Regulation · South Africa
South Africa: FIC Directive 5 of 2019 on the use of automated transaction monitoring systems
South Africa’s Financial Intelligence Centre sets the conditions for using an automated transaction monitoring system to find and report suspicious activity. Directive 5 has been in force since 29 March 2019 and binds every institution that uses such a system: attend to each alert within 48 hours, and report within 15 days. It is short: 24 requirements. This page takes you through each one: the FIC’s own words, what an examiner will look for, and the detection rules that help you meet it.
- Issued by
- Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), South Africa
- Reference
- Directive 5/2019
- Issued
- Applies to
- Accountable and reporting institutions, and other persons, that use an automated transaction monitoring system to report under section 29 of the FIC Act
- In force
- Updated
Detection rules for this regulation
10 rules in the library help meet 1 of its 24 requirements. Most of the others are about systems, governance and process, where no detection rule applies.
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Cumulative amount over a period (threshold aggregation)
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Dormant account reactivation
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Funnel account (many senders into one account)
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High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch
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Large single transaction
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New account activity (mule accounts)
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Rapid pass-through (rapid movement of funds)
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Sudden change from a customer’s baseline
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Transaction structuring (smurfing)
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Transaction velocity
Before the requirements
What the Directive is
On 29 March 2019 South Africa’s Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) issued Directive 5/2019, “The usage of an automated transaction monitoring system for the detection and submission of regulatory reports to the Financial Intelligence Centre in terms of section 29 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001 (Act No. 38 of 2001)”. It is issued under section 43A(1) of the FIC Act, which lets the FIC issue directives by notice in the Government Gazette after consulting the supervisory bodies. The FIC says on its directives page that directives have the force of law.
Its purpose “is to set conditions for the use of an automated transaction monitoring system (ATMS) implemented by reporters to identify potentially suspicious and unusual activities or transactions or a series of transactions, and to ensure that a proper governance arrangement is in place for reporters to fully comply with all reporting obligations” (para 1.1).
The Directive has four parts: its purpose (part 1); the directive itself, which sets the time limits for working alerts and reporting (part 2); 21 conditions for using an ATMS (part 3); and the effective date and non-compliance (part 4). It is five pages long, in English.
Who it applies to
“This Directive applies to all accountable and reporting institutions and to other persons (collectively referred to as reporters for purposes of this directive) who use an automated transaction monitoring system (ATMS) to enable them to discharge their obligation of submitting regulatory reports to the Centre in terms of section 29 of the FIC Act read with Regulation 24(3) of the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Control Regulations (the MLTFC Regulations).” (Preface)
The FIC’s guidance on the Directive, Public Compliance Communication 45 (PCC 45, 20 March 2020), makes two points about scope. “It is not mandatory for a reporter to use an ATMS. However, should the reporter opt to make use of an ATMS, they must do so in accordance with Directive 5.” (PCC 45, para 3). And monitoring transactional activity “is different from scrutinising client information including payment information against the FIC Targeted Financial Sanctions list and the United Nations Security Council Consolidated Sanctions lists. Directive 5 and this PCC relates to the monitoring of transactional activity only.” (PCC 45, para 4).
Most conditions are worded for every reporter. Some are worded for accountable institutions: paragraphs 3.1.1 and 3.1.12 (the board or highest authority “in an accountable institution”, “in the accountable institution”), 3.1.9, 3.1.11, the part of 3.1.16 on the Risk Management and Compliance Programme (RMCP), and 3.1.20. Paragraph 3.1.13 also puts its tuning methodology in “the RMCP of that reporter”; the FIC Act requires an RMCP of accountable institutions (section 42), so that part of 3.1.13 concerns them too. Which reporters each paragraph binds is our reading of this wording; the FIC has not listed them. PCC 45 does not limit top-level responsibility to accountable institutions: “The board of directors, senior management or other person or group of persons exercising the highest level of authority within a reporter, remain responsible for the appropriate and effective use of the ATMS.” (para 10).
Dates and status
- 1 March 2019: draft published for comment, after the FIC consulted the Prudential Authority of the South African Reserve Bank. The FIC’s notice of 29 March 2019 says no comments were received by the closing date of 22 March 2019.
- 29 March 2019: issued. “This Directive is effective from date of publication in the Government Gazette.” (para 4.1). PCC 45 gives the publication reference as Government Gazette Notice 42357, dated 29 March 2019.
- 20 March 2020: the FIC issued PCC 45 after consulting on a draft from 31 January to 21 February 2020.
On 12 November 2026 the FIC’s document library lists Directive 5 of 2019 among its current directives, and PCC 45 among its current public compliance communications. No amendment, replacement or withdrawal of either was found on the FIC’s site; the FIC’s other directives deal with other subjects. The only Directive 5 document the FIC lists as archived or withdrawn is the March 2019 consultation draft.
Non-compliance: “Failure to comply with this Directive may result in the imposition of an administrative sanction, in accordance with section 45C of the FIC Act.” (para 4.2). Section 45C lets the FIC or a supervisory body sanction an institution or person that has failed to comply with a directive made under the Act.
Time limits
- Attend to every alert within 48 hours of its generation, to decide whether to report (para 2.1). PCC 45 reads this as beginning the investigation, not completing it: reporters “must within 48 hours of the alerts generated, begin the process (investigation)” to decide whether to report (para 5), and “It is not the Centre’s expectation that the investigation of the alert be completed within 48 hours (two days) of the alert generating” (para 6). The two days leave out Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays (para 7).
- The reporter “is deemed to have knowledge” of the possible suspicious and unusual activity when the ATMS generates the alert (para 2.2).
- Report as soon as possible, and no later than 15 days after the alert (para 2.3). PCC 45: “The investigation must be completed, and the report filed within 15 days in accordance with MLTFC Regulation 24(3).” (para 6); “When an alert is automatically generated on the ATMS, the 15 day reporting period starts.” (para 8). The first two days are “included in the 15 day period” (para 8), and the days are counted, as in the MLTFC Regulations, without Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays (glossary).
- The alert is not the only possible start. Paragraph 2.3 applies regulation 24(3), which runs the 15 days from when the reporter became aware of the facts behind the report. The FIC’s Guidance Note 4B says that this “may be, and in the majority of cases will be, before a suspicion is formed” (para 80), and that an institution “may not add additional timeframes for its internal transactional monitoring alert system processes, and / or internal investigation and review processes to the prescribed reporting period” (para 81). PCC 45 asks reporters “to ensure that all alerts are generated without delay from the date when the transaction, series of transactions and/or relevant activity takes place”, so that a slow system does not hold up a report due within 15 days of the reporter becoming aware (para 9). Our reading: where the reporter knew the facts before the alert (from a staff report, a law-enforcement request or an earlier manual review), count the 15 days from then, not from the alert; and keep the time from transaction to alert short.
The FIC’s guidance (PCC 45)
PCC 45 is the FIC’s guidance on certain requirements of the Directive: “This PCC must be read together with Directive 5.” (para 2). Its main points, besides the scope and time limits above:
- The board, senior management or highest authority “remain responsible for the appropriate and effective use of the ATMS”, and the reporter “must ensure that these persons have the requisite seniority, relative knowledge and oversight required to make informed decisions” (para 10).
- “Reporters should ensure that the alerts generated by the ATMS are of a high quality by considering the quantity of alerts converted to actual submitted reports to the Centre. Reporters are advised to document what the reporters deem to be an acceptable conversion rate and the reasons thereof in the ATMS methodology of the reporter. Reporters should ensure that the ATMS rules are proportionate with the reporter’s money laundering and terrorism financing (ML/TF) risk and the reporter’s ML/TF risk appetite.” (para 11).
- “The number of reporter’s analysts responsible for attending to the ATMS alerts must not be a determining factor for the calibration of the ATMS and the number of alerts generated and investigated.” (para 12).
- Paragraph 3.1.8 means continuously checking whether the ATMS works as well as it should and what has to change so that it catches similar activity in future (para 13). Where the ATMS cannot be configured to monitor some transactions or activities, “manual monitoring is still required, to ensure that there are no monitoring gaps” (para 14).
- “Reporters must review the ATMS deployed. The regularity of the periods at which the review of the ATMS should be conducted must be adequate for the reporter to determine, whether the ATMS remains fit for purpose and that data integrity is maintained.” (para 15).
- For an accountable institution, the ATMS rules, its methodology, its procedures and the system itself are all part of the RMCP (para 16).
Related provisions
The Directive rests on these provisions, which this page names but does not turn into requirements:
- FIC Act, section 29: the duty to report suspicious and unusual transactions to the FIC “within the prescribed period after the knowledge was acquired or the suspicion arose”.
- MLTFC Regulations, regulation 24(3): “A report under section 29 of the Act must be sent to the Centre as soon as possible but not later than fifteen days after a natural person or any of his or her employees, or any of the employees or officers of a legal person or other entity, has become aware of a fact concerning a transaction on the basis of which knowledge or a suspicion concerning the transaction must be reported, unless the Centre has approved of the report being sent after the expiry of this period.” Regulation 1 defines “days” for regulation 24 as “all days of the week excluding Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays”.
- FIC Act, section 42: the Risk Management and Compliance Programme, which paragraphs 3.1.11, 3.1.13 and 3.1.16 require the ATMS process and methodology to be part of.
- FIC Act, section 42A: the board of directors, or senior management, must ensure compliance with the Act and the RMCP, with a compliance function and a person of sufficient competence and seniority to make it effective.
- FIC Act, section 43A: the FIC’s power to issue directives. FIC Act, section 45C: administrative sanctions.
- FIC Directive 12 (4 September 2026): accountable institutions in items 1, 2, 3, 9, 11 (except banks, mutual banks and co-operative bank credit providers), 14, 20, 21 and 22 of Schedule 1 to the FIC Act must submit their RMCP documentation to the FIC every year (first by 9 or 31 October 2026, depending on the item), within 90 days of starting business, and within 10 days of approving an updated RMCP. For these institutions, the ATMS process and methodology that the Directive puts in the RMCP reach the FIC each year.
What this page covers and leaves out
One requirement for each of paragraphs 2.1 to 2.3 and one for each condition in paragraph 3.1 (3.1.1 to 3.1.21): 24 requirements. Left out, because they set no obligation of their own:
- The preface: who the Directive applies to, given above.
- Part 1 (purpose): quoted above.
- Paragraph 2.4, which directs reporters to comply with the conditions of paragraph 3, and the opening of paragraph 3.1: both lead into the 21 conditions, each of which has its own requirement.
- Part 4 (effective date and non-compliance): given above.
The Directive sets time limits for alerts and reports, not thresholds for detection rules.
Every requirement
All 24, in the regulation’s own order. Open a part to read it.
About this page
This page lists each of the Directive’s time limits (paragraphs 2.1 to 2.3) and each of its 21 conditions for using an automated transaction monitoring system (paragraph 3.1), quoted from the FIC’s text, with what an examiner will look for, what meeting it can look like and, where one exists, a detection rule from this library that helps.
The FIC’s guidance on the Directive, Public Compliance Communication 45, is copyright: this page does not quote it, and says in our own words what it adds. An examiner note without a citation, and an “Expect …” sentence after one, is our reading of what evidence fits the paragraph, not FIC guidance.
The Directive sets time limits for alerts and reports, not thresholds for detection rules.
2. Directive
3 requirements
2.1 Attend to every alert within 48 hours
Reporters who have implemented an ATMS are directed to attend to all alerts generated by the ATMS within 48 hours of an alert being generated with a view to determine whether a report should be submitted to the Centre.
- What an examiner will look for
- PCC 45 reads “attend” as starting the investigation within the 48 hours, not finishing it: reporters “must within 48 hours of the alerts generated, begin the process (investigation)” (para 5); it counts the 48 hours as two days that leave out Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays (paras 6 and 7). Expect alert records showing when each alert was generated and when work on it began, and a report of alerts not started within two days. The paragraph covers all alerts and makes no exception for those the system closes, suppresses or merges into an existing case: expect the rules that do so to be part of the documented methodology (para 3.1.16) and tested and approved like any other configuration change (para 3.1.14), and the alerts they close to be counted and sampled. Where several alerts are merged into one case, each keeps the time it was generated, and its 48 hours and 15 days run from then.
- What this can look like
- Each alert carries the time it was generated and the time an analyst first worked on it; a queue view shows alerts nearing two working days untouched, and a weekly report lists any that passed it, including alerts closed or merged automatically.
2.2 Deemed to know once the alert is generated
The reporter is deemed to have knowledge of the possible suspicious and unusual activity when an alert is generated by the ATMS.
- What an examiner will look for
- PCC 45: “When an alert is automatically generated on the ATMS, the 15 day reporting period starts.” (para 8). It says it is in every reporter’s interest that alerts are generated without delay after the transaction or activity, so that a slow system does not hold up a report due within 15 days of the reporter becoming aware (para 9). Regulation 24(3) runs the 15 days from when the reporter became aware of the facts; Guidance Note 4B says that “may be, and in the majority of cases will be, before a suspicion is formed” (para 80), and time taken by alert systems and internal investigation is not added (para 81). Expect evidence of how long the system takes from transaction to alert, that reporting deadlines are counted from the alert’s time, and, where the reporter knew the facts earlier (a staff report, a law-enforcement request, an earlier manual review), that the deadline was counted from then.
- What this can look like
- Deadlines in the case system are counted from the time the alert was generated, not from when an analyst picked it up, or from an earlier date recorded on the case when the facts were known before the alert; transactions reach the ATMS soon enough that alerts are not generated days late.
2.3 Report within 15 days of the alert
Suspicious and unusual transaction or activity reports must be submitted to the Centre in accordance with regulation 24(3) as soon as possible but no later than 15 days after the alert has been generated by the ATMS.
- What an examiner will look for
- PCC 45: “The investigation must be completed, and the report filed within 15 days in accordance with MLTFC Regulation 24(3).” (para 6). It says the 15 days include the two days of paragraph 2.1, and counts them as the MLTFC Regulations count days, without Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays (paras 6 and 8, and glossary). Regulation 24(3) allows a later report only where the Centre has approved it. Guidance Note 4B: “It is only in exceptional cases that the Centre may consider condoning a report submitted in terms of section 29 of the FIC Act being sent after the expiry of the 15 day period.” A reporter that expects to miss the 15 days applies for an extension, which “must be made before the expiry of the 15 day period and must be in writing”, giving its reasons and when the report will be submitted (para 82). Expect, for each report filed from an alert, the alert’s date and the report’s date, and for any later report the written application and the FIC’s approval.
- What this can look like
- Each report shows the alert it came from and both dates; cases nearing day 15 without a decision go to the compliance officer, who decides in time whether to ask the FIC for more.
3. Conditions for using an ATMS
1 with rules 21 requirements
The paragraph opens: “Reporters must, as a condition to using an ATMS, ensure compliance with the following requirements to ensure effective money laundering and terrorist financing risk management:”
3.1.1 Oversight by the board or senior management
The board of directors, senior management or other person or group of persons exercising the highest level of authority in an accountable institution responsible to ensure the effectiveness of the compliance function of an accountable institution must have adequate oversight over the process of implementing the ATMS, alert management, adequacy of rules and or scenarios implemented including testing thereof, and reporting to the Centre arising from alerts generated by the ATMS.
- What an examiner will look for
- PCC 45 says this highest authority remains answerable for whether the ATMS is used properly and works, and that the people it relies on to decide about the system need the seniority and knowledge to take informed decisions (para 10). Section 42A of the FIC Act puts compliance with the Act and the RMCP on the board or senior management. Expect board or committee papers and minutes covering each of the four areas the paragraph names: implementation, alert management, the adequacy and testing of rules and scenarios, and reporting from alerts.
- What this can look like
- The board or a senior committee receives regular ATMS reports (alert volumes and backlog, rule changes and their test results, reports filed), and its minutes show the questions asked and the decisions taken.
3.1.2 Alerts investigated in time to report
Reporters must ensure that all alerts are timeously investigated to ensure that reports are submitted to the Centre within the prescribed period.
- What an examiner will look for
- The prescribed period is the 15 days of paragraph 2.3, with work starting within the 48 hours of paragraph 2.1, as PCC 45 explains them (paras 5 to 8). Expect ageing reports of open alerts against both limits, and evidence that alerts running late were escalated.
- What this can look like
- Every open alert shows its age in working days; alerts past day 2 without work, or near day 15 without a decision, are escalated automatically.
3.1.3 Clear responsibilities for alerts
Reporters must clearly allocate responsibilities for reviewing, investigating and reporting of alerts generated by the ATMS within their respective organisations.
- What an examiner will look for
- A written allocation of who reviews, who investigates and who decides and files the report, for example in the RMCP or alert procedures, and evidence that cases follow it.
- What this can look like
- A procedure names the roles for first review, investigation and the reporting decision, and the case system assigns each alert to a named person in the right role.
3.1.4 Skilled and regularly trained alert staff
The persons so responsible in paragraph 3.1.3 must have the appropriate level of skill required to perform this function, and must be regularly trained to identify unusual and suspicious activities.
- What an examiner will look for
- Role requirements for the people named under paragraph 3.1.3, and training records showing regular training on recognising unusual and suspicious activity. Section 43 of the FIC Act requires accountable institutions to train employees on the Act and the RMCP.
- What this can look like
- Analysts and reviewers have documented skill requirements, complete a training plan each year that includes current typologies, and their attendance is recorded.
3.1.5 Investigations and decisions documented and accessible
All investigations and decisions taken relating to alerts generated by the ATMS must be adequately documented, and kept in a manner readily accessible to the respective reporters’ relevant supervisory body and or the Centre where applicable.
- What an examiner will look for
- For a sample of alerts, the record of the investigation and of the decision, closed or reported, with the reasons, and the ability to retrieve them quickly when the supervisory body or the FIC asks.
- What this can look like
- Every alert closes with the investigation notes, the evidence looked at and the reason for the decision, kept in one place that can be searched and exported for an inspection.
3.1.6 Enough skilled staff for the alert volume
Adequately skilled staff must be appointed by reporters to deal with the volumes of alerts generated by the ATMS.
- What an examiner will look for
- PCC 45: “The number of reporter’s analysts responsible for attending to the ATMS alerts must not be a determining factor for the calibration of the ATMS and the number of alerts generated and investigated.” (para 12). Staffing follows the alerts, not the other way round. Expect a staffing analysis that compares alert volumes with analyst capacity, and how gaps were filled.
- What this can look like
- Alert volumes and analyst capacity are tracked together each month, and when alerts rise the team grows or is reinforced, rather than thresholds being raised to cut alerts.
3.1.7 Resources to report on time, with no backlog
Reporters utilising an ATMS must ensure that there are adequate resources to report timeously and not create a backlog of unattended alerts.
- What an examiner will look for
- The same PCC 45 point applies: alert numbers are not to be managed down to fit the team (para 12). Expect backlog figures over time (alerts not yet attended, by age) and the measures taken when a backlog appeared.
- What this can look like
- A dashboard shows unattended alerts by age; a backlog triggers extra resources and a plan to clear it.
3.1.8 New detection rules for suspicions found elsewhere
Where a suspicious or unusual transaction or activity is detected by a reporter in an instance other than through the ATMS, the reporter must ensure that the ATMS detection rules are developed and implemented to enable future detection of similar scenarios via the ATMS.
- What an examiner will look for
- PCC 45 reads this paragraph as a continuing check of whether the ATMS works as well as it should and what must change for it to catch similar activity in future (para 13), and adds that what the ATMS cannot be set up to monitor must be monitored by hand so that no gap is left (para 14). Expect a log of suspicions found outside the ATMS (staff reports, law enforcement requests, manual reviews), each with the rule built or changed in response, or the reason none could be.
- What this can look like
- Every report that did not start from an ATMS alert is reviewed for a detection gap, and the result (a new or changed rule, or manual monitoring where the system cannot do it) is recorded and tracked to completion.
3.1.9 Staff can still report suspicions by hand
The fact that an accountable institution uses an ATMS must not prevent the accountable institution from receiving manual reports from internal stakeholders regarding suspicious and unusual activity or transactions.
- What an examiner will look for
- An internal reporting channel open to all staff, and records of manual reports received and handled alongside ATMS alerts.
- What this can look like
- Any employee can raise a suspicion through a form or a named contact, and those reports are investigated and decided in the same way as alerts.
3.1.10 Validation and testing of detection
Reporters must ensure that the detection methodology and effectiveness of an ATMS are validated and tested to ensure that the system is detecting potentially suspicious and unusual transactions or series of transactions, resulting in the generation of high quality alerts, and is being effectively utilised by the reporter.
- What an examiner will look for
- PCC 45 asks reporters to ensure that alerts “are of a high quality by considering the quantity of alerts converted to actual submitted reports to the Centre”, and asks reporters to write down in their ATMS methodology the conversion rate they consider acceptable and why (para 11). It also asks for reviews of the ATMS often enough to tell whether it still does the job and whether its data are still sound (para 15). Expect validation and testing reports, conversion rates per rule or scenario set against the documented acceptable rate, and data-quality checks on what feeds the system.
- What this can look like
- Each rule’s alerts and resulting reports are counted; rules far below the acceptable rate are reviewed; the system is tested on known cases and its input data are reconciled with the source systems.
3.1.11 Alert and reporting process in the RMCP
Reporters that are accountable institutions must include the process for reporting information to the Centre and the investigation of automated alerts in the accountable institution’s Risk Management and Compliance Programme (RMCP).
- What an examiner will look for
- PCC 45 says that for an accountable institution the ATMS rules, its methodology, its procedures and the system itself all form part of the RMCP (para 16). The RMCP is required by section 42 of the FIC Act; under Directive 12 many accountable institutions now submit it to the FIC each year. Expect the RMCP sections that describe how alerts are investigated and how reports are made.
- What this can look like
- The RMCP has a chapter on the ATMS: how alerts arise, who investigates them, how the reporting decision is taken and filed, and the time limits.
3.1.12 Annual review approved at the top
The effectiveness of the ATMS must be periodically reviewed and approved, at least annually by the board of directors, senior management or other person or group of persons exercising the highest level of authority in the accountable institution and in accordance with the reporters RMCP.
- What an examiner will look for
- PCC 45 asks for reviews often enough to tell whether the ATMS still does the job and whether its data are still sound (para 15), and keeps the highest authority responsible for its effective use (para 10). Expect a review of effectiveness at least once a year, and the record of its approval by the board, senior management or highest authority.
- What this can look like
- Once a year a review of the ATMS (coverage, alert quality, conversion, backlog, changes made) goes to the board or senior management, which approves it and the actions in it; the minutes are kept.
3.1.13 Ongoing risk assessment and tuning, method in the RMCP
The ATMS must be subject to ongoing risk assessment and parameter calibration (tuning), and such risk assesment and tuning methodology should be included in the RMCP of that reporter.
- What an examiner will look for
- PCC 45 asks that ATMS rules stay in proportion to the reporter’s money laundering and terrorist financing risk and risk appetite (para 11), and that calibration is not set by the number of analysts (para 12). Expect the tuning methodology in the RMCP, and records of each tuning exercise: the data used, the change made and its expected effect on alerts.
- What this can look like
- Thresholds are reviewed on a schedule and after changes in products or risks, using the outcomes of past alerts; the method is written in the RMCP and each change is recorded with its reason.
3.1.14 Governed, tested and authorised changes
All configuration changes to the ATMS must follow a documented governance procedure, must be adequately tested and significant changes must be authorised by the board of directors, senior management or other person or group of persons exercising the highest level of authority prior to implementation.
- What an examiner will look for
- The documented change procedure, test evidence for a sample of changes, and, for significant changes, the prior approval of the board, senior management or highest authority. The Directive does not define “significant”; expect the reporter’s own definition in the procedure.
- What this can look like
- Every change to a rule, threshold or setting goes through a change request, is tested on past data before release, and significant ones wait for senior sign-off before they go live.
3.1.15 Audit trail of rule and configuration changes
At all times a clear audit trail should exist to demonstrate what changes, configurations, additions or withdrawal of rules and scenarios have occured, as well as when the changes took place and the responsible person/s that effected these changes.
- What an examiner will look for
- An audit trail, for the whole life of the system, of every change, configuration, addition and withdrawal of rules and scenarios, each with its date and the person who made it.
- What this can look like
- The system keeps every version of every rule and setting, with who changed it and when, including rules switched off, and the history can be shown to an inspector.
3.1.16 Detection methodology documented
Reporters must ensure that the detail relating to the detection methodology including algorithms, scenarios, threshold settings or rules used by the ATMS are set out accurately and clearly, and is documented, and in the case of an accountable institutions is included in its RMCP.
- What an examiner will look for
- PCC 45 asks for the acceptable alert-to-report conversion rate, and the reasons for it, to be written in the ATMS methodology (para 11), and puts the ATMS rules and methodology in the RMCP of an accountable institution (para 16). Expect a methodology document that matches what is configured in the system: each rule or scenario, its logic, its thresholds and the risk it addresses.
- What this can look like
- A rule inventory, kept in step with the system, gives each rule’s purpose, logic, thresholds and owner, and is part of or attached to the RMCP.
3.1.17 Detection methodology sufficient for the risks
Reporters must ensure that the detection methodology including, algorithms, scenarios, threshold settings or rules used by the ATMS are sufficient to address the associated money laundering and terrorist financing risks applicable to the reporter.
- What an examiner will look for
- PCC 45 asks that ATMS rules stay in proportion to the reporter’s money laundering and terrorist financing risk and risk appetite (para 11), and that what the ATMS cannot be set up to monitor is monitored by hand (para 14). Expect a mapping from the risks in the reporter’s risk assessment to the rules and scenarios that cover each one, with the gaps and how they are handled.
- What this can look like
- Each risk in the business risk assessment (products, channels, customer types, geographies) is mapped to at least one rule or scenario, or to a documented manual control where no rule can cover it.
- Rules that help
- Transaction structuring (smurfing), Cumulative amount over a period (threshold aggregation), Large single transaction, Rapid pass-through (rapid movement of funds), Funnel account (many senders into one account), Dormant account reactivation, New account activity (mule accounts), Sudden change from a customer’s baseline, High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch, Transaction velocity
3.1.18 Group systems adapted to South African risks
Where a reporter is a subsidiary or a branch of a foreign-based organisation which also utilises an ATMS, the reporter must have procedures in place to ensure its usage of the ATMS is adequately customised for its domestic money laundering and terrorist financing risks within the domestic reporting regime.
- What an examiner will look for
- Where the reporter uses its foreign group’s ATMS: procedures showing how rules and thresholds are adapted to South African risks and to South African reporting, including the time limits of part 2.
- What this can look like
- The local compliance team reviews the group’s rules against the South African risk assessment, adds or adjusts rules for local risks and the local currency, and alerts are worked to South African deadlines.
3.1.19 Monitoring across all products, branches and agents
For reporters that have branches, departments and partnering agents (such as mobile service providers), the ATMS must monitor the clients and transactions across all products and services, including transactions effected by agents.
- What an examiner will look for
- PCC 45: where the ATMS cannot be configured to monitor some transactions or activities, “manual monitoring is still required, to ensure that there are no monitoring gaps” (para 14). Expect a coverage map of every product, service, branch and agent channel against the data feeds into the ATMS, with any manual monitoring that fills a gap.
- What this can look like
- Transactions from every product, branch and agent, including partners such as mobile operators, reach the ATMS; a reconciliation shows nothing is missing, and anything that cannot be fed is monitored by hand.
3.1.20 One view of a client across several systems
Where a reporter, who is an accountable institution, is utilising more than one ATMS which operates independently of each other, must ensure that the systems utilised do not prevent a reporter from having a holistic view of both the alerts generated and the total number of suspicious and unusual transaction or activity reports submitted in respect of a specific client of a reporter.
- What an examiner will look for
- Where an accountable institution runs more than one independent ATMS: a way to see, for any one client, all alerts from every system and all reports filed on that client.
- What this can look like
- Alerts from each system carry a shared client identifier and land in one case view, which also lists every report filed on the client.
3.1.21 Evaluation reports available on request
Reporters must make available to the Centre or to the reporters’ relevant supervisory body, on request, reports relating to the results of an evaluation of the ATMS.
- What an examiner will look for
- The reports of past ATMS evaluations (validation, testing and the annual review), kept so that they can be handed to the FIC or the supervisory body when asked.
- What this can look like
- Validation and annual review reports are filed with their dates and approvals and can be produced the day they are requested.
Sources
- Financial Intelligence Centre (South Africa), Directive 5/2019, “The usage of an automated transaction monitoring system for the detection and submission of regulatory reports to the Financial Intelligence Centre in terms of section 29 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001 (Act No. 38 of 2001)”, 29 March 2019.
- Financial Intelligence Centre (South Africa), Public Compliance Communication 45 (PCC 45) on Directive 5 of 2019 in relation to the use of automated transaction monitoring systems, 20 March 2020, paras 2 to 16 and glossary.
- Financial Intelligence Centre (South Africa), directive notice, 29 March 2019, and web notice on the draft directive, 1 March 2019 (consultation and issue of Directive 5). Another copy.
- Financial Intelligence Centre (South Africa), web notice on PCC 45, 20 March 2020 (consultation dates).
- Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001 (Act No. 38 of 2001), sections 29, 42, 42A, 43, 43A and 45C, the FIC’s published copy.
- Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Control Regulations, 2002 (Government Notice R. 1595 of 20 December 2002, as amended), regulation 1 (“days”) and regulation 24(3), the FIC’s published copy.
- Financial Intelligence Centre (South Africa), Directive 12 on the submission of risk management and compliance programmes, 4 September 2026, Government Gazette 55337, Notice 7887.
- Financial Intelligence Centre (South Africa), “Directives” page (“Directives have the force of law”).
- Financial Intelligence Centre (South Africa), Guidance Note 4B on reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions and activities to the Financial Intelligence Centre in terms of section 29 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001, 26 March 2019, paras 80 to 82.
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