Money laundering
New account activity (mule accounts)
In the first days or weeks after an account is opened, it receives large sums or many payments, sends most of it straight on, or moves far more than the customer declared.
What it catches
A newly opened account that receives large sums or many payments soon after opening, sends most of it on quickly, or moves far more than the customer said it would at onboarding. Mule accounts are often opened for the job: a recruited person opens one in their own name and hands it over or sells it, or the account is opened with a stolen or borrowed identity, and it is used hard before anyone knows what normal looks like for that customer. In its fastest form the account is filled and emptied within days, which some call a bust-out. In lending and cards the term more often means building up credit, drawing it all down and disappearing; this rule looks at payments, not credit lines, and does not detect that.
Regulators name the pattern widely. The FATF, INTERPOL and Egmont list “Rapid or immediate, high or low value transactions after opening of an account, inconsistent with the purpose of the account” among their risk indicators for cyber-enabled fraud. The FATF’s virtual-asset red flags include “a large initial deposit to open a new relationship” while “the amount funded is inconsistent with the customer profile”. The FCA found that “high value payments into a new or (previously) dormant account and similar amounts subsequently debiting the account” are “not being detected as often as they should be”. FinCEN lists, as a red flag in its alert on deepfake identity fraud, “A newly opened account or an account with little prior transaction history” that “has a pattern of rapid transactions”. Tracfin describes payment accounts that, “peu après leur ouverture” (shortly after opening), are fed by many transfers that are then quickly debited.
The rule also fills a gap other behaviour rules leave. A rule that compares a customer with their own history has nothing to compare a new customer with, and a dormancy rule has to skip new accounts. Most new customers are honest, and their first weeks are often busy: the rule is a prompt to review, not a finding.
How the rule works
For each completed transaction on an account younger than a set window, measured from the opening date held by onboarding, compare what the account has done since opening with what a new customer of that type would do. Alert on any of these:
- Large early funding. Money from third parties since opening is above a floor for the customer’s segment. In a case in the FATF’s virtual-asset red flags, “in the first two days after a personal account had been created for a young individual, the account received deposits of a commercial nature from different legal persons in large amounts”, and the money was “immediately transferred to accounts of several VASPs (in one day)”.
- Many senders. Money arrives from several different people, adding up to at least a minimum total (see Funnel account).
- Fill and empty (bust-out). Most of what came in leaves again within a short window: the rapid pass-through test, run on a new account. FinCEN’s money-mule red flag: a customer opens a new bank account in the name of a business “and, shortly thereafter, someone transfers the funds out of the account.” The FATF’s virtual-asset red flags describe a new customer who funds a large deposit on the first day and “starts to trade the total amount or a large portion of the amount on that same day or the day after, or if the customer withdraws the whole amount the day after”.
- Above declared activity. Turnover since opening is well above what the customer declared at onboarding (expected monthly amount, purpose of the account, occupation or business). FINTRAC lists activity that “far exceeds the projected activity at the time of the account opening”; the EBA treats as a risk factor a customer whose “behaviour or transaction volume” is “unexpected based on the information the customer provided at account opening”.
On loan products, a related signal is a new borrower who repays a large loan early or in full soon after it is paid out. The same EBA list names a customer who “unexpectedly and without reasonable explanation accelerates an agreed repayment schedule”. It needs the loan’s payout date and repayment schedule, it is not part of the rule below, and no public source gives a value: set the amount and the time from payout from your own book.
Many new accounts opened from one phone, device, address, employer or batch is a different test, run across customers: see Shared identifiers across customers.
Looks at
Every completed transaction, in or out, on an account opened less than 7–30 days ago, counted from the opening date held by onboarding.
Measures
- Money in: every completed payment the customer received from other people since the account was opened. Own-account moves, refunds, bonuses, fee reversals and zero-value credits are left out.
- Money out: every completed payment the customer sent to other people since the account was opened. Moves to the customer’s own accounts are left out.
Both totals are converted to one currency at a documented rate.
Alerts when
Any of these is true:
- Large early funding: money in is at least about USD 500–1,000 for the customer’s segment.
- Many senders: money in came from at least 3–8 different senders and is at least your minimum for the segment.
- Fill and empty: over the last few hours on instant rails, or 24–72 hours on bank transfers, up to this transaction, money in reached the same floor of about USD 500–1,000, and money out was at least 80–95% of that money in.
- Above declared activity: the customer declared an expected monthly amount at onboarding, and money in or money out since opening, whichever is larger, is more than 2–3 times that amount. If the declaration covers total turnover, compare it with money in and money out added together.
Ignores
- Accounts with no opening date on record. Each is logged as a data gap: an unknown opening date never counts as new.
How often
At most one alert per customer for each of the four tests.
Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.
New-account window How long after opening an account counts as new. Start at the first 7 to 30 days. Mule and bust-out use is fastest in the first days; a longer window catches slower set-ups but takes in more ordinary first-month activity.
Early-inflow floor How much money from other people counts as large for a new account. Start at about USD 500–1,000 equivalent for a window of about a week, set per market and segment, in local currency. Raise it if your new-account window is longer than a week: over a month, a floor this low is met by an ordinary salary. Lower it where typical payments are small; set it much higher for business segments.
Distinct senders How many different people must have sent money in. Start at 3–8: the low end for a new individual account, the high end for businesses.
Minimum money in Set per segment and currency from your own data; no public source gives a value. Without it, a few small credits from relatives make the count.
Drain window How far back the fill-and-empty test looks. Start at a few hours on instant rails and 24–72 hours on bank transfers, as in Rapid pass-through.
Share sent out How much of the money that came in has to go out. Start at 80–95%. A brand-new account that keeps nothing back is a stronger signal than an established one.
Multiple of declared activity How far above the declared monthly amount the account must go. Start at more than 2–3 times the expected monthly activity declared at onboarding, so that a customer who does what they declared never fires. Use the higher end where declarations are rough ranges or out of date. With a new-account window shorter than a month, less than a month of activity is compared with a monthly amount, so the test fires only on a clear excess.
Run the test when money leaves as well as when it arrives. On a credit you can only hold the money; on the outgoing payment you can still stop it.
Customer attributes such as age. Age alone is a weak signal on a new account. Money mules “can be of any age, race, or gender”, and the FIC South Africa describes unemployed people, pensioners and students recruited as mules. Other typologies describe older scam victims persuaded to open accounts that receive other victims’ money (FinCEN), and accounts opened in the names of people aged 73 to 81 by a mobile-money agent who then controlled them (CENTIF Sénégal). In each case the warning sign is what the account does, not who holds it, and the older people were victims rather than offenders. A rule on age fires on ordinary older customers, treats them differently for who they are rather than what they do, and rests on birth-date data that can be missing or filled with placeholders. Do not use age as a trigger. If you use it at all, use it only to look sooner at a behavioural alert for signs that the customer is being exploited, and check that use against your data protection and equal-treatment obligations.
Data it needs
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| Field | Usually comes from | If it’s missing |
|---|---|---|
| Account opening date | onboarding or KYC system | Required. Without it nothing is “new”, and a rule that needs it skips those customers without an error. “First seen by the monitoring tool” is not the opening date. |
| Customer id | account or wallet | Required. All of a customer’s accounts and wallets should share one id, or a second account looks like a new customer. |
| Customer segment (individual, business, agent) | onboarding (KYC/KYB) | Needed to set floors. Without it, new businesses dominate the alerts. |
| Declared expected activity | onboarding questionnaire | Needed for the above-declared variant. Without it, compare with what new customers of the segment typically do over the same time since opening. |
| Amount and currency | ledger or payment event | Required. Convert to one currency before comparing. |
| Direction, status and transaction type | ledger, processor | Required. Count completed transactions. Leave moves between the customer’s own accounts out of money in and money out, and refunds, bonuses and fee reversals out of money in. |
| Counterparty id | payment details | Needed to count distinct senders and to tell the customer’s own money from third-party money. |
| Date of birth | KYC | Optional, never a trigger (see Customer attributes above). Check how often it is filled and whether placeholder dates are common. |
| Device, phone and IP at sign-up | onboarding | For the cross-customer test (Shared identifiers) and for the analyst. |
Thresholds
No regulator we reviewed sets a new-account window or amount for monitoring, except Mexico’s six-month initial profile for fintech institutions (see By country). Nigerian institutions surveyed by the NFIU report using “thresholds set on accounts based on account opening dates and transaction counts”, without giving values (see By country). Set by law values come from the source named under “Where it comes from”.
| Parameter | Value | Type | Where it comes from |
|---|---|---|---|
| New-account window | the first 7 to 30 days after opening | Suggested | Mule and bust-out use is fastest in the first days; a longer window catches slower set-ups but takes in more ordinary first-month activity. Customers older than the window belong to baseline rules. |
| Early-inflow floor | about USD 500 to 1,000 equivalent of third-party money, for a window of about a week, set per market and segment | Suggested | Raise it if your new-account window is longer than a week: over a month, a floor this low is met by an ordinary salary. Lower it where typical payments are small; set it much higher for business segments; set it in local currency. |
| Distinct senders | 3 to 8 | Suggested | As in Funnel account: use the low end for a new individual account, the high end for businesses. |
| Minimum money in for many senders | set per segment and currency from your own data | Suggested | As in Funnel account. No public source gives a value. Without it, a few small credits from relatives make the count. |
| Share sent out and drain window | Share 80% to 95%; window as in Rapid pass-through (a few hours on instant rails, 24 to 72 hours on bank transfers) | Suggested | As in Rapid pass-through. A brand-new account that keeps nothing back is a stronger signal than an established one. |
| Declared-maximum period (Mexico, fintech institutions) | at least the first six months, with the client’s declared maximum monthly amounts as the initial profile in the alert system | Set by law | See By country. How the amounts are compared (for example month by month) is not set by law. |
| Multiple of declared activity | more than 2 to 3 times the expected monthly activity declared at onboarding, since opening and within the new-account window | Suggested | A customer who does what they declared never fires. Use the higher end where declarations are rough ranges or out of date. With a window shorter than a month, the test fires only on a clear excess. |
By country
Nigeria. The NFIU’s 2023 fraud typologies list among indicators “Newly opened corporate accounts receiving funds from different persons” (Case Study 9, a Ponzi scheme) and “Newly opened accounts receiving funds from foreign jurisdictions” (Case Study 14, a romance scam). Institutions surveyed for the same report name “restrictions on new accounts pending verification, thresholds set on accounts based on account opening dates and transaction counts” among their controls. The CBN’s Baseline Standards for Automated AML Solutions (10 March 2026) require monitoring scenarios and models to “make risk-based use of relevant CDD/KYC/KYB attributes (such as occupation, declared income or turnover range, customer segment, product profile, geography, and delivery channel) in addition to raw transactional patterns” (section 5.5(a)(iv)): the declared activity and segment this rule compares against. For stablecoin issuers and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) licensed by the CBN, its Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria (in force 5 November 2026) require ongoing scrutiny of “transactions and wallet activity throughout the relationship” against what is known of the customer (section 26.3.8(a)). Where verification is completed after the relationship starts, the licensee must limit “the number, type and amount of transactions” and “not permit any withdrawal, transfer to an external wallet or redemption until verification is completed” (section 26.3.9). Those limits and blocks are account settings, not this rule; this rule watches how a new account behaves within them.
Reporting deadline
Report to the NFIU immediately, with a written report within 24 hours (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.7(1)–(2)). The NFIU’s December 2024 STR guidelines start the 24 hours once the transaction is found suspicious, after an examination of no more than 72 hours, and require written reasons for every alert closed as not suspicious (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, Part Six, para 2).
West Africa (GIABA). GIABA’s 2025 cybercrime typologies describe a CENTIF-Togo case in which the holder declared “At the opening of the account” that he managed an import-export company; the account never paid abroad and instead “functioned more like a bounce account”.
WAEMU (UEMOA). The 2023 Uniform Law requires institutions to check that operations are “conformes à ce qu’elles savent de leurs clients” (consistent with what they know of their customers) (art. 20). BCEAO Instruction 001-03-2025 (18 March 2025), whose Title I binds credit institutions, financial companies, microfinance institutions, e-money institutions, payment institutions and fintechs in the eight member states (art. 3), requires their information system to allow “le suivi des mouvements sur les comptes et la génération des alertes” (the monitoring of account movements and the generation of alerts) and “l’identification des transactions à caractère suspect ou inhabituel” (the identification of suspicious or unusual transactions), and “le profilage des clients et des comptes ouverts dans ses livres” (the profiling of customers and of the accounts opened in its books); information that changes a customer’s profile must be in the system within one month. The system’s effectiveness is reviewed at least once a year (art. 6). WAEMU (UEMOA in French) is the West African Economic and Monetary Union: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, the same eight states that form the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). The BCEAO’s instructions and the Council of Ministers’ decisions cited here apply in all eight. The uniform law applies in each state through that state’s own act, which may number its articles differently. The law of a single state is covered only where that state is named.
Reporting deadline
Report to the CENTIF “immédiatement” (Loi uniforme 2023, art. 60). The law defines “sans délai” as at most 24 hours (art. 2, point 58); “immédiatement” is not defined, and our reading is to treat 24 hours as the outer limit. Do not carry out an operation you suspect until the report is made; if it has already gone through, inform the CENTIF “sans délai” (art. 61).
Senegal. CENTIF Sénégal’s 2024 report describes a mobile-money agent who used the identities of people aged 73 to 81 to create and control e-money accounts (Cas 4).
South Africa. The FIC’s 2024 money-mule report lists “Newly opened accounts as well as shelf and shell companies that were previously dormant suddenly credited with high-value amounts from government-owned entities” among account indicators, and notes that mules “can be of any age, race, or gender”. Where the rule runs in an automated transaction monitoring system, FIC Directive 5 of 2019 requires the system’s detection methodology, “including algorithms, scenarios, threshold settings or rules” (this rule among them), to be documented (para 3.1.16) and, taken as a whole, “sufficient to address the associated money laundering and terrorist financing risks applicable to the reporter” (para 3.1.17), and sets the time limits for the system’s alerts given under the reporting deadline below (paras 2.1–2.3).
Reporting deadline
As soon as possible, and no later than 15 days excluding weekends and public holidays (FIC Act s.29; MLTF Control Regulations, reg. 24(3), via FIC Guidance Note 4B para 71). The 15 days run from when you became aware of the facts, which “may be, and in the majority of cases will be, before a suspicion is formed” (GN4B para 80). Where the alert comes from an automated transaction monitoring system, the reporter “is deemed to have knowledge” of the possible suspicious activity when the alert is generated: the report is due “no later than 15 days after the alert has been generated”, and work on the alert must start within 48 hours, which the FIC counts as two days without weekends and public holidays, inside the 15 (FIC Directive 5 of 2019, paras 2.1–2.3; FIC PCC 45, paras 5–8).
Ghana. A “Sudden and unexpected increase in account activity or balance arising from deposit of cash and non-cash items”, typically in an account “opened with a small amount which subsequently increases rapidly and significantly”, is a red flag in the BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025 (Appendix E, 3i). For new customers whose documents are deferred for up to 90 days, “DURING THIS 90-DAY PERIOD, A POST-NO-DEBIT SHALL BE PLACED ON THE ACCOUNT” (Appendix B). Where business starts before identification, no money may be transferred or paid out to a third party “until the identification requirements have been satisfied” (3.6(3)), and a customer allowed to use the relationship before verification is subject to risk-based measures such as “limits on the number, types and amount of transactions that can be performed” (2.4.3(2) and (3)). Ongoing due diligence checks that transactions are “consistent with the AI’s knowledge of the business, risk profile, and the source of funds of the customer” (2.4.2(7)).
Reporting deadline
Within 24 hours of the suspicion, attempted transactions included, whatever the amount (BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.8.1(6) and 2.8.3(2)).
France. Tracfin’s 2024 threat assessment describes payment accounts opened with false documents that, “Peu après leur ouverture” (shortly after opening), are fed by many transfers that are “rapidement débitées” (quickly debited), and says easy, remote account opening at payment and e-money institutions attracts people looking for pass-through accounts. Its alert criteria include “Un volume des transactions important pour une société de création récente” (a large volume of transactions for a recently created company) (Tome III, case 16).
Canada. FINTRAC’s indicators for financial entities include “The transactional activity far exceeds the projected activity at the time of the account opening or the beginning of the relationship” and “Client appears to have recently established a series of new relationships with different financial entities.”
Reporting deadline
File “as soon as practicable” after the measures that establish reasonable grounds to suspect (FINTRAC STR guidance, section 4).
EU. The EBA risk factor guidelines for retail banks treat behaviour or volume “unexpected based on the information the customer provided at account opening” as a risk factor (EBA/GL/2021/02, para 9.6).
Argentina. Each customer starts with a “perfil transaccional prospectivo” (prospective transactional profile), built from the expected purpose and nature of the relationship and the information the customer gave, and adjusted later to the operations actually made (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 33). Automated rules check operations against that profile (art. 34(a)), and operations out of line with the customer’s background and economic activity are among the circumstances to weigh in alerts (art. 34(b), circumstance 3).
Reporting deadline
Money laundering, within 24 hours of concluding that the operation is suspicious, and no later than 90 calendar days from the operation, performed or attempted; terrorist financing and proliferation financing, within 24 hours of the operation (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 36(c)).
Mexico. For at least the first six months of the relationship, fintech institutions (crowdfunding and e-money institutions, ITFs) must base each client’s initial transactional profile on the maximum monthly amounts the client declared at onboarding, and that profile “deberá estar incluido en el sistema de alertas” (must be included in the alert system) “con objeto de detectar inconsistencias entre la información proporcionada por el Cliente y el monto de las Operaciones que realice” (to detect inconsistencies between what the client declared and the amount of its operations) (set by law, SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, art. 35). The alert system must allow the timely detection of changes in the client’s behaviour or profile (art. 36) and run on the information the client gave at the start of the relationship (art. 56(VII)). The profile is re-evaluated at least every six months for clients whose contract is at least six months old (art. 35).
Reporting deadline
The Communication and Control Committee rules on an unusual operation within 60 calendar days of its detection, and the report goes to SHCP, through the CNBV, within 3 business days of the end of that session; within 24 hours of the alert or staff notice where there are signs or concrete facts that the funds could come from illicit activities or be used for terrorist financing or money laundering (SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, arts. 69 and 73).
False positives and tuning
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Common innocent explanations: a first salary; a customer moving savings from another provider; an account opened to make one large payment (a rent deposit, school fees, a car); a small business that starts trading on day one; relatives paying into a student’s new account; welcome and referral bonuses.
Typical causes of misfires:
- Newness alone. On a growing product, new customers can make up most of the activity, so “large activity on a new account” fires on ordinary first weeks. Require a pattern on top of newness (a drain, many senders, turnover above what was declared) and set floors per segment.
- “New” measured from the wrong date. Monitoring tools can know only when they first saw a customer, an email or a phone. Those proxies mark established customers as new whenever their details are loaded or changed. Use the opening date from onboarding, and check on a sample that the field holds the real date.
- Several opening dates. Sign-up, KYC approval, record creation and wallet or card creation can fall on different dates. A record or wallet created after sign-up makes an established customer look new. Pick the date that means “the customer started” and test it.
- Missing opening dates. A rule that needs account age returns nothing, not an error, for customers with no opening date. Customers onboarded outside the main flow (manually, through an intermediary, or as businesses) can be exactly those. Check the fill rate by segment before trusting a quiet rule.
- Counting the wrong credits. Welcome and referral bonuses, refunds, moves between the customer’s own accounts and cards, fee reversals and zero-value credits are not third-party money. Leave them out of inflow sums and sender counts. A top-up from the customer’s own bank account or card at another provider comes with an outside counterparty, so it looks like third-party money: treat it as the customer’s own money where the name or card can be matched, and where it can’t, expect these top-ups to make up much of the early-funding alerts.
- Failed attempts counted as activity. A new customer whose funding keeps failing produces many deposit attempts in a short time. Count completed transactions here, and treat repeated failures as a separate signal (see Card testing).
- Counting events, not customers. Apps can send several sign-up or onboarding events for one person, so a count of sign-up events fires when a single customer completes onboarding. To find many accounts opened together, count distinct customers linked by a shared identifier.
- Groups that join together. A company opening salary or loan accounts for its staff, a cooperative, a school or a marketing campaign brings many related sign-ups at once. Sharing an employer is normal for these products. Look for a second signal, such as one device, phone or payout account across several of them, or early defaults.
- New business customers. A new business moving large sums in its first week can be normal. Segment, and test it against its declared expected activity rather than an individual’s floor.
- Fixed attributes as triggers. A rule on a fixed attribute such as age fires on ordinary customers who match it and carries no behaviour. Birth dates can be missing, or filled with placeholder or default values. Check the distribution of the field before using it, and do not use age as a trigger. A rule on such an attribute can also fire when the attribute arrives, usually at the identity check, before any money has moved: it then only repeats that check, since customers the check rejected are already stopped and the rest have done nothing yet.
How to tune: require a behaviour on top of newness; measure age from the onboarding opening date; segment by customer type and set floors per segment and currency; leave out own-account and promotional credits; count completed transactions; evaluate when money leaves; cap at one alert per customer per variant; and check how often the opening date is filled before going live.
When it fires
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Analyst checklist:
- Confirm the account is new: opening date from onboarding, KYC approval date, and whether the customer has or had another account with you.
- Compare the activity with what the customer declared at onboarding: occupation or business, purpose of the account, expected monthly amount, source of funds.
- List who paid in and where the money went. Check whether the senders are related to the customer, whether they appear on other customers’ accounts or in fraud reports, and whether the exits go to crypto, cash-out or abroad.
- Check the onboarding signals: device, phone, IP, address or documents shared with other customers (see Shared identifiers), KYC retries, and changes of contact details soon after opening, which the FATF, INTERPOL and Egmont list as an indicator (“Frequent changes of contact details, phone numbers, email addresses after opening of the account”).
- Ask the customer about the purpose of the account and of the payments, as part of ordinary due diligence and never in a way that reveals a suspicion or a report. Mules are often told the money is a job, a loan or a favour. Where the risk is high, consider holding outgoing payments while you review.
- Escalate when the customer cannot explain the flows, the senders are victims of reported fraud, or the account appears to have been opened for this.
An alert is a reason to review, not a suspicion in itself: the NFIU’s 2024 STR guidelines call monitoring alerts “unusual” and say they “should not be automatically regarded as suspicious” (Part Three, paras 1–2). Under the FATF standard, suspicious transactions are reported regardless of amount, attempted transactions included (Interpretive Note to Recommendation 20, para 3). Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.
Related rules
- Rapid pass-through: the drain test that the bust-out variant runs on a new account.
- Funnel account: many senders into one account.
- Shared identifiers across customers: many new accounts opened from one device, phone, address or employer.
- Dormant account reactivation: the same surprise on an account that was quiet. It should skip new accounts; this rule covers them.
- Sudden change from a customer’s baseline and New beneficiary, high-value payment: both skip new customers or misfire on them, and hand them to this rule.
- Transaction structuring: many small credits on a new account.
- Card testing: repeated failed funding attempts.
- Account takeover: changes of contact details or device soon after opening.
- Refused or failed identity verification, and false KYC data: the identity check at opening, refused, failed or false.
- Peer-group outlier: similar customers as the yardstick from the first full month; accounts used for a few weeks and dropped are left to this rule.
- Internal watchlist match: an identifier at sign-up already on your own or shared lists, such as an exited customer coming back.
Sources
27 sourcesHide
- FATF, INTERPOL and Egmont Group, “Illicit Financial Flows from Cyber-Enabled Fraud”, November 2023, Annex A “Risk indicators for CEF”, pp.63–64 (“Rapid or immediate, high or low value transactions after opening of an account, inconsistent with the purpose of the account”; “Frequent changes of contact details, phone numbers, email addresses after opening of the account”). https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Illicit-financial-flows-cyber-enabled-fraud.pdf
- FATF, “Virtual Assets: Red Flag Indicators of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing”, September 2020, para 11 (p.6, transfers “to a newly created or to a previously inactive account”), para 12, “Transactions concerning new users” (p.7), and Case Study 3, “Initial deposit inconsistent with customer profile” (pp.7–8). https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Virtual-Assets-Red-Flag-Indicators.pdf
- FATF, The FATF Recommendations, October 2025 edition (R.20 was not changed by the June 2026 update): Interpretive Note to R.20 para 3. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Fatf-recommendations.html
- FCA, “Proceeds of fraud – Detecting and preventing money mules”, multi-firm review, 19 October 2023 (last updated 3 December 2025), “Transaction monitoring”. https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/multi-firm-reviews/proceeds-fraud-detecting-preventing-money-mules
- FinCEN Alert FIN-2024-Alert004, “FinCEN Alert on Fraud Schemes Involving Deepfake Media Targeting Financial Institutions”, 13 November 2024, red flag indicators, p.6. https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FinCEN-Alert-DeepFakes-Alert508FINAL.pdf
- FinCEN Advisory FIN-2020-A003, “Advisory on Imposter Scams and Money Mule Schemes Related to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)”, 7 July 2020, red flag 9, p.6. https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2020-07-07/Advisory_%20Imposter_and_Money_Mule_COVID_19_508_FINAL.pdf
- FinCEN Advisory FIN-2022-A002, “Advisory on Elder Financial Exploitation”, 15 June 2022, pp.5–6. https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2022-06-15/FinCEN%20Advisory%20Elder%20Financial%20Exploitation%20FINAL%20508.pdf
- EBA, “Guidelines on customer due diligence and the factors credit and financial institutions should consider when assessing the ML/TF risk” (EBA/GL/2021/02, consolidated with EBA/GL/2023/03), para 9.6; the later amendment EBA/GL/2024/01 does not change para 9.6. https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2023-11/EBA%20GL%202021%2002%20-%20consolidated%20%28amended%20by%20EBA%20GL%202023%2003%29_EN.pdf
- Tracfin, “LCB-FT : état de la menace 2024-2025”, Rapport d’activité 2024, Tome III, case 16, p.45. https://www.vie-publique.fr/files/rapport/pdf/300600.pdf
- NFIU, “Money Laundering Typologies Through Fraud in Nigeria”, December 2023, Case Study 9 (p.31), Case Study 14 (p.36), survey findings (p.74). Listed at https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/Trendstypo
- GIABA, “Typologies of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Linked to Cybercrime in West Africa”, May 2025, Case 6, p.24. https://www.giaba.org/typologies/3495__typologies-of-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-linked-to-cybercrime-in-west-africa.html
- CENTIF Sénégal, Rapport d’activités 2024 (April 2025), Cas 4, pp.38–39. https://www.vie-publique.sn/docs/17b18584-068f-42ee-980e-5e3c2c65d137/centif-2024.pdf
- UEMOA, Loi uniforme relative à la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux, le financement du terrorisme et de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive (March 2023), arts. 2 (point 58), 20, 60 and 61. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Loi-uniforme-LBCFTFP-Mars-2023-vf.pdf
- FIC South Africa, “Financial Crime Insights: Money mules”, June 2024, pp.4, 8 and 17. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Financial-Crime-Insights-Money-mules.pdf
- FIC South Africa, Guidance Note 4B on reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions and activities, 26 March 2019, para 71 (reporting period, MLTF Control Regulations reg. 24(3)) and para 80 (when the period starts). https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019.03-Guidance-Guidance-Note-4B-STRs.pdf
- FINTRAC, “Money laundering and terrorist financing indicators—Financial entities”, modified 24 November 2025 (“The transactional activity far exceeds the projected activity at the time of the account opening or the beginning of the relationship”; “Client appears to have recently established a series of new relationships with different financial entities”). https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/indicators-indicateurs/fin_mltf-eng
- FINTRAC, “Reporting suspicious transactions to FINTRAC”, modified 22 May 2025, section 4. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/str-dod/str-dod-eng
- Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 (Nigeria), s.7(1)–(2). https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/LawsAndRegulations
- NFIU, “Guidelines for the Identification, Verification and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions Related to ML/FT/PF for Financial Institutions”, STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, 13 December 2024, Part Three paras 1–2 and Part Six para 2. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Baseline Standards for Automated Anti-Money Laundering, Combating the Financing of Terrorism and Countering Proliferation Financing Solutions, circular BSD/DIR/PUB/LAB/019/002, 10 March 2026, section 5.5(a)(iv). https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/CBN%20issues%20Baseline%20Standards%20for%20Automated%20Anti-Money%20Laundering%20Solution.pdf
- Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 200/2024 (RESOL-2024-200-APN-UIF#MJ), 18 December 2024, Boletín Oficial no. 35571, 19 December 2024, arts. 33, 34(a) and 34(b), circumstance 3; art. 36(c) (report deadlines). https://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/405000-409999/407429/norma.htm
- Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Mexico), “Disposiciones de carácter general a que se refiere el Artículo 58 de la Ley para Regular las Instituciones de Tecnología Financiera”, DOF 10 September 2018, arts. 35, 36 and 56(VII); arts. 69 and 73 (report deadlines). https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5537449&fecha=10/09/2018 (accessed 2026-11-12).
- FIC South Africa, Directive 5 of 2019 on the usage of an automated transaction monitoring system for the detection and submission of regulatory reports, 29 March 2019, paras 2.1–2.3, 3.1.16 and 3.1.17. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019-DIR-Directive-5-of-2019-ATMS.pdf
- FIC South Africa, Public Compliance Communication 45 on Directive 5 of 2019 in relation to the use of automated transaction monitoring systems, 20 March 2020, paras 5–8. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2020.03-PCC-PCC-45-On-Directive-5-of-2019-in-relation-to-the-use-of-ATMS.pdf
- BCEAO, Instruction n°001-03-2025 du 18 mars 2025 on AML/CFT/CPF organisation, internal control and compliance of financial institutions, arts. 3 and 6. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-04/Instruction%20n%C2%B0001-03-2025%20du%2018%20mars%2025%20portant%20modalit%C3%A9s%20de%20mise%20en%20oeuvre%20par%20les%20IF%20de%20leurs%20obligations%20en%20mati%C3%A8re%20de%20lutte%20contre%20le%20blanchiment%20de%20capitaux.pdf
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Payments System Policy Department, Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, November 2026, issued by circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004 of 5 November 2026, in force that day (circular, section 4.0); sections 26.3.8(a) and 26.3.9. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/REGULATIONS%20FOR%20THE%20OPERATIONS%20OF%20NON-SECURITY%20VIRTUAL%20ASSETS%20IN%20NIGERIA.pdf
- Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism / Combating Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Accountable Institutions, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 12 December 2025, 2.4.2(7), 2.4.3(2)–(3), 3.6(3), Appendix B (heading) and Appendix E, red flag 3i. https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/BOG-FIC-AML-GUIDELINE-2025-FINAL-5-TO-BE-PUBLISHED.pdf
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