic testing, monitoring and audit of its compliance with the requirements of this Section and shall promptly remediate and report to the Bank any material deficiencies identified in the implementation of the Travel Rule.
- What an examiner will look for
- Travel Rule test and audit reports, the remediation of what they found, and reports of material deficiencies to the CBN. The Regulations number two clauses 26.14.15; this is the first. The second sets the CBN’s supervisory testing of Travel Rule systems.
- What this can look like
- A quarterly test of a sample of transfers for complete Travel Rule data, with gaps fixed and material ones reported.
26.15.1 Unhosted wallets: obtain the Travel Rule information from the customer
Where a licensed or authorised VASP sends virtual assets to, or receives virtual assets from, an unhosted wallet, it shall obtain the required information in 26.14.3 or 26.14.4 from its customer and retain it in accordance with Section 26.12.
- What an examiner will look for
- Transfers to and from unhosted wallets with the originator and beneficiary information the customer gave. An unhosted wallet is one over which no licensee, VASP or other regulated intermediary “holds, administers or exercises Control” (Section 1).
- What this can look like
- A withdrawal to a personal wallet asks the customer who owns it, and the answer is kept with the transfer.
26.15.2 Unhosted wallets: verify the customer owns or controls the wallet at USD/EUR 1,000 or more
For transfers equal to or above the threshold in 26.14.3, the licensed or authorised VASP shall take reasonable measures to verify that its customer owns or controls the unhosted wallet, such as a message-signing or micro-transfer test.
- What an examiner will look for
- For transfers at or above USD/EUR 1,000 with an unhosted wallet: the ownership check done, such as a signed message or a micro-transfer.
- What this can look like
- Before a first large withdrawal to a personal wallet, the customer signs a message with it or sends a small test amount from it. A micro-transfer test is a small transfer followed by a large one, the sequence a rule that looks for a test transfer before a large transfer alerts on; a wallet proven this way can be excluded from that rule.
- Rules that help
- Unhosted wallet exposure (self-hosted wallets)
26.15.3 Unhosted wallets: assess and mitigate risk, with analytics, limits or refusal
The licensed or authorised VASP shall assess and mitigate the AML/CFT/CPF risks of unhosted-wallet transfers on a risk-sensitive basis. Depending on the risks, measures may include blockchain analytics screening of the wallet and its transaction history, enhanced due diligence, transaction limits, and refusing or suspending the transfer.
- What an examiner will look for
- The risk assessment for unhosted-wallet transfers and the measures applied: analytics screening of the wallet, enhanced due diligence, limits, refusals.
- What this can look like
- Unhosted wallets are scored by the analytics provider; high-risk ones are refused and others have limits.
- Rules that help
- Unhosted wallet exposure (self-hosted wallets)
26.16.1 Due diligence on counterparty VASPs before and during the relationship
Before establishing a relationship with, or transferring virtual assets to or from, another VASP, and on an ongoing basis, a licensed or authorised VASP shall conduct counterparty due diligence to: a) gather sufficient information about the counterparty to understand fully the nature of its business, including its ownership, beneficial ownership, management, place of incorporation and operation, and to determine from publicly available information its reputation, regulatory history and whether it has been subject to any AML/CFT/CPF or sanctions investigation or regulatory action; b) confirm that the counterparty is licensed or registered and supervised for AML/CFT/CPF purposes in the jurisdiction(s) where it operates; c) assess the counterparty’s AML/CFT/CPF and sanctions controls; and d) confirm that the counterparty can comply with Travel Rule requirements and protect the confidentiality of the information transmitted.
- What an examiner will look for
- A due diligence file per counterparty VASP: ownership and management, licence and supervision, AML and sanctions controls, Travel Rule capability, with review dates.
- What this can look like
- A counterparty register; transfers go only to VASPs with a current due diligence file.
26.16.2 Senior management approval for key and higher-risk counterparty relationships
A licensed or authorised VASP shall obtain senior management approval before establishing a new counterparty relationship involving custody, liquidity, settlement, nested services or direct customer access, and before continuing any higher-risk counterparty relationship.
- What an examiner will look for
- Senior management approvals for custody, liquidity, settlement, nested and direct-access relationships, and for each higher-risk one continued.
- What this can look like
- A new liquidity provider or nested exchange is signed off by senior management before go-live.
26.16.3 Document each party’s AML responsibilities; check the counterparty’s due diligence on its customers
A licensed or authorised VASP shall clearly understand and document the respective AML/CFT/CPF responsibilities of each party. Where a counterparty’s customers have direct or indirect access to the licensed or authorised VASP’s services, the licensed or authorised VASP shall be satisfied that the counterparty has conducted CDD on those customers and can provide relevant CDD information upon request.
- What an examiner will look for
- The written allocation of responsibilities, and where the counterparty’s customers reach the licensee’s services, evidence that the counterparty did due diligence on them and can share it.
- What this can look like
- The counterparty agreement says who does due diligence, screening and Travel Rule, and the counterparty answers sample information requests.
26.16.4 Nested services: enhanced counterparty due diligence, restrict or end where risk cannot be managed
Where a counterparty relationship involves nested services, or otherwise enables another VASP or the customers of another VASP to access the licensed or authorised VASP’s services directly or indirectly, the licensed or authorised VASP shall apply enhanced counterparty due diligence proportionate to the risks. Such due diligence shall include identifying any underlying VASP and its beneficial owners; assessing its licensing or registration status, jurisdiction of operation and AML/CFT/CPF controls; understanding the nature and risk profile of its customer base and transaction activities; ensuring that relevant underlying customer information can be obtained promptly upon request; monitoring indirect and third-party exposures arising through the relationship; and periodically reassessing the relationship. The licensed or authorised VASP shall restrict, suspend or terminate the nested relationship where the risks cannot be adequately mitigated or the required information cannot be obtained.
- What an examiner will look for
- For each nested relationship: the underlying VASP identified, its licence and controls assessed, its customers understood, indirect exposures monitored, periodic reassessments, and restrictions where needed.
- What this can look like
- A broker serving another exchange’s customers is reviewed each year, its underlying platforms listed, and flows from it monitored as a group.
- Rules that help
- Transfers with unlicensed or high-risk counterparty VASPs
26.16.5 No shell banks, shell VASPs or unlicensed VASPs
A licensed or authorised VASP shall not enter into or continue a relationship with a shell bank, a shell VASP, or an unlicensed or unregistered VASP, and shall satisfy itself that its counterparties do not permit their services to be used by such entities.
- What an examiner will look for
- The licence check for each counterparty, and the counterparty’s assurance that it does not serve shell or unlicensed entities.
- What this can look like
- Transfers to an exchange the analytics provider tags as unlicensed are blocked.
- Rules that help
- Transfers with unlicensed or high-risk counterparty VASPs
26.16.6 VASPs in countries that do not license VASPs, or whose status cannot be verified, are higher-risk
26.16.6 A licensed or authorised VASP shall treat as higher-risk, and apply enhanced counterparty due diligence to, a VASP incorporated or operating in a jurisdiction that does not effectively license or register VASPs, or whose licensing or supervisory status cannot be verified.
- What an examiner will look for
- The counterparty risk ratings, with such VASPs rated higher-risk and their enhanced due diligence. Section 26.16.7 repeats this clause word for word.
- What this can look like
- The counterparty register flags VASPs from countries without a VASP licensing regime as higher-risk.
- Rules that help
- Transfers with unlicensed or high-risk counterparty VASPs
26.16.8 No services to persons on the CBN’s list of unauthorised operators; report their attempts
A Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP shall not provide services, including Naira on-ramp or off-ramp, settlement, liquidity or account services, to or for the benefit of a person named on the list under Section 52.6, and shall report to the Bank, and where appropriate to the NFIU, any attempt by that person, or by a person it reasonably suspects to be carrying on a Regulated Activity without authorisation, to obtain such services.
- What an examiner will look for
- Screening against the CBN’s published list of unauthorised persons (Sections 52.6 and 52.7), and the reports to the CBN and, where appropriate, the NFIU of attempts to use the service.
- What this can look like
- The CBN’s list of unauthorised operators is loaded as a watchlist on customers, counterparties and wallets, and a match blocks the service and is reported.
26.17.1 Issuers mint only to customers with completed due diligence
26.17.1 A Licensed Issuer shall issue (mint) stablecoins only to customers on whom CDD has been completed in accordance with Section 26.3.
- What an examiner will look for
- Mint records showing every recipient with completed due diligence. Section 26.18.1 repeats this clause word for word.
- What this can look like
- The mint flow checks the customer’s due diligence status and refuses if it is incomplete.
26.17.2 Redeem only for customers with current due diligence; refresh it on triggers
A Licensed Issuer shall redeem stablecoins only for a customer on whom CDD has been completed and remains current in accordance with its risk-based review cycle under Section 26.3.8. It shall update CDD before redemption where a trigger event, unusual activity or a material change in the customer’s risk profile has been identified.
- What an examiner will look for
- Redemption records showing due diligence current under the review cycle of 26.3.8, and refreshed where a trigger, unusual activity or risk change came first.
- What this can look like
- A redemption by a customer whose review is overdue, or who has an open alert, is held until due diligence is refreshed.
26.17.3 Due diligence on a non-customer holder before direct redemption
Where a holder who is not a customer of the Licensed Issuer seeks to redeem directly, the issuer shall complete CDD on that holder before processing the redemption.
- What an examiner will look for
- Direct redemptions by non-customers, each with due diligence completed first.
- What this can look like
- A holder who bought the stablecoin elsewhere is onboarded before the issuer pays out.
26.17.4 Redemption proceeds only to an account in the verified customer’s name
Redemption proceeds shall be paid only to an account held in the name of the verified customer at a bank or other financial institution licensed by the Bank or, for a foreign customer, at a financial institution subject to equivalent AML/CFT/CPF supervision.
- What an examiner will look for
- The name check on the receiving account and a sample of redemptions paid to accounts in the customer’s name.
- What this can look like
- The payout account’s name is checked against the verified customer before redemption proceeds are sent; a mismatch stops the payout.
- Rules that help
- Third-party funding and payment account name mismatch
26.18.2 Issuers can freeze, block and reject transfers, and burn and reissue on order
A Licensed Issuer shall maintain the technical capability, policies and procedures to freeze, block and reject transfers of its stablecoin and, where lawfully ordered, to burn and reissue it, in both primary and secondary markets.
- What an examiner will look for
- The smart contract functions and procedures, and tests showing they work on primary and secondary market transfers. Section 37.3 lists the same functions among the mandatory smart contract controls.
- What this can look like
- The stablecoin contract has freeze, block, burn and reissue functions, tested before launch and after each upgrade (26.20.3).
26.18.3 Multi-party control and a log of every use of those functions
A Licensed Issuer shall secure the administrative keys or functions that control freezing, blocking, burning and reissuance through multi-party authorisation and segregation of duties, and shall keep a log of every use of those functions.
- What an examiner will look for
- The multi-party authorisation set-up, the segregation of duties, and the log of each use.
- What this can look like
- A freeze needs two signers from different teams, and each use is logged with the order behind it.
26.18.4 Report every use to the CBN, and to the NFIU where AML or sanctions, within 24 hours
A Licensed Issuer shall report every use of the functions in 26.18.1 to the Bank, and to the NFIU where the action relates to suspected AML/TF/PF or sanctions, within twenty-four (24) hours.
- What an examiner will look for
- The reporting calendar lists “Use of freeze, block or burn functions”, “Within 24 hours”, to the “Bank; NFIU where relevant” (Schedule 7). Our reading: the clause says “the functions in 26.18.1”, and 26.18.1 is the clause that repeats 26.17.1 on minting; we read it as the freeze, block, burn and reissue functions of 26.18.2, which the calendar row supports. The CBN has not corrected the reference. Expect reports of each use, with times, matched to the log of 26.18.3.
- What this can look like
- Each freeze or burn produces a report to the CBN the same day, and to the NFIU where it relates to suspicion or sanctions.
26.19.1 Issuers monitor every wallet holding their stablecoin, customer or not
A Licensed Issuer shall monitor, using blockchain analytics, wallets holding or transacting in its stablecoin, whether or not the holder is its customer, to identify wallets associated with designated persons, sanctions evasion, fraud, ransomware, terrorist financing or other unlawful activity.
- What an examiner will look for
- The analytics coverage of all holders of the stablecoin and the wallets it identified.
- What this can look like
- The issuer screens every holder address of its token against sanctioned and illicit addresses, daily and on list updates.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
26.19.2 Keep a deny-list and freeze or block where required
A Licensed Issuer shall maintain a deny-list of wallets identified under 26.19.1 and shall freeze or block the stablecoins held by such wallets where required by Section 26.8, a lawful order, or its risk-based policies approved by the board.
- What an examiner will look for
- The monthly return reports wallets “frozen, blocked, deny-listed, or otherwise restricted” (Schedule 7, Part C, item 13). Expect the deny-list, the reason for each entry, and the freezes or blocks applied under Section 26.8, a lawful order or a board-approved policy.
- What this can look like
- Each deny-listed wallet has a reason and source, and the contract blocks its transfers.
- Rules that help
- Blacklist / internal watchlist match
26.19.3 STRs on suspicious secondary-market activity, customer or not
A Licensed Issuer shall file a suspicious transaction report under Section 26.9 in respect of suspicious secondary-market activity in its stablecoin, whether or not the persons involved are its customers.
- What an examiner will look for
- STRs filed on secondary-market activity, including by non-customers.
- What this can look like
- When analytics show a sanctioned or ransomware wallet receiving the stablecoin, the issuer files even though the holder is not its customer.
26.19.4 Share the deny-list with the CBN, the NFIU and distributors
A Licensed Issuer shall share its deny-list with the Bank and the NFIU upon request, and with licensed or authorised VASPs distributing its stablecoin to the extent permitted by law.
- What an examiner will look for
- Records of the deny-list shared with the CBN and the NFIU on request and with distributors.
- What this can look like
- Distributors receive the deny-list feed and screen against it.
26.20.1 Issue only on networks where the freeze controls work
A Licensed Issuer shall issue its stablecoin only on blockchain networks on which it can exercise the controls in Section 26.18.
- What an examiner will look for
- For each network the stablecoin is issued on, evidence that freeze, block, burn and reissue work there.
- What this can look like
- A network is added only after the freeze functions are tested on it.
26.20.2 Risk assessment and 30 days’ notice before a new network, bridge or contract change
A Licensed Issuer shall complete the risk assessment in 26.1.4 before deploying its stablecoin on any new network or bridge, or changing any smart-contract function, and shall notify the Bank at least thirty (30) days in advance.
- What an examiner will look for
- The reporting calendar lists the notice of a “New network, bridge or smart-contract change”, “At least 30 days in advance”, to the Bank (Schedule 7). Expect the 26.1.4 assessment and the notice to the CBN, at least 30 days before each deployment or change.
- What this can look like
- A deployment plan with the risk assessment and the CBN notice date at least 30 days before go-live.
26.20.3 Independent smart contract audit, including the freeze functions
A Licensed Issuer shall ensure that its smart contracts are independently audited before deployment and after any material change, including for the effectiveness of the freeze, block, burn and reissue functions.
- What an examiner will look for
- The audit reports before deployment and after each material change, each covering the freeze, block, burn and reissue functions. Section 37.5 asks for audits from at least two independent firms before launch or a material upgrade.
- What this can look like
- Audits by two independent firms before launch and before each material upgrade (37.5), each testing the freeze, block, burn and reissue functions.
26.20.4 Bridged or wrapped tokens out of reach of the controls: assess, mitigate, tell the CBN
Where its stablecoin is bridged or wrapped on a network where it cannot exercise the controls in Section 26.18, the Licensed Issuer shall assess the resulting AML/TF/PF risks, apply mitigating measures, and inform the Bank.
- What an examiner will look for
- For each such network: the risk assessment, the mitigation and the notice to the CBN.
- What this can look like
- The issuer lists the bridges carrying its token, monitors flows through them, and has told the CBN.
26.21.1 Due diligence and senior approval before appointing a distributor
Before appointing a VASP, financial institution or other person to distribute, offer, exchange or custody its stablecoin, a Licensed Issuer shall conduct due diligence equivalent to that in 26.16.1, and shall obtain senior management approval.
- What an examiner will look for
- For each distributor: the due diligence equivalent to 26.16.1 and the senior management approval, both dated before the appointment.
- What this can look like
- A distributor file with licence, ownership, AML controls and Travel Rule capability, signed off before the agreement.
26.21.2 A written agreement allocating AML responsibilities to each distributor
A Licensed Issuer shall enter into a written agreement with each distributor that allocates AML/CFT/CPF responsibilities, including CDD, Travel Rule compliance, sanctions screening, suspicious transaction reporting and the provision of customer and transaction information to the issuer upon request without delay.
- What an examiner will look for
- The agreements, each with the AML clauses the section lists.
- What this can look like
- Each distribution agreement says who does due diligence, Travel Rule, screening and STRs, and gives the issuer customer and transaction data on request.
26.21.3 No unlicensed or weak distributors
A Licensed Issuer shall not appoint, and shall terminate, a distributor that is unlicensed or unregistered where licensing or registration is required, or that fails to maintain adequate AML/CFT/CPF controls.
- What an examiner will look for
- Periodic reviews of distributors’ licences and AML controls, and terminations that followed.
- What this can look like
- A yearly distributor review; one that loses its licence is cut off.
26.21.4 The issuer stays responsible
The appointment of a distributor shall not relieve the Licensed Issuer of its obligations under this Part.
- What an examiner will look for
- The issuer’s own oversight of its distributors’ AML work, for example sample checks of their due diligence and screening.
- What this can look like
- The issuer tests a sample of each distributor’s customer files every year.
26.22.1 Issuers follow the Travel Rule and unhosted-wallet rules on their own transfers
Where a Licensed Issuer transfers its stablecoin to or from a wallet on issuance, on redemption or otherwise on behalf of a customer, Section 26.14 and Section 26.15 shall apply to it as if it were a licensed or authorised VASP.
- What an examiner will look for
- Mint, redemption and customer transfers by the issuer, with Travel Rule data and unhosted-wallet checks as for a VASP.
- What this can look like
- A mint to a customer’s personal wallet goes through the same ownership check as a VASP withdrawal.
26.22.2 Issuers do counterparty VASP due diligence
Where a Licensed Issuer transfers its stablecoin to or from another VASP, or has a business relationship with another VASP other than as a distributor under Section 26.21, Section 26.16 shall apply to it as if it were a licensed or authorised VASP.
- What an examiner will look for
- Due diligence files under 26.16 for each VASP the issuer transfers to or from, other than its distributors (26.21).
- What this can look like
- Market makers and exchanges that receive the stablecoin directly from the issuer have a counterparty file.
Section 27 Obligations Towards Customers and Complaints
1 requirement
27.7 Channels for error and fraud reports
Service providers shall give customers clear and accurate information appropriate to their approved services and maintain effective channels for enquiries, error reports, fraud reports and complaints.
- What an examiner will look for
- The channels customers use to report errors and fraud, and the log of reports received.
- What this can look like
- An in-app “report fraud” option and a hotline, each logging the report and opening a case.
Section 33 Unauthorised Transfers Errors Liability and Refunds
2 requirements
33.1 Report, secure, investigate and inform on unauthorised transfers and fraud
A provider shall maintain accessible procedures for customers to report suspected unauthorized transfers, errors, fraud or loss of credentials and shall promptly secure affected accounts or assets, preserve evidence, investigate and inform the customer of the outcome, subject to lawful restrictions on disclosure.
- What an examiner will look for
- The procedure, and for a sample of reports: the time the account or assets were secured, the evidence kept, the investigation and the outcome sent to the customer.
- What this can look like
- A report of an unauthorised transfer locks the account within minutes, the session and device data are preserved, and the customer is told the result.
33.2 Keep evidence of authorisation, authentication and execution
The provider shall maintain evidence of transaction authorisation, authentication, execution and relevant controls.
- What an examiner will look for
- For a sample of transactions, the stored evidence of who authorised them, how they were authenticated and how they were executed.
- What this can look like
- Each transfer record keeps the login session, the authentication factors used, the device and the approval step.
Section 36 General Risk Management and Internal Control Systems
1 requirement
36.6 Monitor fraud
It shall monitor conflicts, fraud, outsourcing and dependencies on custodians, banks, networks and technology providers.
- What an examiner will look for
- The fraud monitoring in place and its reporting to management. Section 37.13 sets the fraud detection duty in detail.
- What this can look like
- Fraud losses, cases and trends reported to management each month.
Section 37 Technology Risk and Information Security
3 with rules 7 requirements
37.3(a) Issuers: a smart contract freeze function
Freeze capability: the ability to freeze a specific wallet address or token balance pursuant to a lawful court order, regulatory directive, or NFIU instruction, preventing further transfers from or to the frozen address;
- What an examiner will look for
- The contract function and a test showing it stops transfers to and from a frozen address.
- What this can look like
- A freeze call on an address makes every later transfer from or to it fail.
37.3(c) Issuers: smart contract deny-listing of addresses named by the CBN, NFIU or law enforcement
Deny-listing: the ability to block transactions to or from wallet addresses identified by the Bank, the NFIU, or competent law enforcement authorities as being associated with money laundering, terrorist financing, proliferation financing, or sanctions violations;
- What an examiner will look for
- The deny-list function and the addresses blocked on request from the CBN, the NFIU or law enforcement.
- What this can look like
- An NFIU request adds the address to the contract’s deny-list the same day.
37.4 Board-approved procedures, audit trails and legal authority for freeze, burn and deny-listing
Exercise of freeze, burn or deny-listing powers shall be governed by documented procedures approved by the Board and shall be subject to audit trails, access controls and legal authorization requirements.
- What an examiner will look for
- The board-approved procedure, the audit trail of each use, and the legal authority recorded for each.
- What this can look like
- Each freeze or deny-listing records the order or policy it rests on and who approved it.
37.11 Authentication proportionate to risk, against credential theft and unauthorised transfers
Authentication and access controls shall be proportionate to transaction and account risks and protect against credential theft and unauthorised transfers. Sensitive changes and transaction authorisation shall be verifiable and recorded.
- What an examiner will look for
- The authentication set-up for logins, sensitive changes and transfers, with stronger steps for riskier actions, and records of each authorisation.
- What this can look like
- A new device, a change of phone or email, or a first withdrawal to a new wallet needs a second factor, and each is logged.
- Rules that help
- Account takeover (ATO)
37.12 Detect failed logins and anomalous sessions; controls against bots and account takeover
The provider shall detect repeated failed logins and anomalous sessions, apply controls against automated attacks and account takeover and protect session credentials. It shall maintain risk-based session termination and re-authentication controls.
- What an examiner will look for
- Detection rules for failed logins and anomalous sessions, the controls against automated attacks and account takeover, and the session termination and re-authentication settings.
- What this can look like
- Repeated failed logins lock the account or require a second factor; a login from a new device and country followed by a password change ends the session and asks for re-authentication.
- Rules that help
- Account takeover (ATO)
37.13 Monitor device, access, wallet and transaction patterns; investigate fraud alerts; work with AML monitoring
The provider shall monitor suspicious device, access, wallet and transaction patterns and promptly investigate fraud alerts. Fraud controls shall work alongside the AML/CFT/CPF monitoring and sanctions systems required by Section 26.
- What an examiner will look for
- The fraud scenarios on device, access, wallet and transaction data, fraud alerts with their investigation times, and how fraud findings reach the AML monitoring and sanctions systems.
- What this can look like
- Fraud rules on new devices, shared devices across customers, bursts of withdrawals and first large sends to new wallets, with fraud cases visible to AML analysts.
37.14 Advise customers on credentials, scams and reporting compromise
The provider shall give clear advice on protecting credentials, verifying transaction details, recognising scams and promptly reporting suspected compromise. Customer advice shall not replace the provider’s own security and asset-protection duties.
- What an examiner will look for
- The security advice given to customers, in the app and before sensitive actions.
- What this can look like
- Warnings before a first withdrawal to a new wallet, and a page on common scams and how to report them.
Section 46 Risk Management AML and Customer Protection
1 with rules 3 requirements
These clauses bind a Deposit Money Bank that issues deposit money tokens.
46.1 DMT issuers: controls for fraud risk
The bank shall maintain appropriate controls for technology, operational, liquidity, settlement, fraud and cybersecurity risks associated with DMTs.
- What an examiner will look for
- The bank’s fraud controls extended to DMT transfers. The Baseline Standards’ fraud monitoring duty already binds the bank (Baseline Standards, section 4(j)).
- What this can look like
- DMT transfers go through the bank’s fraud monitoring like other payments.
46.2 DMT issuers: due diligence and sanctions screening before transfers involving unverified persons
All DMT activities shall comply with applicable AML/CFT laws, regulations and CBN requirements. The Issuing Bank shall ensure that appropriate customer due diligence and sanctions screening are undertaken before permitting transfers involving persons or entities that are not appropriately identified or verified.
- What an examiner will look for
- Evidence that DMT transfers are blocked or screened where a party is not identified or verified, and that the bank’s AML programme covers DMTs.
- What this can look like
- A DMT transfer to a wallet not linked to a verified customer is held for due diligence and screening.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
46.4 DMT issuers: procedures for fraud and disputes
A bank shall maintain procedures for handling customer complaints, erroneous transfers, fraud and disputes involving DMT transactions.
- What an examiner will look for
- The procedure for DMT fraud reports and disputes, and the cases handled.
- What this can look like
- A DMT fraud report follows the same steps as a card or transfer fraud report.
Section 54 Transition and Pilot Arrangements
1 requirement
54.1 Existing operators comply with AML/CFT/CPF from commencement
During that transition, it may continue only at its existing scale and subject to the Bank’s interim conditions, provided it registers with the Bank within thirty days, complies with AML/CFT/CPF requirements from commencement, begins supervisory reporting within sixty days or an earlier prescribed period, and submits a complete application within the transition period.
- What an examiner will look for
- For a person operating before 5 November 2026: registration with the CBN, an AML/CFT/CPF programme in force from that date, supervisory reporting begun, and the application submitted. The circular sets commencement at 5 November 2026 (section 4.0).
- What this can look like
- An existing exchange ran Section 26 controls from 5 November 2026, registered with the CBN within thirty days, began reporting within sixty days (or by the earlier date the CBN set) and filed its application within 180 calendar days. Counting calendar days, the library’s own count, those are 5 December 2026, 4 January 2027 and 4 May 2027.
Schedule 7 Supervisory Reporting Templates
8 requirements
The monthly regulatory report’s AML/CFT/CPF and sanctions metrics (Part C) and the P2P return’s fraud, AML, Travel Rule and concentration items (Part F). These are what the CBN sees each month, so they are also the evidence most examiner lines above can point to.
Schedule 7, Part C, item 12 Monthly: alerts, STRs, screening hits and typologies
AML/CFT alerts generated, escalated, closed, and outstanding; STR count filed with the NFIU; sanctions screening hits; and material typologies identified, without disclosing individual STR contents unless lawfully required.
- What an examiner will look for
- This item of the monthly return (Schedule 7, Part C). Expect the figures traced to the monitoring, case and screening systems.
- What this can look like
- The monthly return is generated from the case system: alerts by status, STRs filed, screening hits, and the typologies seen.
Schedule 7, Part C, item 13 Monthly: wallets frozen, blocked, deny-listed or restricted
Number of wallet addresses frozen, blocked, deny-listed, or otherwise restricted pursuant to lawful regulatory or law-enforcement action.
- What an examiner will look for
- This item of the monthly return (Schedule 7, Part C). Expect the figure traced to the freeze and deny-list logs (26.18.3, 26.19.2).
- What this can look like
- A count from the deny-list and freeze log, by reason.
Schedule 7, Part F, item 24 P2P return: disputed, fraudulent, anomalous or unauthorised transactions
the number and value of disputed, fraudulent, anomalous or unauthorised transactions, together with complaints received, amounts affected, resolution status and average resolution time;
- What an examiner will look for
- This item of the P2P return (Schedule 7, Part F). Expect the figures traced to the fraud and dispute logs (10.4.1(e), 10.10.3).
- What this can look like
- A monthly count and value of fraud and dispute cases on the P2P service, with resolution times.
Schedule 7, Part F, item 25 P2P return: monitoring, screening and wallet alerts and suspicious P2P patterns
transaction-monitoring alerts, sanctions-screening alerts, wallet-monitoring alerts and suspicious or anomalous P2P patterns identified, without reproducing the contents of individual Suspicious Transaction Reports except where lawfully required;
- What an examiner will look for
- This item of the P2P return (Schedule 7, Part F). Expect the figures traced to the alerts of 10.4.1(d) and 10.7.5.
- What this can look like
- Monthly P2P alert counts by scenario, without STR contents.
Schedule 7, Part F, item 26 P2P return: third-party, nominee and mule accounts and the action taken
transactions involving third-party, nominee, mule, fictitious or improperly attributed payment accounts or wallets, including the action taken by the Licensee;
- What an examiner will look for
- This item of the P2P return (Schedule 7, Part F). Expect the figures traced to the cases raised under 10.3.4.
- What this can look like
- A monthly list of trades paid from or to accounts not in the customer’s name, each with the action taken.
Schedule 7, Part F, item 27 P2P return: unhosted-wallet and VASP transactions, Travel Rule compliance, cross-border activity
transactions involving unhosted wallets or another VASP, including the number and value of such transactions and compliance with the applicable Travel Rule and counterparty due-diligence requirements; domestic and cross-border P2P activity by jurisdiction, corridor, token, settlement channel and transaction purpose;
- What an examiner will look for
- This item of the P2P return (Schedule 7, Part F). Expect the figures traced to the Travel Rule records (10.7.3, 10.7.4, 26.15.1), the counterparty due diligence of 26.16 and the cross-border trades of 10.9.3.
- What this can look like
- Monthly counts and values of P2P trades with unhosted wallets and with other VASPs, how many carried complete Travel Rule data, and cross-border activity by country and corridor.
Schedule 7, Part F, item 28 P2P return: concentration by customer, counterparty, wallet, bank, channel and country
concentration by customer, counterparty, Regulated Token, wallet, financial institution, payment channel, settlement channel and jurisdiction;
- What an examiner will look for
- This item of the P2P return (Schedule 7, Part F). Expect the figures traced to the trade records, and consistent with the “unusual counterparty concentration” that 10.7.5 asks the provider to identify.
- What this can look like
- A monthly table of the largest customers, counterparties, wallets, banks, channels and countries by share of P2P volume.
Schedule 7, Part F, item 30 P2P return: fraud events and operational incidents
material outages, reconciliation exceptions, escrow failures, settlement failures, fraud events, cybersecurity incidents and other operational incidents affecting the P2P Service; and
- What an examiner will look for
- This item of the P2P return (Schedule 7, Part F). Expect the figures traced to the fraud and incident logs (10.4.1(e), 10.10.3, 37.13).
- What this can look like
- A monthly list of fraud events and operational incidents on the P2P service, with dates, amounts and status.
Sources
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Payments System Policy Department, circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004 to virtual asset service providers in Nigeria and stakeholders in the financial services industry, 5 November 2026, with the attached “Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria” (November 2026).
- Central Bank of Nigeria, circular BSD/DIR/PUB/LAB/019/002, “Baseline Standards for Automated Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Solutions for Financial Institutions in Nigeria”, 10 March 2026, section 4.
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Financial Policy and Regulation Department, circular FPR/DIR/PUB/CIR/002/003, Guidelines on Operations of Bank Accounts for Virtual Assets Service Providers (VASPs), 22 December 2023.
- Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 (Nigeria), s.11(1), Official Gazette No. 90 Vol. 109, 13 May 2022, as published by the NFIU.
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The Fraud & AML Library is a practical reference, not legal advice. What binds is the regulator’s own text, which every rule and regulation page links.