Money laundering

Funnel account (many senders into one account)

One account receives money from many unrelated senders in a short window, and the money is then withdrawn or moved on.

Many unrelated senders pay into one account in a short window, and the money is then withdrawn or moved on Many unrelated senders, short window One account Withdrawn or moved on

What it catches

One account collects money from many people who have no visible link to the account holder, and the money is then withdrawn or sent on, often quickly. Criminals use funnel accounts to gather the proceeds of crime in one place before moving them on, for example money from scam victims passed through mules, who open accounts “so he or she may receive money from various individuals or businesses” (FinCEN FIN-2020-A003, red flag 10), or to bring cash collected in many places into the financial system. FinCEN’s 2014 advisory defines the term: “An individual or business account in one geographic area that receives multiple cash deposits, often in amounts below the cash reporting threshold, and from which the funds are withdrawn in a different geographic area with little time elapsing between the deposits and withdrawals.” That definition is about cash and geography. Applying the name to transfers, wallet payments and crypto deposits from many unrelated senders into one account is our reading: regulators describe that digital shape without calling it a funnel account (an NFIU example of a good STR narrative, FINTRAC’s indicators, Tracfin’s 2024 case and FATF’s virtual-asset red flags, under By country and Sources).

This rule covers the transfer form. The cash form in FinCEN’s definition, deposits by unidentified people at branches far from where the account is held, carries no sender account to count: catching it means counting deposit locations instead, which this rule does not do.

Many honest accounts also receive from many people: marketplace sellers, landlords, small shops, group collections, people paid through platforms. The rule finds the shape; an analyst checks whether the customer’s activity explains it.

How the rule works

For each incoming payment, count the distinct senders who paid the customer in a window, keyed on the sender’s account identifier (IBAN, account number, wallet address or mobile-money number), not the sender’s name. Alert when the count and the total are at or above the segment’s thresholds. The stronger variant also requires that most of the money left the account soon after: many-in alone is common; many-in then out is what many regulators’ examples describe. The money leaves after the credits arrive, so the stronger variant is checked again on each payment out, until the exit window after the last credit has passed.

Looks at

Every completed payment a customer receives and, for variant B, every completed payment out.

Measures

Over the completed payments the customer received in the 24 hours to 30 days up to and including this one:

  • Senders: how many different senders paid in. A sender is told apart by their account (IBAN, account number, wallet address or mobile-money number), not by their name.
  • Money in: the total of those payments.

Leaves out

  • The customer’s own movements: transfers from their other accounts, refunds and currency conversions.
  • Payouts from known platforms, such as payroll, marketplaces and payment processors, recognised by the field that actually carries the platform’s identity.
  • Zero-value and tiny credits.
  • Cash deposits, including mobile-money cash-ins at an agent: they carry no sender account.

Alerts when variant A: many senders

Both of these are true:

  1. At least 3–8 different senders paid in.
  2. Money in is at least your minimum for the segment.

At most one alert per customer per window.

Alerts when variant B: in, then out

Checked on each credit and each payment out. Both of these are true, and the alert gets a higher priority:

  1. Variant A’s conditions are met.
  2. Completed payments out of the account since the first of those credits, up to 24–48 hours after the last one, add up to at least 80–90% of money in.

If variant A already alerted in the window, variant B raises that alert’s priority instead of opening a new one.

Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.

The mirror image, one sender paying into several customers’ accounts, is a strong signal too. It needs links across customers and is covered by Shared identifiers across customers.

Data it needs

ShowHide
FieldUsually comes fromIf it’s missing
Customer idaccount or walletRequired.
Direction, amount, currency, timestampledgerRequired. Convert to one currency before summing.
Statuspayment processorCount completed credits. Refunds of failed payments are not new senders.
Sender account identifier (IBAN, account number, wallet address, phone)payment details on the incoming creditRequired for a reliable count. Some rails carry no sender identifier at all, and cash deposits have none. For crypto, the sending address is on the chain but often not passed into the monitoring data: get it from your node or custody provider. Transfers inside an exchange, off the chain, have none. Where it is missing, the rule cannot count senders on that rail; say so in your coverage, and don’t fall back silently to the name.
Sender namepayment detailsUseful to spot platforms and the customer’s own name. Not a reliable key: one person’s name is spelled several ways, and different people share names.
Transaction typeledgerNeeded to remove own-account movements, refunds and cash-ins at agents.
Customer segment and declared activityonboarding (KYC/KYB)Needed to set thresholds: a shop or a landlord legitimately has many payers.
Outgoing payments with destination railledgerNeeded for variant B.

Thresholds

Each row is a setting the rule needs. Set by law values come from the source named under “Where it comes from”. Suggested values are starting points: test them on your own history, then adjust.

ParameterValueTypeWhere it comes from
Distinct senders3 to 8SuggestedA handful of unrelated senders is already unusual for an individual, while established businesses legitimately have more payers. Use the low end for individuals, new accounts and newly created companies; the high end only for established businesses whose declared activity explains many payers. In Tracfin’s 2024 case the collecting accounts belonged to newly created companies, and its alert criteria include “un volume des transactions important pour une société de création récente” (a large volume of transactions for a recently created company).
Window24 hours to 30 daysSuggestedA short window catches bursts; a long one catches slow collection.
Share moved on (variant B)80% to 90% of the window’s inflowSuggestedIn the regulators’ examples the money leaves quickly; in Tracfin’s 2024 case the balance ends close to zero (see By country). Lower it to catch partial drains, at the cost of ordinary spending.
Exit window (variant B)24 to 48 hours after the last credit countedSuggestedIn the NFIU’s example the cash is withdrawn immediately or the next day (see By country). A longer window catches slower drains, with more ordinary spending in it.
Minimum totalset per segment and currency from your own dataSuggestedNo public source gives a value. Without it, small and zero-value credits make the count.
Legal cash line (US)cash transactions of more than USD 10,000 are reportedSet by law31 CFR 1010.311 (currency transaction reports). Cash transactions by or for one person on one business day are added together, across all domestic branches (31 CFR 1010.313), so deposits each under the line can still add up to a report. FinCEN’s funnel-account red flag describes “multiple cash deposits of less than $10,000 by unidentified persons” (FIN-2014-A005). This is the reporting line the deposits stay under, not a detection threshold.

By country

  • Nigeria. The NFIU’s STR filing guidance uses this pattern in one of its examples of a good STR narrative: a company account “receiving multiple inflows from 15 individuals … all through another fintech application, and is usually followed by immediate or next-day cash withdrawal” (NFIU STR guidance, May 2023, PDF p.14). For stablecoin issuers and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) licensed by the CBN, its Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria (in force 5 November 2026) name fan-in in due diligence: blockchain analysis of wallet histories, “particularly where funds are received from multiple unrelated wallets” (section 26.3.4, second item (e)). The monitoring system must alert on a customer who appears to be an undisclosed VASP, shown by “numbers of counterparties inconsistent with retail use, pooled or omnibus flows” among other signs (section 26.7.1(h)). A P2P provider may not knowingly permit “third-party, nominee, mule, fictitious or otherwise improperly attributed accounts or wallets” (section 10.3.4), must identify “unusual counterparty concentration” (section 10.7.5), and applies enhanced due diligence and limits to customers trading as a business, judged partly by the “number of counterparties” (section 10.3.5).

    Reporting deadline

    Report to the NFIU immediately, with a written report within 24 hours (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.7(1)–(2)). The NFIU’s December 2024 STR guidelines start the 24 hours once the transaction is found suspicious, after an examination of no more than 72 hours, and require written reasons for every alert closed as not suspicious (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, Part Six, para 2).

  • Canada. FINTRAC’s indicators for financial entities include “Multiple deposits which are made to an account by non-account holders”, “Unrelated parties sending email money transfers or other forms of electronic transfers to the same beneficiary with no apparent relation to the recipient”, and “A client makes numerous outgoing payments to unrelated parties shortly after they receive incoming funds.”

    Reporting deadline

    File “as soon as practicable” after the measures that establish reasonable grounds to suspect (FINTRAC STR guidance, section 4).

  • France. Tracfin’s 2024 threat assessment describes payment accounts of newly created companies that, shortly after opening, “sont alimentés par de nombreux virements de diverses entreprises” (are fed by many transfers from various companies), with the money quickly debited and the balance close to zero (Tome III, case 16).

    Reporting deadline

    Report to Tracfin before carrying out the operation, so that Tracfin can use its right to oppose it. Reporting after the operation is allowed only when it could not be postponed or the suspicion arose afterwards, and Tracfin is then informed “sans délai” (Tracfin, “Les déclarants et Tracfin”, June 2025, citing CMF L.561-15 and L.561-22).

  • United States. FinCEN defined funnel accounts in FIN-2014-A005 and asks institutions to use the term “Funnel Account” in the narrative of suspicious activity reports on this activity.

    Reporting deadline

    Banks file within 30 calendar days of first detecting the facts, and may take 30 more days to identify a suspect if none was identified, never more than 60 days in all (31 CFR 1020.320(b)(3)); money services businesses file within 30 calendar days (31 CFR 1022.320(b)(3)). For an ongoing money laundering scheme, both also notify law enforcement by telephone immediately.

  • East and Southern Africa (ESAAMLG). The ESAAMLG money remittance typologies report lists “Multiple senders toward a single individual” and “Large or frequent transfers of money from several unrelated individuals in different areas” as indicators (2014, §3.3.4).

  • South Africa. Among the cases of suspected money-mule activity in the FIC’s 2024 money-mule report: “A young individual received funds domestically from different senders based in South Africa”, more than R300 000 that was then withdrawn in Lesotho, and a person who “received funds from multiple senders based in the United States without a clear relationship between the sender and the receiver of funds” (p.13). Where the rule runs in an automated transaction monitoring system, FIC Directive 5 of 2019 requires the system’s detection methodology, “including algorithms, scenarios, threshold settings or rules” (this rule among them), to be documented (para 3.1.16) and, taken as a whole, “sufficient to address the associated money laundering and terrorist financing risks applicable to the reporter” (para 3.1.17), and sets the time limits for the system’s alerts given under the reporting deadline below (paras 2.1–2.3).

    Reporting deadline

    As soon as possible, and no later than 15 days excluding weekends and public holidays (FIC Act s.29; MLTF Control Regulations, reg. 24(3), via FIC Guidance Note 4B para 71). The 15 days run from when you became aware of the facts, which “may be, and in the majority of cases will be, before a suspicion is formed” (GN4B para 80), and an institution “may not add additional timeframes for its internal transactional monitoring alert system processes, and / or internal investigation and review processes to the prescribed reporting period” (GN4B para 81). Where the alert comes from an automated transaction monitoring system, the reporter “is deemed to have knowledge” of the possible suspicious activity when the alert is generated: the report is due “no later than 15 days after the alert has been generated”, and work on the alert must start within 48 hours, which the FIC counts as two days without weekends and public holidays, inside the 15 (FIC Directive 5 of 2019, paras 2.1–2.3; FIC PCC 45, paras 5–8).

  • Ghana. “Large number of individuals making payments into the same account without an adequate explanation” is a red flag twice in the BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, under money laundering through institutions and under proliferation financing (Appendix E, 3t and 8a), and identifying it “shall put AIs on enquiry and provoke further investigation” (Appendix E, introduction).

    Reporting deadline

    Within 24 hours of the suspicion, attempted transactions included, whatever the amount (BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.8.1(6) and 2.8.3(2)).

  • EU. The EBA risk factor guidelines treat it as higher risk when, for a money remitter, “transfers are made from one or more payers in different countries to a local payee” (EBA/GL/2021/02, para 11.5).

  • Argentina. Two of the circumstances to weigh in alerts: “Cuando se tome conocimiento que el cliente opera con fondos de terceros” (where it becomes known that the customer operates with third-party funds), and an account that “reciba fondos de terceros e inmediatamente estos fondos sean transferidos a otras cuentas o sacados en efectivo desde cajeros automáticos” (receives funds from third parties that are immediately transferred to other accounts or withdrawn in cash at ATMs) (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 34(b), circumstances 17 and 19).

    Reporting deadline

    Money laundering, within 24 hours of concluding that the operation is suspicious, and no later than 90 calendar days from the operation, performed or attempted; terrorist financing and proliferation financing, within 24 hours of the operation (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 36(c)).

  • Mexico. For fintech institutions (crowdfunding and e-money institutions, ITFs), it is an unusual-operation circumstance “Cuando se tenga indicios o se presuma que un Cliente realiza Operaciones en beneficio, por encargo o cuenta de un tercero, sin haberlo declarado a la ITF” (where there are signs, or it is presumed, that a client carries out operations for the benefit, on the instructions or on behalf of a third party without having declared it) (SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, art. 70(XII)). Where the institution has well-founded grounds to presume a client acts for an undisclosed third party, it must ask the client for the information needed to identify the beneficial owner of the funds (art. 42). A person who regularly puts money into an account without being its holder or getting its benefits is a funds provider (Proveedor de Recursos), whose identification data the institution must collect (arts. 2(XXVII) and 11(VII)). These provisions cover fintech institutions only.

    Reporting deadline

    The Communication and Control Committee rules on an unusual operation within 60 calendar days of its detection, and the report goes to SHCP, through the CNBV, within 3 business days of the end of that session; within 24 hours of the alert or staff notice where there are signs or concrete facts that the funds could come from illicit activities or be used for terrorist financing or money laundering (SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, arts. 69 and 73).

  • Kenya.

    Reporting deadline

    Within two days after the suspicion arose (POCAMLA s.44(2), as replaced by the AML/CFT Laws (Amendment) Act 2023, Act No. 10 of 2023).

  • WAEMU (UEMOA).

    Reporting deadline

    Report to the CENTIF “immédiatement” (Loi uniforme 2023, art. 60). The law defines “sans délai” as at most 24 hours (art. 2, point 58); “immédiatement” is not defined, and our reading is to treat 24 hours as the outer limit. Do not carry out an operation you suspect until the report is made; if it has already gone through, inform the CENTIF “sans délai” (art. 61). WAEMU (UEMOA in French) is the West African Economic and Monetary Union: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, the same eight states that form the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). The BCEAO’s instructions and the Council of Ministers’ decisions cited here apply in all eight. The uniform law applies in each state through that state’s own act, which may number its articles differently. The law of a single state is covered only where that state is named.

False positives and tuning

ShowHide

Common innocent explanations: marketplace and platform payouts, salary from more than one employer, a landlord collecting rent, a small trader paid by customers, a family collection for a funeral or wedding, a group savings scheme, and other lenders or relatives paying off someone’s loan.

Typical causes of misfires:

  • Platform payouts look like many senders. Payments from marketplaces, payment processors and payroll providers arrive under many references and can read as many unrelated payers. Keep an allowlist of these platforms, and check that it matches the field where the platform’s identity actually arrives.
  • Don’t exclude person-to-person services. A money-transfer service that carries payments between individuals is not a platform payout: the people behind it are real senders. Excluding one can hide exactly the customers the rule is meant to find.
  • Counting names instead of accounts. Names split (spelling, order, initials) and merge (common names). Count distinct sender account identifiers. Where only names are available, expect both misses and false alerts.
  • Dust and refunds. Zero-value crypto credits and refunds of failed payments add “senders” that never sent money. Remove them before counting.
  • Agent cash-ins are not senders. On mobile money, a cash deposit at an agent arrives with the agent’s number as the counterparty. Counted as senders, one customer topping up at several agents looks like many senders, and many people paying in cash through one agent look like one. Tell cash-ins apart from person-to-person transfers by transaction type and leave them out of the sender count.
  • Re-alerting on every credit. Without a cooldown, a customer who meets the thresholds alerts again on each new credit. Alert once per customer per window.
  • The onward movement separates collection from business. In the regulators’ examples (see By country), collection accounts move the money on quickly. Variant B is what separates collection from ordinary business; rank it above variant A.
  • Lending: other people paying a borrower’s loan. On lending products, a credit from another person followed by a loan repayment looks like a funnel, but relatives, employers and other lenders pay borrowers’ loans for ordinary reasons. One sender funding several borrowers is the stronger signal.

How to tune: segment by customer type and declared activity, keeping newly created companies with individuals; key on sender account identifiers; maintain a platform allowlist matched on the right field; remove dust and refunds; alert once per window; rank variant B above variant A.

When it fires

ShowHide

Analyst checklist:

  1. List the senders in the window: identifiers, names, amounts, where they bank, and whether any are known to you.
  2. Check whether the same senders also pay other customers (see Shared identifiers), and whether any sender has reported fraud or a recall.
  3. Check where the money went next, how fast, and over which rail. Fast exits to crypto, cash-out or cross-border payouts raise the risk.
  4. Compare with the customer’s declared occupation and expected activity. A customer declared as a student or unemployed receiving from many strangers is a strong signal.
  5. Ask the customer what the payments are for and how they know the senders. Ask for invoices or other evidence where they say it is trade.
  6. Escalate when the senders are unexplained, the money moved on quickly, or the explanation does not match the flows.

An alert is a reason to review, not a suspicion in itself: the NFIU’s 2024 STR guidelines call monitoring alerts “unusual” and say they “should not be automatically regarded as suspicious” (Part Three, paras 1–2). Under the FATF standard, suspicious transactions are reported regardless of amount, attempted transactions included (Interpretive Note to Recommendation 20, para 3). Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.

Sources

27 sourcesHide
  1. FinCEN Advisory FIN-2014-A005, “Update on U.S. Currency Restrictions in Mexico: Funnel Accounts and TBML”, 28 May 2014, p.1 (definition, and the earlier 2011 and 2012 advisories), p.3 (red flags), p.4 (SAR key terms). https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/FIN-2014-A005.pdf
  2. 31 CFR 1010.311, “Filing obligations for reports of transactions in currency”. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-X/part-1010/subpart-C/section-1010.311
  3. NFIU, “Guidance to Reporting Institutions on Preparing a Complete Suspicious Transaction / Activity Report and Filing Electronically to the NFIU”, May 2023, p.4 and PDF p.14 (“Examples of a good STR narrative”, second example). https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance (“2023 NFIU Guidelines on STR Filing”)
  4. NFIU, “Guidelines for the Identification, Verification and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions Related to ML/FT/PF for Financial Institutions”, STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, 13 December 2024, Part Three paras 1–2 and Part Six para 2. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance
  5. Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 (Nigeria), s.7(1)–(2). https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/LawsAndRegulations
  6. FINTRAC, “Money laundering and terrorist financing indicators—Financial entities”, modified 24 November 2025, “ML/TF indicators related to the use of other parties” (Use of third party). https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/indicators-indicateurs/fin_mltf-eng
  7. FINTRAC, “Reporting suspicious transactions to FINTRAC”, modified 22 May 2025, section 4. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/str-dod/str-dod-eng
  8. Tracfin, “LCB-FT : état de la menace 2024-2025”, Rapport d’activité 2024, Tome III, case 16 and its “Critères d’alerte”, p.45. https://www.vie-publique.fr/files/rapport/pdf/300600.pdf
  9. ESAAMLG, “Typologies Report on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing through the Money Remittance and Currency Exchange Sector in the ESAAMLG Region”, 2014, §3.3.4(a) and (d), pp.18–19. https://www.esaamlg.org/reports/Typologies_Report_mvts..pdf
  10. EBA, ML/TF Risk Factors Guidelines (EBA/GL/2021/02, consolidated with EBA/GL/2023/03; the later amendment EBA/GL/2024/01 leaves Guideline 11 unchanged), para 11.5. https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2023-11/EBA%20GL%202021%2002%20-%20consolidated%20%28amended%20by%20EBA%20GL%202023%2003%29_EN.pdf
  11. UEMOA, Loi uniforme relative à la LBC/FT/FP (March 2023), arts. 2 (point 58), 60 and 61. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Loi-uniforme-LBCFTFP-Mars-2023-vf.pdf
  12. Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism Financing Laws (Amendment) Act, 2023 (Kenya, Act No. 10 of 2023), amending POCAMLA s.44(2). https://brs.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/AntiMoneyLaunderingandCombatingofTerrorismFinancingLawsAmendmentAct2023.pdf
  13. FATF, “Virtual Assets: Red Flag Indicators of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing”, September 2020, “Transaction patterns – transactions concerning all users”, p.8 (“Incoming transactions from many unrelated wallets in relatively small amounts (accumulation of funds) with subsequent transfer to another wallet or full exchange for fiat currency”). https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Virtual-Assets-Red-Flag-Indicators.pdf
  14. FATF, The FATF Recommendations, updated June 2026, Recommendation 20 and Interpretive Note para 3. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Fatf-recommendations.html
  15. FinCEN Advisory FIN-2020-A003 (imposter scams and money mule schemes), 7 July 2020, p.6, red flag 10 (a customer opening accounts at multiple banks “so he or she may receive money from various individuals or businesses”). https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2020-07-07/Advisory_%20Imposter_and_Money_Mule_COVID_19_508_FINAL.pdf
  16. 31 CFR 1010.313, “Aggregation”. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-X/part-1010/subpart-C/section-1010.313
  17. 31 CFR 1020.320(b)(3), “Reports by banks of suspicious transactions”, when to file. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-X/part-1020/subpart-C/section-1020.320
  18. 31 CFR 1022.320(b)(3), “Reports by money services businesses of suspicious transactions”, when to file. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-X/part-1022/subpart-C/section-1022.320
  19. Tracfin, “Fiche focus : Les déclarants et Tracfin”, June 2025, “Obligation de déclaration” (citing CMF L.561-15 and L.561-22). https://tracfin.finances.gouv.fr/Documentation/FicheFocus-RelationsTRACFINEtLeDeclarantVF.pdf
  20. Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 200/2024 (RESOL-2024-200-APN-UIF#MJ), 18 December 2024, Boletín Oficial no. 35571, 19 December 2024, art. 34(b), circumstances 17 and 19; art. 36(c) (report deadlines). https://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/405000-409999/407429/norma.htm
  21. Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Mexico), “Disposiciones de carácter general a que se refiere el Artículo 58 de la Ley para Regular las Instituciones de Tecnología Financiera”, DOF 10 September 2018, arts. 2(XXVII), 11(VII), 42 and 70(XII); arts. 69 and 73 (report deadlines). https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5537449&fecha=10/09/2018 (accessed 2026-11-12).
  22. FIC South Africa, Guidance Note 4B on reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions and activities, 26 March 2019, para 71 (reporting period, MLTF Control Regulations reg. 24(3)), para 80 (when the period starts) and para 81. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019.03-Guidance-Guidance-Note-4B-STRs.pdf
  23. FIC South Africa, “Financial Crime Insights: Money mules”, June 2024, p.13. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Financial-Crime-Insights-Money-mules.pdf
  24. FIC South Africa, Directive 5 of 2019 on the usage of an automated transaction monitoring system for the detection and submission of regulatory reports, 29 March 2019, paras 2.1–2.3, 3.1.16 and 3.1.17. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019-DIR-Directive-5-of-2019-ATMS.pdf
  25. FIC South Africa, Public Compliance Communication 45 on Directive 5 of 2019 in relation to the use of automated transaction monitoring systems, 20 March 2020, paras 5–8. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2020.03-PCC-PCC-45-On-Directive-5-of-2019-in-relation-to-the-use-of-ATMS.pdf
  26. Central Bank of Nigeria, Payments System Policy Department, Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, November 2026, issued by circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004 of 5 November 2026, in force that day (circular, section 4.0); sections 10.3.4, 10.3.5, 10.7.5, 26.3.4 (second item (e)) and 26.7.1(h). https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/REGULATIONS%20FOR%20THE%20OPERATIONS%20OF%20NON-SECURITY%20VIRTUAL%20ASSETS%20IN%20NIGERIA.pdf
  27. Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism / Combating Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Accountable Institutions, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 12 December 2025, Appendix E, introduction and red flags 3t and 8a. https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/BOG-FIC-AML-GUIDELINE-2025-FINAL-5-TO-BE-PUBLISHED.pdf

Ask us

A question about this rule?

A person at Archer reads every question and answers by email.

The Fraud & AML Library is a practical reference, not legal advice. What binds is the regulator’s own text, which every rule and regulation page links.

Get new rules and regulation changes by email

When we add a rule or a regulation changes, we’ll email you.

You can unsubscribe at any time. Privacy policy