Money laundering
Rapid pass-through (rapid movement of funds)
Money arrives in an account and almost all of it leaves again within minutes or hours, leaving the balance near zero.
What it catches
An account that receives money and sends almost all of it on soon after, so the balance goes back to near zero. Criminals use such accounts to put distance between stolen or illicit money and its source: the account holder is often a money mule, recruited or paid to let the account be used, and the victims are the people defrauded upstream. Regulators describe the pattern in almost the same words across regions: “funds transferred in and out of an account on the same day or within a relatively short period of time” (FINTRAC), funds “immediately withdrawn or transferred to multiple accounts within minutes of receipt” on mobile money (GIABA), and “a rapid disposition of funds after receipt” in mule accounts (FIC South Africa).
The rule finds the shape, not the crime. Many honest customers move money straight through: payment agents, payroll accounts, people paying a bill the day their salary lands. An analyst decides which is which.
How the rule works
When a customer sends money out, look back over a window. Add up what came in and what went out in that window, in one currency, leaving out the customer’s own internal movements. Count completed credits; on the way out, count the completed payments sent after the first of those credits, plus the payment being checked. Alert when what went out is close to all of what came in, and what came in is above a minimum amount for the customer’s segment.
The share of money that left stands in for the balance left behind, which is what the sources describe: a balance “généralement proche de zéro” (Tracfin) or, for trade accounts, “a small end-of-day balance” (FATF and Egmont). Where you hold balances, the closer test is the balance after the payment: alert when it is a small part of what came in.
Looks at
Every payment a customer sends, checked when it is initiated where you can.
Measures
- Money in: every completed payment the customer received in the look-back window up to this payment, reversals and chargebacks included.
- Money out: every completed payment the customer sent in the same window after the first of those credits, plus this one, whatever its status (initiated, blocked or failed).
Both totals are converted to one currency at a documented rate.
Leaves out
- The customer’s own movements, from both totals: currency conversions, card loads and unloads, fees, transfers between the customer’s own accounts, and refunds of a payment the customer made from this account.
Alerts when
Both of these are true:
- Money in is at least your minimum for the segment.
- Money out is at least 80–95% of money in.
How often
At most one alert per customer per look-back window.
Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.
Look-back window How far back to add up money in and money out. Start at 3–6 hours for mobile money, instant transfers and crypto, and 24–72 hours for bank transfers. Test it on your own data.
Minimum money in Set per customer segment and currency, from your own spread of credit sizes. Business segments need a much higher minimum than individuals. Without it, the rule mostly catches tiny amounts, where spending everything that came in is normal. Payment agents, payout platforms and remitters pass money through by design: give them their own segment, with a minimum and share set from their declared expected flows, rather than leaving them out.
Share that leaves How much of the money that came in has to go out. Start at 80–95%. Lower catches partial drains but adds ordinary spending; higher misses accounts that keep a little back.
Common variants:
- Instant drain. Short window (hours, not days), for mobile money, instant transfers and crypto, where mules cash out fast.
- Drain to a high-risk exit. Count only exits to crypto, cash-out at an agent, or a cross-border payout. FATF, INTERPOL and Egmont list “rapid or immediate cash withdrawals or transfers of large amounts following the receipt of a funds transfer in order to empty the account” among the signs of cyber-enabled fraud. On mobile money, cashing out at an agent the day money arrives is ordinary, so treat it as high risk only with a second signal: many senders, a new or dormant account, or flows that don’t fit the customer’s profile.
- Crypto in, crypto out. At an exchange, the same shape is virtual assets deposited “and then often immediately” withdrawn without further exchange activity, or withdrawn straight to a private wallet, which FATF lists as a red flag. Where the money leaves on another network or as another asset, see Chain-hopping and cross-chain bridge use.
- Drain after quiet. The same test on an account that was dormant or just opened. These are stronger signals, and they overlap with dormant-account and new-account rules.
- Third-party money then repayment (lending). A credit from another person, followed shortly by a loan repayment of about the same amount.
The test runs when money goes out. A version that fires on the incoming credit can only guess; one that fires on completion of the outgoing payment may be too late to stop it. Where you can, evaluate at the moment the outgoing payment is initiated.
Data it needs
ShowHide
| Field | Usually comes from | If it’s missing |
|---|---|---|
| Customer id | account or wallet | Required. Both legs must sit on the same id, or the rule never sees the round trip. |
| Direction (in or out) | ledger | Required. Settlement or adjustment rows with no direction are invisible to the rule; check how many you have. |
| Amount and currency | ledger or payment event | Required. Convert to one currency before comparing. |
| Timestamp | payment event | Required. |
| Status | payment processor | Count completed credits, and the outgoing payment being checked whatever its status. If blocked or failed outgoing attempts aren’t stored, a drain that was stopped looks like no drain. |
| Transaction type | ledger | Needed to remove own-account movements and to tell a refund of the customer’s own payment from a reversal paid in by someone else. Without it, conversions and card loads look like money moving through. |
| Customer segment (individual, business, agent, platform) | onboarding (KYC/KYB) | Needed to set the floor and to give pass-through-by-design businesses their own tier. Without it, expect business customers to dominate the alerts. |
| Balance after the payment | ledger or core system | Optional. Needed for the balance test; without it, the share of money out stands in for it. |
| Counterparty id and exit rail | payment details | Needed for the high-risk-exit variant and to tell paying oneself from paying others. |
| Account opening date and full history | core system | Needed for the dormant and new-account variants. A history shorter than the look-back makes every first-time customer look new or dormant. |
Thresholds
Each row is a setting the rule needs. Set by law values come from the source named under “Where it comes from”. Suggested values are starting points: test them on your own history, then adjust.
| Parameter | Value | Type | Where it comes from |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share sent out (out ÷ in) | 80% to 95% | Suggested | A lower share catches partial drains but adds ordinary spending; a higher one misses accounts that keep a little back. A high ratio over a short window to a crypto or cash-out exit is the strongest form. |
| Window, instant rails (mobile money, instant transfers, crypto) | 3 to 6 hours | Suggested | For rails where money can leave within minutes. GIABA’s red flag (“within minutes of receipt”) describes the pattern; it is not a threshold. A shorter window catches faster cash-outs with fewer coincidences: test it on your own data. |
| Window, bank transfers | 24 to 72 hours | Suggested | For slower rails. A shorter window cuts coincidences; a longer one catches slower drains but adds ordinary bill payments after a salary. Set it from your own data. |
| Minimum inflow | set per segment and currency from your own distribution of credit sizes | Suggested | No public source gives a value. Required: without a meaningful floor, a ratio rule matches mostly tiny amounts, where spending everything that came in is normal. Business segments need a much higher floor than individuals. |
| Kenya, mobile money | investigate accounts above KShs 100,000 daily turnover, or personal accounts above KShs 300,000 a week | Set by law | CBK mobile payment AML guidelines 2013, para 3.2(a). Set in 2013; CBK’s AML page lists no newer mobile-money guideline, and whether the limits are still applied is not confirmed. A turnover limit, not a pass-through rule. |
By country
Nigeria. The NFIU’s STR filing guidance gives, as its worked example of a suspicious report, an account “receiving multiple inflows from 15 individuals … all through another fintech application, and is usually followed by immediate or next-day cash withdrawal” (NFIU STR guidance, May 2023, p.14). Its 2023 fraud typologies report describes an account credited with chargeback reversals, some with “no corresponding outflow transaction”, that “were all immediately withdrawn through POS” (Case Study 20). A suspicious transaction is reported within 24 hours (see the reporting deadline below). For stablecoin issuers and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) licensed by the CBN, its Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria (in force 5 November 2026) require the automated monitoring system to alert on “rapid layering through multiple wallets” (section 26.7.1(c)). Each alert is reviewed and its outcome documented within five business days (section 26.7.2). A P2P provider must maintain controls to identify “rapid movement of value, layering through multiple wallets or accounts, use of mule or third-party accounts” (section 10.7.5), and may not knowingly permit mule or nominee accounts or wallets used to conceal who is behind the funds (section 10.3.4).
Reporting deadline
Report to the NFIU immediately, with a written report within 24 hours (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.7(1)–(2)). The NFIU’s December 2024 STR guidelines start the 24 hours once the transaction is found suspicious, after an examination of no more than 72 hours, and require written reasons for every alert closed as not suspicious (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, Part Six, para 2).
Kenya. CBK’s 2013 mobile payment AML guidelines tell providers to investigate accounts above the turnover limits in Thresholds (set by law, para 3.2(a)). The limits date from 2013 and are not confirmed as still applied; check with CBK or your supervisor for your licence type.
Reporting deadline
Within two days after the suspicion arose (POCAMLA s.44(2), as replaced by the AML/CFT Laws (Amendment) Act 2023, Act No. 10 of 2023). The Financial Reporting Centre’s 2025 guidance still gives two days from forming the suspicion (Guidance notes to TCSPs, section 3.1).
West Africa (GIABA). GIABA’s 2025 cybercrime typologies report lists, for mobile money, funds “immediately withdrawn or transferred to multiple accounts within minutes of receipt” and “series of funds transfers from a wallet or account into multiple accounts or wallets at short intervals”. A case from CENTIF-Togo describes an account that “functioned more like a bounce account, where the funds from the transfers received are immediately withdrawn”.
WAEMU (UEMOA). The Uniform Law does not name the pattern; the duty to report suspicion applies (see the reporting deadline below). BCEAO Instruction 001-03-2025 (18 March 2025) does not name it either. Its Title I, which binds credit institutions, financial companies, microfinance institutions, e-money institutions, payment institutions and fintechs in the eight member states (art. 3), requires their information system to allow “le suivi des mouvements sur les comptes et la génération des alertes” (the monitoring of account movements and the generation of alerts) and “l’identification des transactions à caractère suspect ou inhabituel” (the identification of suspicious or unusual transactions). The system’s effectiveness is reviewed at least once a year (art. 6). WAEMU (UEMOA in French) is the West African Economic and Monetary Union: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, the same eight states that form the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). The BCEAO’s instructions and the Council of Ministers’ decisions cited here apply in all eight. The uniform law applies in each state through that state’s own act, which may number its articles differently. The law of a single state is covered only where that state is named.
Reporting deadline
Report to the CENTIF “immédiatement” (Loi uniforme 2023, art. 60). The law does not define “immédiatement”; it defines “sans délai” as at most 24 hours (art. 2, point 58). Check the expected timing with your CENTIF. Do not carry out an operation you suspect until the report is made, and then only if the CENTIF has not opposed it: an opposition blocks the operation for up to four days (arts. 61 and 65). If it has already gone through, inform the CENTIF “sans délai” (art. 61). Each member state enacts the uniform law in its own national text; the article numbers here are the uniform law’s.
South Africa. The FIC’s 2024 money-mule insights report lists among mule account indicators: “In many cases there appeared to be a rapid disposition of funds after receipt.” Where the rule runs in an automated transaction monitoring system, FIC Directive 5 of 2019 requires the system’s detection methodology, “including algorithms, scenarios, threshold settings or rules” (this rule among them), to be documented (para 3.1.16) and, taken as a whole, “sufficient to address the associated money laundering and terrorist financing risks applicable to the reporter” (para 3.1.17), and sets the time limits for the system’s alerts given under the reporting deadline below (paras 2.1–2.3).
Reporting deadline
As soon as possible, and no later than 15 days excluding weekends and public holidays (FIC Act s.29; MLTF Control Regulations, reg. 24(3), via FIC Guidance Note 4B para 71). The 15 days run from when you became aware of the facts, which “may be, and in the majority of cases will be, before a suspicion is formed” (GN4B para 80), and an institution “may not add additional timeframes for its internal transactional monitoring alert system processes, and / or internal investigation and review processes to the prescribed reporting period” (GN4B para 81). Where the alert comes from an automated transaction monitoring system, the reporter “is deemed to have knowledge” of the possible suspicious activity when the alert is generated: the report is due “no later than 15 days after the alert has been generated”, and work on the alert must start within 48 hours, which the FIC counts as two days without weekends and public holidays, inside the 15 (FIC Directive 5 of 2019, paras 2.1–2.3; FIC PCC 45, paras 5–8).
Ghana. Institutions licensed by the Bank of Ghana pay special attention to unusual patterns of transactions with no apparent economic or lawful purpose, among them “very high account turnover inconsistent with the size of the balance”, examine as far as possible their background and purpose and set out the findings in writing, and report the findings to the FIC within 24 hours after the knowledge or the grounds of reasonable suspicion (set by law, BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.8.2(1)–(3)). The red flags of the Guideline include cash deposits “subsequently transferred within a short period out of the account to a destination not normally associated with the customer” (Appendix E, 2a), “Accounts with large volumes of activity but low balances or frequently overdrawn positions” (3f), numerous deposits followed soon after by transfers to other accounts, “perhaps in other countries, leaving only small balances” (3h), “Accounts that are used as temporary repositories for funds that are subsequently transferred outside the AI to foreign accounts” (3j), “Large cash withdrawals from a previously dormant/inactive account, or from an account which has just received an unexpected large credit from abroad” (3q), and “High velocity of funds that reflects the large volume of money flowing through an account” (3u).
Reporting deadline
Within 24 hours of the suspicion, attempted transactions included, whatever the amount (BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.8.1(6) and 2.8.3(2)).
France. Tracfin’s 2024 threat assessment describes payment and e-money accounts fed by many transfers shortly after opening, whose sums “sont rapidement débitées” (are quickly debited), leaving a balance “généralement proche de zéro” (generally close to zero), and lists “la célérité des flux crédit et au débit” (the speed of credit and debit flows) among its alert criteria (Tome III, case 16).
Canada. FINTRAC’s indicators for financial entities include “Accounts used for pass-through activities (e.g. to receive and subsequently send funds to beneficiaries)” and “Funds transferred in and out of an account on the same day or within a relatively short period of time.”
Reporting deadline
File “as soon as practicable” after the measures that establish reasonable grounds to suspect (FINTRAC STR guidance, section 4).
EU. The EBA risk factor guidelines flag money-remitter customers who “send funds on immediately after receiving them” (EBA/GL/2021/02, para 11.7).
Argentina. A circumstance to weigh in alerts: an account that “reciba fondos de terceros e inmediatamente estos fondos sean transferidos a otras cuentas o sacados en efectivo desde cajeros automáticos” (receives funds from third parties that are immediately transferred to other accounts or withdrawn in cash at ATMs) (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 34(b), circumstance 19).
Reporting deadline
Money laundering, within 24 hours of concluding that the operation is suspicious, and no later than 90 calendar days from the operation, performed or attempted; terrorist financing and proliferation financing, within 24 hours of the operation (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 36(c)).
False positives and tuning
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Common innocent explanations: salary paid in and spent on bills the same day; a customer topping up a wallet to pay one bill; a family remittance on mobile money cashed out at an agent the same day; a loan disbursement spent at once or paid on to the borrower’s supplier; savings moved to another of the customer’s own accounts; businesses whose job is to receive and pay out on others’ behalf (payment agents, payout platforms, brokers, payroll and sweep accounts).
Typical causes of misfires:
- Businesses that are pass-through by design. A long-window ratio rule run on all customers can draw most of its alerts from business customers whose job is to receive money and pay it out for others. Segment first, and judge those businesses against their own expected flows, not against an individual’s.
- Spending from an existing balance. A customer who receives a credit and, in the same window, makes a large payment from money already in the account passes the share test although the balance stays high. The balance test (see How the rule works) removes these.
- Mixed currencies. Comparing an outflow in one currency with inflows summed in another produces alerts where the real ratio was far below the line. Convert both legs to one currency at a documented rate. Check that “filter to one currency” is not being used where “convert to one currency” was meant. Check also that each amount and its currency belong together: a leg recorded in the wrong currency can read many times its real value, and converting won’t fix it. A plausibility cap per segment, or checking each leg of a trade against its paired leg, will.
- Own-account movements. Currency conversions inside a wallet, card loads and unloads, and refunds of the customer’s own payments look like money arriving and leaving. List the institution’s internal transaction types and exclude them from both legs.
- Empty denominators. If you run the ratio without a minimum money in, decide what an empty money in does: some engines treat the ratio as passed and others as failed. Test it.
- History shorter than the window. With less history loaded than the look-back, the dormant and new-account variants fire on every customer’s first activity. Load at least one full window before going live.
- Overlapping versions. In-and-out rules that differ only in their window mostly flag the same customers twice, and each carries the other’s false positives. Keep one rule with tiers rather than several rules.
- Third-party money in lending. When someone else funds a borrower who then repays, the payer may be a relative, employer or another lender. The pattern needs a second signal, such as one sender funding several borrowers, before it means fraud.
How to tune: segment by customer type and rail; use a short window on instant rails and a longer one on bank transfers; set the floor per segment and currency; exclude own-account movements; cap alerts at one per customer per window; and measure on a full window of history before switching it on.
When it fires
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Analyst checklist:
- List the credits and debits in the window and a few days around it. Note who sent the money, where it went, and over which rail.
- Check whether the senders are related to the customer, whether the exits go to the customer’s own accounts, and whether the destinations are crypto, cash-out or cross-border.
- Check whether the senders or beneficiaries appear on other customers’ accounts (see Shared identifiers across customers) and whether many unrelated people paid in (see Funnel account).
- Compare with the customer’s declared occupation, income and expected activity. A new or recently dormant account is a stronger signal.
- Ask the customer for the purpose of the payments and the relationship with the senders and recipients. Mules are often told the money is a job, a loan, or a favour.
- Escalate when the customer cannot explain the flows, the senders are victims of reported fraud, or the account was recently opened or reactivated for this.
An alert is a reason to review, not a suspicion in itself: the NFIU’s 2024 STR guidelines call monitoring alerts “unusual” and say they “should not be automatically regarded as suspicious” (Part Three, paras 1–2). Under the FATF standard, suspicious transactions are reported regardless of amount, attempted transactions included (Interpretive Note to Recommendation 20, para 3). Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.
Related rules
- Funnel account: many senders in, often followed by the same drain.
- Shared identifiers across customers: the mule network behind several pass-through accounts.
- Transaction structuring: small credits that then pass through.
- Test transfer before a large transfer: mule warm-up before a large credit.
- Dormant account reactivation and New account activity: the same drain on an account that was quiet or just opened.
- Cross-border transfer chains (layering through several countries): money passed through on its way abroad, followed hop by hop across countries.
- Third-party funding and payment account name mismatch: money paid in from accounts in other people’s names, before it is passed on.
- Chain-hopping and cross-chain bridge use: crypto deposited and sent out on another network or as another asset.
- Account takeover: a real customer’s balance sent out by someone who got into the account, before the money reaches a mule.
- New beneficiary, high-value payment: a large first payment to a beneficiary the customer has never paid before.
- Round-tripping among related accounts: money passed on that comes back to where it started, or circles among related accounts.
- Unlicensed virtual asset business (crypto trading through an ordinary account): a customer trading crypto for others, whose clients’ money comes in and goes straight out to an exchange.
- Unhosted wallet exposure (self-hosted wallets): the exit when crypto passed straight through leaves for a wallet no regulated provider holds.
Sources
25 sourcesHide
- FINTRAC, “Money laundering and terrorist financing indicators—Financial entities”, modified 24 November 2025: “ML/TF indicators related to products and services” and “ML/TF indicators based on atypical transactional activity”. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/indicators-indicateurs/fin_mltf-eng
- FINTRAC, “Reporting suspicious transactions to FINTRAC”, modified 22 May 2025, section 4. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/str-dod/str-dod-eng
- GIABA, “Typologies of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Linked to Cybercrime in West Africa”, May 2025: Typology 6 (mobile money) red flags, p.40 and p.45; CENTIF-Togo case, p.24. https://www.giaba.org/typologies/3495__typologies-of-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-linked-to-cybercrime-in-west-africa.html
- NFIU, “Guidance to Reporting Institutions on Preparing a Complete Suspicious Transaction / Activity Report and Filing Electronically to the NFIU”, Guidance Note NFIU/EXT/PUB/GDNTE/AC-COMP/FI-DNFI/2-MAY-2023/VOL.01/001, May 2023, p.4 and p.14. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance (“2023 NFIU Guidelines on STR Filing”)
- NFIU, “Money Laundering Typologies Through Fraud in Nigeria”, December 2023, Case Study 20. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng (Trends & Typologies)
- NFIU, “Guidelines for the Identification, Verification and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions Related to ML/FT/PF for Financial Institutions”, STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, 13 December 2024, Part Three paras 1–2 and Part Six para 2. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance
- Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 (Nigeria), s.7(1)–(2). https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/LawsAndRegulations
- Central Bank of Kenya, “The National Payment System (Anti-Money Laundering Guidelines for the Provision of Mobile Payment Services) Guidelines, 2013”, para 3.2(a). https://www.centralbank.go.ke/images/docs/NPS/Regulations%20and%20Guidelines/Guidelines%20-%20Mobile%20money%20AML%20Guidelines.pdf
- Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism Financing Laws (Amendment) Act, 2023 (Kenya, Act No. 10 of 2023), Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 148, 1 September 2023, amending POCAMLA s.44(2). https://brs.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/AntiMoneyLaunderingandCombatingofTerrorismFinancingLawsAmendmentAct2023.pdf
- FIC South Africa, Guidance Note 4B on reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions and activities, 26 March 2019, para 71 (reporting period, MLTF Control Regulations reg. 24(3)) and para 80 (when the period starts). https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019.03-Guidance-Guidance-Note-4B-STRs.pdf
- FIC South Africa, “Financial Crime Insights: Money mules”, June 2024, p.8. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Financial-Crime-Insights-Money-mules.pdf
- Tracfin, “LCB-FT : état de la menace 2024-2025”, Rapport d’activité 2024, Tome III, case 16, p.45. https://www.vie-publique.fr/files/rapport/pdf/300600.pdf
- UEMOA, Loi uniforme relative à la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux, le financement du terrorisme et de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive (March 2023), arts. 2 (point 58), 60 and 61. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Loi-uniforme-LBCFTFP-Mars-2023-vf.pdf
- FATF, “Virtual Assets: Red Flag Indicators of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing”, September 2020, “Red flag indicators related to transactions”, p.6. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Virtual-Assets-Red-Flag-Indicators.pdf
- FATF, INTERPOL and Egmont Group, “Illicit Financial Flows from Cyber-Enabled Fraud”, November 2023, para 23 and Annex A (“Rapid or immediate cash withdrawals or transfers of large amounts following the receipt of a funds transfer in order to empty the account”). https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Illicit-financial-flows-cyber-enabled-fraud.pdf
- FATF and Egmont Group, “Trade-Based Money Laundering: Risk Indicators”, March 2021, account and transaction activity indicators, p.6 (a “‘pay-through’ or ‘transit’ account with a rapid movement of high-volume transactions and a small end-of-day balance”). https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Trade-Based-Money-Laundering-Risk-Indicators.pdf
- FATF, The FATF Recommendations, October 2025 edition (R.20 was not changed by the June 2026 update): Recommendation 20, Interpretive Note to R.20 para 3. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Fatf-recommendations.html
- EBA, “Guidelines on customer due diligence and the factors credit and financial institutions should consider when assessing the ML/TF risk” (EBA/GL/2021/02, consolidated with EBA/GL/2023/03), para 11.7. https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2023-11/EBA%20GL%202021%2002%20-%20consolidated%20%28amended%20by%20EBA%20GL%202023%2003%29_EN.pdf
- Financial Reporting Centre (Kenya), “Guidance notes to TCSPs on AML/CFT/CPF 2025”, December 2025, section 3.1 (POCAMLA s.44 and Regulation 38: “within two days upon forming suspicion”). https://www.frc.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/TCSP-Guidance.pdf
- Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 200/2024 (RESOL-2024-200-APN-UIF#MJ), 18 December 2024, Boletín Oficial no. 35571, 19 December 2024, art. 34(b), circumstance 19; art. 36(c) (report deadlines). https://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/405000-409999/407429/norma.htm
- FIC South Africa, Directive 5 of 2019 on the usage of an automated transaction monitoring system for the detection and submission of regulatory reports, 29 March 2019, paras 2.1–2.3, 3.1.16 and 3.1.17. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019-DIR-Directive-5-of-2019-ATMS.pdf
- FIC South Africa, Public Compliance Communication 45 on Directive 5 of 2019 in relation to the use of automated transaction monitoring systems, 20 March 2020, paras 5–8. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2020.03-PCC-PCC-45-On-Directive-5-of-2019-in-relation-to-the-use-of-ATMS.pdf
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Payments System Policy Department, Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, November 2026, issued by circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004 of 5 November 2026, in force that day (circular, section 4.0); sections 10.3.4, 10.7.5, 26.7.1(c) and 26.7.2. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/REGULATIONS%20FOR%20THE%20OPERATIONS%20OF%20NON-SECURITY%20VIRTUAL%20ASSETS%20IN%20NIGERIA.pdf
- Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism / Combating Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Accountable Institutions, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 12 December 2025, 2.8.2(1)–(3) and Appendix E, red flags 2a, 3f, 3h, 3j, 3q and 3u. https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/BOG-FIC-AML-GUIDELINE-2025-FINAL-5-TO-BE-PUBLISHED.pdf
- BCEAO, Instruction n°001-03-2025 du 18 mars 2025 on AML/CFT/CPF organisation, internal control and compliance of financial institutions, arts. 3 and 6. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-04/Instruction%20n%C2%B0001-03-2025%20du%2018%20mars%2025%20portant%20modalit%C3%A9s%20de%20mise%20en%20oeuvre%20par%20les%20IF%20de%20leurs%20obligations%20en%20mati%C3%A8re%20de%20lutte%20contre%20le%20blanchiment%20de%20capitaux.pdf
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The Fraud & AML Library is a practical reference, not legal advice. What binds is the regulator’s own text, which every rule and regulation page links.