Money laundering
High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch
Payments to, from, or through high-risk or monitored jurisdictions, and customers whose card, IP address, or location doesn’t fit the country they declared.
What it catches
Two related patterns.
- Exposure to high-risk jurisdictions. A payment sent to, received from or routed through a country the FATF has called out for strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, a country under comprehensive sanctions or a national directive, or a country on your own risk list; or a customer who lives in one. FATF Recommendation 19 requires enhanced due diligence for business relationships and transactions with persons from countries “for which this is called for by the FATF”. For countries under increased monitoring (the “grey list”) the FATF does not call for it and asks for a risk-based approach instead (see “By country”).
- Country mismatch. The countries attached to a customer don’t agree: a card issued in one country paying in another, an IP address in a country other than the declared residence, a customer “resident” in one country who always connects from another. These are fraud and mule signals as much as AML ones: a stolen card used abroad, or an account used by someone other than the person who opened it. The EBA lists “discrepancies between submitted and detected information, for example, between submitted country of origin information and the electronically detected IP address” as something e-money issuers’ systems should catch (EBA/GL/2021/02, para 10.14).
On its own, neither is evidence of wrongdoing. Most cross-border activity is legitimate, and the rule is only useful when narrowed (see “False positives”).
How the rule works
Exposure. For each payment, take every country attached to it (counterparty’s country, the counterparty bank’s country, card issuer country, IP country, merchant country) and your customer’s declared country of residence, and check them against a dated list. The Wolfsberg Group notes that the countries in the parties’ addresses “are relevant for screening against geographic sanctions programmes” (Sanctions Screening Guidance, §4.2). Alert when one is on the list, with a value floor for monitored jurisdictions and no floor for call-for-action ones, sanctioned ones or those under a national directive.
Mismatch. Compare two country fields that should agree, and alert only when the mismatch comes with a behaviour that makes it unusual: a value or velocity condition, many different payees or amounts from one foreign instrument, or a mismatch that persists across sessions. Leave out sessions flagged as VPN or proxy: their IP country is the exit server’s, not the customer’s.
Looks at
Every payment, checked against a dated list of high-risk jurisdictions, refreshed after each FATF plenary. The location test also looks at the customer’s sessions.
Alerts when exposure
Any country of the payment is:
- a call-for-action country on the list, a sanctioned country, or a country under a national directive or countermeasure (such as Canada’s directive on Russia): a high-level alert, whatever the amount; or
- a monitored country on the list, and the payment is at least USD 1,000–20,000: a medium-level alert.
Alerts when card mismatch
Both of these are true:
- The card issuer’s country is known and differs from the country of the transaction.
- The card also meets a behaviour condition you add within your window, such as many different payees or amounts.
Alerts when location mismatch
Both of these are true:
- In at least your persistence share of the customer’s sessions within your window, the IP address country differs from the customer’s country of residence, leaving out sessions flagged as VPN or proxy.
- That IP address country is not a neighbour of the country of residence.
Counts as a country of the payment
The counterparty’s country, the counterparty bank’s country, the card issuer’s country, the IP address country, the merchant’s country and your customer’s declared country of residence. If your own country is under increased monitoring, leave it out (see “False positives and tuning”).
Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.
List refresh The dated list of call-for-action and monitored jurisdictions the rule checks. Refresh it after each FATF plenary (in 2026: February, June and October).
Value floor for monitored jurisdictions Start at USD 1,000–20,000 equivalent for a single payment, set by your average ticket and how often your customers legitimately pay those countries. A lower floor sends more ordinary payments to review; a higher one misses smaller transfers. Call-for-action and sanctioned countries, and countries under a national directive, have no floor.
Behaviour condition What has to come with a card mismatch before it alerts, such as many different payees or amounts from one foreign card. Do not alert on the mismatch alone: honest cross-border card use is common, and a value floor alone may add little.
Behaviour and persistence window The period over which the card’s behaviour condition and the share of a customer’s sessions are measured. No public source gives a value; set it from your own data.
Data it needs
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| Field | Usually comes from | If it’s missing |
|---|---|---|
| Counterparty country and counterparty bank country (or BIC) | Payment instruction | Exposure is checked only on your own customer, not on where money goes. |
| Card issuer country | Card processor, or a BIN lookup | Card mismatch rules can’t run. Check the field really arrives; a rule reading an empty field is silent forever. |
| IP country (and a VPN/proxy indicator) | Session or login events, device tools | Residence-vs-location rules can’t run. Without the indicator, VPN sessions count as foreign. |
| Declared residence and nationality | KYC | Residence can’t be checked against the list or compared with the IP country. Nationality feeds the customer’s risk rating rather than an alert (see “False positives”). Keep residence separate from any “current country” field that sessions overwrite. |
| Transaction / collection country | Your platform | Know whose country it is: the payer’s, or the merchant’s? |
| Amount in a common currency, timestamp | Transaction | Needed for value floors and windows. |
| The list, with its version date | FATF statements, your own risk assessment | Without a date you can’t show which list applied when. |
Thresholds
Each row is a setting the rule needs. Set by law and Standard values come from the source named under “Where it comes from”. Suggested values are starting points: test them on your own history, then adjust. Where there is no public value, set it from your own data.
| Parameter | Value | Type | Where it comes from |
|---|---|---|---|
| List refresh | After each FATF plenary (in 2026: February, June and October) | Standard | FIC South Africa: “The FATF issues a statement identifying jurisdictions under increased monitoring after each Plenary meeting” (notice of 19 February 2026). National lists follow the FATF’s: the CBN updates its list of high-risk countries “promptly” after “any amendments to the FATF’s list of countries subject to a call for counter measures” (CBN AML/CFT/CPF Regulations 2022, reg. 34(6)). Plenaries in 2026: February and June (FIC notices of 19 February and 22 June 2026), October (FinCEN, 30 October 2026). |
| Value floor, call-for-action jurisdictions | None. Any amount. | Standard | FATF R.19 calls for enhanced due diligence on business relationships and transactions with persons from these countries and sets no amount. |
| Value floor, comprehensively sanctioned countries and countries under a national directive | None. Any amount. | Set by law | Canada: FINTRAC’s ministerial directives on Iran, the DPRK and Russia each cover every transaction originating from or bound for the country, “regardless of its amount”. United States: U.S. persons are “broadly prohibited” from dealings with Iran, the Government of Iran and Iranian financial institutions (FinCEN, 30 October 2026, on the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations). |
| Value floor, monitored jurisdictions or own risk list | USD 1,000–20,000 equivalent for a single payment, set by your average ticket and how often your customers legitimately pay those countries | Suggested | A lower floor sends more ordinary payments to review, a higher one misses smaller transfers. Move it with your average ticket and how often your customers legitimately pay those countries. |
| Card or billing mismatch | Not alone. Add a behaviour condition; a value floor alone may add nothing (see “False positives”). | Suggested | Honest cross-border card use is common, and where foreign cards spend no more than domestic ones, a floor alone separates little. Compare the two distributions first. |
| Behaviour and persistence window | No public value; set it from your own data | — | The period over which the card’s behaviour condition and the share of a customer’s sessions are measured. |
| Persistence share | No public value; set it from your own data | — | The share of a customer’s sessions from an IP country other than the declared residence that counts as persistent. Start above the share your customers who travel or work across a border reach. |
By country
The FATF’s lists change at every plenary. Anything below is dated; check the current statements before relying on it.
FATF (everywhere). The lists after the October 2026 plenary. Subject to a call for action: Iran and the DPRK (countermeasures), Myanmar (enhanced due diligence, not countermeasures). Under increased monitoring: Angola, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cameroon, Haiti, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Vietnam, Virgin Islands (UK), Yemen. That is the June 2026 list (FATF statement of 19 June 2026, reproduced by the FIC South Africa advisory of 22 June 2026) less the four jurisdictions removed on 30 October 2026: Bulgaria, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Monaco. FinCEN’s release of 30 October 2026 reports no additions, and the Fiji FIU publishes the same eighteen. What the FATF asks for: for call-for-action jurisdictions, enhanced due diligence (R.19). INR.19 para 1 points to the measures in para 20 of the Interpretive Note to R.10: more information on the customer, on the purpose of the relationship and on source of funds and wealth, senior management approval, and “enhanced monitoring of the business relationship”. INR.10 para 15(b) lists the country risk factors: inadequate AML/CFT systems, sanctions or embargoes, significant corruption, and support for terrorism. For jurisdictions under increased monitoring, “The FATF does not call for the application of enhanced due diligence measures to be applied to these jurisdictions”: it asks for a risk-based approach, not de-risking, and for “flows of funds for humanitarian assistance, legitimate NPO activity and remittances” to be “neither disrupted nor discouraged” (FATF, Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring, 19 June 2026). National law can go further: see each country’s entry.
Nigeria. CBN AML/CFT/CPF Regulations 2022, reg. 34, which the CBN’s covering circular applies to banks, other financial institutions and payment service providers. A financial institution applies enhanced due diligence, proportionate to the risks, to business relationships and transactions with persons, including financial institutions, “from countries for which the FATF raised such concerns” (reg. 34(1)). “High-risk countries” are those the FATF subjects to a call for countermeasures and those the CBN or other competent authorities identify (reg. 34(4)). The CBN publishes the list on its website and updates it after FATF changes (reg. 34(5)–(6)), and can call for countermeasures such as limiting business relationships or transactions with the country (reg. 34(2)–(3)). Among the further countermeasures the regulation lets institutions apply is systematic reporting of transactions with such countries, “on the basis that financial transactions with such countries are more likely to be suspicious”. For stablecoin issuers and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) licensed by the CBN, its Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria (in force 5 November 2026) set the same duties in section 26.6: enhanced due diligence for relationships and transactions “with natural and legal persons, financial institutions and VASPs from countries for which this is called for by the FATF” (26.6.1); countermeasures when the FATF calls for them or the CBN directs, including “enhanced reporting or systematic reporting of transactions” (26.6.2); and the FATF’s increased-monitoring findings in the risk assessment (26.6.3). The CBN publishes or communicates the countries “by circular or otherwise” (26.6.4). The automated monitoring system must alert on “transactions originating from or directed to countries referred to in Section 26.6” (26.7.1(d)).
Reporting deadline
Report to the NFIU immediately, with a written report within 24 hours (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.7(1)–(2)). The NFIU’s December 2024 STR guidelines start the 24 hours once the transaction is found suspicious, after an examination of no more than 72 hours, and require written reasons for every alert closed as not suspicious (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, Part Six, para 2).
Kenya. POCAMLA s.45A(2), as replaced in 2023: “In addition to enhanced customer due diligence measures, a reporting institution shall apply appropriate countermeasures proportionate to the risk presented by countries” when the FATF calls for them, independently of any FATF call, or as advised by the Cabinet Secretary. The Financial Reporting Centre disseminates to reporting institutions the high-risk countries identified, the countermeasures that apply and the FATF’s published information on listed jurisdictions (s.45A(4)). Kenya is itself under increased monitoring (see the FATF entry): see “When your own country is on the list” under “False positives and tuning”.
Reporting deadline
Within two days after the suspicion arose (POCAMLA s.44(2), as replaced by the AML/CFT Laws (Amendment) Act 2023, Act No. 10 of 2023).
WAEMU (UEMOA). Loi uniforme LBC/FT/FP (2023 text, as adopted by each member state), art. 30: financial institutions apply enhanced due diligence, proportionate to the risks, to business relationships and transactions with persons, including financial institutions, from countries “pour lesquels le GAFI appelle à le faire”; the competent authorities set any countermeasures, whether or not the FATF calls for them. BCEAO Instruction 001-03-2025 (18 March 2025), whose Title I binds credit institutions, financial companies, microfinance institutions, e-money institutions, payment institutions and fintechs in the eight member states (art. 3), requires their information system to allow “le suivi des mouvements sur les comptes et la génération des alertes” (the monitoring of account movements and the generation of alerts) and “l’identification des transactions à caractère suspect ou inhabituel” (the identification of suspicious or unusual transactions). The system’s effectiveness is reviewed at least once a year (art. 6). WAEMU (UEMOA in French) is the West African Economic and Monetary Union: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, the same eight states that form the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). The BCEAO’s instructions and the Council of Ministers’ decisions cited here apply in all eight. The uniform law applies in each state through that state’s own act, which may number its articles differently. The law of a single state is covered only where that state is named.
Reporting deadline
Report to the CENTIF “immédiatement” (Loi uniforme 2023, art. 60). The law defines “sans délai” as at most 24 hours (art. 2, point 58) and does not define “immédiatement”. Do not carry out an operation you suspect until the report is made, and then only if the CENTIF has not opposed it, or its opposition (at most four days) has run out without a court decision (arts. 61 and 65). If it has already gone through, inform the CENTIF “sans délai” (art. 61).
South Africa. The FIC publishes an advisory on high-risk jurisdictions and one on jurisdictions under increased monitoring after each FATF plenary (FIC notice, 19 February 2026). Where the rule runs in an automated transaction monitoring system, FIC Directive 5 of 2019 requires the system’s detection methodology, “including algorithms, scenarios, threshold settings or rules” (this rule among them), to be documented (para 3.1.16) and, taken as a whole, “sufficient to address the associated money laundering and terrorist financing risks applicable to the reporter” (para 3.1.17), and sets the time limits for the system’s alerts given under the reporting deadline below (paras 2.1–2.3).
Reporting deadline
As soon as possible, and no later than 15 days excluding weekends and public holidays (FIC Act s.29; MLTF Control Regulations, reg. 24(3), via FIC Guidance Note 4B para 71). The 15 days run from when you became aware of the facts, which “may be, and in the majority of cases will be, before a suspicion is formed” (GN4B para 80). Where the alert comes from an automated transaction monitoring system, the reporter “is deemed to have knowledge” of the possible suspicious activity when the alert is generated: the report is due “no later than 15 days after the alert has been generated”, and work on the alert must start within 48 hours, which the FIC counts as two days without weekends and public holidays, inside the 15 (FIC Directive 5 of 2019, paras 2.1–2.3; FIC PCC 45, paras 5–8).
Ghana. Institutions licensed by the Bank of Ghana apply enhanced due diligence to relationships and transactions “with natural and legal persons (including financial institutions) from countries as published by FATF” (set by law, BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.6.6(1)), apply countermeasures when the regulator or the FIC calls for them and also independently (2.6.6(2)), keep “Enhanced monitoring on all financial transactions from such high-risk countries” (2.6.6(4)), and report suspicious transactions with no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose by customers from high-risk countries (2.6.6(3)). Business transactions with persons and institutions in or from countries that do not or insufficiently comply with the FATF Standards always get enhanced due diligence (3.8.2(4)), and the institution must “exercise due caution” with persons from high-risk jurisdictions named in public statements by OFAC, the EU, His Majesty’s Treasury, the UN Security Council, the FATF, the African Union and ECOWAS (3.8.2(5)). “Transactions involving high-risk countries/jurisdictions vulnerable to ML/TF/PF” are a red flag (Appendix E, 1a).
Reporting deadline
Within 24 hours of the suspicion, attempted transactions included, whatever the amount (BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.8.1(6) and 2.8.3(2)).
Canada. FINTRAC ministerial directives cover Iran (in force since 25 July 2020, amended 15 February 2024 and 15 November 2025), the DPRK (since 9 December 2017) and Russia (since 24 February 2024). Each requires reporting entities to treat every transaction originating from or bound for the country, “regardless of its amount”, as high risk, to verify the identity of anyone requesting or benefiting from it, and to keep a record. Transactions with Iran are all reported to FINTRAC; for the DPRK and Russia, a report is due when there are reasonable grounds to suspect money laundering, terrorist financing or sanctions evasion. Russia is on neither FATF list, so a rule fed only by the FATF lists misses it.
Reporting deadline
File “as soon as practicable” after the measures that establish reasonable grounds to suspect (FINTRAC STR guidance, section 4).
United States. For Iran and the DPRK, “Existing U.S. sanctions and FinCEN regulations prohibit any such correspondent account relationships” with their financial institutions; for Iran this includes the Section 311 fifth special measure (31 CFR 1010.661), and U.S. persons are “broadly prohibited” from dealings with Iran, its government and its financial institutions. Burma “remains subject to the application of enhanced due diligence, but not countermeasures”. For jurisdictions under increased monitoring, FinCEN points covered institutions to their risk-based due diligence duties on correspondent accounts for foreign financial institutions (31 CFR 1010.610(a)), and adds that due diligence “should not be used as the basis to engage in wholesale or indiscriminate de-risking” (FinCEN, 30 October 2026).
Reporting deadline
No later than 30 calendar days after the initial detection of facts that may constitute a basis for filing a SAR. A bank that has not identified a suspect may take 30 more days to identify one, but never more than 60 days after initial detection (31 CFR 1020.320(b)(3); 1022.320(b)(3) for money services businesses, 30 days). Ongoing money laundering schemes also need an immediate telephone call to law enforcement.
EU. Directive (EU) 2015/849, art. 18a(1): for business relationships or transactions involving the high-risk third countries the Commission identifies by delegated act (art. 9(2)), obliged entities must apply enhanced due diligence: more information on the customer, the beneficial owner and the purpose of the relationship, the source of funds and wealth, the reasons for the transactions, senior management approval, and “enhanced monitoring of the business relationship by increasing the number and timing of controls applied”. The Commission’s list is its own instrument, separate from the FATF statements: load both. EBA ML/TF Risk Factors Guidelines: firms should always consider “the European Commission’s list of high-risk third countries” (para 1.30). For money remitters, a higher-risk factor is that “the transaction is executed from an IP address, in a jurisdiction associated with higher ML/TF risk” (para 11.11). For e-money, systems should detect a mismatch between submitted country and detected IP address (para 10.14). For crypto-asset service providers, higher-risk factors include a customer whose “IP address is inconsistent with other information about the customer”, such as their habitual residence, and a customer using VPNs or other anonymising software (Guideline 21.5, added by EBA/GL/2024/01).
Reporting deadline
Inform the FIU “promptly” (Directive (EU) 2015/849, art. 33(1)(a), which each member state’s law transposes).
Argentina. Payment service providers and non-financial lenders must take the FATF’s list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring into account in their risk analysis, and apply enhanced due diligence to all relationships and transactions with persons from FATF high-risk jurisdictions subject to a call for action (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 8(w) and (x)); customers with operations linked to call-for-action jurisdictions are high-risk customers (art. 29). Among the cases of higher risk the firm may weigh in the customer rating, and again among the circumstances to weigh in alerts, are relationships with persons from countries “respecto de los cuales la República Argentina haya expresado su preocupación por las debilidades de sus sistemas LA/FT/FP” (about which Argentina has expressed concern over the weaknesses of their AML/CFT/CPF systems), from countries credibly identified as funding or supporting terrorism, from countries under UN sanctions or embargoes, and from countries under FATF increased monitoring (arts. 26(e) to (h) and 34(b), circumstances 28 to 31); the alert list adds activity linked to offshore operations or to low or no-tax countries (circumstance 16). The country-mismatch half of this rule helps with circumstance 18, which covers any gap between what the customer declared and what monitoring detects: “Cuando existan discrepancias entre la información aportada por el cliente y la información detectada por los sistemas de monitoreo” (where the information the customer gave differs from what the monitoring systems detect).
Reporting deadline
Money laundering, within 24 hours of concluding that the operation is suspicious, and no later than 90 calendar days from the operation, performed or attempted; terrorist financing and proliferation financing, within 24 hours of the operation (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 36(c)).
Mexico. For fintech institutions (crowdfunding and e-money institutions, ITFs), an operation a client carries out or intends to carry out that is linked to or has effects in a country or jurisdiction that “la legislación mexicana considera que aplican regímenes fiscales preferentes” (Mexican law treats as having preferential tax regimes), or that Mexican authorities or international bodies of which Mexico is a member determine “no cuenten con medidas para prevenir, detectar y combatir dichas operaciones, o bien, cuando la aplicación de dichas medidas sea deficiente” (lack measures to prevent, detect and combat such operations, or apply them deficiently), is an unusual-operation circumstance; SHCP publishes the list online (SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, art. 70(X)). The automated system must run alerts on operations intended with those countries (art. 56(XIII)), and the Communication and Control Committee must make sure the list is in the systems (art. 45(VI)(a)). Non-resident clients linked to those jurisdictions are graded high risk at least, and the institution records why they operate in Mexico (art. 33).
Reporting deadline
The Communication and Control Committee rules on an unusual operation within 60 calendar days of its detection, and the report goes to SHCP, through the CNBV, within 3 business days of the end of that session; within 24 hours of the alert or staff notice where there are signs or concrete facts that the funds could come from illicit activities or be used for terrorist financing or money laundering (SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, arts. 69 and 73).
False positives and tuning
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- Know what the country field means. A common failure is a field named “country” that describes the merchant or the collection point rather than the payer. A high-risk country rule on that field stays silent and can never fire on a payer. Map each country field to whose country it is before writing the rule.
- Silent is not the same as working. A list rule that never fires is fine if the field it reads is populated on every event and a test event with a listed country fires it. Check both. Without that check, a silent tripwire gives false assurance.
- Some list rules will rarely fire by construction. On a card product that runs only on the international card schemes, cards issued in comprehensively sanctioned countries rarely appear, so an issuer-country list rule stays at or near zero. Keep it if the data arrives, but don’t describe it as geographic coverage.
- When your own country is on the list. If your country is under increased monitoring, every domestic payment carries a listed country in every field, and the monitored-country alert fires on your whole domestic book above the floor. Leave your own country out of the rule and record its listing in your risk assessment; the rule then checks foreign counterparties, banks, cards and IP addresses. The FATF does not call for enhanced due diligence on these jurisdictions.
- Plain mismatch floods. Cross-border use is normal where customers have family or work across a border. A bare “card issuer country differs from the payment country” rule flags cards from neighbouring countries and from relatives abroad paying for someone at home. Excluding neighbouring countries cuts much of it but leaves diaspora payments from further afield and a corridor list someone has to maintain. A value floor adds little when foreign cards are no larger than domestic ones. Behaviour narrows it: one foreign card paying many different amounts or many different accounts within your window.
- Residence vs location needs session history and an allowance for borders. Comparing declared residence with the IP country of one login fires on travel and VPNs. Look at the share of sessions over weeks, exclude neighbouring countries where crossing is routine, and keep residence in a field that session data can’t overwrite. Sessions through a VPN or proxy show the exit server’s country, so leave them out of the share; where VPN use is a risk signal in itself (the EBA lists it as one for crypto-asset service providers), count it separately.
- Lists nobody owns. A country list typed into a rule as a placeholder, which no compliance owner has approved, has no standing in an AML file. Each list needs an owner, a source and a date, and a step after each plenary to update it.
- Nationality is not behaviour. Screening on nationality or country alone, without behaviour, mostly flags ordinary customers. Use nationality as an input to the customer’s risk rating rather than as an alert. FinCEN warns against using country due diligence for “wholesale or indiscriminate de-risking”, and the FATF asks that remittances and humanitarian flows to countries under increased monitoring be “neither disrupted nor discouraged”.
When it fires
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- Confirm which country triggered it, from which field, and that the field means what the rule assumes.
- For exposure: identify the counterparty and its bank, the purpose of the payment, and whether it fits the customer’s profile and history with that country. For a call-for-action or sanctioned jurisdiction, also run sanctions screening on every party and check whether a ministerial directive or a national countermeasure applies (for example FINTRAC’s directives on Iran, the DPRK and Russia, which apply regardless of amount).
- For mismatch: look at the instrument’s history (how many accounts it paid, how many different amounts, how many countries), the customer’s declared links to the other country, and device and session data.
- Request from the customer: purpose of the payment, relationship with the counterparty, proof of residence, or an explanation of travel.
- Apply enhanced due diligence where the FATF calls for it (R.19), today the call-for-action jurisdictions, and where national law or your own risk list requires it (see “By country”). The FATF does not call for it on countries under increased monitoring. File an STR when the explanation doesn’t hold or the pattern fits a typology. A country hit alone is not grounds for one. Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.
Related rules
- Sanctions screening: named persons and entities, including those in high-risk countries.
- PEP screening: country risk is one input to a PEP relationship’s risk.
- Shared identifiers across customers: one foreign card or device paying many accounts.
- Card testing.
- New beneficiary, high-value payment.
- Account takeover (ATO): sessions from two distant countries within a few hours (“impossible travel”).
- Transaction structuring (smurfing): payments split to stay under a floor, including the floor for monitored jurisdictions.
- Cross-border transfer chains (layering through several countries): money moved through several countries in quick succession, or spread across many at once, with no reason that fits the customer.
- Activity in a high-risk area inside the country (border zones): areas inside one country, such as a border zone, rather than foreign countries.
- Transfers with unlicensed or high-risk counterparty VASPs: the crypto provider on the other side: its licence, its risk rating, and whether its country licenses such providers at all.
Sources
27 sourcesHide
Primary:
- FATF, The FATF Recommendations, October 2025 edition (R.19 and INR.10 were not changed by the June 2026 update): Recommendation 19 and its Interpretive Note; Interpretive Note to Recommendation 10, paras 15(b) and 20. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Fatf-recommendations.html
- FATF, Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring – 19 June 2026, introduction (copy published by the FIAU Malta). https://fiaumalta.org/app/uploads/2026/06/FATF-On-going-Process-19-June-2026-Increased-monitoring.pdf
- FinCEN, Financial Action Task Force Identifies Jurisdictions with Anti-Money Laundering, Combating the Financing of Terrorism, and Counter-Proliferation Finance Deficiencies, 30 October 2026. https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/financial-action-task-force-identifies-jurisdictions-anti-money-laundering-6
- FinCEN, same title, 6 March 2026 (February 2026 plenary). https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/financial-action-task-force-identifies-jurisdictions-anti-money-laundering-5
- Financial Intelligence Centre (South Africa), notice on the outcomes of the February 2026 FATF meetings, 19 February 2026. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/2026.2-GN-Outcomes-Notice-February-2026.pdf
- Financial Intelligence Centre (South Africa), Outcomes of the June 2026 meeting of the Financial Action Task Force, 22 June 2026, and Advisory: FATF public statement on jurisdictions under increased monitoring – June 2026, 22 June 2026. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/2026.6-GN-Outcomes-Notice-June-2026.pdf · https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/2026.6-GN-Advisory-June-2026-increased-monitoring-.pdf
- Fiji Financial Intelligence Unit, High-Risk and Increased Monitored Countries by FATF (page linking the FATF statements of 30 October 2026). https://fijifiu.gov.fj/FTR-Act-You/High-Risk-and-Increased-Monitored-Countries-by-FAT
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Anti-Money Laundering, Combating the Financing of Terrorism and Countering Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Financial Institutions Regulations, 2022 (S.I. No. 43, Official Gazette No. 94, Vol. 109, 20 May 2022), reg. 34, with the CBN circular of 20 June 2022 to banks, other financial institutions and payment service providers.
- Kenya, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism Financing Laws (Amendment) Act, 2023 (Act No. 10 of 2023), amending POCAMLA s.45A(2) and (4). https://brs.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/AntiMoneyLaunderingandCombatingofTerrorismFinancingLawsAmendmentAct2023.pdf
- UMOA, Loi uniforme relative à la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux, le financement du terrorisme et de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive (2023 text), art. 30. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Loi-uniforme-LBCFTFP-Mars-2023-vf.pdf
- FINTRAC, Ministerial directives, and the directives on Iran, the DPRK and Russia. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/obligations/directives-eng · https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/obligations/dir-iri-eng · https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/obligations/dir-dprk-eng · https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/obligations/dir-rus-eng
- Directive (EU) 2015/849, as amended by Directive (EU) 2018/843, arts. 9, 18a and 33 (EU text as published on legislation.gov.uk). https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eudr/2015/849/article/9 · https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eudr/2015/849/article/18a · https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eudr/2015/849/article/33
- European Banking Authority, Guidelines on ML/TF risk factors (EBA/GL/2021/02, consolidated with EBA/GL/2023/03), paras 1.30, 10.14, 11.11; and Guidelines amending Guidelines EBA/2021/02 (EBA/GL/2024/01, applicable from 30 December 2024), Guideline 21.5. https://www.eba.europa.eu/ · https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2024-01/a3e89f4f-fbf3-4bd6-9e07-35f3243555b3/Final%20Amending%20%20Guidelines%20on%20MLTF%20Risk%20Factors.pdf
- Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 200/2024 (RESOL-2024-200-APN-UIF#MJ), 18 December 2024, Boletín Oficial no. 35571, 19 December 2024, arts. 8(w) and (x), 26(e) to (h), 29 and 34(b), circumstances 16, 18 and 28 to 31; art. 36(c) (report deadlines). https://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/405000-409999/407429/norma.htm
- Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Mexico), “Disposiciones de carácter general a que se refiere el Artículo 58 de la Ley para Regular las Instituciones de Tecnología Financiera”, DOF 10 September 2018, arts. 33, 45(VI), 56(XIII) and 70(X); arts. 69 and 73 (report deadlines). https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5537449&fecha=10/09/2018 (accessed 2026-11-12).
- BCEAO, Instruction n°001-03-2025 du 18 mars 2025 on AML/CFT/CPF organisation, internal control and compliance of financial institutions, arts. 3 and 6. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-04/Instruction%20n%C2%B0001-03-2025%20du%2018%20mars%2025%20portant%20modalit%C3%A9s%20de%20mise%20en%20oeuvre%20par%20les%20IF%20de%20leurs%20obligations%20en%20mati%C3%A8re%20de%20lutte%20contre%20le%20blanchiment%20de%20capitaux.pdf
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Payments System Policy Department, Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, November 2026, issued by circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004 of 5 November 2026, in force that day (circular, section 4.0); sections 26.6 and 26.7.1(d). https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/REGULATIONS%20FOR%20THE%20OPERATIONS%20OF%20NON-SECURITY%20VIRTUAL%20ASSETS%20IN%20NIGERIA.pdf
Reporting deadlines:
- Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act, 2022, s.7, and NFIU, Guidelines for the Identification, Verification and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions Related to ML/FT/PF for Financial Institutions (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, 13 December 2024), Part Six. Both published by the NFIU: https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/
- Kenya, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism Financing Laws (Amendment) Act, 2023 (Act No. 10 of 2023), amending POCAMLA s.44(2). https://brs.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/AntiMoneyLaunderingandCombatingofTerrorismFinancingLawsAmendmentAct2023.pdf
- UMOA, Loi uniforme LBC/FT/FP (2023 text), arts. 2 (point 58), 60, 61 and 65. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Loi-uniforme-LBCFTFP-Mars-2023-vf.pdf
- FIC South Africa, Guidance Note 4B on reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions and activities, 26 March 2019, para 71 (reporting period, MLTF Control Regulations reg. 24(3)) and para 80 (when the period starts). https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019.03-Guidance-Guidance-Note-4B-STRs.pdf
- FIC South Africa, Directive 5 of 2019 on the usage of an automated transaction monitoring system for the detection and submission of regulatory reports, 29 March 2019, paras 2.1–2.3, 3.1.16 and 3.1.17. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019-DIR-Directive-5-of-2019-ATMS.pdf
- FIC South Africa, Public Compliance Communication 45 on Directive 5 of 2019 in relation to the use of automated transaction monitoring systems, 20 March 2020, paras 5–8. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2020.03-PCC-PCC-45-On-Directive-5-of-2019-in-relation-to-the-use-of-ATMS.pdf
- FINTRAC, Reporting suspicious transactions to FINTRAC, section 4. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/str-dod/str-dod-eng
- United States, 31 CFR 1020.320(b)(3) (banks) and 1022.320(b)(3) (money services businesses). https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/31/1020.320 · https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/31/1022.320
Standard setter (industry):
- The Wolfsberg Group, Wolfsberg Guidance on Sanctions Screening, 2019, §4.2 (addresses and countries for geographic sanctions programmes). https://wolfsberg-group.org/ · copy read: https://eimf.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Wolfsberg-Guidance-on-Sanctions-Screening.pdf
- Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism / Combating Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Accountable Institutions, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 12 December 2025, 2.6.6, 3.8.2(4)–(5) and Appendix E, red flag 1a. https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/BOG-FIC-AML-GUIDELINE-2025-FINAL-5-TO-BE-PUBLISHED.pdf
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