Money laundering

Missing originator or beneficiary information (Travel Rule)

A transfer is sent, received, or passed on without the originator and beneficiary information the law requires to travel with it, or a crypto transfer arrives without its Travel Rule message.

A transfer between two providers is sent, received, or passed on with the originator or beneficiary information missing, or a crypto transfer arrives without its Travel Rule message Sent, received, or passed on Sending provider Receiving provider Transfer Originator or beneficiary information missing or Crypto: no Travel Rule message

What it catches

A transfer that leaves, arrives or passes through without the information on who sent it and who receives it that the law says must travel with it: the originator’s name and account (or wallet address, or a unique reference), and above a set amount, or on every transfer where the law sets none, the originator’s address, identity number or date and place of birth; the beneficiary’s name and account or wallet. For crypto transfers the same information travels in a separate Travel Rule message between the two providers, which the FATF asks the sending provider to submit “immediately and securely” (Interpretive Note to Recommendation 15, para 7(b)) and several laws require before or with the transfer (see the crypto variant below).

The FATF standard puts it in one sentence: countries should ensure that financial institutions “monitor payments or value transfers for the purpose of detecting those which lack required originator and/or beneficiary information and take appropriate measures” (Recommendation 16). Its Interpretive Note splits the work by role. The ordering institution “should not be allowed to execute the payments or value transfer” without the required information (para 23); an intermediary takes “reasonable measures to identify cross-border payments or value transfers that lack required information”, consistent with straight-through processing (para 26); a beneficiary institution does the same, and “Such measures may include post-event monitoring or real-time monitoring where feasible” (para 28). Each needs risk-based policies for “when to execute, reject, or suspend” such a transfer and “the appropriate follow-up action” (paras 27 and 31). Since 2019 the same duties apply to virtual asset service providers, and to financial institutions sending or receiving virtual asset transfers for a customer (Interpretive Note to Recommendation 15, para 7(b)).

Missing information is a reason to stop, ask and decide, and it is not a suspicion by itself: the EBA tells firms to “consider that missing or inadmissible information per se does not give rise to suspicion of ML/TF” (EBA/GL/2024/11, para 48). Some laws go further: Nigeria for wire transfers missing originator information, Ghana where the missing information cannot be obtained, and Uganda (see By country). What it can point to is a sender hiding who is behind a payment, a counterparty that does not do its checks, or a payment chain built to break the trail.

How the rule works

The rule is a completeness check on each transfer, run at the point where you can still act on it: before an outgoing transfer is executed, and before an incoming one is credited or made available. Which fields are required depends on your role in the chain, the route and the amount, so the rule first works out the required set, then checks each field is there and means something. It often runs inside the payment engine or the Travel Rule solution; the counterparty variant is built on its results.

Looks at

Every transfer you send, receive or pass on, on any rail (bank, mobile money, e-money, crypto), when it is initiated or received and before the money is released.

Works out

  • Your role: sending (ordering), passing on (intermediary) or receiving (beneficiary).
  • The route: domestic or cross-border; for crypto, to or from another provider or an unhosted wallet.
  • The amount band: above or below the line in your country, counting transfers that appear linked.

From these three, the list of originator and beneficiary fields the transfer must carry.

Leaves out

  • Card payments for goods and services, which carry the card number instead. A card used for a person-to-person transfer stays in.
  • Transfers between financial institutions acting on their own behalf.
  • Individual transfers in a batch file whose batch carries the full information; each still needs the originator’s account or reference.

Alerts when

Any of these is true:

  1. A required field is empty, holds a placeholder, or uses characters the payment system does not accept.
  2. Crypto: no Travel Rule message was sent, or none was received, by the time the transfer moves.
  3. One counterparty institution sends you incomplete transfers repeatedly, or leaves your requests for the missing information unanswered.

Then

Outgoing: the transfer is not executed until the information is complete. Incoming or passing through: the transfer is held, rejected or returned under your written policy, and the missing information is requested from the institution before you, with a deadline.

How often

One alert per transfer; the counterparty alert at most once per counterparty per review period.

Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.

Common variants:

  • Crypto Travel Rule message. For a virtual asset transfer the check is on the message exchanged between the two providers, not on the blockchain transaction, which carries no names. The FATF notes that the information “can be submitted either directly or indirectly” and need not “be attached directly to the virtual asset transfers” (Interpretive Note to Recommendation 15, footnote 47). Nigeria and South Africa require the message before or with the transfer, the EU “in advance of, or simultaneously or concurrently with, the transfer of crypto-assets” (Regulation (EU) 2023/1113, art. 14(4)), and Ghana “immediately” (BoG/FIC Guideline 2025, 2.6.4(4)); South Africa adds that “Post facto transmission of the required information is not permitted” (FIC Directive 9, para 7.3). A deposit that arrives with no message, or whose message comes later, is held until it is matched. A deposit from an unhosted wallet has no provider to send a message: the information comes from your own customer, and the check is that it was collected and stored.
  • Repeatedly failing counterparty. The same check counted per counterparty institution over a period: the share of its transfers that arrive incomplete and the share of your requests it ignores. The EU requires warnings and deadlines, then rejecting its future transfers or restricting or ending the relationship, and a report to the supervisor (Regulation (EU) 2023/1113, arts. 8(2) and 17(2)); Nigeria, Ghana and Uganda have the same idea in their texts (see By country).
  • Split under the line. Several transfers just below the de minimis line between the same parties, each carrying only names and accounts where the total would require the full set. The EU’s thresholds count transfers “which appear to be linked” (Regulation (EU) 2023/1113, arts. 5 to 7). See Transaction structuring.
  • Beneficiary name that does not match the account. The FATF’s June 2025 revision adds, for cross-border transfers above the de minimis line, that the beneficiary institution check how far the beneficiary’s name and account in the message align with its own records, monitor for misaligned beneficiary information, or use a confirmation-of-payee scheme (Interpretive Note to Recommendation 16, para 30). It is a match check rather than a completeness check, and it is aimed at misdirected payments, fraud included.

Data it needs

ShowHide
FieldUsually comes fromIf it’s missing
Direction and your role (ordering, intermediary, beneficiary)payment processorRequired. The fields to check and the action to take both depend on it.
Amount, currency and the amount in USD, EUR or the local line’s currencypayment eventRequired to choose the band. Convert at a documented rate.
Route: domestic or cross-border, and the counterparty institution’s countrypayment message (BIC, bank code, provider identifier)Required. Without it, domestic transfers are checked against the cross-border list, or the reverse.
Counterparty institution (bank, payment provider or virtual asset service provider)payment message or Travel Rule messageRequired for the counterparty variant and for requests for the missing information.
Originator name; originator account, wallet address or unique referencepayment message, or your customer record when you are the senderRequired. Check each field separately: a full name with no account fails as surely as an account with no name.
Originator address, identity number, customer number, or date and place of birth; legal entity identifier for a companypayment message, or your customer recordRequired above the line, and wherever the law sets no line (in the EU, every transfer arriving from outside the Union). Which of these is accepted differs by country.
Beneficiary name; beneficiary account, wallet address or referencepayment messageRequired. Ghana also asks for the beneficiary’s address and an identity number or date and place of birth above USD 1,000 on cross-border transfers.
Purpose of the transactionpayment messageRequired in Ghana on cross-border transfers above USD 1,000 and on transfers through money transfer services.
Travel Rule message status and time (sent, received, pending, failed) and the on-chain transfer timeTravel Rule solutionRequired for crypto. Without it, the rule cannot tell a transfer with no message from one whose message arrived.
Wallet type (hosted by a provider, or unhosted)Travel Rule solution or blockchain analyticsRequired for crypto: an unhosted wallet’s information comes from your customer, not from a message.
Batch file idpayment processorNeeded so that transfers in a batch are checked against the batch’s information.
Rail and transaction type (card purchase, transfer, own-account movement)ledgerNeeded to leave out card payments for goods and services and transfers between institutions on their own account.
Request log: date asked, date answered, outcomecase toolNeeded for the deadline and for the counterparty variant.

Thresholds

Each row is a setting the rule needs. Set by law and Standard values come from the source named under “Where it comes from”. Suggested values are starting points: test them on your own history, then adjust.

ParameterValueTypeWhere it comes from
De minimis line for cross-border and domestic transfersno higher than USD/EUR 1,000StandardFATF, Interpretive Note to Recommendation 16, paras 8 and 10. Below the line, cross-border: both names and both account numbers (or a reference) (para 8); domestic: the originator’s name and account or reference (para 10). Above it, cross-border: also the originator’s address, the beneficiary’s country and town, the originator’s date of birth for a natural person, and for a legal person its BIC, LEI or unique official identifier where one exists (para 9).
Nigeria, virtual asset transfersUSD/EUR 1,000 or its naira equivalent; no line for cross-border virtual asset transactions or for transfers between two customers of the same providerSet by lawCBN Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets, 26.14.3 and 26.14.4; 11.10.9(c) (“[irrespective of the value of the transfer]”, brackets as published); 10.7.3 (“regardless of amount”).
Nigeria, wire transfersUS$1,000 or its equivalentSet by lawCBN AML/CFT/CPF Regulations 2022, reg. 33(1) and (3).
Ghana, cross-border transfers and virtual asset transfersUSD 1,000 or its cedi equivalentSet by lawBoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.6.10.1(1) and (3); for virtual asset service providers 2.6.4(7), which is worded for cross-border transfers.
EU, transfers of fundsEUR 1,000, counting transfers that appear linked: below it, a transfer leaving the Union carries both names and both account numbers, and within the Union the payer’s provider must produce only those on request; above it, the payee’s provider verifies the payee. Transfers arriving from outside the Union: no line, the payer’s name, account and address or identity details and the payee’s name and account are checked whatever the amountSet by lawRegulation (EU) 2023/1113, arts. 5(2), 6(2), 7(2)(b) and 7(3)–(4). Crypto-asset transfers carry the full information whatever the amount (art. 14).
South Africa, crypto asset transfersR5,000: below it, a reduced set; any value above zero is coveredSet by lawFIC Directive 9 of 2024, paras 2.1.9, 4.5 and 4.6.
Mexico, money transmission by e-money institutionsany amount: names, reference and source account, which the sending institution sends with the transfer; USD 1,000, 3,000 and 5,000: more identity data collected from your own sending or receiving client at each band, not carried in the messageSet by lawSHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, art. 101, fractions I to IV.
West African unionno line: the information is required on every electronic transfer, or only the account number or a unique reference where the rest can be made available by other means and the number lets the transfer be tracedSet by lawUniform Law 2023, art. 39.
Time to obtain missing information before decidingEU: up to 3 working days (within the Union), 5 (from outside), 7 days (chains with more than two parties or a provider outside the EU); West African union: 3 working days for the ordering institution to supply it, 3 days for intermediaries; Nigeria: 3 business days for domestic wire transfers, follow-up within 24 hours; Ghana, domestic transfers: close of the day of the requestStandard (EU); Set by law (others)EBA/GL/2024/11, para 56; Uniform Law 2023, arts. 40 and 45; CBN AML/CFT/CPF Regulations 2022, reg. 33(5)(b), (6) and (10)(b); BoG/FIC Guideline 2025, 2.6.10.2(6).
Report of a repeatedly failing counterparty to the supervisor (EU)without undue delay, and no later than three months after identifying itStandardEBA/GL/2024/11, para 74, on Regulation (EU) 2023/1113, arts. 8(2) and 17(2).
Repeated failure by one counterpartyno public value; set from your own baseline across counterpartiesSuggestedThe EBA asks for a percentage of incomplete transfers in a set period and a percentage of unanswered requests (para 68), without a number.

By country

  • Nigeria. Virtual asset service providers licensed or authorised by the CBN, and any CBN-licensed financial institution sending or receiving a virtual asset transfer for a customer, apply the Travel Rule to every virtual asset transfer, domestic or cross-border (CBN Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets, in force 5 November 2026, section 26.14.1). At USD/EUR 1,000 or more the originating provider obtains and holds the originator’s name, account number or wallet address (or a unique transaction reference), “the originator’s address, or NIN or customer identification number, or date and place of birth”, a legal person’s Legal Entity Identifier where available, and the beneficiary’s name and account number or wallet address (26.14.3); below it, both names and the wallet address or reference of each (26.14.4). The line does not apply in two cases: a licensee carries out cross-border virtual asset transactions only “with originator and beneficiary information transmitted under Section 26.14 [irrespective of the value of the transfer]” (11.10.9(c); the brackets are in the published text), and where both parties to a P2P transaction are customers of the provider it “shall obtain, hold and retain the originator and beneficiary information required by Section 26.14.3 for the transfer, regardless of amount” (10.7.3). Transfers in a batch file each carry the originator’s account number, wallet address or reference, and the batch file the full information (26.14.10). The information goes to the beneficiary provider “immediately and securely, before or simultaneously with the transfer” (26.14.5), and “The originating licensed or authorised VASP shall not execute a virtual asset transfer if it cannot comply with 26.14.3 to 26.14.5”, whether or not the counterparty’s country has a Travel Rule (26.14.6). The beneficiary provider “shall take reasonable measures, which may include post-event or real-time monitoring where feasible, to identify virtual asset transfers that lack required originator or required beneficiary information”, with risk-based policies on when to execute, reject, suspend or return such a transfer, “including withholding the virtual assets from the customer’s account pending receipt of the information”, and on the follow-up: requesting the information, restricting or terminating the relationship with the counterparty, and filing a suspicious transaction report (26.14.8). An intermediary does the same (26.14.9). For an unhosted wallet the information comes from the customer (26.15.1). For wire transfers, the CBN’s AML/CFT/CPF Regulations 2022 require intermediary institutions to “take reasonable measures that are consistent with straight-through processing to identify cross border transfer that lack required originator or beneficiary information” (reg. 33(9)); beneficiary and intermediary institutions to have risk-based policies for “when to execute, reject or suspend a wire transfer lacking required originator or beneficiary information” and the follow-up, “not later than 24 hours” (reg. 33(10)); and the beneficiary’s institution to “restrict or even terminate its business relationship with the Financial Institutions that fail to meet the standards specified in this regulation” (reg. 33(12)). Unlike the EBA guidance above, the 2022 Regulations treat the gap itself as reportable for wire transfers missing originator information (for virtual assets, a report is one of the follow-up actions a policy may provide for, 26.14.8(b)): “The lack of complete originator’s information shall be considered as a factor in assessing whether a wire transfer or related transactions are suspicious and Financial Institution shall immediately file a STR on wire transfers with incomplete originator’s transaction information to the NFIU” (reg. 33(11)).

    Reporting deadline

    Report to the NFIU immediately, with a written report within 24 hours (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.7(1)–(2)). The NFIU’s December 2024 STR guidelines start the 24 hours once the transaction is found suspicious, after an examination of no more than 72 hours, and require written reasons for every alert closed as not suspicious (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, Part Six, para 2). For a wire transfer with incomplete originator information, reg. 33(11) asks for the report “immediately”, so the 72 hours of examination are not available.

  • Ghana. Institutions licensed by the Bank of Ghana require, obtain and hold, on cross-border transfers of USD 1,000 or more, the originator’s name, account number or unique reference, “address, and contact information (telephone number and/or email) or national identity number and/or customer identification number, or date and place of birth”, and the purpose of the transaction, and the beneficiary’s name, account number or reference, and “the beneficiary address, Ghana Card Number or national identification document for foreign nationals and/or customer identification number, or date and place of birth”; below USD 1,000, both names and accounts or references (set by law, BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.6.10.1(1) and (3)). Domestic transfers carry the same originator and beneficiary information, or an account number or reference that the ordering institution can back with the full information by the close of the day of a request (2.6.10.2(2) and (6)). Institutions dealing with money transfer services, and beneficiary institutions, monitor “either by close of day or real-time, to identify cross-border wire/electronic transfers and payment transactions that lack required originator information or required beneficiary information” (2.6.8(4), 2.6.10.4(1)); intermediaries “monitor and identify transactions which are consistent with straight-through processing” to find them (2.6.10.3(5)). Each role has policies on “when to execute, reject, or suspend” an incomplete transfer and the follow-up (2.6.10.2(1), 2.6.10.3(1), 2.6.10.4(5)). The institution takes measures “to obtain and verify the missing originator and beneficiary information” (2.6.10.1(5), 2.6.10.4(2)); an intermediary suspends the transfer and asks the originating institution (2.6.10.3(6)) and, if the information cannot be obtained, refuses or reverses it (2.6.10.3(4) and (7)). “Where technical limitations prevent the required originator or beneficiary information accompanying a cross-border or domestic wire/electronic transfer and payment transactions, the AI shall take steps to identify the missing information and keep records of all information obtained” (2.6.10.3(3)). Virtual asset service providers hold the same information on virtual asset transfers, with the Ghana Card number or a foreign national’s identity document and the date and place of birth of both parties above the line, send it to the beneficiary provider “immediately and securely” (2.6.4(4)), and do not execute “the trade, transfer, conversions (fiat to crypto and crypto to fiat)” if the missing information cannot be obtained (2.6.4(2)–(4), (7)–(9)). Screening procedures must “reasonably ensure that originator, intermediary and beneficiary details are included on the transfers” (2.9(7)(iv)), and among the Guideline’s terrorist financing red flags is a “Funds transfer does not include information on the originator, or the person on whose behalf the transaction is conducted, the inclusion of which shall ordinarily be expected” (Appendix E, 6(e)).

    Reporting deadline

    Where the required information cannot be obtained, the institution does not execute the transfer and files a suspicious transaction report with the FIC within 24 hours (2.6.8(6), 2.6.10.1(6), 2.6.10.2(4), 2.6.10.3(4), 2.6.10.4(3); for virtual asset service providers 2.6.4(9)). Any other suspicious transaction: within 24 hours of the suspicion, attempted transactions included, whatever the amount (2.8.1(6) and 2.8.3(2)).

  • WAEMU (UEMOA). The Uniform Law requires financial institutions making national, intra-union and international electronic transfers to obtain and verify the originator’s full name, account number, and address or, failing an address, national identification number or place and date of birth, and to require the beneficiary’s name and account number, all of which must appear “dans le message ou le formulaire de paiement qui accompagne le virement” (in the payment message or form that accompanies the transfer), with a unique reference where there is no account (Loi uniforme 2023, art. 39). It sets no amount below which less is required, but it lets the originator’s institution send “seulement du numéro de compte ou d’un numéro de référence unique d’opération” (only the account number or a unique transaction reference) where the information “peuvent être mises à disposition de l’institution financière du bénéficiaire et des autorités concernées par d’autres moyens” (can be made available to the beneficiary’s institution and the authorities by other means) and the number “permet de reconstituer le parcours de l’opération jusqu’au donneur d’ordre ou au bénéficiaire” (allows the operation to be traced back to the originator or the beneficiary) (art. 39, fourth paragraph), on national, intra-union and international transfers alike; the originator’s institution then provides the information “dans les trois jours ouvrables” (within three working days) of the beneficiary institution’s request (art. 40). An originating institution that cannot obtain the information “s’abstient d’exécuter le virement” (refrains from executing the transfer) and reports to the CENTIF if it has a suspicion (art. 42). Intermediaries take “des mesures raisonnables, conformes au traitement de bout en bout, pour identifier les virements électroniques pour lesquels il manque les informations” (reasonable measures, consistent with straight-through processing, to identify electronic transfers missing the information) (art. 45), and keep risk-based policies on when to execute, reject or suspend such transfers and on the follow-up (art. 43). The beneficiary institution takes reasonable measures, “qui peuvent comprendre une surveillance a posteriori ou une surveillance en temps réel lorsque cela est possible” (which may include post-event or, where possible, real-time monitoring), to detect them (art. 46), under the same policies (art. 47). An intermediary that has not obtained missing originator information “dans un délai de trois jours” (within three days) does not execute the transfer and informs the CENTIF (art. 45). WAEMU (UEMOA in French) is the West African Economic and Monetary Union: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, the same eight states that form the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). The BCEAO’s instructions and the Council of Ministers’ decisions apply in all eight. The uniform law applies in each state through that state’s own act, which may number its articles differently. The law of a single state is covered only where that state is named.

    Reporting deadline

    Report to the CENTIF “immédiatement” (Loi uniforme 2023, art. 60). The law does not define “immédiatement”; it defines “sans délai” as at most 24 hours (art. 2, point 58). Check the expected timing with your CENTIF. Do not carry out an operation you suspect until the report is made, and then only if the CENTIF has not opposed it: an opposition blocks the operation for up to four days (arts. 61 and 65). If it has already gone through, inform the CENTIF “sans délai” (art. 61).

  • South Africa. Crypto asset service providers that are accountable institutions apply FIC Directive 9 of 2024, in operation since 30 April 2025, to every domestic and cross-border crypto asset transfer, a “qualifying transfer” being “any value above zero” (paras 2.1.9, 3 and 9.1). The ordering provider transmits the originator’s full name, identity number (or, for a non-resident, passport or foreign identity number and date of birth), residential address or country of birth, distributed ledger address and account number or reference, and the beneficiary’s full name, ledger address and account number where available (paras 4.2 and 4.4); below R5,000, names, ledger addresses and account numbers or references only (para 4.5). It “may not execute a crypto asset transfer if it cannot comply” (para 4.8), and the information goes “prior to, or simultaneously with the transfer itself”; “Post facto transmission of the required information is not permitted” (paras 7.2 and 7.3). Intermediary and recipient providers take reasonable measures to identify cross-border transfers that lack the required information, the recipient’s “may include post-event monitoring or real-time monitoring where feasible”, and keep risk-based policies on when to execute, suspend execution or return such a transfer and on the follow-up (paras 5.3, 5.4, 6.4 and 6.5). Transfers involving unhosted wallets need their own risk-based policies (para 8.2). The FIC’s guidance on the Directive (PCC 61, 30 March 2026): “Real-time monitoring is recommended in order to identify crypto asset transfers that lack the information as required in Directive 9 and then enable the swift suspending of transactions that are non-compliant” (para 4.3); “Directive 9 also requires accountable institutions to conduct post event monitoring, in addition to conducting real-time monitoring to identify instance of non-compliance” (para 4.4); “Blockchain analytics, when used by the CASP, may therefore supplement, but cannot substitute for an enquiry and analysis of the “travel rule” data requirements and crypto asset transfer transmission obligations” (para 4.5); and “Monitoring tools should assess or analyse compliance with the travel rule requirement at both client and jurisdictional level. In this way, clear patterns of non-compliance can be identified” (para 4.7). Where the counterparty’s country has no Travel Rule: “CASPs that are subject to Directive 9 are reminded that they must comply with the requirements of the travel rule in all instances and therefore must receive and send the required information concerning the crypto asset transfer as set out in Directive 9” (PCC 61, section 3, “What are the sunrise considerations?”).

    Reporting deadline

    As soon as possible, and no later than 15 days excluding weekends and public holidays (FIC Act s.29; MLTF Control Regulations, reg. 24(3), via FIC Guidance Note 4B para 71). The 15 days run from when you became aware of the facts, which “may be, and in the majority of cases will be, before a suspicion is formed” (GN4B para 80), and an institution “may not add additional timeframes for its internal transactional monitoring alert system processes, and / or internal investigation and review processes to the prescribed reporting period” (GN4B para 81).

  • Uganda. An accountable person undertaking a domestic or cross-border wire transfer makes sure the originator’s name, address, account number and national identification number (or passport number or date and place of birth), and the beneficiary’s name, address and account number or a unique reference, accompany it, and the information “shall remain with the fund transfer or related message through the payment chain” (Anti-Money Laundering Regulations 2015, reg. 34(1)). “An accountable person shall monitor and report to the Authority electronic funds transfers which do not contain complete originator and beneficiary information” (reg. 34(5)), and “shall restrict or terminate a business relationship with an accountable person that persistently fails to include complete originator and beneficiary information in its electronic funds transfer” (reg. 34(6)). The 2023 amendment leaves reg. 34 unchanged.

    Reporting deadline

    Reg. 34(5) sets no deadline or form for its report on incomplete transfers. A suspicious transaction is reported “upon investigating and being fully satisfied that the transaction or activity is suspicious” (reg. 39(1)), “as soon as is practicable but in any case not later than forty eight hours after the occurrence of the suspicious activity or transaction” (reg. 39(2)).

  • EU. Since 30 December 2024 the Transfer of Funds Regulation requires the payee’s payment service provider to “implement effective procedures, including, where appropriate, monitoring after or during the transfers, in order to detect whether the following information on the payer or the payee is missing”, and to check that the fields were “filled in using characters or inputs admissible in accordance with the conventions of that system” (Regulation (EU) 2023/1113, arts. 7(1)–(2) and 40). Where it finds information missing, it rejects the transfer or requests the information before or after crediting the payee (art. 8(1)). Crypto-asset service providers do the same for crypto-asset transfers, which carry the originator’s and beneficiary’s names, ledger addresses and account numbers and the originator’s address and identity details whatever the amount, and may reject, return or suspend them (arts. 14, 16(1) and 17(1)). Intermediaries keep the information with the transfer, detect missing information in the same way and decide whether to execute, reject or suspend (arts. 10 to 13 for transfers of funds; arts. 19 to 21 for crypto-assets, where the intermediary checks that the information “has been submitted previously, simultaneously or concurrently with the transfer”, art. 20). Where a provider “repeatedly fails to provide the required information”, the receiving provider warns it and sets deadlines, or directly rejects its future transfers or restricts or ends the relationship, and reports the failure to its AML supervisor (arts. 8(2) and 17(2)). Missing information is a factor in deciding whether to report to the FIU (arts. 9 and 18). Within the Union, transfers of funds need only both account numbers, with the full information available within three working days on request (art. 5). A transfer whose payer’s provider is outside the Union is checked for the payer’s name, account and address or identity details and the payee’s name and account, whatever the amount (art. 7(2)(b)): the EUR 1,000 line does not lighten what an EU payee’s provider checks on incoming transfers from outside the Union. The EBA’s Travel Rule Guidelines treat a field as missing if it is empty, “meaningless or incomplete”, list examples of meaningless entries, set the deadlines for requesting information, and ask firms to measure each counterparty’s rate of incomplete transfers and unanswered requests and to report a repeatedly failing one within three months (EBA/GL/2024/11, paras 49–50, 56, 67–68 and 74).

    Reporting deadline

    Inform the FIU “promptly” (Directive (EU) 2015/849, art. 33(1)(a), which each member state’s law transposes).

  • Mexico. Fintech institutions (crowdfunding and e-money institutions, ITFs) “Para efectos de determinar aquellas Operaciones que sean Inusuales … deberán considerar, entre otras, las siguientes circunstancias” (in determining which operations are unusual, must consider, among others, the following circumstances) (art. 70), among them “Cuando se reciba una transferencia electrónica de Fondos de Pagos Electrónicos sin contar con toda la información requerida para ello” (where an electronic transfer of e-money funds is received without all the information required for it) (SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, art. 70(XI); the clause refers to Title 3, chapter III, which does not list transfer data). For the money transmission service of e-money institutions, every transfer, whatever the amount, carries the sender’s full name without abbreviations, the reference the sending institution gave the transfer, the account or reference the funds come from, and the beneficiary’s full name; the sending institution “deberá acompañar a la transferencia de dinero” (must send with the transfer) those items, and the receiving institution keeps the same four (art. 101(I)). From USD 1,000, and again at USD 3,000 and 5,000, the institution collects more identity data from its own sending or receiving client (art. 101(II)–(IV)); these go in the client’s file, not in the transfer message, and each transfer’s data are loaded into the monitoring system by the close of each business day and into its alerts (art. 101, last paragraphs). These provisions cover fintech institutions only, and art. 101 only their money transmission service: for other e-money transfers they list no required information.

    Reporting deadline

    The Communication and Control Committee rules on an unusual operation within 60 calendar days of its detection, and the report goes to SHCP, through the CNBV, within 3 business days of the end of that session; within 24 hours of the alert or staff notice where there are signs or concrete facts that the funds could come from illicit activities or be used for terrorist financing or money laundering (SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, arts. 69 and 73).

  • Argentina. Payment service providers that offer payment accounts “deberán recabar información precisa del ordenante y destinatario de la operación y de los mensajes relacionados. La información deberá permanecer con la transferencia, a través de la cadena de pagos” (must collect accurate information on the originator and recipient of the operation and of the related messages; the information must stay with the transfer along the payment chain), on domestic and cross-border transfers, which also follow the BCRA’s own rules (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 37). The resolution itself does not list the fields each kind of transfer must carry. Every firm the resolution covers must “Determinar cuándo rechazar o suspender una transferencia electrónica de fondos que carezca de la información requerida, así como la acción de seguimiento apropiada” (determine when to reject or suspend an electronic funds transfer that lacks the required information, and the appropriate follow-up action) (art. 8(j)).

    Reporting deadline

    Money laundering, within 24 hours of concluding that the operation is suspicious, and no later than 90 calendar days from the operation, performed or attempted; terrorist financing and proliferation financing, within 24 hours of the operation (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 36(c)).

False positives and tuning

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The rule checks data, so most false alerts come from the data rather than from the transfer:

  • Information in the message but not in the feed. The payment message may carry the originator’s name and account while the feed the rule reads drops, truncates or masks them, or a rail delivers no originator fields at all. Before switching the rule on, measure each field’s fill rate per rail and per counterparty, and chart its gaps by month and by sending institution. Gaps that start and stop on a date, or that hit one institution’s transfers while the same account arrives complete through other transfers, come from your intake (an export that cuts account numbers, a rail whose originator fields are not mapped), not from the sender: fix the intake rather than requesting the information from the sender. The same check comes before warning a counterparty under the counterparty variant.
  • A field that holds something else. A field labelled as a name can be filled with something that is not a name, such as a wallet address or the label a customer typed for a saved recipient. Test that a name field holds a name before counting it as present.
  • Fields your feed never carries. If the feed never carries a field the law requires (the payer’s address, identity number or date of birth, or the Travel Rule message), every transfer that needs it fails the check. Get the field from the payment message or the Travel Rule solution before switching that form of the rule on; until then the gap is in your monitoring, not in each transfer.
  • The wrong list of fields for the route. Within the EU, transfers of funds need only both account numbers (Regulation (EU) 2023/1113, art. 5); Nigeria and Ghana let a domestic transfer carry only an account number or reference where the full information can be produced on request (CBN AML/CFT/CPF Regulations 2022, reg. 33(5); BoG/FIC Guideline 2025, 2.6.10.2(6)); and the West African union lets any electronic transfer carry only the account number or a unique reference on the same condition (Uniform Law 2023, art. 39, fourth paragraph). A rule that asks every transfer for the cross-border set fires on these.
  • Transfers inside your own institution. A transfer between two of your own customers, a peer-to-peer transfer between two customers of the same virtual asset provider, or a money transfer service that controls both the sending and the receiving side has no message from another institution, so the message fields can be empty while the information is in your own records. Check these against your records, not a message. Nigeria still requires the information to be held for transfers between two customers of the same provider (CBN Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets, 10.7.3), and the FATF asks a money transfer service controlling both sides to take into account “all the information from both the ordering and beneficiary sides” in deciding whether to report (Interpretive Note to Recommendation 16, para 32).
  • Payments that are out of scope. Card payments for goods and services and domestic cash withdrawals carry the card or account number instead, and transfers between institutions acting on their own behalf carry nothing (FATF, Interpretive Note to Recommendation 16, paras 13, 16 and 18; CBN Regulations 2022, reg. 33(14)). A card used for “other types of payment or value transfer (e.g., a person-to-person transfer)” stays in scope (para 17; reg. 33(14)(a)), and cross-border cash withdrawals have requirements of their own (para 19). Loan repayments taken from a card are card payments, not transfers, in our reading. Leave these out by transaction type.
  • A payment institution’s name as the payer. When a payment or money-transfer provider pays for its customer, the originator is the customer, not the provider. The FATF defines the originator as “the account holder who requests the payment or value transfer from that account, or where there is no account, the natural or legal person that places the order with the ordering financial institution”, the payment chain “starts at the financial institution that receives the instructions from the originator” (Interpretive Note to Recommendation 16, glossary and para 6), and only transfers “where both the originator and the beneficiary are financial institutions acting on their own behalf” carry no information (para 13; CBN Regulations 2022, reg. 33(14)(b)). The EBA tells providers not to “treat a transfer from the payer to the payee as liquidity movement or settlement on the PSP’s and IPSP’s own account” (EBA/GL/2024/11, para 30). So a provider’s name alone in the payer field does not meet the requirement when it pays for someone else. A payer’s name found only in the free-text reference helps the review, but it is not the originator information as the FATF asks for it, “structured, to the extent possible, in accordance with the established standards of the system used such as ISO 20022” (para 4). Whether it pays for someone else is not always visible: keep such names on a list of their own, separate from placeholders, and set in your written policy what you accept and when you ask for the payer’s name.
  • Batch files. Each transfer in a batch needs only the originator’s account or reference when the batch file holds the full information (FATF, para 15; Regulation (EU) 2023/1113, arts. 6(1) and 15; CBN Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets, 26.14.10). Check the batch, not each line.
  • Placeholders that look like names, and names that look like placeholders. A list of meaningless values catches “xxxxx” and “My Customer”; it can also catch short real names, initials, transliterated names, company abbreviations, or business names built to sort first (a run of the same letter). Review the list and its hits.
  • Crypto messages that arrive a little after the deposit. The message and the on-chain transfer travel separately (the FATF notes the information need not “be attached directly to the virtual asset transfers”, Interpretive Note to Recommendation 15, footnote 47), so a deposit can be seen on chain before its message is matched. Hold and match rather than alert at once, and count late messages against the sending provider: where the law requires the message before or with the transfer (Nigeria, South Africa, the EU), a late message is the counterparty’s breach, not yours.
  • Counterparties in countries with no Travel Rule yet. Every transfer from them may fail the check. Nigeria, South Africa and the EU still require the information. Handling them at counterparty level (due diligence, limits, or refusal) cuts the review work, but each transfer is still held until its information arrives: Nigeria’s policies include “withholding the virtual assets from the customer’s account pending receipt of the information” (26.14.8(a)), the EU’s provider requests the information “before making the crypto-assets available” where it does not reject (Regulation (EU) 2023/1113, art. 17(1)), and in South Africa “The CASP must not give value to a client as beneficiary, where funds are held in suspense pending travel rule information, until such time the travel rule information is obtained” (FIC PCC 61, para 4.17.4).
  • Unhosted wallets. A deposit from an unhosted wallet has no counterparty to send a message. Check that your customer’s own declaration was collected and stored instead.

How to tune: build the required-field list per role, route, rail and amount band from your country’s text; measure field fill per rail and counterparty, and chart gaps by month and sending institution, before going live; leave out card purchases, own-account and institution-to-institution transfers, and check transfers inside your institution against your own records; review the placeholder list and keep payment institutions’ names on a list of their own; and send repeat offenders to the counterparty variant instead of alerting on each of their transfers.

When it fires

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Analyst checklist:

  1. Note your role (sending, passing on, receiving), the route and the amount band, and which fields that combination requires in your country.
  2. Check whether the information is in the original payment message or Travel Rule message and was lost on the way to the rule, and whether the transfer is inside your own institution, where your own records hold it. If so, it is a data fix.
  3. Outgoing: do not execute until the information is complete. Incoming or passing through: hold, reject or return under your written policy, and ask the institution before you for the missing information, with a deadline.
  4. If you decide to execute a transfer with information missing, record why. The EBA adds that a transfer whose originator or beneficiary cannot be identified unambiguously should not be executed (EBA/GL/2024/11, para 64).
  5. Screen the names and wallet addresses the transfer does carry (see Sanctions screening) and look at the counterparty’s country (see High-risk jurisdiction).
  6. Add the case to the counterparty’s count. A counterparty that keeps failing goes to review: warnings, deadlines, rejection of its future transfers, or restriction or end of the relationship, and in the EU a report to the supervisor.
  7. Decide whether to report. Missing information is one factor among others (Regulation (EU) 2023/1113, arts. 9 and 18; EBA/GL/2024/11, para 48), but the texts go further in Nigeria (wire transfers missing originator information), Ghana (where the missing information cannot be obtained) and Uganda (see By country).

An alert is a reason to review, not a suspicion in itself, except where the law says otherwise. Under the FATF standard, suspicious transactions are reported regardless of amount, attempted transactions included (Interpretive Note to Recommendation 20, para 3). Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.

Sources

16 sourcesHide
  1. FATF, The FATF Recommendations, October 2025 edition (includes the June 2025 revision of Recommendation 16): Recommendation 16 (“Payment transparency”); Interpretive Note to R.16, paras 4, 6, 8–11, 13, 15–19, 23, 26–28 and 30–32 and its glossary (“Originator”); Interpretive Note to R.15, para 7(b) and footnote 47; Interpretive Note to R.20, para 3. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Fatf-recommendations.html
  2. Central Bank of Nigeria, Payments System Policy Department, Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, November 2026, issued by circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004 of 5 November 2026, in force that day; sections 10.7.3, 11.10.9, 26.14.1, 26.14.3–26.14.10 and 26.15.1. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/REGULATIONS%20FOR%20THE%20OPERATIONS%20OF%20NON-SECURITY%20VIRTUAL%20ASSETS%20IN%20NIGERIA.pdf
  3. Central Bank of Nigeria, Anti-Money Laundering, Combating the Financing of Terrorism and Countering Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Financial Institutions Regulations, 2022 (Official Gazette No. 94, Vol. 109, 20 May 2022), reg. 33(1), (3), (5), (6), (9)–(12) and (14) (Gazette pp. B 2084–2086). https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2022/FPRD/AML%20CIRCULAR%20AND%20REGULATIONS%20MERGED.pdf
  4. Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 (Nigeria), s.7(1)–(2). https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/LawsAndRegulations
  5. NFIU, “Guidelines for the Identification, Verification and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions Related to ML/FT/PF for Financial Institutions”, STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, 13 December 2024, Part Six para 2. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance
  6. Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism / Combating Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Accountable Institutions, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 12 December 2025: 2.6.4(2)–(4) and (7)–(9); 2.6.8(4) and (6); 2.6.10.1(1), (3), (5) and (6); 2.6.10.2(1), (2), (4) and (6); 2.6.10.3(1) and (3)–(7); 2.6.10.4(1)–(3) and (5); 2.8.1(6); 2.8.3(2); 2.9(7)(iv); Appendix E, 6(e). https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/BOG-FIC-AML-GUIDELINE-2025-FINAL-5-TO-BE-PUBLISHED.pdf
  7. UEMOA, Loi uniforme relative à la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux, le financement du terrorisme et de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive (March 2023), arts. 2 (point 58), 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 60, 61 and 65. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Loi-uniforme-LBCFTFP-Mars-2023-vf.pdf
  8. FIC South Africa, Directive 9 concerning the implementation of the “Travel Rule” relating to crypto asset transfers in accordance with the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations, 15 November 2024 (Government Gazette No. 51556, Notice 5543), in operation 30 April 2025; paras 2.1.9, 3, 4.2, 4.4–4.6, 4.8, 5.3, 5.4, 6.4, 6.5, 7.2, 7.3, 8.2 and 9.1. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Directive-9-Travel-rule-relating-to-crypto-asset-transfers.pdf
  9. FIC South Africa, Public Compliance Communication 61 of 2026 on the implementation of the “Travel Rule” relating to crypto asset transfers as directed by Directive 9 of 2024, 30 March 2026, section 3 (“What are the sunrise considerations?”) and paras 4.3–4.5, 4.7 and 4.17.4. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/2026.3-PCC-_Travel-Rule-for-CASPS.pdf
  10. FIC South Africa, Guidance Note 4B on reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions and activities, 26 March 2019, paras 71, 80 and 81. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019.03-Guidance-Guidance-Note-4B-STRs.pdf
  11. Uganda, The Anti-Money Laundering Regulations, 2015 (S.I. 2015 No. 75), reg. 34(1), (5) and (6) and reg. 39(1)–(2); and The Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Regulations, 2023 (S.I. 2023 No. 2), which leave regs. 34 and 39(2) unchanged. https://fia.go.ug/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/The-Anti-Money-Laundering-Regulations-2015.pdf · https://fia.go.ug/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Anti-Money-Laundering-Amendment-Regulations-2023.pdf
  12. Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 of 31 May 2023 on information accompanying transfers of funds and certain crypto-assets (recast), OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, arts. 4–21 and 40. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32023R1113
  13. EBA, Guidelines on information requirements in relation to transfers of funds and certain crypto-assets transfers under Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 (“Travel Rule Guidelines”), EBA/GL/2024/11, 4 July 2024, applying from 30 December 2024; paras 30, 46–50, 56, 64, 67–68 and 74. https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2024-07/6de6e9b9-0ed9-49cd-985d-c0834b5b4356/Travel%20Rule%20Guidelines.pdf
  14. Directive (EU) 2015/849, art. 33(1) (EU text as published on legislation.gov.uk). https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eudr/2015/849/article/33
  15. Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Mexico), “Disposiciones de carácter general a que se refiere el Artículo 58 de la Ley para Regular las Instituciones de Tecnología Financiera”, DOF 10 September 2018, arts. 69, 70 (opening and XI), 73 and 101. https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5537449&fecha=10/09/2018
  16. Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 200/2024 (RESOL-2024-200-APN-UIF#MJ), 18 December 2024, Boletín Oficial no. 35571, 19 December 2024, arts. 8(j), 36(c) and 37. https://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/405000-409999/407429/norma.htm

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