Money laundering

Round-tripping among related accounts

Money leaves an account and comes back to it, directly or through other accounts, or circles among the accounts of the customer, their relatives, and their companies, with no economic reason.

Money leaves the customer’s account and comes back, directly or through other accounts, or circles among the accounts of the customer, a relative, and a company Directly or through other accounts Customer Money leaves and comes back Other accounts one or more or Circles among related accounts Customer Relative Company

What it catches

Money that leaves an account and comes back to it, either straight from the account it was sent to or after passing through one or more other accounts, and money that circles among, or is routed through, accounts held by the same people: the customer, their relatives, the companies they own or run, and others connected to them. Moving money in a loop creates a trail of payments that looks like business, loans or repayments, and puts distance between the money and where it came from.

The FATF and the Egmont Group list among the indicators of concealed beneficial ownership a transaction that “appears cyclical (outgoing and incoming transactions are similar in size and are sent to, and received from, the same accounts, indicating that outgoing funds are being returned with little loss) (aka “round-robin” transactions)”, one “occurring between two or more parties that are connected without an apparent business or trade rationale”, “a business transaction that involves family members of one or more of the parties without a legitimate business rationale”, and one that “involves two legal persons with similar or identical directors, shareholders, or beneficial owners” (Concealment of Beneficial Ownership, 2018, Annex E, indicator 22). Argentina’s UIF names the related-account form directly: “Triangulación de fondos entre cuentas del cliente, sus familiares, sociedades y terceros relacionados sin justificación económica aparente” (triangulation of funds between accounts of the customer, their relatives, companies and related third parties with no apparent economic justification) (Resolution 200/2024, art. 34(b), circumstance 12).

The rule finds the shape, not the crime. Families pool money, people lend to each other and get repaid, and business groups move cash between their companies every day. An analyst decides which loops have a reason.

How the rule works

First, build each customer’s related group: the customer’s own other accounts and wallets, declared relatives, companies the customer owns, directs or signs for, other customers with the same directors, beneficial owners, signatories or registered address, and customers linked by shared identifiers. Then, each time money arrives in an account, look back over a window for money that left that account and has now come back, either from the account it was paid to or through a short chain of accounts. Add up everything that came back within the window, since a loop can return in several payments. Alert when most of what left has come back, but not much more than left, and the amount is above a minimum for the customer’s segment. The routing form, where money passes through a related account to another related account without coming back, has its own condition (see the variants below).

Within one institution, where every account in the loop is a customer, the whole loop can be seen. When the money leaves the institution, only the first and last legs are visible: what went out to an outside account and what came back from it. Matching those legs needs a stable identifier for the outside account (account number and bank, wallet address or phone number) or, failing that, the counterparty’s name.

Looks at

Every completed payment a customer receives, checked as it arrives.

Follows

  • Money out: every completed payment the customer sent in the look-back window.
  • The way back: where that money went next, through accounts you can see, up to a loop length, until it reaches this customer again.
  • Related group: the customer’s own accounts, relatives, companies and connected customers, from onboarding records and shared identifiers.

Amounts are converted to one currency at a documented rate.

Leaves out

  • Refunds, reversals, chargebacks and payments returned by the rail, which send the same money back by design.
  • Currency conversions between the customer’s own balances, fees, and loan disbursements and repayments with the institution itself.
  • Payments to and from agents, merchants, payment processors and pooled (omnibus) accounts on a list you keep, which sit on both sides of unrelated payments.

Alerts when

All of these are true:

  1. Money that left the customer’s account has come back to it, directly or through accounts in the related group.
  2. What came back, added up over the window, is at least 80–100% of what left, and no more than your ceiling.
  3. What left is at least your minimum for the segment.

How often

At most one alert per loop, and one per related group per look-back window.

Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.

Common variants:

  • Return to sender. The loop of two: a customer pays someone and gets about the same amount back from them, once or again and again. This is the FATF and Egmont “round-robin” pattern. It needs no relationship data, but it catches many loans between friends: give it a higher minimum or require it to repeat.
  • Routed through a related account. Money moves between two related customers through another account in the related group (A to B, then B to C) instead of directly, and need not come back to A. This is the “triangulation” of Argentina’s circumstance 12. Alert when the middle account passes on most of what it received within the window.
  • A personal account as a bridge between companies. Payments between companies in one group go through the personal account of a shareholder, director or legal representative. Look for a personal account whose credits and debits are mostly with companies the same person owns or represents.
  • Customer on both ends. The customer sends money to themselves at other institutions. The FATF and Egmont list “The customer is both the ordering and beneficiary customer for multiple outgoing international funds transfers” (Annex E, indicator 18). Nothing comes back, so the loop conditions above don’t catch it: alert on repeated outgoing transfers to the customer’s own accounts at other institutions, and only with a second signal, such as amounts out of line with declared income. Moving money between one’s own accounts is common and mostly innocent.

Data it needs

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FieldUsually comes fromIf it’s missing
Customer idaccount or walletRequired. All of a customer’s accounts and wallets need to sit on one id, or the customer’s own loops look like payments to strangers.
Counterparty account idpayment detailsRequired. The same outside account must carry the same identifier on the way out and on the way back: account number and bank, wallet address, or phone number in one international format.
Counterparty namepayment detailsNeeded where the identifier differs between legs. Names need normalising (case, accents, word order, transliteration). Some rails carry no sender name, so money coming back through them can’t be matched by name.
Direction, amount, currency, timestampledger or payment eventRequired. Convert amounts to one currency before comparing.
Statuspayment processorCount completed payments only. A failed or returned payment that comes back is not a loop.
Transaction typeledgerNeeded to leave out refunds, reversals, chargebacks, returns, fees and conversions, which all send money back by design. Some returns arrive as ordinary incoming transfers: see False positives.
Payment referencepayment detailsNeeded to recognise returns that are not typed as returns, and useful to the analyst.
Related partiesonboarding (KYC/KYB)Needed for the related-group forms: declared relatives, beneficial owners, directors, authorised signatories, companies owned or represented, registered addresses. Without it, only the return-to-sender form and loops through shared identifiers can run.
Shared identifiersdevice, phone, email, address recordsFills gaps in declared relationships. See Shared identifiers across customers.
Customer segmentonboarding (KYC/KYB)Needed to set the minimum and to give business groups, treasury accounts and currency exchange customers their own settings.

Thresholds

Each row is a setting the rule needs. Each value is a starting point: test it on your own history, then adjust.

ParameterStarting pointWhere it comes from
Share returned (back ÷ out, every payment back in the window added up)80% to 100%A lower share catches loops that lose more on the way but adds ordinary repayments; an exact match misses any loop that loses a cut.
Ceiling on the share returnedset from your own dataNo public source gives a value. Without it, money from someone who regularly pays the customer more than they receive counts as a loop coming back.
Window, payments between individuals, mobile money and instant transfers24 hours to 7 daysA shorter window cuts coincidences; a longer one catches slower loops. Test it on your own data.
Window, companies in one groupset from your own dataNo public source gives a value. Loops through companies can take weeks; start from the usual time between a group’s intercompany payments.
Loop length (accounts in the loop, the customer’s own included)2 to 32 is the return-to-sender form; 3 adds one account in between. Longer loops cost more to compute and add coincidences.
Minimum amountset per segment and currency from your own distribution of payment sizesNo public source gives a value. Without a floor, small transfers within families dominate.

No law sets a number for this pattern in the countries below. Argentina’s circumstance 12 turns on “sin justificación económica aparente” (no apparent economic justification), not on an amount.

By country

  • Argentina. UIF Resolution 200/2024 binds payment service providers, among them digital wallet providers, and non-financial credit providers. Its article 34(a) requires “reglas de control de operaciones y alertas automatizadas” (transaction control rules and automated alerts) that check each customer’s operations against their transactional profile and risk level. Article 34(b) lists circumstances that “deberán valorarse especialmente” (shall be given special weight) in setting alerts and controls, “a mero título enunciativo” (by way of example only); circumstance 12 is “Triangulación de fondos entre cuentas del cliente, sus familiares, sociedades y terceros relacionados sin justificación económica aparente” (triangulation of funds between accounts of the customer, their relatives, companies and related third parties with no apparent economic justification). The same article tells firms to draw on their own business experience and on the typologies and guidance published by the UIF and by the international bodies Argentina belongs to; Argentina is a member of GAFILAT (see the Latin America (GAFILAT) entry). An operation with no economic or legal justification is unusual (art. 2(n)); an unusual operation the firm’s analysis cannot justify is suspicious and is reported (art. 2(l)).

    Reporting deadline

    Money laundering, within 24 hours of concluding that the operation is suspicious, and no later than 90 calendar days from the operation, performed or attempted; terrorist financing and proliferation financing, within 24 hours of the operation (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 36(c)).

  • Latin America (GAFILAT). GAFILAT’s 2025 regional typologies report includes two cases of this pattern. In a case from Guatemala, construction companies that received public contracts moved funds among themselves; its warning signs include “Estructuración de fondos a través de envío, retorno y traslado de fondos entre las mismas constructoras…” (structuring of funds by sending, returning and moving funds among the same construction companies) and “Triangulación de fondos con el posible objetivo de simular actividades económicas” (triangulation of funds, possibly to simulate economic activity) (p. 48). In a case from Mexico, a group of companies with common shareholders and legal representatives moved money among themselves and their shareholders, and companies in the network passed money back to the beneficial owners; its warning signs include “Uso de las cuentas bancarias del representante legal como “puente” para realizar operaciones entre compañías…” (use of the legal representative’s bank accounts as a “bridge” for operations between companies), “Relación financiera entre las empresas y los Beneficiarios Controladores (BC) sin congruencia comercial por el giro y/o la actividad de los negocios” (financial dealings between the companies and their beneficial owners that do not fit the line or activity of the business) and “Coincidencia en domicilios entre compañías” (companies sharing an address) (pp. 60–61).

  • United States. The FFIEC’s red flags for bank examiners include “Unusual transfers of funds occur among related accounts or among accounts that involve the same or related principals” and “Suspicious movements of funds occur from one bank to another, and then funds are moved back to the first bank” (BSA/AML Examination Manual, Appendix F). A bank files a suspicious activity report for amounts of at least USD 5,000, and a money services business from USD 2,000 (31 CFR 1020.320(a)(2), 1022.320(a)(2)).

    Reporting deadline

    Banks file within 30 calendar days of first detecting the facts, and may take 30 more days to identify a suspect if none was identified, never more than 60 days in all (31 CFR 1020.320(b)(3)); money services businesses file within 30 calendar days (31 CFR 1022.320(b)(3)). For an ongoing money laundering scheme, both also notify law enforcement by telephone immediately.

  • Canada. FINTRAC’s money laundering indicators for financial entities, such as banks, credit unions and trust and loan companies (money services businesses have a separate list), include “Frequent and/or atypical transfers between the client’s products and accounts for no apparent reason”, “Accounts held by multiple entities either headquartered at the same location or having the same directors/signing authorities for no apparent reason”, and, under the use of nominees, “A person maintains multiple accounts, or maintains accounts in the names of family members or corporate entities with no apparent business or other purpose.”

    Reporting deadline

    File “as soon as practicable” after the measures that establish reasonable grounds to suspect; the report “must be treated as a priority” (FINTRAC STR guidance, section 4).

False positives and tuning

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Common innocent explanations: a customer moving savings between their own accounts at different institutions; family members pooling money for household costs or sending each other remittances; a loan between friends or relatives, repaid; a group savings scheme where members pay in and take turns receiving the pot; a business group’s treasury moving cash between its companies (cash pooling, intercompany loans, payroll funding); escrow and marketplace payments that are paid out and refunded.

Typical causes of misfires:

  • Money that comes back by design. Refunds, reversals, chargebacks and payments returned by the rail all send the same amount back to the same account. Exclude them by transaction type, not by amount. Some returns don’t arrive typed as returns: a payment the payee’s bank sends back can come in as an ordinary incoming transfer, recognisable only by its reference (the original reference repeated, or a return reason code). Match such a payment to the one it returns (same account, amount and reference) and leave both out.
  • Customers paying themselves. Money moved between the customer’s own accounts at different institutions looks like a loop. Those accounts are not always in onboarding records; the name the customer gave a saved recipient (their own name, or “me”) can be the only sign an account is theirs. Decide whether own-account movements are in scope; if they are, give them their own minimum and require a second signal.
  • Shared counterparties. Agents used for both cash-in and cash-out, payment processors and payout providers, exchanges’ pooled accounts and the institution’s own settlement accounts sit on both sides of unrelated payments, so a customer who pays one and is later paid by it looks like a loop. Leave them out by a list of known agents, processors and pooled accounts, not by how many customers use them: a customer who pays and is paid by many other customers is what the rule should see.
  • No ceiling on what comes back. A test that only asks whether most of what left has come back also passes when someone who regularly pays the customer receives one small payment from them. Set a ceiling on the share returned, or compare the two totals with each other.
  • Currency exchange round trips. Customers who buy a currency and sell it back, above all exchange desks and trading businesses, show money going out and coming back as a matter of course. Segment them, and compare legs in one currency.
  • Names that don’t match. Matching on names without normalising them misses loops; matching loosely joins strangers with common names. Prefer stable account identifiers, normalise phone numbers to one international format, and check that the rails you rely on carry a sender name at all.
  • Relationships nobody declared. A related-group rule sees only the relationships in your data. Declared relatives and beneficial owners cover only part of the group; shared identifiers fill some gaps, at the cost of linking unrelated people who share a device or an address. Shared identifiers also link one person’s several accounts, and money between those is the customer paying themselves; where one phone or account is registered to several customers, a payment from it can’t be pinned to one of them.
  • History shorter than the window. With less history loaded than the look-back, the first leg of a loop is missing and nothing fires. Load at least one full window before going live.

How to tune: segment by customer type and rail; give business groups, treasury accounts and exchange customers their own window and minimum; exclude refunds, reversals and returns, including those that arrive untyped; leave out known shared counterparties by a list; set a ceiling on the share returned; require a repeat or a second signal for own-account and return-to-sender loops; and cap alerts at one per loop.

When it fires

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Analyst checklist:

  1. Draw the loop: every leg, with dates, amounts, rails, references and the accounts in between. Check whether the loop has happened before and whether the amounts grow each time.
  2. Establish how the parties are related: onboarding records, beneficial owners, directors, signatories, addresses and shared identifiers.
  3. Look for the economic reason: a loan with an agreement and interest, intercompany payments that match invoices, a refund, a household arrangement. Ask the customer for documents where the reason isn’t plain.
  4. Check whether the companies in the loop have real activity. A company with no staff, premises or trade of its own, or one that only receives and pays on within the group, is a further indicator.
  5. Compare the loop with the customer’s declared income or turnover. Loops that make an account’s turnover look larger than the business behind it, or that turn the same money into “income” several times, need an explanation.
  6. Escalate when no economic reason is given, the documents don’t match the payments, or the loop involves accounts already flagged.

An alert is a reason to review, not a suspicion in itself: the FFIEC notes that “The mere presence of a red flag is not by itself evidence of criminal activity” (Appendix F). Under the FATF standard, suspicious transactions are reported regardless of amount, attempted transactions included (Interpretive Note to Recommendation 20, para 3). Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.

Sources

9 sourcesHide
  1. Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 200/2024 (RESOL-2024-200-APN-UIF#MJ), 18 December 2024, Boletín Oficial no. 35571, 19 December 2024, art. 2(l) and (n) (suspicious and unusual operations), art. 34(a), art. 34(b) opening paragraph and circumstance 12, art. 36(c) (report deadlines). https://www.argentina.gob.ar/normativa/nacional/norma-407429/texto

  2. GAFILAT, Informe de Tipologías Regionales de LA/FT 2025, December 2025: case “Sustracción de fondos públicos a través de una red de constructoras” (Guatemala), warning signs 5 and 6, p. 48; case “Tequileros” (Mexico), warning signs and case description, pp. 60–61. https://biblioteca.gafilat.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Informe-de-Tipologias-Regionales-LA-FT-25.pdf

  3. FFIEC, Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual, Appendix F, “Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Red Flags”: introduction; “Activity Inconsistent with the Customer’s Business”; “Other Unusual or Suspicious Customer Activity”. https://bsaaml.ffiec.gov/manual/Appendices/07

  4. 31 CFR 1020.320(a)(2) and (b)(3), “Reports by banks of suspicious transactions”, the amount and when to file. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-X/part-1020/subpart-C/section-1020.320

  5. 31 CFR 1022.320(a)(2) and (b)(3), “Reports by money services businesses of suspicious transactions”, the amount and when to file. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-X/part-1022/subpart-C/section-1022.320

  6. FINTRAC, “Money laundering and terrorist financing indicators—Financial entities”, modified 24 November 2025: “ML/TF indicators related to products and services” and “ML/TF indicators related to the use of other parties” (Use of nominee). https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/indicators-indicateurs/fin_mltf-eng

  7. FINTRAC, “Reporting suspicious transactions to FINTRAC”, modified 22 May 2025, section 4. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/str-dod/str-dod-eng

  8. FATF and Egmont Group, Concealment of Beneficial Ownership, July 2018, Annex E “Indicators of concealed beneficial ownership”, indicators 18 and 22, pp. 185–186. https://egmontgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/FATF-Egmont-Concealment-beneficial-ownership-annex-E.pdf

  9. FATF, The FATF Recommendations, October 2025 edition: Interpretive Note to Recommendation 20, para 3. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Fatf-recommendations.html

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