Screening
PEP screening (politically exposed persons)
Customers and beneficial owners checked against PEP data at onboarding and periodically, so that politically exposed persons, their family, and close associates get enhanced due diligence.
What it catches
Customers or beneficial owners who hold, or have held, a prominent public function (heads of state and government, senior politicians, senior government, judicial and military officials, senior executives of state-owned companies, important party officials), and their family members and close associates. A PEP match is not a suspicion. It tells you the relationship may carry a higher risk of corruption proceeds. For a foreign PEP the law always requires extra steps: senior management approval, source of wealth and funds, and closer monitoring. For a domestic or international-organisation PEP it depends on the country: the FATF asks for those steps only when the relationship is higher risk, while Nigeria (for banks and other institutions under the CBN’s 2022 AML/CFT/CPF Regulations; virtual asset service providers under its 2026 virtual asset Regulations follow the FATF split), the UEMOA and the EU apply them to every PEP (see Thresholds and By country). The FATF’s definitions “do not cover middle ranking or more junior individuals” (FATF PEP Guidance 2013, para 11).
How the rule works
The customer’s names are compared with PEP data (commercial or open PEP databases, government lists of prominent functions). A candidate match is checked against date of birth, nationality and country where both sides carry them. Remaining candidates go to an analyst, who decides whether the customer is the listed person. A confirmed PEP is flagged on the customer record and moved to enhanced due diligence. The alert does not decide a payment by itself. Where the law requires senior management approval (see By country), the approval comes before the relationship is opened, or continued once an existing customer is found to be a PEP (FATF R.12(b)); in the UEMOA it also comes before any operation with or for a PEP is carried out (Loi uniforme art. 29(b)), so that operation waits for it.
Screening runs at onboarding, at periodic review, on trigger events (a change of name, role, nationality or residence, or a new beneficial owner), on a reliable tip-off, and when the PEP data changes, because existing customers can become PEPs.
Runs when
- A customer is onboarded.
- A customer’s periodic review falls due.
- A customer’s identifying details change.
- A beneficial owner is added.
- A reliable tip-off says a customer may be a PEP.
- The PEP data changes. Every customer is screened again, not only new ones.
Screens
The customer and their beneficial owners.
Every name held for each of them is compared with the PEP data.
Keeps a match only if
All of these are true:
- The names are close enough: the match score is at or above strict, near the top of your tool’s scale.
- The person on the list is a PEP, a family member of one or a close associate of one. Other categories, such as “person of interest” or candidate, are dropped.
- None of the details contradict it: date of birth, nationality, country.
Alerts when
At least one match is kept.
The alert shows
Who was screened, the possible matches, the role each one holds, the source, and the details that were compared.
If confirmed
When an analyst confirms the match, the customer is flagged as a PEP and moved to enhanced due diligence. Where the law requires senior management approval, the relationship waits for it.
Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.
Name-match strictness How close a name must be to count as a possible match. Start strict, near the top of your tool’s scale. Scores do not carry over between tools, so set your own floor by testing on your own customers. It moves with how common the names among your customers are, and whether you hold date of birth.
Data it needs
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| Field | Usually comes from | If it’s missing |
|---|---|---|
| Full name, and every other name given | KYC | Can’t screen. Record “not screened”, never “clear”. |
| Date of birth | KYC, ID document | Matches on common names can’t be cleared. Screen anyway and re-screen when it arrives. Watch for placeholder dates (e.g. 1 January 1970). |
| Nationality and country of residence | KYC | Weaker clearing. Country alone clears little when most customers and most list entries share a country. |
| Beneficial owners and directors | KYB | PEPs behind companies are missed; FATF lists corporate vehicles as the first way PEPs shield identity (PEP Guidance 2013, Annex 1), and private-sector respondents to ESAAMLG’s 2019 procurement-corruption typology highlighted PEPs acting “as beneficial owners of corporate vehicles that bid for government contracts” (§3.8). |
| The matched entry’s role, position, country and source | PEP data provider | Analysts can’t tell a minister from a namesake without it. Show it on the alert. |
| The matched entry’s category (PEP, family member, close associate, other) | PEP data provider | Non-PEP entries mixed into PEP data become alerts (see “False positives”). |
Thresholds
Each row is a setting the rule needs. Set by law values come from the source named under “Where it comes from”. Suggested values are starting points: test them on your own history, then adjust.
| Parameter | Value | Type | Where it comes from |
|---|---|---|---|
| Name-match strictness | Strict, near the top of your tool’s scale. Scores are not comparable between tools, so set your own floor by testing. | Suggested | No public source gives a value. Set it from testing on your own customers. Moves with: how common the names in your book are, and whether you hold date of birth. |
| When to screen | Onboarding, periodic review, trigger events, a reliable tip-off | Set by law | CBN Guidance Notes on PEPs (June 2023), §6.1(a)–(d); CBN AML/CFT/CPF Regulations 2022, reg. 29(3) and (5) (potential and existing customers, and customers who become PEPs); FATF PEP Guidance (2013), para 58. |
| Re-screening when the PEP data changes | Every customer, each time the data is updated | Suggested | No law sets this trigger. It is how existing customers who become PEPs are found (FATF PEP Guidance para 58). Moves with: how often your PEP data is updated. |
| Review of customers already identified as PEPs | Every three years (UEMOA) | Set by law | Loi uniforme LBC/FT/FP (2023), art. 29: re-assess “tous les trois ans” the profile of customers identified as PEPs and update the PEP list. |
| How long a former PEP stays a PEP | FATF: no fixed period, decide on risk. EU: at least 12 months after leaving office, then on risk. Kenya: generally 12 months, then a documented risk assessment. Mexico (fintech institutions): during the year following the one in which they left office; for a new client who left office in the year before, during the year following the one in which the contract was entered into (see By country). | Set by law | FATF PEP Guidance (2013), para 44, and CBN Guidance Notes (2023), §6.5: “based on an assessment of risk and not on prescribed time limits”. EU: Directive (EU) 2015/849, art. 22, “for at least 12 months”. Kenya: CBK Guidance on PEPs (August 2025), Part IV(n). South Africa: domestic and foreign PEPs are people who hold or have held a listed function, with no period (FIC GN 7A paras 146, 148); prominent influential persons, 12 months (para 147, see By country). Mexico: SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, art. 2(XXV), last two paragraphs. |
| Foreign PEPs | Always enhanced due diligence | Set by law | FATF R.12 (a)–(d); PEP Guidance para 23: “Foreign PEPs are always considered high risk”. In law: Kenya, POCAML Regulations 2023, reg. 26(1); South Africa, FIC Act s.21F (FIC GN 7A para 140); EU, EBA GL paras 4.46 and 4.50; Nigeria (CBN Regulations 2022, reg. 29) and the UEMOA (Loi uniforme art. 29) apply the measures to every PEP; Nigerian virtual asset service providers apply them to every foreign PEP (CBN virtual asset Regulations 2026, section 26.4.2). |
| Domestic and international-organisation PEPs | FATF baseline: enhanced due diligence when the relationship is higher risk. Nigeria (except virtual asset service providers, which follow the FATF baseline), the UEMOA and the EU apply it to every PEP. | Set by law | FATF R.12, second paragraph. Kenya: POCAML Regulations 2023, reg. 26(2), the same as the FATF. South Africa: FIC GN 7A para 139, business relationships with domestic PEPs “are not inherently high-risk”. Nigeria: CBN Regulations 2022, reg. 29(4)–(7), make no foreign/domestic split, and CBN Guidance (2023) §1 says “by default, most domestic PEPs are considered high risk”; for virtual asset service providers, the CBN’s 2026 virtual asset Regulations, section 26.4.3, are the same as the FATF. UEMOA: Loi uniforme art. 29 applies the measures to every PPE, and its definition (art. 2, point 50) includes national and international-organisation PEPs. EU: every PEP is a case firms “must always treat as higher risk” (EBA GL para 4.46), with the measures of para 4.50. |
| Family members and close associates | Same measures as the PEP | Set by law | FATF R.12, last paragraph; CBN Regulations 2022, reg. 29(1)(i); POCAML Regulations 2023 (Kenya), reg. 26(5)(j); FIC Act s.21H (FIC GN 7A para 153); EU, EBA GL para 4.51. The UEMOA definition is wider: spouse, children and their spouses or partners, “les autres parents”, and anyone the institution designates on risk (Loi uniforme art. 2, point 50(a)(x)–(xii)). |
By country
FATF (everywhere). Recommendation 12: for foreign PEPs, have risk-management systems to determine PEP status, obtain senior management approval, establish source of wealth and source of funds, and conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring. For domestic and international-organisation PEPs, take reasonable measures to identify them and apply the same measures where the relationship is higher risk. The FATF’s 2013 guidance warns that commercial PEP databases are “not sufficient for compliance with Recommendation 12” and “should never replace traditional CDD processes” (paras 61–62).
Kenya. POCAML Regulations 2023, reg. 26, as set out in the CBK Guidance on Politically Exposed Persons (August 2025, effective 1 September 2025), §3.1. For foreign PEPs: risk-management systems to determine whether a customer or beneficial owner is a PEP, senior management approval before establishing or continuing the relationship, reasonable measures to establish source of wealth and source of funds, and enhanced ongoing monitoring (reg. 26(1)). For domestic and international-organisation PEPs: reasonable measures to identify them, and the same measures where the relationship is higher risk (reg. 26(2)). The guidance adds that “Foreign PEPs are always considered a high-risk customer factor” (§3.3), and that PEPs “should generally still be classified as a PEP 12 months after they leave office”, followed by a documented risk assessment (Part IV(n)). It applies to banks, microfinance banks, money remittance providers, payment service providers and non-deposit-taking credit providers, among others (§1.2).
Reporting deadline
Within two days after the suspicion arose (POCAMLA s.44(2), as replaced by the AML/CFT Laws (Amendment) Act 2023, Act No. 10 of 2023).
Nigeria. CBN AML/CFT/CPF Regulations 2022, reg. 29: risk-management systems to determine whether a potential or existing customer or beneficial owner is a PEP; senior management approval before establishing a relationship with a PEP, and to continue one when an existing customer is found to be or becomes a PEP; reasonable measures to establish source of wealth and source of funds; enhanced ongoing monitoring, flagging the account and reporting any abnormal transaction to the NFIU immediately as a suspicious transaction; and monthly returns on all transactions with PEPs to the CBN and NFIU. The regulation makes no foreign/domestic split, and its definition includes family members, close associates and members of royal families. The CBN Guidance Notes on Politically Exposed Persons (June 2023) add: screen all customers at onboarding and on an ongoing basis, automated where appropriate (§6.1); risk-based, not time-based, treatment of former PEPs (§6.5); “by default, most domestic PEPs are considered high risk” (§1). The guidance also notes that “in many instances, PEP screening is not the primary control for identifying PEPs”. For stablecoin issuers and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) licensed by the CBN, its Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria (in force 5 November 2026) do split foreign and domestic PEPs: every customer, beneficial owner or representative is checked “at onboarding, on an ongoing basis, and whenever there is a material change in customer information or activity” (section 26.4.1); a foreign PEP always needs senior management approval, source of wealth and funds and enhanced ongoing monitoring (26.4.2); a domestic PEP or an international-organisation official gets those measures “in cases of a higher-risk business relationship” (26.4.3); family members and close associates are covered (26.4.4); and PEPs, their family members and close associates are listed among the cases for enhanced due diligence “in accordance with Section 26.4” (26.3.11(a)), so for a domestic PEP the measures still depend on the risk of the relationship. A bank or other CBN-licensed institution offering these services under an Approval to Extend Permitted Activities stays under the AML/CFT/CPF regulations of its principal licence (26.1), so reg. 29 of the 2022 Regulations, with no split, still applies to it.
Reporting deadline
Report to the NFIU immediately, with a written report within 24 hours (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.7(1)–(2)). The NFIU’s December 2024 STR guidelines start the 24 hours once the transaction is found suspicious, after an examination of no more than 72 hours, and require written reasons for every alert closed as not suspicious (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, Part Six, para 2).
WAEMU (UEMOA). Loi uniforme LBC/FT/FP (2023 text, as each member state adopts it), art. 29: a formal risk-management system to determine whether a customer or beneficial owner is a PPE; senior management authorisation before entering a relationship or carrying out a transaction with or for a PPE; establish the origin of wealth and of funds; “une surveillance continue et renforcée”; and re-assess the profile of customers identified as PPE every three years. Article 29 does not distinguish foreign from domestic PPE, and the definition (art. 2, point 50) covers foreign, national and international-organisation PPE and a wide circle of family members. BCEAO Instruction 001-03-2025, art. 5: the executive body authorises entering a relationship or a transaction with or for a PEP, and validates the list of the institution’s customers identified as PEPs. Its art. 6 requires the information system to allow “le filtrage en temps réel des clients et des transactions” (real-time screening of customers and transactions); it does not name the lists, so PEP screening at onboarding is one way to meet it, not a duty the article spells out. WAEMU (UEMOA in French) is the West African Economic and Monetary Union: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, the same eight states that form the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). The BCEAO’s instructions and the Council of Ministers’ decisions cited here apply in all eight. The uniform law applies in each state through that state’s own act, which may number its articles differently. The law of a single state is covered only where that state is named.
Reporting deadline
Report to the CENTIF “immédiatement” (Loi uniforme 2023, art. 60). The law defines “sans délai” as at most 24 hours (art. 2, point 58); “immédiatement” is not defined, and our reading is to treat 24 hours as the outer limit. Do not carry out an operation you suspect until the report is made; if it has already gone through, inform the CENTIF “sans délai” (art. 61).
South Africa. FIC Act ss.21F–21H, as explained in FIC Revised Guidance Note 7A (1 September 2025): foreign PEPs are always high-risk (senior management approval, source of wealth and funds, enhanced ongoing monitoring); business relationships with domestic PEPs and prominent influential persons “are not inherently high-risk”, and get the same measures only where the institution finds that the relationship brings a higher risk (paras 139–140). Domestic and foreign PEPs are people who hold or have held a listed function, with no time limit (paras 146, 148). A prominent influential person (Schedule 3C to the FIC Act) includes “an individual who holds or has held at any time in the preceding 12 months a position as listed in Schedule 3C”; the FIC notes in the same paragraph that the Minister of Finance is expected to delay Schedule 3C’s operational date (para 147). “The client remains the most valuable source of information”, and using commercial databases “does not provide automatic indemnity from regulatory action” (paras 150–151).
Reporting deadline
As soon as possible, and no later than 15 days excluding weekends and public holidays (FIC Act s.29; MLTF Control Regulations, reg. 24(3), via FIC Guidance Note 4B para 71). The 15 days run from when you became aware of the facts, which “may be, and in the majority of cases will be, before a suspicion is formed” (GN4B para 80).
Ghana. PEPs are “individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions both in Ghana or in foreign countries and people or entities associated with them”, and people entrusted with a prominent function by an international organisation. The examples include members of Parliament, signatories of ministries, departments and agencies and of metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies, party executives down to constituency level, chief executives and board members of state-owned companies, family members and close associates, and traditional rulers (BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.6.1(1)). The definition sets no end to PEP status. Institutions licensed by the Bank of Ghana must have systems to identify when a customer or beneficial owner is a PEP, domestic or foreign, and give greater scrutiny to family members and close associates (2.6.1(2) and (3)); get senior management approval to start a relationship, or to continue one when a customer becomes or is found to be a PEP (2.6.1(4) and (5)); establish source of wealth and funds, including through a source of wealth form (2.6.1(6)); and monitor the relationship more closely (2.6.1(7)). They report “all transactions conducted by PEPs (domestic and foreign)” to the FIC (set by law, 2.6.1(8)), through goAML as they occur, and send the FIC an updated PEP list every quarter (Appendix F).
Reporting deadline
Within 24 hours of the suspicion, attempted transactions included, whatever the amount (BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.8.1(6) and 2.8.3(2)).
EU. Directive (EU) 2015/849, as explained in the EBA ML/TF Risk Factors Guidelines (EBA/GL/2021/02, consolidated): every PEP, domestic included, is a case firms “must always treat as higher risk” (para 4.46); para 4.48: use the Commission’s list of prominent public functions for EU PEPs; para 4.49: firms using commercial PEP lists “should ensure that information on these lists is up to date and that they understand the limitations of those lists”; para 4.50: source of wealth and funds, senior management approval and enhanced ongoing monitoring, always; para 4.51: the same measures for family members and known close associates; para 4.52: the measures should not leave PEP customers “unduly denied access to financial services”. A former PEP stays a continuing risk “for at least 12 months” after leaving office (Directive art. 22).
Argentina. Payment service providers and non-financial lenders must apply the UIF’s rules on politically exposed persons to customers and beneficial owners (UIF Resolution 200/2024, arts. 8(c), 22(h) and 23(i)). Foreign PEPs are high-risk customers by default: “Deberán ser considerados clientes de alto riesgo, a modo enunciativo, los siguientes: a) PEP extranjeras” (the following shall be considered high-risk customers, among others: a) foreign PEPs) (art. 29). The decision to accept or reject a foreign PEP is recorded with its reasons, and the Compliance Officer approves starting the relationship and keeps a register of these customers (arts. 8(i) and 12(e)). Who counts as a PEP is set by the UIF’s separate PEP resolution.
Reporting deadline
Money laundering, within 24 hours of concluding that the operation is suspicious, and no later than 90 calendar days from the operation, performed or attempted; terrorist financing and proliferation financing, within 24 hours of the operation (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 36(c)).
Mexico. For fintech institutions (crowdfunding and e-money institutions, ITFs), a PEP is anyone who holds or has held prominent public functions in Mexico or abroad; spouses, partners, relatives by blood or marriage to the second degree and partners in companies with property ties are treated as PEPs, and a domestic PEP stays one “durante el año siguiente a aquel en que hubiesen dejado su cargo” (during the year following the one in which they left office). Where a person ceased to be a domestic PEP within the year before seeking a new business relationship with an institution, that institution “deberá catalogarla como tal, durante el año siguiente a aquel en que se haya celebrado el contrato correspondiente” (must classify them as such during the year following the one in which the contract was entered into), so the flag can outlast the first anniversary of leaving office (SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, art. 2(XXV), last two paragraphs). Foreign PEPs are graded high risk at least (art. 33); domestic PEPs need extra risk factors to judge whether their activity matches their income and position (art. 32). An empowered director approves in writing operating with a PEP or a high-risk client (art. 39), and a PEP who is also high risk needs that approval for the operation as the manual sets out (art. 40); a beneficial owner who is a PEP gets the same approval (art. 11(VI)). Institutions draw up their own PEP list from the list of public offices SHCP publishes (art. 95), and the automated system alerts on operations intended with PEPs (art. 56(XIII)).
Reporting deadline
The Communication and Control Committee rules on an unusual operation within 60 calendar days of its detection, and the report goes to SHCP, through the CNBV, within 3 business days of the end of that session; within 24 hours of the alert or staff notice where there are signs or concrete facts that the funds could come from illicit activities or be used for terrorist financing or money laundering (SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, arts. 69 and 73).
False positives and tuning
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- Exact name, wrong person. With common names, many alerts are exact string matches to a PEP entry that still say nothing about whether this customer is that person. When the alerts are already perfect name matches, raising the name threshold does nothing: the fix is identifiers, not strictness.
- Not everything in a PEP dataset is a PEP. Some datasets, especially national ones assembled from candidate lists and public records, mix PEPs with “persons of interest”, election candidates and junior officials. Such entries can make up a large share of PEP alerts. Filter on the entry’s role or category where your provider exposes it. Dropping a whole national dataset instead also drops the real PEPs that appear only there.
- Stale and former entries. PEP data carries people who left office long ago, and some who have died; the FATF warns such lists “cannot be relied upon as being up-to-date” (PEP Guidance 2013, para 62). Judge a match on a former PEP under your former-PEP policy (see Thresholds) rather than escalating every one the same way.
- Spelling and transliteration. The same name is written several ways across scripts and records, and “inconsistent transliterations and spellings of names” make matching harder; with thin identifiers on the list, they produce many false positives (FATF PEP Guidance 2013, para 62). Screen every name variant you hold, and clear on identifiers rather than on spelling.
- Required fields decide who gets screened. Making identity fields mandatory before screening can leave most customers unscreened when those fields arrive after the screening event. Screen on the name, and use the other fields to clear contradictions.
- A date-of-birth match needs a date on both sides. Many national PEP entries carry no date of birth. Requiring an exact date-of-birth match then produces zero alerts: it switches the screen off rather than tuning it. Where your tool already penalises contradicting dates, sending the customer’s date of birth clears most namesakes without any extra condition.
- Screening before the name exists. If the screening event fires before the customer’s name is stored, the screen returns nothing for everyone, which looks the same as “screened and clear”. Check what each trigger event actually carries.
- Show the role on the alert. Without the position held, its jurisdiction and the source on the alert, analysts must research each case. Put them on the alert.
- No seniority tier. Some datasets have no structured seniority, so “senior PEPs only” cannot be configured from them.
When it fires
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- Compare the full entry with what you hold: role, country, date of birth, nationality, photo or public information. Clear namesakes on contradicting identifiers and record why.
- If you cannot decide, ask the customer (occupation, public functions held, date of birth) before concluding.
- On a confirmed PEP, family member or close associate: get senior management approval to start or continue the relationship, establish source of wealth and source of funds, and put the account under enhanced monitoring (FATF R.12; for a domestic PEP, whether this applies depends on the country, see By country). In Nigeria, include the customer’s transactions in the monthly PEP return (CBN Regulations 2022, reg. 29(4); Guidance Notes 2023, §11.2).
- A PEP match is not, on its own, a reason for an STR. File one when the activity is suspicious; the FATF’s PEP red flags (2013 guidance, Annex 1) list the patterns, such as corporate vehicles or family members used to obscure ownership. Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.
- Re-screen at each periodic review and on trigger events.
Related rules
- Sanctions screening: the same matching problem, a stricter obligation.
- High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch: country risk feeds the PEP relationship’s risk rating.
- Large single transaction and Sudden change from a customer’s baseline: the enhanced monitoring a confirmed PEP relationship needs.
- Adverse media screening (negative news): the same names checked against the news rather than PEP data.
Sources
19 sourcesHide
Primary:
- FATF, The FATF Recommendations, October 2025 edition (R.12 was not changed by the June 2026 update), Recommendation 12 and its Interpretive Note. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Fatf-recommendations.html
- FATF, Guidance: Politically Exposed Persons (Recommendations 12 and 22), June 2013, paras 11, 23–24, 44, 46–49, 58, 61–62, Annex 1. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Peps-r12-r22.html
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Guidance Notes on Politically Exposed Persons, June 2023, §§1, 6.1, 6.3, 6.5, 11. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2023/CCD/Approved%20PEP%20Guidance%20May%202023-combined.pdf
- Central Bank of Nigeria, AML/CFT/CPF of WMD in Financial Institutions Regulations, 2022 (Official Gazette No. 94, Vol. 109, 20 May 2022), reg. 29. Copy of the gazetted text with the CBN circular of 20 June 2022: https://sponsorships.standardbank.com/static_file/Nigeria/nigeriabank/Personal/Products/Ways%20To%20Bank/Self%20service%20banking/Agency%20Banking/AML%20CIRCULAR%20AND%20REGULATIONS%20MERGED%202022---.pdf
- Central Bank of Kenya, Guidance on Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs), August 2025, §§1.2, 3.1 (quoting the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Regulations 2023, reg. 26), 3.3, Part IV(n). https://www.centralbank.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Guidance-on-Politically-Exposed-Persons.pdf
- BCEAO, Instruction n°001-03-2025 du 18 mars 2025, art. 2, point 22, art. 5, art. 6. Published by the BCEAO: https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-04/Instruction%20n%C2%B0001-03-2025%20du%2018%20mars%2025%20portant%20modalit%C3%A9s%20de%20mise%20en%20oeuvre%20par%20les%20IF%20de%20leurs%20obligations%20en%20mati%C3%A8re%20de%20lutte%20contre%20le%20blanchiment%20de%20capitaux.pdf (same file: https://www.cb-umoa.org/sites/default/files/2025-08/Instruction%20n%C2%B0001-03-2025%20du%2018%20mars%2025%20portant%20modalit%C3%A9s%20de%20mise%20en%20oeuvre%20par%20les%20IF%20de%20leurs%20obligations%20en%20mati%C3%A8re%20de%20lutte%20contre%20le%20blanchiment%20de%20capitaux.pdf )
- UMOA, Loi uniforme relative à la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux, le financement du terrorisme et de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive (2023 text), arts. 2 (point 50), 29. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Loi-uniforme-LBCFTFP-Mars-2023-vf.pdf
- Financial Intelligence Centre (South Africa), Revised Guidance Note 7A on the implementation of various aspects of the FIC Act, 1 September 2025, paras 138–160. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Revised-Guidance-Note-7A-%E2%80%93-Implementation-of-various-aspects-of-the-FIC-Act.pdf
- ESAAMLG, Procurement Corruption in the Public Sector and Associated Money Laundering in the ESAAMLG Region (typologies report), September 2019, §3.5 (perpetrators) and §3.8 (the private-sector perspective). https://www.esaamlg.org/reports/Report_procurement.pdf
- European Banking Authority, Guidelines on ML/TF risk factors (EBA/GL/2021/02, consolidated with EBA/GL/2023/03), paras 4.46–4.52. https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2023-11/EBA%20GL%202021%2002%20-%20consolidated%20%28amended%20by%20EBA%20GL%202023%2003%29_EN.pdf
- Directive (EU) 2015/849 (fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive), art. 22. Official copy held by the UK National Archives: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eudr/2015/849/article/22
- Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 200/2024 (RESOL-2024-200-APN-UIF#MJ), 18 December 2024, Boletín Oficial no. 35571, 19 December 2024, arts. 8(c) and (i), 12(e), 22(h), 23(i) and 29; art. 36(c) (report deadlines). https://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/405000-409999/407429/norma.htm
- Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Mexico), “Disposiciones de carácter general a que se refiere el Artículo 58 de la Ley para Regular las Instituciones de Tecnología Financiera”, DOF 10 September 2018, arts. 2(XXV), 11(VI), 32, 33, 39, 40, 56(XIII) and 95; arts. 69 and 73 (report deadlines). https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5537449&fecha=10/09/2018 (accessed 2026-11-12).
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Payments System Policy Department, Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, November 2026, issued by circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004 of 5 November 2026, in force that day (circular, section 4.0); sections 26.1, 26.3.11(a) and 26.4. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/REGULATIONS%20FOR%20THE%20OPERATIONS%20OF%20NON-SECURITY%20VIRTUAL%20ASSETS%20IN%20NIGERIA.pdf
- Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism / Combating Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Accountable Institutions, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 12 December 2025, 2.6.1 and Appendix F. https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/BOG-FIC-AML-GUIDELINE-2025-FINAL-5-TO-BE-PUBLISHED.pdf
Reporting deadlines:
- Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act, 2022, s.7, and NFIU, Guidelines for the Identification, Verification and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions Related to ML/FT/PF for Financial Institutions (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, 13 December 2024), Part Six. Both published by the NFIU: the Act at https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/LawsAndRegulations, the guidelines at https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance
- Kenya, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism Financing Laws (Amendment) Act, 2023 (Act No. 10 of 2023), amending POCAMLA s.44(2). https://brs.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/AntiMoneyLaunderingandCombatingofTerrorismFinancingLawsAmendmentAct2023.pdf
- UMOA, Loi uniforme LBC/FT/FP (2023 text), arts. 2 (point 58), 60 and 61. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Loi-uniforme-LBCFTFP-Mars-2023-vf.pdf
- FIC South Africa, Guidance Note 4B on reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions and activities, 26 March 2019, para 71 (reporting period, MLTF Control Regulations reg. 24(3)) and para 80 (when the period starts). https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019.03-Guidance-Guidance-Note-4B-STRs.pdf
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