Money laundering
Sudden change from a customer’s baseline
A customer’s transaction count or value in a short window jumps far above their own average over the previous 30 to 90 days.
What it catches
A customer who usually sends or receives a little suddenly moves a lot, measured against their own history rather than a fixed limit. This is how an account that has been sold or taken over starts behaving, how a mule account looks once it is put to work, and how a customer’s declared profile stops matching what they actually do. Regulators ask for exactly this comparison: the EBA says transactions may be unusual because “they have an unusual or unexpected pattern compared with the customer’s normal activity”, GIABA lists, for West African mobile money, an account that “suddenly receives or sends large sums of money, inconsistent with previous activity”, and South Africa’s FIC gives the example of a client whose “overall transacting pattern does not correspond with the expected profile”. For crypto, the FATF’s virtual-asset red flags start from “irregular, unusual, or uncommon patterns of transactions”. The rule’s strength is that it adapts to each customer. Its weakness is that it is only as good as the history it compares against.
How the rule works
For each customer, compute a baseline: the average daily count or value of completed transactions over a look-back period (30–90 days), averaged over the days the customer was active, and excluding the current window. Compare the current window (usually 24 hours; longer for products customers use only occasionally) with the baseline. Alert when the current window is several times the baseline and also above an absolute floor, and only when the baseline rests on enough history.
Looks at
Every completed transaction of a customer, at the moment it completes.
Compares
- Normal day: the customer’s transactions in the last 30–90 days, leaving out the current window, added up and divided by the number of days the customer was active in that period.
- Now: the customer’s transactions in the 24 hours up to this one, added up the same way. If this window is longer than a day, divide it by its number of days first.
Both sides count only completed transactions in the direction this version watches (money in or money out), leave out fees, reversals and own-account movements, and use either their total value, in one currency, or their number.
Alerts when
Both of these are true:
- Now is at least 3–5× the normal day.
- Now is at least a few hundred to about USD 1,000 equivalent in value, or around 10 transactions a day in number.
Ignores
- Customers with fewer than about 5 completed transactions in the look-back: too little history for a normal day.
- Customers whose first transaction was less than 30–90 days ago.
- Transactions that did not complete, fees, reversals and own-account movements.
How often
At most one alert per customer per current window.
The alert shows
The customer, the figure for now and the normal day.
Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.
Look-back The period the normal day is worked out from, leaving out the current window. Start at 30–90 days: long enough to show the customer’s normal pattern, short enough to follow real changes in it. Shorter if you have less history.
Current window The recent period compared with the normal day. Start at 24 hours, which catches a single burst. For products customers use only occasionally, such as loan repayments or bill payments, a longer window may fit better; set it from how often your customers normally transact.
Multiplier How many times the normal day the current figure must reach. Start at 3–5×. That range is usually quoted against a plain daily average over the look-back; an average over active days only, as here, is higher, so the same multiplier is stricter and you can go lower. A lower multiplier catches smaller changes but fires on ordinary variation; use a higher one, around 10×, when comparing single payment amounts.
Minimum for now The least the current window must reach, so a customer with a small normal day does not alert on an ordinary day. Start at a few hundred to about USD 1,000 equivalent in value, or around 10 transactions a day in number, set per segment in local currency from your own distribution.
Minimum history The least history a customer needs before the rule compares them. Start at about 5 completed transactions, with history at least as long as the look-back. Raising it on its own drops real cases; pair it with the minimum for now.
Run count and value versions separately; they catch different things (many small payments vs one large one). Inflows and outflows can each have their own version.
Data it needs
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| Field | Usually comes from | If it’s missing |
|---|---|---|
| Customer identifier | Core ledger or wallet id, one per person | Baselines split across cards or accounts and every new identifier looks like a spike. |
| Transaction id, one per payment | Ledger; stable across retries | Retries and duplicates distort both the baseline and the current window. |
| Timestamp | Ledger | The rule can’t run. |
| Amount and currency | Ledger | Without conversion to one reference currency, a customer who uses two currencies produces nonsense ratios. |
| Status | Processor callbacks | Failed and pending attempts fill the baseline. Check that final statuses arrive before filtering on them. |
| Direction and transaction type | Ledger | Can’t separate inflow and outflow spikes, or exclude fees and own-account movements. |
| History covering the full look-back | Your own data, backfilled before go-live | Every customer looks new; see “False positives”. |
| Customer segment | KYC / onboarding | One floor for retail and business customers. |
Thresholds
No regulator sets a multiplier or look-back. Regulators require the comparison; the numbers below are suggestions.
| Parameter | Starting point | Where it comes from |
|---|---|---|
| Look-back window | 30–90 days, excluding the current window | Long enough to show the customer’s normal pattern, short enough to follow real changes in it. Shorter if you have less history. |
| Current window | 24 hours | A day catches a single burst. For products customers use only occasionally (loan repayments, bill payments), a longer window may fit better; set it from how often your customers normally transact. |
| Multiplier, count or value vs the normal day | 3–5× | A lower multiplier catches smaller changes but fires on ordinary variation. The range is usually quoted against a plain daily average over the look-back; an active-day average (the normal day above) is higher, so the same multiplier is stricter and you can go lower. Higher (10×) for single-payment amount comparisons. |
| Minimum history | At least about 5 completed transactions, and history at least as long as the look-back | No public source gives a value. A handful of transactions is the least an average can rest on, and history shorter than the look-back understates it. Raising it on its own drops real cases; pair it with the floor below (see False positives). |
| Absolute floor on the current window | A value floor of a few hundred to about USD 1,000 equivalent, or a count floor of around 10 per day, set per segment | Keeps a customer with a small baseline from alerting on an ordinary day (see False positives). Set it from your own distribution, in local currency per market. |
| Alert frequency | Once per customer per window | Avoids repeat alerts during one spike. |
By country
None of the countries covered here sets a multiplier. What the rules require is the comparison with the customer’s profile, and what to do after:
WAEMU (UEMOA). The 2023 uniform AML/CFT law requires institutions to examine transactions “en vue de s’assurer qu’elles sont conformes à ce qu’elles savent de leurs clients” (Art. 20), and to give special examination to “toute opération … d’un montant inhabituellement élevé, eu égard au profil du client” (Art. 21(c)): enquire, from the customer “et/ou par tous autres moyens”, about the origin and destination of funds, and keep a confidential written report. BCEAO Instruction 001-03-2025 (18 March 2025), whose Title I binds credit institutions, financial companies, microfinance institutions, e-money institutions, payment institutions and fintechs in the eight member states (art. 3), requires their information system to allow “le suivi des mouvements sur les comptes et la génération des alertes” (the monitoring of account movements and the generation of alerts) and “l’identification des transactions à caractère suspect ou inhabituel” (the identification of suspicious or unusual transactions), and “le profilage des clients et des comptes ouverts dans ses livres” (the profiling of customers and of the accounts opened in its books); information that changes a customer’s profile must be in the system within one month. The system’s effectiveness is reviewed at least once a year (art. 6). WAEMU (UEMOA in French) is the West African Economic and Monetary Union: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, the same eight states that form the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). The BCEAO’s instructions and the Council of Ministers’ decisions cited here apply in all eight. The uniform law applies in each state through that state’s own act, which may number its articles differently. The law of a single state is covered only where that state is named.
Reporting deadline
Report to the CENTIF “immédiatement” (Loi uniforme 2023, art. 60). The law defines “sans délai” as at most 24 hours (art. 2, point 58); “immédiatement” is not defined, and our reading is to treat 24 hours as the outer limit. Do not carry out an operation you suspect until the report is made, and after it only on the terms of art. 65, al. 3: the CENTIF has not opposed it, or no court decision has followed within four days of an opposition (art. 61); if it has already gone through, inform the CENTIF “sans délai” (art. 61).
West Africa (GIABA). Mobile money red flag: “A mobile money account suddenly receives or sends large sums of money, inconsistent with previous activity” (2025 cybercrime typologies, Typology 6, p.40).
Nigeria. The Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 deems a transaction that “is inconsistent with the known transaction pattern of the account or business relationship” to be suspicious, to be reported to the NFIU immediately (s.7(1)(d)). The CBN’s 2022 AML/CFT/CPF Regulations repeat this: such a transaction “shall be deemed to be suspicious, regardless of the amount, and the Financial Institution shall seek information from the customer as to the origin and destination of the funds, the purpose of the transaction and the identity of the beneficiary” (Reg. 38(1)(d)). They define an “unusual pattern of transactions” to include “transactions which fall outside the regular pattern of the account’s activity” (Reg. 37(3)). The CBN’s Baseline Standards for Automated AML Solutions (March 2026) require automated solutions to support “risk-based transaction and activity monitoring using appropriate techniques (including, where suitable, predictive analytics, anomaly detection, behavioural pattern recognition, and automated risk scoring)” (section 5.5(a)(i)), and expect them “to assess activity in the context of the full customer profile and not monitoring solely on raw transactional data” (section 4). The NFIU’s 2024 STR guidelines describe red flags as transactions that “exhibit inconsistencies with what is expected or considered normal based on the facts and context known to the Reporting Entity about its client” (Part Six, para 1(c)). For stablecoin issuers and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) licensed by the CBN, its Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria (in force 5 November 2026) require ongoing scrutiny of “transactions and wallet activity throughout the relationship to ensure that they are consistent with its knowledge of the customer, the customer’s business and risk profile” (section 26.3.8(a)), enhanced due diligence for customers “whose transactions are inconsistent with their stated source of funds or business profile” (section 26.3.11(c)), and an automated monitoring system that alerts on “large-value or rapid-succession transactions inconsistent with the customer’s profile” (section 26.7.1(e)).
Reporting deadline
Report to the NFIU immediately, with a written report within 24 hours (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.7(1)–(2)). The NFIU’s December 2024 STR guidelines start the 24 hours once the transaction is found suspicious, after an examination of no more than 72 hours, and require written reasons for every alert closed as not suspicious (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, Part Six, para 2).
South Africa. FIC Guidance Note 4B lists among its indicators “A transaction seems to be unusually large or otherwise inconsistent with the customer’s financial standing or usual pattern of activities” (para 42), and in its Example 21 a suspicion “based on a comparative review of the client’s previous transacting pattern” is reportable. Where the rule runs in an automated transaction monitoring system, FIC Directive 5 of 2019 requires the system’s detection methodology, “including algorithms, scenarios, threshold settings or rules” (this rule among them), to be documented (para 3.1.16) and, taken as a whole, “sufficient to address the associated money laundering and terrorist financing risks applicable to the reporter” (para 3.1.17), and sets the time limits for the system’s alerts given under the reporting deadline below (paras 2.1–2.3).
Reporting deadline
As soon as possible, and no later than 15 days excluding weekends and public holidays (FIC Act s.29; MLTF Control Regulations, reg. 24(3), via FIC Guidance Note 4B para 71). The 15 days run from when you became aware of the facts, which “may be, and in the majority of cases will be, before a suspicion is formed” (GN4B para 80), and an institution “may not add additional timeframes for its internal transactional monitoring alert system processes, and / or internal investigation and review processes to the prescribed reporting period” (GN4B para 81). Where the alert comes from an automated transaction monitoring system, the reporter “is deemed to have knowledge” of the possible suspicious activity when the alert is generated: the report is due “no later than 15 days after the alert has been generated”, and work on the alert must start within 48 hours, which the FIC counts as two days without weekends and public holidays, inside the 15 (FIC Directive 5 of 2019, paras 2.1–2.3; FIC PCC 45, paras 5–8).
Ghana. Institutions licensed by the Bank of Ghana must have processes that detect “unusual transactions, patterns and activities that are not consistent with the customer’s risk profile” (set by law, BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.8.6.1(1)), check that transactions are “consistent with the AI’s knowledge of the business, risk profile, and the source of funds of the customer” (2.4.2(7)), and pay special attention to “significant transactions relative to a relationship” and “transactions that fall out of the regular pattern of the account activity”, with written findings and a report to the FIC within 24 hours (2.8.2). Due diligence is repeated when “there is a material change in the way that the account is operated” (2.4.4(2)). For high-risk customers, the institution may obtain the number, size and frequency of transactions likely to be conducted, and “The account shall be regularly monitored to establish a full view of the nature of activity and whether it fits with the initial risk profile of the customer” (3.8.2.1(1)(iii)). Red flags include “Significant increases in cash deposits of an individual or business entity without apparent cause” (Appendix E, 2a) and a “Sudden and unexpected increase in account activity or balance arising from deposit of cash and non-cash items” (3i).
Reporting deadline
Within 24 hours of the suspicion, attempted transactions included, whatever the amount (BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.8.1(6) and 2.8.3(2)).
Canada. FINTRAC indicators: “Abrupt change in account activity”; “There is a sudden change in the client’s financial profile, pattern of activity or transactions”; “The transactional activity far exceeds the projected activity at the time of the account opening”.
Reporting deadline
File “as soon as practicable” after the measures that establish reasonable grounds to suspect (FINTRAC STR guidance, section 4).
EU. EBA ML/TF risk factor guidelines 4.60: firms should detect transactions with “an unusual or unexpected pattern compared with the customer’s normal activity or the pattern of transactions associated with similar customers, products or services”, and apply enhanced due diligence when they find one.
Argentina. Payment service providers and non-financial lenders must set “reglas de control de operaciones y alertas automatizadas” (transaction control rules and automated alerts) that check operations against each customer’s transactional profile and risk level (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 34(a)). The profile is adjusted to the operations the customer actually makes (art. 33), and operations whose amounts, types, frequency and nature “no guarden relación con los antecedentes y la actividad económica de ellos” (bear no relation to the customers’ background and economic activity) are among the circumstances to weigh in alerts (art. 34(b), circumstance 3).
Reporting deadline
Money laundering, within 24 hours of concluding that the operation is suspicious, and no later than 90 calendar days from the operation, performed or attempted; terrorist financing and proliferation financing, within 24 hours of the operation (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 36(c)).
Mexico. Fintech institutions (crowdfunding and e-money institutions, ITFs) must have an alert system that allows “la detección oportuna de algún cambio en el comportamiento o perfil transaccional del Cliente” (the timely detection of any change in the client’s behaviour or transactional profile) (SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, art. 36), on the client’s declared data, operation history, transactional behaviour and average balances (art. 56(VII)). “Los tipos, montos, frecuencia y naturaleza de las Operaciones que comúnmente realicen sus Clientes” (the types, amounts, frequency and nature of the client’s usual operations) are an unusual-operation circumstance to consider (art. 70(II)). When the institution detects “cambios significativos en el comportamiento transaccional habitual” (significant changes in usual transactional behaviour) without justified cause, it must re-verify the client’s data, update the file, raise the risk grade where the review warrants it and, where applicable, report an unusual operation (art. 26). The transactional profile the alerts compare against is re-evaluated at least every six months (art. 35). No multiplier is set.
Reporting deadline
The Communication and Control Committee rules on an unusual operation within 60 calendar days of its detection, and the report goes to SHCP, through the CNBV, within 3 business days of the end of that session; within 24 hours of the alert or staff notice where there are signs or concrete facts that the funds could come from illicit activities or be used for terrorist financing or money laundering (SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, arts. 69 and 73).
Kenya.
Reporting deadline
Within two days after the suspicion arose (POCAMLA s.44(2), as replaced by the AML/CFT Laws (Amendment) Act 2023, Act No. 10 of 2023).
False positives and tuning
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This rule fails mostly when its baseline is wrong. The UK’s JMLSG guidance puts the balance to strike: alerts should not be set to produce “just enough output for the existing staff complement to deal with”, nor “large numbers of unproductive alerts/‘false positives’” (Part I, 5.7.20). The typical causes are below, each with its fix.
- Idle days and a tiny baseline make ordinary days look like spikes. If the baseline divides by calendar days, a customer who transacts twice a month has a tiny daily average, so any active day looks huge, even one with a single transaction, and after a gap of a few weeks a normal-sized day fires as a spike. Average over active days, as the rule above does, then use a lower multiplier. Keep an absolute floor on the current window (see Thresholds) as a second line of defence for customers whose normal day is small. Raising the minimum history alone is not the answer: set high enough to matter, it drops real cases too.
- Not enough history. A 30- or 90-day baseline needs 30 or 90 days of data. Switched on with only a few days of backfill, the rule inverts: it flags the busiest customers, not the unusual ones. On a young or fast-growing product, many customers have less than 90 days of their own history, so the ratio never applies to them. Backfill the full look-back before go-live, and skip customers younger than it. Cover them with a new account activity rule, or compare them with a peer or segment baseline instead of their own: both the EBA (4.60, “the pattern of transactions associated with similar customers”) and the JMLSG (“comparing their activity or profile with that of a similar, peer group of customers”, 5.7.5) name that comparison.
- Today inside the baseline. If the current window is part of the baseline, a spike raises its own average and is damped, and a brand-new customer can score the maximum on day one. Exclude the current window.
- Attempts in the baseline. Counting created or failed attempts instead of completed payments lets customers meet the minimum-history rule with no real history. Counting completed payments only, with a value floor, removes most of that noise. Retries also suppress real spikes: a large payment attempted twice scores lower than one attempted once. First confirm that final statuses actually reach you: if events stay “pending”, a completed-only filter silences the rule.
- Duplicate deliveries. Some integrations send the same event two or three times, each with its own event id. Duplicates inflate the current window and the baseline unevenly, and can account for many of a rule’s alerts. Deduplicate on content (amount, timestamp, account, counterparty) when ids aren’t stable.
- Mixed currencies. Summing amounts in their own currencies breaks the ratio for anyone who uses two currencies. Converting to one reference currency removes those false alerts and recovers real spikes that an unconverted sum misses.
- Floor per transaction instead of per window. A per-payment minimum still lets busy accounts clear the bar every day. Put the floor on the window total.
- Structurally lumpy customers. Brokers, B2B payers and aggregator partners have naturally uneven days, and a single large partner can make most of a rule’s alerts. Raise the floor for those segments rather than excluding them: a compromised partner looks exactly like a busy one.
- Calendar cycles. Mondays, paydays and month-ends produce predictable spikes. Compare like with like (same weekday, or a longer baseline) if they dominate.
- Rules aimed at nobody. A rule aimed at a segment that never makes that kind of transaction, or one that needs more history than any of its targets have, stays silent. Check how many customers can qualify before trusting a quiet rule.
- Drops are an operations signal. A “volume fell sharply” version fires on weekends and quiet mornings. Treat drops as a business-health alert, not a fraud rule.
When it fires
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- Check the baseline: how many transactions and active days it rests on, and whether the current window contains retries, duplicates, fees or own-account movements. Close data artefacts and fix the rule. A failed attempt is not an artefact when deciding whether to report: the rule leaves attempts out of its counts, but the reporting duties cover attempted transactions too (Nigeria: MLPPA s.7(3), CBN Reg. 38(4); UEMOA: art. 60, “les tentatives d’opérations”; Canada: FINTRAC STR guidance, “the transaction or attempted transaction”).
- Look at what changed: new counterparties, new countries, new devices, a new product, a change of contact details shortly before the spike.
- Compare with the declared profile (occupation, expected volumes, business type). A salary rise or a seasonal business explains many spikes; get evidence rather than accepting a story.
- Ask the customer for the purpose of the transactions and the source of funds when the amount is material or the pattern doesn’t fit. In UEMOA states this enquiry (from the customer or by other means) and a written report are required for unusually large operations (Art. 21). In Nigeria, the CBN requires you to seek the origin and destination of the funds, the purpose of the transaction and the identity of the beneficiary for any transaction inconsistent with the account’s known pattern (Reg. 38(1)(d)). Asking must not disclose that a report is being filed (CBN Reg. 38(6)).
- If you form a suspicion, file a suspicious transaction report. Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.
Related rules
- Transaction velocity: fixed counts in a window, no history needed.
- Dormant account reactivation: the extreme case where the baseline is zero.
- New account activity: customers too new for a baseline, which this rule skips.
- Large single transaction, Rapid pass-through, New beneficiary, high-value payment.
- Account takeover: a new device or changed contact details followed soon after by a payout, which can explain a jump.
- Peer-group outlier: the same question asked of similar customers, which catches a customer out of line from the start.
- Unlicensed virtual asset business (crypto trading through an ordinary account): an individual who starts trading crypto for others, one reason activity jumps.
Sources
20 sourcesHide
- EBA, Guidelines on ML/TF risk factors (EBA/GL/2021/02, consolidated version amended by EBA/GL/2023/03), guideline 4.60 (unusual transactions), 4.70(a) and 4.73 (monitoring “in line with the customer’s risk profile”; “reliably to identify unusual and suspicious transactions and transaction patterns”). https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2023-11/EBA%20GL%202021%2002%20-%20consolidated%20%28amended%20by%20EBA%20GL%202023%2003%29_EN.pdf
- FIC South Africa, Guidance Note 4B on reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions and activities, 26 March 2019, para 42, Example 21, paras 71, 80 and 81. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019.03-Guidance-Guidance-Note-4B-STRs.pdf
- UMOA, Loi uniforme relative à la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux, le financement du terrorisme et de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive, March 2023, Art. 2 (point 58), 20, 21, 60, 61, 65. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Loi-uniforme-LBCFTFP-Mars-2023-vf.pdf
- NFIU, Guidelines for the Identification, Verification and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions … for Financial Institutions, ref. STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, 13 December 2024, Part Six paras 1(c) and 2. Listed at https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance
- FINTRAC, Money laundering and terrorist financing indicators—Financial entities, modified 2025-11-24, “ML/TF indicators surrounding the financial transactions in relation to the person/entity profile” and “…related to change in account activity”. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/indicators-indicateurs/fin_mltf-eng
- FINTRAC, Reporting suspicious transactions to FINTRAC, section 4. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/str-dod/str-dod-eng
- JMLSG, Guidance for the UK financial sector, Part I, October 2026 edition, para 5.7.5 (monitoring “by reference to … the profile of the customer … or by comparing their activity or profile with that of a similar, peer group of customers”), 5.7.20 (balancing alert levels against “unproductive alerts/‘false positives’”). https://www.jmlsg.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/JMLSG-Guidance-Part-I_Oct-2026.pdf
- GIABA, Typologies of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Linked to Cybercrime in West Africa, May 2025, Typology 6 red flags, p.40. https://www.giaba.org/typologies/3495__typologies-of-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-linked-to-cybercrime-in-west-africa.html
- CBN, AML/CFT/CPF of WMD in Financial Institutions Regulations, 2022 (Official Gazette No. 94, Vol. 109, 20 May 2022), Reg. 37(3) and Reg. 38(1)(d), (4) and (6) (Gazette pp. B 2089–2090). https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2022/FPRD/AML%20CIRCULAR%20AND%20REGULATIONS%20MERGED.pdf
- Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 (Nigeria), s.7(1)(d), (2) and (3). Listed at https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/LawsAndRegulations
- Kenya, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism Financing Laws (Amendment) Act, 2023, replacing POCAMLA s.44(2). https://brs.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/AntiMoneyLaunderingandCombatingofTerrorismFinancingLawsAmendmentAct2023.pdf
- FATF, Virtual Assets Red Flag Indicators of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, September 2020, para 12: the misuse of virtual assets “could be identified through irregular, unusual, or uncommon patterns of transactions”. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/Virtual-assets-red-flag-indicators.html
- CBN, Baseline Standards for Automated Anti-Money Laundering, Combating the Financing of Terrorism and Countering Proliferation Financing Solutions, circular BSD/DIR/PUB/LAB/019/002, 10 March 2026, section 4 and section 5.5(a)(i). https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/CBN%20issues%20Baseline%20Standards%20for%20Automated%20Anti-Money%20Laundering%20Solution.pdf
- Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 200/2024 (RESOL-2024-200-APN-UIF#MJ), 18 December 2024, Boletín Oficial no. 35571, 19 December 2024, arts. 33, 34(a) and 34(b), circumstance 3; art. 36(c) (report deadlines). https://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/405000-409999/407429/norma.htm
- Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Mexico), “Disposiciones de carácter general a que se refiere el Artículo 58 de la Ley para Regular las Instituciones de Tecnología Financiera”, DOF 10 September 2018, arts. 26, 35, 36, 56(VII) and 70(II); arts. 69 and 73 (report deadlines). https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5537449&fecha=10/09/2018 (accessed 2026-11-12).
- FIC South Africa, Directive 5 of 2019 on the usage of an automated transaction monitoring system for the detection and submission of regulatory reports, 29 March 2019, paras 2.1–2.3, 3.1.16 and 3.1.17. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019-DIR-Directive-5-of-2019-ATMS.pdf
- FIC South Africa, Public Compliance Communication 45 on Directive 5 of 2019 in relation to the use of automated transaction monitoring systems, 20 March 2020, paras 5–8. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2020.03-PCC-PCC-45-On-Directive-5-of-2019-in-relation-to-the-use-of-ATMS.pdf
- BCEAO, Instruction n°001-03-2025 du 18 mars 2025 on AML/CFT/CPF organisation, internal control and compliance of financial institutions, arts. 3 and 6. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-04/Instruction%20n%C2%B0001-03-2025%20du%2018%20mars%2025%20portant%20modalit%C3%A9s%20de%20mise%20en%20oeuvre%20par%20les%20IF%20de%20leurs%20obligations%20en%20mati%C3%A8re%20de%20lutte%20contre%20le%20blanchiment%20de%20capitaux.pdf
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Payments System Policy Department, Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, November 2026, issued by circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004 of 5 November 2026, in force that day (circular, section 4.0); sections 26.3.8(a), 26.3.11(c) and 26.7.1(e). https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/REGULATIONS%20FOR%20THE%20OPERATIONS%20OF%20NON-SECURITY%20VIRTUAL%20ASSETS%20IN%20NIGERIA.pdf
- Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism / Combating Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Accountable Institutions, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 12 December 2025, 2.4.2(7), 2.4.4(2), 2.8.2, 2.8.6.1(1), 3.8.2.1(1)(iii) and Appendix E, red flags 2a and 3i. https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/BOG-FIC-AML-GUIDELINE-2025-FINAL-5-TO-BE-PUBLISHED.pdf
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