Money laundering

Third-party funding and payment account name mismatch

Money reaches or leaves a customer’s account through a payment account held in someone else’s name, or one outside person keeps funding the same customer.

Money reaches or leaves a customer’s account through a payment account in another name, or one outside person keeps paying into the same customer’s account Payment account in another name Names differ in or out Customer or Outside person Keeps paying in Customer

What it catches

Money that reaches a customer’s account, or leaves it, through a payment account that is not the customer’s. It comes in two forms:

  • Name mismatch on a payment leg. The bank account, wallet or card that pays in, or receives a payout, is held in a name (or, in Nigeria, a Bank Verification Number) that does not match the verified customer. Typical places: the naira leg of a peer-to-peer (P2P) crypto trade, a stablecoin redemption, a wallet top-up, a withdrawal to a bank account.
  • A recurring third-party funder. One person who is not the customer pays into the same customer’s account again and again, or pays the customer’s loan for them.

A customer who moves an unverified person’s money through a verified account hides who is behind it. The FATF, INTERPOL and Egmont list “Mismatch of account number and name of the holder of the account” among the risk indicators of cyber-enabled fraud. FINTRAC lists “Multiple deposits which are made to an account by non-account holders”. Nigeria’s FIU describes a fraudster who laundered stolen funds “using different third parties bank accounts via peer-to-peer exchange of the virtual asset to fiat money”. Some regulators turn the check into a rule of the product: in Nigeria a P2P provider may not release tokens until the name and BVN of the naira account match the customer, and stablecoin redemptions are paid only to an account in the customer’s name.

The rule finds the shape, not the crime. Third-party money can be ordinary: a relative helping out, an employer, a customer’s own account at another bank, another lender buying out a loan. The EBA’s risk factor guidelines give “a state benefit authority or a guarantor” as third parties a firm may expect to pay (EBA/GL/2021/02, Guideline 2). An analyst decides which is which, except where the law makes the name match a condition of the payment.

How the rule works

Name mismatch. For each payment in or out, get the name on the counterparty’s account from the payment message, a name enquiry or a verification-of-payee service, and, where the rail gives it, the national identifier behind the account (the BVN in Nigeria). Compare them with every name and identifier the customer was verified with. In a P2P trade, compare each party’s own leg with that party: the account the buyer paid from with the buyer, the account the seller was paid into with the seller. The other side of the trade is not a third party. Leave out payments where no payer name is known: an empty name is “unknown”, not a mismatch. Alert when the names do not match closely enough and no identifier matches.

Where the law makes the match a condition. In Nigeria, a P2P provider releases or credits the token only when both the name and the BVN of the naira account match the verified customer, and a stablecoin redemption is paid only to an account in the verified customer’s name. This is a check on every trade and redemption, not an alert after the fact: a missing name or BVN, or a mismatch on either one, holds the trade or the redemption until the account is shown to be the customer’s. None of the exclusions or suppression of the alert apply to it.

Recurring third-party funder. For each customer, group incoming payments by the paying account. Leave out the customer’s own accounts (a name match, or an account the customer registered and proved) and, on a P2P platform, the other side of each trade. Alert when one outside account has paid the customer a set number of times adding up to a minimum total, or a set amount, within a period. In lending, the same form looks at money from another person followed shortly by a loan repayment of about the same amount.

Looks at

Every payment into or out of a customer’s account that carries the counterparty’s account and name: top-ups, the fiat leg of a crypto trade, withdrawals and redemptions, the credits that fund a loan repayment.

Compares

  • Name: the name on the counterparty’s account against all the customer’s verified names (first, middle, last, full, birth and transliterated names), after removing case, accents, punctuation, titles and word order. In a P2P trade, each party’s own leg against that party: the buyer’s paying account against the buyer, the seller’s receiving account against the seller.
  • Identifier: where the rail returns one, the national identifier behind the account against the customer’s.

Counts

For each outside account that pays the customer (on a P2P platform, not the other side of a trade): how many times, and how much, in the period.

Leaves out

  • Payments with no counterparty name, and payments whose “sender” is a payment provider or aggregator rather than the payer.
  • Accounts the customer registered and proved to be their own.
  • Payers the product expects and has identified, such as an employer on a payroll product or a government support programme.

None of these apply to a hold the law requires (below).

Alerts when

Either of these is true:

  1. The counterparty’s name scores below your match level against every verified name, and no identifier matches.
  2. One outside account has paid the customer at least your count times adding up to at least your minimum total, or at least your amount in all, in the period.

Holds

Where the law makes the match a condition of the payment, the check runs on every trade or redemption before it is paid, with nothing left out and nothing suppressed. A missing name or identifier holds the payment, as a mismatch does.

  • Nigeria, P2P trade: the token is released or credited only when both the name and the BVN of the naira account match the verified customer on whose behalf the provider acts.
  • Nigeria, stablecoin redemption: the proceeds are paid only to an account in the verified customer’s name.

How often

One alert per customer and outside account per period. A payer already reviewed and identified is not alerted again unless the pattern changes.

Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.

Common variants:

  • P2P fiat leg. For a P2P crypto platform: the account that paid the naira (or other fiat) for a trade against the verified buyer, and the account that received it against the verified seller. Nigeria makes this a condition of releasing the tokens.
  • Withdrawal and redemption to someone else’s account. A withdrawal or stablecoin redemption meant for the customer’s own account that goes to an account not in the customer’s name. In Mexico, a fintech institution pays its clients’ funds out to the accounts they hold at financial institutions (Fintech Law, art. 45). On a wallet or payments product where paying other people is the service, a payment to another name is not this rule, and the recipient’s name there is usually the one the customer typed when saving the recipient.
  • Third-party loan repayment. Money from another person, followed soon after by a repayment of about the same amount on the customer’s loan. In lending the repayment itself may be a direct debit from the borrower’s own account, so the payer only shows on the credit before it.
  • One funder, many customers. The same outside account funds several customers. This joins the rule to Shared identifiers across customers, and a private payer funding several customers is worth reviewing first once businesses and payment platforms are left out. On a P2P platform, though, merchants and active traders pay many customers as a matter of course. Elsewhere, where the money each customer receives is sent on as crypto within minutes, the payments can be the fiat leg of crypto trades run outside a licensed platform: see Unlicensed virtual asset business.
  • Third-party money then out. Third-party credits followed by a fast exit; see Rapid pass-through.

Data it needs

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FieldUsually comes fromIf it’s missing
Customer’s verified names (all of them)KYCRequired. Keep middle, birth, married and transliterated names: comparing against one full-name field is the main source of false alerts.
Customer’s national identifier (BVN, NIN, CURP)KYCNeeded where the rail returns the payer’s identifier (Nigeria’s BVN).
Counterparty account and its holder’s namepayment message, name enquiry or verification-of-payee serviceRequired. Know what the field holds before comparing it: on some rails the field that looks like the payer’s name repeats the customer’s own name, and on payouts the name is usually the one the customer typed when saving the recipient. Measure the fill rate per rail first: the feed you receive may carry no payer name on some rails, and card top-ups and agent cash-ins can have none.
Counterparty’s national identifierthe bank leg or name enquiryNeeded for the Nigeria P2P check, which compares the BVN as well as the name.
Customer’s registered own accountsonboarding or account linkingNeeded to leave out own-account top-ups. Without it, every top-up from the customer’s other bank looks like a third party unless the names match. A small verification payment proves the customer controls the account, not that it is in their name.
Link between the payment and what it funds (order, trade, loan reference)P2P order book, settlement, loan ledgerNeeded to tie a fiat payment to its crypto trade or a credit to the repayment it funds, and to tell each party’s own leg of a P2P trade from the other side’s.
Direction, amount, currency, timestamp, status, transaction typeledgerRequired.
Customer segment (individual, business) and declared business accountsonboarding (KYB)Needed to compare a business account’s payers with its directors and signatories rather than with one person’s name, and to recognise a sole trader paying from an account in a trade name.

The same customer must sit on one identifier across the credit and the activity it funds. If credits arrive under one customer id and repayments or trades under another, the rule never sees the pair.

Thresholds

Each row is a setting the rule needs. Set by law values come from the source named under “Where it comes from”. Suggested values are starting points: test them on your own history, then adjust.

ParameterValueTypeWhere it comes from
Nigeria, P2P trade: the naira accountIts name and BVN must match the verified customer before the token is released or creditedSet by lawCBN Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets, section 10.3.3.
Nigeria, stablecoin redemptionProceeds paid only to an account in the verified customer’s nameSet by lawSame Regulations, section 26.17.4.
Mexico, bank account an individual client links to a fintech accountWhere applicable, must match the client’s nameSet by lawSHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, art. 11(I)(h) and (III)(g).
Mexico, funds providersIdentify anyone who regularly funds an account without holding it. Not required for concentration accounts, government support programmes, and level 1 and level 2 accounts (operations limited to 750 and 3,000 UDIs a month)Set by lawSame provisions, arts. 2(XXVII), 11(VII) and 12(I)–(II). The provisions do not say how often is “regularly”.
Name match levelNo public value. Set from a hand-labelled sample of your payer names, tested on money known to be the customer’s ownSuggestedName matching across all payments produces false positives from complex spellings, nicknames and middle names (Nacha).
Recurring funder: count, minimum total, amount, periodNo public value. Set from your own data, per segment and currencySuggestedNo regulator or standard setter gives a number.

By country

  • Nigeria. For P2P services licensed by the CBN, its Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria (in force 5 November 2026) say a provider “shall not release or credit a Regulated Token in a P2P transaction unless it has verified that the name and the Bank Verification Number of the account from which the Naira payment was made, or to which it was made, match the verified customer on whose behalf the provider acts” (section 10.3.3). A provider may not knowingly permit third-party, nominee or mule accounts or wallets used to conceal who is behind the funds (section 10.3.4), and must maintain controls to identify the “use of mule or third-party accounts” and “attempts to obscure the relationship between the fiat and virtual-asset legs” (section 10.7.5). The monthly P2P return reports “transactions involving third-party, nominee, mule, fictitious or improperly attributed payment accounts or wallets, including the action taken by the Licensee” (Schedule 7, Part F, item 26). For stablecoin issuers, “Redemption proceeds shall be paid only to an account held in the name of the verified customer” (section 26.17.4). The NFIU’s 2023 fraud typologies report gives the “Use of third-party bank Accounts via peer-to-peer virtual asset exchange” as an indicator in a case where stolen funds were sold on P2P platforms and the naira “paid by the third parties into his local bank account” (Case Study 3), and, in another case, a relative’s account used to collect the proceeds before they were moved to the suspect’s own (Case Study 30).

    Reporting deadline

    Report to the NFIU immediately, with a written report within 24 hours (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.7(1)–(2)). The NFIU’s December 2024 STR guidelines start the 24 hours once the transaction is found suspicious, after an examination of no more than 72 hours, and require written reasons for every alert closed as not suspicious (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, Part Six, para 2).

  • Mexico. For fintech institutions (crowdfunding and e-money institutions, ITFs), a funds provider (Proveedor de Recursos) is “aquella persona que, sin ser el titular de una cuenta abierta en una ITF o haber celebrado un contrato con esta, aporta recursos a la ITF de manera regular sin obtener los beneficios económicos derivados de esa cuenta, contrato u Operación” (a person who, without holding an account at the ITF or having a contract with it, regularly provides funds to it without obtaining the economic benefits of that account, contract or operation) (SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, art. 2(XXVII)). The ITF must collect and record the funds provider’s identification data (art. 11(VII)), with the exceptions in Thresholds. Where applicable (“En su caso”), the bank account an individual client links to the fintech account must be one “que corresponda con el nombre” (that matches the name) of the client (art. 11(I)(h) and (III)(g)). An unusual-operation circumstance is “Cuando se tenga indicios o se presuma que un Cliente realiza Operaciones en beneficio, por encargo o cuenta de un tercero, sin haberlo declarado a la ITF” (where there are signs or a presumption that a client carries out operations for the benefit, on the instructions or on behalf of a third party, without having declared it to the ITF) (art. 70(XII)). Where the ITF has “información que le haga presumir de manera fundada” (information giving it well-founded grounds to presume) that a client acts on behalf of an undeclared third party, it must ask the client for the information needed to identify the beneficial owner of the funds (art. 42). The Fintech Law lets an ITF receive its clients’ funds only “que provengan directamente de cuentas de depósito de dinero abiertas en una Entidad Financiera” (coming directly from deposit accounts at a financial entity) and pay them out “a las respectivas cuentas que estos mantengan abiertas en Entidades Financieras” (to the accounts the clients hold at financial entities), unless the CNBV authorises cash or foreign accounts (Fintech Law, art. 45). These provisions cover fintech institutions only.

    Reporting deadline

    The Communication and Control Committee rules on an unusual operation within 60 calendar days of its detection, and the report goes to SHCP, through the CNBV, within 3 business days of the end of that session; within 24 hours of the alert or staff notice where there are signs or concrete facts that the funds could come from illicit activities or be used for terrorist financing or money laundering (SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, arts. 69 and 73).

  • Argentina. UIF Resolution 200/2024 binds payment service providers and non-financial lenders (art. 1). Among the circumstances they must weigh specially when setting alerts: “Cuando se tome conocimiento que el cliente opera con fondos de terceros” (where it becomes known that the customer operates with third-party funds), and “Cuando una cuenta reciba fondos de terceros e inmediatamente estos fondos sean transferidos a otras cuentas o sacados en efectivo desde cajeros automáticos” (where an account receives third-party funds that are immediately transferred to other accounts or withdrawn in cash at ATMs) (art. 34(b), circumstances 17 and 19).

    Reporting deadline

    Money laundering, within 24 hours of concluding that the operation is suspicious, and no later than 90 calendar days from the operation, performed or attempted; terrorist financing and proliferation financing, within 24 hours of the operation (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 36(c)).

  • Ghana. Accountable institutions “shall in respect of all customers, determine whether or not a customer is acting on behalf of another person. Where the customer or any other third party is acting on behalf of another person or making deposits and withdrawals, the AI shall take reasonable steps which include obtaining sufficient identification data (the name, address, contact, purpose of transaction, and signature) and verifying the identity of the third party (acting on behalf of the other person)” (BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.4.2 para 13). “If the customer is acting on behalf of another (the funds are supplied by someone else or the investment is to be held in the name of someone else) then the AI has the obligation to identify and verify the identity of both the customer and the agent/trustee unless the customer is itself an AI” (3.2 para 2).

    Reporting deadline

    Within 24 hours of the suspicion, attempted transactions included, whatever the amount (BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.8.1(6) and 2.8.3(2)).

  • South Africa. The FIC’s 2024 money-mule report says current accounts were reported for “possible third-party transactions”, which “involve an individual opening an account and handing over their bank card, account number and/or the login details to another person who anonymously transacts using that account” and “also include individuals opening accounts and performing transactions on behalf of other individuals” (p.8). This rule sees only the second kind, and only where the other person’s money arrives under their own name: an account handed over moves money in the customer’s own name, and cash deposited by unknown people carries no payer name, so neither shows to a name check (Funnel account and Rapid pass-through look at those flows). Where the rule runs in an automated transaction monitoring system, FIC Directive 5 of 2019 requires the system’s detection methodology, “including algorithms, scenarios, threshold settings or rules” (this rule among them), to be documented (para 3.1.16) and, taken as a whole, “sufficient to address the associated money laundering and terrorist financing risks applicable to the reporter” (para 3.1.17), and sets the time limits for the system’s alerts given under the reporting deadline below (paras 2.1–2.3).

    Reporting deadline

    As soon as possible, and no later than 15 days excluding weekends and public holidays (FIC Act s.29; MLTF Control Regulations, reg. 24(3), via FIC Guidance Note 4B para 71). The 15 days run from when you became aware of the facts, which “may be, and in the majority of cases will be, before a suspicion is formed” (GN4B para 80), and an institution “may not add additional timeframes for its internal transactional monitoring alert system processes, and / or internal investigation and review processes to the prescribed reporting period” (GN4B para 81). Where the alert comes from an automated transaction monitoring system, the reporter “is deemed to have knowledge” of the possible suspicious activity when the alert is generated: the report is due “no later than 15 days after the alert has been generated”, and work on the alert must start within 48 hours, which the FIC counts as two days without weekends and public holidays, inside the 15 (FIC Directive 5 of 2019, paras 2.1–2.3; FIC PCC 45, paras 5–8).

  • Canada. FINTRAC’s indicators for the use of a third party include “Multiple deposits which are made to an account by non-account holders” and “Wire transfers, deposits or payments to or from unrelated parties (foreign or domestic)”.

    Reporting deadline

    File “as soon as practicable” after the measures that establish reasonable grounds to suspect (FINTRAC STR guidance, section 4).

  • United States. Nacha’s Operating Rules, a payment scheme’s rules rather than a law, require every bank that receives ACH credits to “establish and implement risk-based processes and procedures designed to identify credit Entries initiated due to fraud”: from 20 March 2026 for banks that received 10 million or more ACH entries in 2023, and from 19 June 2026 for all others. Nacha’s Risk Management Advisory Group advises receiving banks that name matching on every ACH credit is “untenable” at volume, but that comparing names is useful once a payment is flagged, and that “Credit transactions with a gross mismatch between the name on the transaction and the name on the account, or accounts suddenly receiving multiple credits under multiple names, may indicate an account is being used to receive illicit funds in a credit push fraud scheme” (Nacha, 29 November 2022).

    Reporting deadline

    Banks file within 30 calendar days of first detecting the facts, and may take 30 more days to identify a suspect if none was identified, never more than 60 days in all (31 CFR 1020.320(b)(3)); money services businesses file within 30 calendar days (31 CFR 1022.320(b)(3)). For an ongoing money laundering scheme, both also notify law enforcement by telephone immediately.

  • EU. The EBA risk factor guidelines ask, as a product risk factor, whether products “allow payments from third parties” where not normally expected, whether, where such payments are expected, the firm knows “the third party’s identity”, or whether products are “funded exclusively by fund transfers from the customer’s own account at another financial institution” (EBA/GL/2021/02, Guideline 2, product, service and transaction risk factors). Higher risk for banks: “the product allows payments from third parties that are neither associated with the product nor identified upfront, where such payments would not be expected, for example for mortgages or loans” (para 9.4). Higher risk for e-money: a product that can be “funded with payments from unidentified third parties” (para 10.4). For crypto-asset service providers, a higher-risk customer is one who, when exchanging crypto-assets to official currencies and back, “uses a bank or payment account, credit card in the name of a different person than the customer without having evident links to that person” (EBA/GL/2024/01, Guideline 21.5(b)(xi)(b), applicable from 30 December 2024). A higher-risk product is one that “allows payments from third parties that are neither associated with the product nor identified and verified upfront, where such payments have no apparent economic rationale” (21.3(b)). Where a customer’s withdrawals or redemptions do not fit their profile, the provider should add measures “to ensure that a withdrawal or redemption is requested by the customer and not by a third party” (21.12(l)).

False positives and tuning

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Common innocent explanations: the customer’s own account at another bank or e-money provider; a relative paying in or repaying a loan; an employer paying wages or an advance; another lender buying out a loan; a business account paid by its director; a sole trader paying from an account in their business’s name; a joint account; on a P2P platform, the other side of a trade.

Typical causes of misfires:

  • Names that differ in form, not in person. Middle names, short forms, initials, reversed word order, accents, transliterations from another script, married and birth names, titles and prefixes on bank account names, names that a name enquiry returns truncated or abbreviated, and phone numbers typed into a name field. Exact comparison of one full-name field fails on all of them. Normalise both sides, compare token by token against every verified name, and score the similarity. Nacha’s advisory group warns that, when every ACH payment is matched, “names with complex spellings, nicknames for the account holder, or customers using their middle names would all create instances of false positives at an unmanageable scale”.
  • Sole traders’ business accounts. Expect sole traders to pay from an account in their business’s name, a trade name that may be built from a piece of the owner’s name. A word-by-word comparison misses it: use a similarity measure that catches fused and shortened names, and let customers declare a business account. Where the law asks for the name, a matching identifier does not settle it on its own: in Nigeria a P2P trade paid from a business-name account stays held even when the BVN behind it is the customer’s.
  • A name field that is not the payer’s. Know what each name field holds before comparing it. On some rails the field that looks like the payer’s name repeats the customer’s own name, which hides every third-party payment; on payouts the name is usually the one the customer typed when saving the recipient, which only checks what the customer says. Use the name the paying bank sends, or a name-enquiry or verification-of-payee result.
  • The payment provider’s name in the payer field. On some rails the sender name on a credit is the remitter, wallet or aggregator that routed it, not the person who paid. Keep a list of such intermediaries and treat their credits as “payer unknown”.
  • Businesses a keyword list misses. A list of platform and company names leaves many businesses in: trading names without a legal suffix, sole traders marked only by a short business-form tag, card acquirers paying merchants under the merchant’s trading name, betting operators paying out winnings, banks returning a closed account’s balance. Read the payment reference with the name (invoice, payout, salary, withdrawal, account closure), and look first at the payers that fund many customers: that is where missed businesses collect.
  • Missing payer names. The feed you receive may carry no payer name on some rails, and card top-ups and mobile-money agent cash-ins can have none. Measure the fill rate per rail before switching the rule on, and do not read an empty name as a mismatch.
  • Own accounts elsewhere. A customer funding the account from another account in their own name is a self-transfer. Let customers register their other accounts and prove them once. A small verification payment, or a phone number or account on the customer’s profile, shows control, not that the account is in the customer’s name: a mobile-money number registered by the customer can belong to a relative. Where the law asks for the name (Nigeria’s P2P trades and redemptions, Mexico’s linked accounts), check the name.
  • Money between people on a wallet. On a wallet or payments product, receiving money from other people is what the product is for, so a per-payment mismatch alert fires on ordinary use. Keep the mismatch as a fact on the case, and alert on the recurring form with a minimum total, or on one private payer funding several customers.
  • No minimum total on the count. Without one, a few small payments from a friend make a recurring funder.
  • P2P merchants and traders. On a P2P platform the other side of every trade is another person, and merchants and active traders pay many customers again and again. Compare each party’s own leg with that party, and leave the trade counterparty out of the recurring-funder count.
  • Family, employers and other lenders. In lending, third-party money can come from relatives, employers and other lenders refinancing the loan. Treat the single mismatch as a review, and put the weight on the stronger signs: one payer funding several customers, a payer who is a member of staff (matched on account or phone, not on a common name), or third-party money followed by a fast exit.
  • The payer’s account written as the customer’s. If a third party’s account is stored as one of the customer’s own identifiers, shared-identifier and connection rules will link the customer to everyone else that account ever paid. Store payer accounts as counterparties, never as the customer’s own identifiers.
  • Credits and the activity they fund under different ids. When a credit and the repayment or trade it pays for are recorded under different customer ids, the sequence form never fires.

How to tune: start with the rails that carry a payer name, and check what each name field holds; normalise names and compare against every verified name; test the comparison on money you know is the customer’s own (an auto-debit from their account, a withdrawal to an account they verified), where every mismatch is an error of the comparison and its rate is the floor of your false positives; exclude registered own accounts and known intermediaries; review rather than block, except where the law makes the match a condition; raise priority when one private payer funds several customers or the money leaves fast.

When it fires

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Analyst checklist:

  1. Confirm who holds the counterparty account: the name and, where available, the identifier behind it (name enquiry, BVN, verification of payee).
  2. Check whether the account is the customer’s own under another form of their name, or a registered own account. If so, close and record it so it does not alert again.
  3. Ask the customer who the payer or recipient is, their relationship and why they paid. Among the risk indicators of cyber-enabled fraud, under suspicion in the account holder’s profile, the FATF, INTERPOL and Egmont list: “Account holder is unfamiliar with the source of the funds moving through their account or claiming they are transacting for someone else”.
  4. Check whether the same outside account pays other customers (see Shared identifiers across customers), whether many unrelated people pay this customer (see Funnel account), and whether the money left soon after (see Rapid pass-through).
  5. Where the law asks for it, identify the third party: Mexico’s funds providers (art. 11(VII)) and the beneficial owner where a client acts for an undeclared third party (art. 42); Ghana’s third parties making deposits (2.4.2 para 13).
  6. In Nigeria, keep a P2P release or a redemption payout on hold until the account is shown to be the customer’s, and record the action taken: the monthly P2P return asks for it (Schedule 7, Part F, item 26).
  7. Escalate when the customer cannot explain the payer, the payer is a reported fraud victim, the payer funds several customers, or the account appears to be operated for someone else.

An alert is a reason to review, not a suspicion in itself: the NFIU’s 2024 STR guidelines call monitoring alerts “unusual” and say they “should not be automatically regarded as suspicious” (Part Three, paras 1–2). Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.

Sources

21 sourcesHide
  1. Central Bank of Nigeria, Payments System Policy Department, Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, November 2026, issued by circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004 of 5 November 2026, in force that day (circular, section 4.0); sections 10.3.3, 10.3.4, 10.7.5 and 26.17.4, and Schedule 7, Part F, item 26. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/REGULATIONS%20FOR%20THE%20OPERATIONS%20OF%20NON-SECURITY%20VIRTUAL%20ASSETS%20IN%20NIGERIA.pdf
  2. NFIU, “Money Laundering Typologies Through Fraud in Nigeria”, December 2023, Case Study 3 (p.26) and Case Study 30 (pp.52–53). https://www.nfiu.gov.ng (Trends & Typologies)
  3. NFIU, “Guidelines for the Identification, Verification and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions Related to ML/FT/PF for Financial Institutions”, STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, 13 December 2024, Part Three paras 1–2 and Part Six para 2. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance
  4. Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 (Nigeria), s.7(1)–(2). https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/LawsAndRegulations
  5. Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Mexico), “Disposiciones de carácter general a que se refiere el Artículo 58 de la Ley para Regular las Instituciones de Tecnología Financiera”, DOF 10 September 2018, arts. 2(XXVII), 11(I)(h), 11(III)(g), 11(VII), 12(I)–(II), 42 and 70(XII); arts. 69 and 73 (report deadlines). https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5537449&fecha=10/09/2018 (accessed 2026-11-12).
  6. Ley para Regular las Instituciones de Tecnología Financiera (Mexico), DOF 9 March 2018, art. 45. https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5515623&fecha=09/03/2018
  7. Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 200/2024 (RESOL-2024-200-APN-UIF#MJ), 18 December 2024, Boletín Oficial no. 35571, 19 December 2024, art. 1; art. 34(b), circumstances 17 and 19; art. 36(c) (report deadlines). https://www.argentina.gob.ar/normativa/nacional/norma-407429/texto
  8. Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism / Combating Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Accountable Institutions, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 12 December 2025, 2.4.2 para 13 (p.10), 3.2 para 2 (p.41), 2.8.1(6) and 2.8.3(2). https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/BOG-FIC-AML-GUIDELINE-2025-FINAL-5-TO-BE-PUBLISHED.pdf
  9. FIC South Africa, “Financial Crime Insights: Money mules”, June 2024, p.8. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Financial-Crime-Insights-Money-mules.pdf
  10. FIC South Africa, Guidance Note 4B on reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions and activities, 26 March 2019, para 71 (reporting period, MLTF Control Regulations reg. 24(3)), para 80 (when the period starts) and para 81. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019.03-Guidance-Guidance-Note-4B-STRs.pdf
  11. FIC South Africa, Directive 5 of 2019 on the usage of an automated transaction monitoring system for the detection and submission of regulatory reports, 29 March 2019, paras 2.1–2.3, 3.1.16 and 3.1.17. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019-DIR-Directive-5-of-2019-ATMS.pdf
  12. FIC South Africa, Public Compliance Communication 45 on Directive 5 of 2019 in relation to the use of automated transaction monitoring systems, 20 March 2020, paras 5–8. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2020.03-PCC-PCC-45-On-Directive-5-of-2019-in-relation-to-the-use-of-ATMS.pdf
  13. FINTRAC, “Money laundering and terrorist financing indicators—Financial entities”, modified 24 November 2025, “ML/TF indicators related to the use of other parties” (Use of third party). https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/indicators-indicateurs/fin_mltf-eng
  14. FINTRAC, “Reporting suspicious transactions to FINTRAC”, modified 22 May 2025, section 4. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/str-dod/str-dod-eng
  15. Nacha, “RMAG Offers Guidance on Risk-Based Controls to Address Potential Fraudsters Gaining Access to Illicit Funds”, 29 November 2022, “Name Matching”. https://www.nacha.org/news/rmag-offers-guidance-risk-based-controls-address-potential-fraudsters-gaining-access-illicit
  16. Nacha, Risk Management Topics (Fraud Monitoring Phase 2), Nacha Operating Rules, “RDFI ACH Credit Monitoring”: receiving banks must “establish and implement risk-based processes and procedures designed to identify credit Entries initiated due to fraud”; Phase 1 on 20 March 2026 for those with 10 million or more ACH receipts in 2023, Phase 2 on 19 June 2026 for all others. A payment scheme’s rule, not a law. https://www.nacha.org/rules/risk-management-topics-fraud-monitoring-phase-2
  17. 31 CFR 1020.320(b)(3), “Reports by banks of suspicious transactions”, when to file. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-X/part-1020/subpart-C/section-1020.320
  18. 31 CFR 1022.320(b)(3), “Reports by money services businesses of suspicious transactions”, when to file. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-X/part-1022/subpart-C/section-1022.320
  19. EBA, ML/TF Risk Factors Guidelines (EBA/GL/2021/02, consolidated with EBA/GL/2023/03), Guideline 2 (product, service and transaction risk factors, complexity, p.21 of the consolidated version), paras 9.4 and 10.4. https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2023-11/EBA%20GL%202021%2002%20-%20consolidated%20%28amended%20by%20EBA%20GL%202023%2003%29_EN.pdf
  20. EBA, Guidelines amending Guidelines EBA/2021/02 on customer due diligence and the factors credit and financial institutions should consider when assessing the money laundering and terrorist financing risk associated with individual business relationships and occasional transactions (EBA/GL/2024/01), 16 January 2024, applicable from 30 December 2024; Guideline 21.3(b), 21.5(b)(xi)(b) and 21.12(l). https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2024-01/a3e89f4f-fbf3-4bd6-9e07-35f3243555b3/Final%20Amending%20%20Guidelines%20on%20MLTF%20Risk%20Factors.pdf
  21. FATF, INTERPOL and Egmont Group, “Illicit Financial Flows from Cyber-Enabled Fraud”, November 2023, Annex A (risk indicators for CEF, pp.64–65: “Mismatch of account number and name of the holder of the account”; under “Suspicion in account holder’s profile”, an account holder “claiming they are transacting for someone else”) and Annex B (verification of payee, p.67). https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Illicit-financial-flows-cyber-enabled-fraud.pdf

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