Crypto
Unlicensed virtual asset business (crypto trading through an ordinary account)
A customer who is not a licensed or registered virtual asset service provider uses an ordinary account to buy and sell crypto for other people, as an informal exchanger or peer-to-peer trader.
What it catches
A customer who runs a crypto exchange business for other people through an account that was opened for personal or unrelated business use, without a licence or registration as a virtual asset service provider (VASP). The form this rule looks for is the informal or peer-to-peer (P2P) exchanger: people who want crypto pay the trader in local currency, the trader buys the crypto at an exchange and sends it on, and the reverse for people who want to sell. To the institution holding the trader’s account this looks like payments in from several unrelated people, matched by payments out to a crypto exchange, or payments in from an exchange paid out to several people.
FATF’s definition, which Ghana’s Guideline repeats, makes the business the test: a VASP is a person who, “as a business, conducts one or more of the following activities or operations for or on behalf of another natural or legal person”, the first of them “Exchange between virtual assets and fiat currencies” (BoG/FIC Guideline 2025, 3.9(2)). The FATF standard requires VASPs to be licensed or registered and says countries “should take action to identify natural or legal persons that carry out VASP activities without the requisite license or registration” (Interpretive Note to Recommendation 15, para 3). Its 2020 virtual asset red flags include “Customers that operate as an unregistered/unlicensed VASP on peer-to-peer (P2P) exchange websites, particularly when there are concerns that the customers handle huge amount of VA transfers on its customer’s behalf, and charge higher fees to its customer than transmission services offered by other exchanges. Use of bank accounts to facilitate these P2P transactions” (Virtual Assets Red Flag Indicators, para 13). FinCEN, the US financial intelligence unit, describes the bank’s view of it: institutions “may identify P2P exchangers through perceived funnel account activity, as many of the P2P exchangers’ clients deposit funds into the P2P exchanger’s account”, and “may be able to distinguish P2P exchangers from traditional funnel account activity by identifying frequent interactions with CVC-focused MSBs” (crypto exchanges and other crypto money services businesses).
The risk is that the trader becomes an unsupervised gateway: no one identifies the people who pay the trader. FinCEN separates these exchangers from people who trade on online P2P platforms that match buyers and sellers, but notes that some of those buyers and sellers trade again and again, “thereby operating as small-scale unregistered CVC exchangers”, and that recent cases suggest small-volume traders “are increasingly used for money laundering purposes, possibly without their knowledge”. Some countries now require institutions to look for these customers and report them (Ghana, Nigeria), or treat a customer acting as an unlicensed provider as a reason to report (South Africa); see By country.
The rule finds the shape: crypto exchange activity together with several unrelated people on the other side, in numbers or in matched two-way flows that the customer’s declared activity doesn’t explain. Whether the customer is in fact running a business, and whether it needs a licence where they are, is for the analyst.
How the rule works
There are two forms, depending on what the institution sees.
At a bank, e-money issuer or mobile money provider (the fiat side). The institution sees the local-currency payments and, from the counterparty, which of them go to or come from a crypto exchange. Over a look-back window, for every customer who is not a declared virtual asset business, count the payments to and from crypto exchanges and the payments whose reference names a crypto asset, an exchange or a P2P order; count the distinct people who paid in and who were paid, leaving out exchanges and the customer’s own accounts; and compare money in from individuals with money out to exchanges, and money in from exchanges with money out to individuals. Alert when the exchange activity is above the line and several unrelated people stand on the other side: either many of them, or a few whose total matches the exchange total. That combination is what FinCEN’s red flags describe (“a series of deposits from disparate sources that, in aggregate, amount to nearly identical aggregate funds transfers to a known virtual currency exchange platform within a short period of time”).
Looks at
Every customer not on file as a licensed or registered virtual asset business, over a look-back window, checked daily and at each payment to or from a crypto exchange.
Measures
- Exchange payments: payments to or from accounts and wallets on your list of crypto exchanges, P2P platforms and other VASPs, plus payments whose reference names a crypto asset, an exchange or a P2P order.
- People: the distinct people who paid the customer, and the distinct people the customer paid. Exchanges are not counted as people.
- Matched flows: money in from individuals against money out to exchanges, and money in from exchanges against money out to individuals.
Amounts are converted to one currency at a documented rate.
Leaves out
- Transfers between the customer’s own accounts at your institution, from the counts of people.
- Customers you have on file as licensed or registered virtual asset businesses, which you monitor against their own declared activity.
Alerts when
Both of these are true:
- Exchange payments in the window number more than your limit, or add up to at least your value minimum.
- Either at least your minimum number of people paid the customer, or were paid by the customer; or at least 3 people did, and their total is close to the exchange total on the other side (money in from individuals against money out to exchanges, or money in from exchanges against money out to individuals).
How often
At most one alert per customer per look-back window, and again only if the activity grows.
Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.
Look-back window Start at 30 days. The pattern builds up over weeks of trades; a shorter window misses traders who deal a few times a week, and a longer one dilutes a trader who has just started.
Exchange payments Start at 10: the rule counts more than 10 in the window. Lower it for customers whose declared activity gives no reason to deal with exchanges at all; raise it for customers who invest in crypto themselves and say so.
Exchange value Set per segment and currency from your own data; no public source gives a value. A trader who moves large sums in a few transfers stays under any count.
Minimum number of people Counted on either side: a trader who buys for others has many payers and one exchange, a trader who sells has one exchange and many payees. Set it per customer segment from your own spread of distinct payers and payees a month; no public source gives a value. An individual trading for others will usually sit far above other individuals in the same segment.
People behind a matched flow Start at 3. With one or two people, a matched flow is usually the customer’s own money or family: their own earnings sent to their own exchange account, or exchange withdrawals passed to a relative. Raise it for segments where a few regular payers are normal.
Close to Set from your own data; no public source gives a value. A trader’s money in and money out are close to equal, less a margin. Compare the two totals with each other: “most of the money went on to exchanges” holds whenever the exchange payments are large, whatever funded them.
At a VASP or a P2P platform (the crypto side). The provider sees the customer’s trades, the counterparties of each trade and the wallets the crypto goes to. Look for a customer whose volumes, frequency or number of counterparties are those of a business rather than a retail user, who pools deposits from many wallets or accounts, who advertises rates on the platform, or whose withdrawals go to platforms not licensed in the country. Nigeria’s CBN names these signs for its licensees (By country). The data differ, the question is the same: is this customer providing virtual asset services to others?
Common variants:
- Selling side. Money in from an exchange, paid out to many individuals in local currency: the trader is selling crypto for people who want cash.
- Advertised trader. The customer’s phone number or email appears on a P2P platform advertising exchange services. FinCEN lists it as a red flag (“Customer’s phone number or email address is connected to a known CVC P2P exchange platform advertising exchange services”). It needs an outside source, so it is usually an analyst step rather than a rule.
- Cash in, crypto out. Cash deposits from different places or people, then transfers to an exchange shortly after (FinCEN red flag 6). Overlaps with Funnel account.
- Foreign or unlicensed exchange. The exchange counterparty is not licensed in the country, or is in a jurisdiction with weak controls (FinCEN red flags 9 and 10; Nigeria’s “links to platforms not licensed in Nigeria”). A VASP checks its own counterparty providers under Transfers with unlicensed or high-risk counterparty VASPs.
What the rule does not see: a trader whose account never touches an exchange. On P2P platforms that match buyers and sellers, both money legs can run between individuals’ accounts, and in a product where customers hold and convert crypto themselves, the conversion happens inside the product. Many unrelated people paying in and the money moved on is the subject of Funnel account.
Data it needs
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| Field | Usually comes from | If it’s missing |
|---|---|---|
| Customer id | account or wallet | Required. |
| Direction, amount, currency, timestamp | ledger or payment event | Required. Convert to one currency before comparing. |
| Counterparty account or wallet id | payment details | Required to count distinct counterparties. Without it, the rule can only count payments, which a busy individual also has. |
| Counterparty type (crypto exchange, P2P platform, other VASP) | your own list of exchange accounts, merchant categories, wallet attribution from blockchain analytics | Required for the exchange signal. Exchanges often collect through payment processors or collection accounts in other names: a list of the exchanges’ own names misses them. |
| Payment reference or narration | payment details | Needed for the keyword signal (asset names such as USDT or BTC, exchange names, “P2P”, order numbers). Free text; expect misses. |
| Customer segment and declared occupation or business | onboarding (KYC/KYB) | Needed to set the minimums per segment and to tell a declared crypto business from an undeclared one. Without it, every busy account looks alike. |
| Licence or registration of customers in the virtual asset business | your customer records | Needed to leave out the licensed ones. |
| Platform trades, counterparties, advertised rates (crypto-side form) | the VASP or P2P platform’s own records | Needed for the crypto-side form. |
Thresholds
Each row is a setting the rule needs. Each value is a starting point: test it on your own history, then adjust.
| Parameter | Starting point | Where it comes from |
|---|---|---|
| Look-back window | 30 days | A starting value from a public rule list’s rule on crypto exposure, written for layering through exchanges rather than for this pattern. Shorter windows miss traders who deal a few times a week; test on your own data. |
| Exchange payments in the window | more than 10 | A starting value from the same rule, which counts payments received from exchanges; apply it to payments to exchanges as well. Lower it for customers whose declared activity gives no reason to deal with exchanges; raise it for customers who invest in crypto themselves and say so. |
| Exchange value in the window | set per segment and currency from your own data | No public source gives a value. It catches a trader who moves large sums in a few transfers. |
| Distinct people, on either side | set per segment from your own distribution | No public source gives a value. Set it well above what individuals in the same segment show. |
| People behind a matched flow | 3 | A starting value. FinCEN’s red flag speaks of deposits “from disparate sources”; with one or two people, a matched flow is usually the customer’s own money or a relative’s. Raise it for segments where a few regular payers are normal. |
| Matched flow, how close | set from your own data | No public source gives a value. FinCEN describes the flows as “nearly identical” in aggregate. |
By country
Ghana. Institutions licensed by the Bank of Ghana “shall take steps to identify natural or legal persons that carry out VASP activities and put in place measures to mitigate any ML/TF/PF risks associated with such activities” (BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 3.9(9)), with a VASP defined as a person who, “as a business”, exchanges virtual assets and fiat currencies, or carries out the other listed activities, for or on behalf of others (3.9(2)). Neither clause turns on whether the person is licensed or registered: in Ghana, leaving customers on file as licensed virtual asset businesses out of this rule does not remove the duty to identify and report their VASP activity. In its August 2024 exposure draft on digital assets, the Bank of Ghana said that its 2022 notice “prohibiting banks and payment service providers (PSPs) from facilitating crypto asset transactions remains effective until formal regulatory guidelines are published” (Draft Guidelines on Digital Assets, introduction), and the FIC’s 2024 risk assessment of virtual assets says that, under that notice, “accountable institutions (AIs) are required to file suspicious transactions reports on all crypto-asset-related transactions” (section 3.2). The texts cited here do not say whether that notice still applies since the 2025 Act; check with the Bank of Ghana. In July 2025 the Bank of Ghana required VASPs serving residents of Ghana to register with it, and said that registration “does not constitute a licence to operate” (Notice BG/GOV/SEC/2025/18). Parliament passed the Virtual Asset Service Providers Bill in December 2025: persons conducting virtual asset activities “will need licensing or registration” from the Bank of Ghana or the Securities and Exchange Commission, depending on the activity, from an effective date to be announced (Bank of Ghana press release, 22 December 2025). The Bank of Ghana describes the Virtual Asset Service Providers Act, 2025 (Act 1154) as establishing “the legal foundation for the registration, licensing, and supervision” of VASPs.
Reporting deadline
“AIs shall report SAR/STR on identified VASP activities to the FIC within 24 hours” (BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 3.9(10)); the general deadline for a suspicious transaction is also 24 hours (2.8.1(6)).
Nigeria. For banks and other financial institutions supervised by the CBN, its Guidelines on Operations of Bank Accounts for VASPs (circular FPR/DIR/PUB/CIR/002/003, 22 December 2023) say an institution “shall not open or permit the operation of any account by any person or entity to conduct the business of virtual/digital assets unless that account is designated for that purpose and opened in line with the requirement of these Guidelines” (7.1). A designated account needs senior management approval and, for a company, evidence of a licence from the Securities and Exchange Commission (7.2, 7.3(a)). Institutions must have know-your-customer procedures to “identify all individuals/entities offering services covered by this regulation, in their books” (8.4(i)), and investigate suspicious transactions and report the findings to the NFIU immediately (8.4(vii)). The CBN’s 2026 virtual asset Regulations neither mention nor repeal these Guidelines. For stablecoin issuers and VASPs licensed by the CBN, those Regulations (in force 5 November 2026) require the automated monitoring system to alert on “activity indicating that a customer is a VASP or is providing virtual asset services to third parties without disclosure, including volumes, frequency or numbers of counterparties inconsistent with retail use, pooled or omnibus flows, or links to platforms not licensed in Nigeria” (section 26.7.1(h)), with each alert reviewed within five business days (26.7.2). Where a customer appears to be an undisclosed VASP, the licensee applies its counterparty VASP due diligence (section 26.16), restricts or ends the relationship where the customer is not licensed or registered as required, files a suspicious transaction report where appropriate, and informs the CBN (26.7.4). A P2P provider keeps board-approved criteria for spotting a customer trading “as a business, having regard to transaction volume, frequency, number of counterparties and advertising of rates”, applies enhanced due diligence and limits to them, and reports them to the CBN (10.3.5).
Reporting deadline
Report to the NFIU immediately, with a written report within 24 hours (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.7(1)–(2)). The NFIU’s December 2024 STR guidelines start the 24 hours once the transaction is found suspicious, after an examination of no more than 72 hours, and require written reasons for every alert closed as not suspicious (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, Part Six, para 2).
United States. FinCEN’s 2019 advisory says P2P exchangers “function as MSBs and, therefore, must comply with all requirements for MSBs under the Bank Secrecy Act”, and that it “is aware of cases in which unregistered entities fraudulently represent themselves as individual account holders or misrepresent the nature of their business”. Its red flags for “Unregistered or Illicitly Operating P2P Exchangers” are: “A customer receives multiple cash deposits or wires from disparate jurisdictions, branches of a financial institution, or persons and shortly thereafter uses such funds to acquire virtual currency”; “A customer receives a series of deposits from disparate sources that, in aggregate, amount to nearly identical aggregate funds transfers to a known virtual currency exchange platform within a short period of time”; and the customer’s phone number or email linked to a P2P platform advertising exchange services (FIN-2019-A003, red flags 6 to 8).
Reporting deadline
Banks file within 30 calendar days of first detecting the facts, and may take 30 more days to identify a suspect if none was identified, never more than 60 days in all (31 CFR 1020.320(b)(3)); money services businesses file within 30 calendar days (31 CFR 1022.320(b)(3)).
South Africa. The FIC’s guidance to crypto asset service providers (CASPs) on the travel rule says: “Where CASPs detect activity with a client that seems to be counterpart CASP type activity, such as high volume of transactions, this should be reported to the Centre, as it could indicate that the client is an unlicensed or unregistered CASP” (FIC PCC 61 of 2026, para 4.19). CASPs “are discouraged from adopting end-to-end manual screening measures, and are strongly encouraged to automate the monitoring of transactions” (para 4.20).
Reporting deadline
As soon as possible, and no later than 15 days excluding weekends and public holidays (FIC Act s.29; MLTF Control Regulations, reg. 24(3), via FIC Guidance Note 4B para 71).
EU. The EBA’s risk factor guidelines, as amended from 30 December 2024, say that a bank whose customer provides crypto-asset services and is not a crypto-asset service provider regulated under MiCA “may be exposed to increased risk of ML/TF” (Guideline 9.20). Among the due diligence measures for such a customer, banks should at least “determine whether the customer is registered or licensed” in an EU/EEA Member State or a non-EU country, “determine whether the services provided by the customer fall within the scope of the registration or licence”, and determine whether the customer provides services other than those it is registered or licensed for (Guideline 9.21(d) to (f)). These measures apply once the bank knows what the customer does; finding the customers who haven’t said so is what this rule is for. Under MiCA, “A person shall not provide crypto-asset services, within the Union, unless that person is” a legal person or other undertaking authorised as a crypto-asset service provider, or one of the financial firms allowed to provide those services (Regulation (EU) 2023/1114, Art. 59(1)). Providers already operating under national law before 30 December 2024 could go on until 1 July 2026 at the latest, or until their authorisation was granted or refused, and a Member State could shorten that period (Art. 143(3)).
WAEMU (UEMOA). The uniform AML/CFT law says: “Nul ne peut se livrer à l’activité professionnelle de prestataire de services d’actifs virtuels s’il n’a pas obtenu l’agrément ou l’autorisation préalable de l’autorité compétente” (No one may carry on the professional activity of a virtual asset service provider without the prior approval or authorisation of the competent authority) (Loi uniforme 2023, art. 58). The law uses the same business test as FATF: a virtual asset service provider is any natural or legal person who carries out the listed activities “à titre commercial … au nom d’un client ou pour son compte” (as a business … in the name or on behalf of a client), the first being “échange entre actifs virtuels et monnaie fiduciaire” (exchange between virtual assets and fiat currency) (art. 2, point 51). Each supervisory authority sees to it that art. 58 is respected on its territory and, where the activity is carried on illegally, that the criminal penalties are applied (art. 107, point o). The law does not ask reporting institutions to look for such customers; the duty to report suspicion applies (see the reporting deadline below). WAEMU (UEMOA in French) is the West African Economic and Monetary Union: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, the same eight states that form the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). The uniform law applies in each state through that state’s own act, which may number its articles differently; the article numbers here are the uniform law’s. The law of a single state is covered only where that state is named.
Reporting deadline
Report to the CENTIF “immédiatement” (Loi uniforme 2023, art. 60). The law does not define “immédiatement”; it defines “sans délai” as at most 24 hours (art. 2, point 58). Check the expected timing with your CENTIF. Do not carry out an operation you suspect until the report is made, and then only if the CENTIF has not opposed it: an opposition blocks the operation for up to four days (arts. 61 and 65). If it has already gone through, inform the CENTIF “sans délai” (art. 61).
False positives and tuning
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Common innocent explanations: a customer who invests in crypto with their own money (buys from an exchange, sometimes sells back); the customer’s own account at an exchange, topped up and withdrawn; salary or freelance income paid by a crypto company; a licensed VASP’s agent or employee whose role was never recorded; group savings schemes (susu, esusu, chama, tontine) where many members pay one collector; a small trader in goods with many customers who also holds some crypto; family remittances received through an exchange’s payout service or through P2P sellers; a small importer who buys crypto from several P2P sellers to pay foreign suppliers; a retail user who sells once on a P2P platform and is paid by several buyers, one per order.
Typical causes of misfires:
- Investors look like traders on the exchange count alone. A personal investor can make many exchange payments a month. What separates a trader is the other side: several unrelated people paying in or being paid. Require both signals.
- Counting payments, not people. A busy individual has many payments; a trader has many different people. Count distinct people, leave out transfers between the customer’s own accounts, and don’t count exchanges as people.
- Counts alone don’t identify a business acting for others. Activity counts rise with how busy an account is, and no single count separates a trader from an active individual. Combine the count with the counterparty type (an exchange) and the matched two-way flow.
- A matched flow with one or two people. A customer sending their own earnings to their own exchange account, or passing exchange withdrawals to a relative, shows a matched flow. The red flag is deposits from disparate sources: require several people behind a matched flow too.
- One total checked against the other. “Most of the money from individuals went on to exchanges” holds whenever the exchange payments are large, whatever funded them. Compare the two totals with each other.
- A count misses large, few transfers. A trader who moves large sums in a few transfers stays under any count of exchange payments. Add a value alternative.
- A one-off sale looks like many buyers. On a P2P platform each order can have a different counterparty, so one sale split into several orders brings several payers. Look for activity that repeats across the window: FinCEN’s small-scale exchangers are platform users in “ongoing, repeated exchange transactions”, and a single burst is weaker.
- Crypto inside your product. Where customers hold and convert crypto inside your product, a crypto payment is not by itself an exchange payment, and counting crypto payments separates no one. Recognise exchanges by the counterparty: wallets that pay many of your customers, and addresses customers have labelled with an exchange’s name.
- Exchanges hidden behind other names. Exchanges and P2P platforms often collect and pay out through payment processors, collection accounts or agents in other names. An exchange list built from brand names misses them, and the rule goes quiet. Build the list from the accounts and wallets actually seen, and review it.
- One exchange wallet paying many customers. A single exchange or platform wallet can credit hundreds of customers and then looks like a hub. Classify such wallets as exchanges rather than treating them as one individual paying many people.
- Declared businesses in the wrong segment. A licensed VASP or an OTC desk that is on file as such passes money through by design. Give declared virtual asset businesses their own segment and monitor them against their declared activity, rather than letting them dominate this rule.
- Keywords in free text. References are free text: “BTC” can be part of a name, and many traders write nothing. Use keywords to add weight, not as the only signal.
How to tune: segment by customer type; require the exchange signal plus several people on the other side, in numbers or behind a matched flow; count distinct people, not payments; compare the matched totals with each other; keep the exchange list current; and measure on at least one full window of history before switching it on.
When it fires
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Analyst checklist:
- List the payments in the window: who paid in, who was paid, which went to or came from exchanges or P2P platforms, and the references.
- Check whether the payers and payees are related to the customer or are the customer’s own accounts, whether the money in from individuals goes on to exchanges in similar totals (or the reverse), and whether the activity repeats across the window or is a single burst.
- Compare with the declared occupation, income and expected activity, and with any crypto activity the customer declared.
- Search the customer’s name, phone number and email on P2P platforms and social media for advertised exchange services or rates (FinCEN red flag 8).
- Ask the customer what the payments are for and who the counterparties are.
- If the customer is providing virtual asset services to others, check the regulator’s register for a licence or registration (a registration is not always a licence), and follow your country’s rule under By country. In Ghana, identified VASP activity is reported to the FIC whether or not the customer is licensed. In Nigeria, a bank does not let an ordinary account be used for the business, and a CBN licensee restricts or ends the relationship with a customer who is not licensed or registered as required, files a report where appropriate and informs the CBN.
An alert is a reason to review, not a suspicion in itself. Under the FATF standard, suspicious transactions are reported regardless of amount, attempted transactions included (Interpretive Note to Recommendation 20, para 3). Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.
Related rules
- Funnel account: many unrelated people paying into one account, the bank’s first view of a P2P exchanger, and the shape to watch where no exchange appears.
- Rapid pass-through: money in and straight out again, here to an exchange.
- Transfers with unlicensed or high-risk counterparty VASPs: a provider’s checks on the other providers its customers’ transfers go to or come from.
- Unhosted wallet exposure: crypto moved to or from wallets no regulated provider holds.
- Missing originator or beneficiary information (Travel Rule): transfers that arrive without the information the law requires.
- Third-party funding and payment account name mismatch: money paid in from accounts in other people’s names, as a trader’s clients do.
- Peer-group outlier: a customer far above similar customers, the way to set the minimum number of people per segment.
- Transaction velocity and Cumulative amount over a period: the volume and frequency signs a business shows.
- Sudden change from a customer’s baseline: an individual whose activity jumps when they start trading.
- High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch: exchanges in countries with weak controls.
Sources
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- Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism / Combating Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Accountable Institutions, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 12 December 2025, 2.8.1(6) and 3.9(2), (9) and (10), p.50. https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/BOG-FIC-AML-GUIDELINE-2025-FINAL-5-TO-BE-PUBLISHED.pdf
- Bank of Ghana, “Press release: Passage of the Virtual Asset Service Providers Bill”, 22 December 2025. https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/PRESS-RELEASE-PASSAGE-OF-THE-VIRTUAL-ASSET-SERVICE-PROVIDERS-BILL221225-1.pdf
- Bank of Ghana, “Virtual Assets” page, “Legal and Regulatory Frameworks” (read 12 November 2026). https://www.bog.gov.gh/virtual-assets/
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Financial Policy and Regulation Department, circular FPR/DIR/PUB/CIR/002/003, Guidelines on Operations of Bank Accounts for Virtual Assets Service Providers (VASPs), 22 December 2023, sections 7.1, 7.2, 7.3(a), 8.4(i) and 8.4(vii). https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2024/FPRD/GUIDELINES%20ON%20OPERATIONS%20OF%20BANK%20ACCOUNTS%20FOR%20VIRTUAL%20Asset%20Providers.pdf
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Payments System Policy Department, Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, November 2026, issued by circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004 of 5 November 2026, in force that day; sections 10.3.5, 26.7.1(h), 26.7.2 and 26.7.4. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/REGULATIONS%20FOR%20THE%20OPERATIONS%20OF%20NON-SECURITY%20VIRTUAL%20ASSETS%20IN%20NIGERIA.pdf
- Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 (Nigeria), s.7(1)–(2). https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/LawsAndRegulations
- NFIU, “Guidelines for the Identification, Verification and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions Related to ML/FT/PF for Financial Institutions”, STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, 13 December 2024, Part Six para 2. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance
- FinCEN, Advisory on Illicit Activity Involving Convertible Virtual Currency, FIN-2019-A003, 9 May 2019, “Unregistered Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Exchangers” (pp.4–5) and red flags 6 to 10 (p.8). https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2019-05-10/FinCEN%20Advisory%20CVC%20FINAL%20508.pdf
- 31 CFR 1020.320(b)(3), “Reports by banks of suspicious transactions”, when to file. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-X/part-1020/subpart-C/section-1020.320
- 31 CFR 1022.320(b)(3), “Reports by money services businesses of suspicious transactions”, when to file. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-X/part-1022/subpart-C/section-1022.320
- FIC South Africa, Public Compliance Communication 61 of 2026 on the implementation of the “travel rule” relating to crypto asset transfers as directed by Directive 9 of 2024, 30 March 2026, paras 4.19 and 4.20. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/2026.3-PCC-_Travel-Rule-for-CASPS.pdf
- FIC South Africa, Guidance Note 4B on reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions and activities, 26 March 2019, para 71 (reporting period, MLTF Control Regulations reg. 24(3)). https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019.03-Guidance-Guidance-Note-4B-STRs.pdf
- EBA, Guidelines amending Guidelines EBA/2021/02 on customer due diligence and the ML/TF risk factors (EBA/GL/2024/01), 16 January 2024, applying from 30 December 2024, Guidelines 9.20 and 9.21(d)–(f). https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2024-01/a3e89f4f-fbf3-4bd6-9e07-35f3243555b3/Final%20Amending%20%20Guidelines%20on%20MLTF%20Risk%20Factors.pdf
- UEMOA, Loi uniforme relative à la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux, le financement du terrorisme et de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive (March 2023), arts. 2 (points 51 and 58), 58, 60, 61, 65 and 107 (point o). https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Loi-uniforme-LBCFTFP-Mars-2023-vf.pdf
- FATF, “Virtual Assets: Red Flag Indicators of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing”, September 2020, “Red flag indicators related to anonymity”, para 13, p.9. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Virtual-Assets-Red-Flag-Indicators.pdf
- FATF, The FATF Recommendations, October 2025 edition: Interpretive Note to Recommendation 15, para 3; Interpretive Note to Recommendation 20, para 3. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Fatf-recommendations.html
- Bank of Ghana, Draft Guidelines on Digital Assets (exposure draft), August 2024, introduction. https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Draft-Guidelines-on-Digital-Assets.pdf
- Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing (ML/TF) Risk Assessment on Virtual Assets and Virtual Assets Service Providers (VAs/VASPs), 2024, section 3.2, p.7. https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ML-FT-Risk-Assessment-on-VAs-VASPs-2024.pdf
- Bank of Ghana, Notice No. BG/GOV/SEC/2025/18, “Mandatory registration of virtual asset service providers operating in Ghana”, 10 July 2025. https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/NOTICE-NO.-BG-GOV-SEC-2025-18-NOTICE-ON-MANDATORY-REGISTRATION-OF-VIRTUAL-ASSET-SERVICE-PROVIDERS-OPERATING-IN-GHANA.pdf
- Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 on markets in crypto-assets (MiCA), Art. 59(1) and Art. 143(3). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32023R1114
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