Fraud

Transaction velocity

Too many transactions from one customer in a short window: minutes for scripted bursts, hours or days for mule and account-takeover activity.

Too many transactions from one customer in a short window of minutes, hours, or days Short window minutes, hours, or days Too many transactions

What it catches

A customer makes far more transactions than normal in a short time. In seconds or minutes this points to scripts, bots and account takeover: a fraudster empties an account, tests stolen cards, or pushes many small transfers before anyone reacts. Over hours or days it points to mule accounts and laundering, where many payments move through one account quickly. Regulators list both as red flags: the FATF names “multiple high-value transactions … in short succession, such as within a 24-hour period” for virtual assets, and the EBA names customers who make “several cash withdrawals in a short period of time and without an economic rationale” for e-money. A velocity rule finds the burst. It does not tell you why it happened; that is the analyst’s job.

How the rule works

Count one customer’s completed transactions inside a rolling window and alert when the count reaches a threshold set for that customer’s segment. UK guidance names “abnormal size or frequency for that customer or peer group” as what makes a transaction unusual (JMLSG Part I, para 5.7.10), which is why the threshold is set per segment. Run several windows side by side, because each catches something different: a very short window (a few minutes) for scripted bursts, an hourly or daily window for mule and takeover activity, a weekly window for slow, sustained use.

Count business transactions, not deliveries or attempts. Before counting, drop failed attempts, duplicate deliveries of the same event, merchant- or lender-initiated recurring debits, and internal platform movements (fees, own-account conversions, settlement legs).

Looks at

Every new transaction of a customer that counts (see below), as it happens.

Measures

The number of the customer’s countable transactions in the window up to and including this one. Several windows run side by side.

Alerts when

The number reaches the threshold for that window and the customer’s segment:

  • 3–5 completed transactions within a few minutes
  • from single digits to low tens of completed transactions in 24 hours for retail customers
  • around 20 in 7 days
  • a separate, higher threshold for each business and partner segment

Counts as a transaction

A completed transaction, in or out, except debits started by a merchant or lender. Retries and re-sent events of the same payment count once.

Ignores

  • Failed attempts.
  • Recurring debits and collections started by a merchant or lender.
  • Fees, moves between the customer’s own accounts, and settlement legs.

How often

At most one alert per customer per window length (for example, once a day for the daily window).

The alert shows

The customer, the window and the number of transactions in it.

Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.

Optional refinements: count only one direction (inflows for mule collection, outflows for account draining); require a minimum total value so a burst of tiny payments doesn’t alert; split the count by counterparty (many payments to one recipient is a different story from many recipients).

Data it needs

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FieldUsually comes fromIf it’s missing
Customer identifierYour core ledger or wallet id. Must be one per person, not per card or per session.Counts split across cards or accounts and the rule under-fires. Link identifiers first.
Transaction id (one per payment)Ledger. Needs to stay the same across retries and re-sent webhooks.Count on a content key (amount, time, counterparty) instead, or retries and duplicates inflate the count.
TimestampLedger, in one time zone.The rule can’t run.
Status (completed / failed / reversed)Payment processor callbacks.You will count attempts. Check that final statuses actually arrive before relying on a “completed” filter.
Initiation type (who started a debit: the customer, or a merchant or lender)Card network or processor fields, mandate data for debits.Recurring and collection debits will dominate alerts.
Transaction type and directionLedger.You can’t exclude internal movements or count one direction.
Customer segment (retail, business, partner)KYC / onboarding.One threshold for everyone: businesses flood it or retail is under-watched.

Thresholds

No regulator we reviewed sets a transaction-count threshold. Regulators describe the behaviour (see Sources) and leave the number to the firm’s risk assessment. The one regulatory number nearby is a turnover limit for mobile money in Kenya (below). All other values are suggestions to tune on your own data.

ParameterValueTypeWhere it comes from
Very short window (scripted bursts)3–5 completed transactions within a few minutesSuggestedNo public source gives a value. A script produces several payments within minutes, more than a person typing normally does; a rule that counts attempts here stays noisy until retries and lender collections are taken out. Moves with your retry behaviour: if failed payments are retried within seconds, filter them out first or this window fills with retries.
Daily window, retail customersFrom single digits to low tens of completed transactions in 24 hoursSuggestedWithin the range, set it per segment where only a thin tail of customer-days sits above it, read from a high percentile of your own completed counts per customer-day, then backtest.
Business and partner customersA separate, higher threshold per segmentSuggestedBusinesses routinely run at counts that would be extreme for a retail customer. Set from that segment’s own distribution.
Weekly windowAround 20 in 7 daysSuggestedUse for slow, sustained activity; set it from your own weekly counts per segment.
Alert frequencyOnce per customer per window lengthSuggestedFor example once a day for the daily window. Prevents one burst from producing dozens of alerts.
Kenya, mobile money: turnover above which the CBK says investigations should be carried outDaily turnover above KShs 100,000 on any account; more than KShs 300,000 a week on a personal accountSet by lawCBK mobile payment AML guidelines 2013, para 3.2(a), addressed to mobile payment service providers and their agents. A value limit, not a count: run it alongside the count rule. The CBK has since raised the mobile-money limits: from 15 August 2023, a daily transaction limit of up to KShs 250,000 and a wallet of up to KShs 500,000 (CBK press release, 8 September 2023). The 2013 daily trigger now sits below what a wallet may move in a day, so measure how many accounts cross it on your own data before running it. The guidelines date from 2013 and part of them (the STR deadline) has since been replaced by statute; check with the CBK that these limits still apply.

Tune by moving the threshold only when false alerts sit in a dense band just below a thin tail of real bursts. If false alerts come from retries, recurring debits or duplicates, raising the number won’t help; fix the counting (see below).

By country

None of the countries covered here sets a transaction-count threshold. What local rules add is the duty to scrutinise unusual frequency, one turnover limit, and the deadline once you suspect something:

  • West Africa (GIABA). GIABA’s 2025 cybercrime typologies list, for mobile money: “Multiple high-value transactions within a short period” and “Series of funds transfers from a wallet or account into multiple accounts or wallets at short intervals” (Typology 6 red flags, p.40).

  • Kenya. The CBK’s mobile payment AML guidelines tell mobile payment service providers that “The higher the value and frequency of transactions, and the higher the payment account limit, the greater the risk”, and set the limits “above which investigations should be carried out”: “Any account exceeding a daily turnover of KShs 100,000” and “Any personal account transacting more than KShs 300,000 per week” (para 3.2(a)). The guidelines date from 2013, and the CBK has raised mobile-money transaction and wallet limits since (press release, 8 September 2023); confirm the investigation limits are current before relying on them.

    Reporting deadline

    Within two days after the suspicion arose (POCAMLA s.44(2), as replaced by the AML/CFT Laws (Amendment) Act 2023, Act No. 10 of 2023). The 2025 amendment Act (Act No. 6 of 2025) does not change s.44.

  • WAEMU (UEMOA). The 2023 uniform AML/CFT law requires identification checks when several cash transactions by the same person exceed a set total “en l’espace d’une journée, ou selon une fréquence inhabituelle”, and treats them as one transaction (Art. 17(i)). Art. 20 requires constant vigilance that transactions match what the institution knows of the customer. Each member state enacts the uniform law in its own act: Senegal’s Loi n° 2024-08 of 14 February 2024 keeps the same article numbers for every article cited here. In another member state, check the numbers in that state’s act. BCEAO Instruction 001-03-2025 (18 March 2025), whose Title I binds credit institutions, financial companies, microfinance institutions, e-money institutions, payment institutions and fintechs in the eight member states (art. 3), requires their information system to allow “le suivi des mouvements sur les comptes et la génération des alertes” (the monitoring of account movements and the generation of alerts) and “l’identification des transactions à caractère suspect ou inhabituel” (the identification of suspicious or unusual transactions), and “le recensement des opérations effectuées par un même client, qu’il soit occasionnel ou habituel” (a record of the operations carried out by the same customer, whether occasional or regular), which is the record a rule needs to add up linked operations. The system’s effectiveness is reviewed at least once a year (art. 6). Licensed bureaux de change must have a system that allows the same record of a customer’s operations and the identification of suspicious or unusual transactions (art. 15). WAEMU (UEMOA in French) is the West African Economic and Monetary Union: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, the same eight states that form the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). The BCEAO’s instructions and the Council of Ministers’ decisions cited here apply in all eight. The uniform law applies in each state through that state’s own act, which may number its articles differently. The law of a single state is covered only where that state is named.

    Reporting deadline

    Report to the CENTIF “immédiatement” (Loi uniforme 2023, art. 60, in each state’s own act). “Immédiatement” is not defined; the law’s own “sans délai” means at most 24 hours (art. 2, point 58). Do not carry out an operation you suspect until the report is made; if it has already gone through, inform the CENTIF “sans délai” (art. 61).

  • South Africa. FIC Guidance Note 4B lists “Performing similar transactions (i.e. cash deposits) at multiple branches of the same institution on the same business day” as an indicator (para 42). Where the rule runs in an automated transaction monitoring system, FIC Directive 5 of 2019 requires the system’s detection methodology, “including algorithms, scenarios, threshold settings or rules” (this rule among them), to be documented (para 3.1.16) and, taken as a whole, “sufficient to address the associated money laundering and terrorist financing risks applicable to the reporter” (para 3.1.17), and sets the time limits for the system’s alerts given under the reporting deadline below (paras 2.1–2.3).

    Reporting deadline

    As soon as possible, and no later than 15 days excluding weekends and public holidays (FIC Act s.29; MLTF Control Regulations, reg. 24(3), via FIC Guidance Note 4B para 71). The 15 days run from when you became aware of the facts, which “may be, and in the majority of cases will be, before a suspicion is formed” (GN4B para 80), and an institution “may not add additional timeframes for its internal transactional monitoring alert system processes, and / or internal investigation and review processes to the prescribed reporting period” (GN4B para 81). Where the alert comes from an automated transaction monitoring system, the reporter “is deemed to have knowledge” of the possible suspicious activity when the alert is generated: the report is due “no later than 15 days after the alert has been generated”, and work on the alert must start within 48 hours, which the FIC counts as two days without weekends and public holidays, inside the 15 (FIC Directive 5 of 2019, paras 2.1–2.3; FIC PCC 45, paras 5–8).

  • Ghana. The rules, scenarios and parameters of an institution’s automated monitoring tool “should be consistent with the frequency, volume and size of transactions of customers, in the context of the risk profile, product risk, geographic and delivery channels” (set by law, BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.8.6.1(5)(iii)), and high-risk accounts get specific limits or parameters “that would trigger early warning signals and require mandatory review” (3.8.2.2(1)(ii)). Red flags include “High velocity of funds that reflects the large volume of money flowing through an account” (Appendix E, 3u) and a “Large number of incoming or outgoing funds transfers” through a business account with no logical business or economic purpose, particularly when high-risk locations are involved (6c). Its general fraud duties apply too: institutions must “ensure that effective systems and policies are in place to detect and curb fraud activities” (2.14(2)) and “acquire or develop a fraud detection tool” (2.14(4)(ii)).

    Reporting deadline

    Within 24 hours of the suspicion, attempted transactions included, whatever the amount (BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.8.1(6) and 2.8.3(2)).

  • Canada. FINTRAC’s indicators for financial entities include “Funds transferred in and out of an account on the same day or within a relatively short period of time” (atypical transactional activity) and “Large and/or rapid movement of funds not commensurate with the client’s financial profile” (transactions in relation to the client’s profile).

    Reporting deadline

    File “as soon as practicable” after the measures that establish reasonable grounds to suspect (FINTRAC STR guidance, section 4).

  • EU. EBA ML/TF risk factor guidelines, guideline 10.6 (e-money issuers): a customer who “frequently reloads the product or make several cash withdrawals in a short period of time and without an economic rationale”.

    Reporting deadline

    Report “promptly”, on your own initiative, including attempted transactions (Directive (EU) 2015/849, Art. 33(1), through each member state’s law). Refrain from carrying out a transaction you suspect until you have reported it; where that is impossible, inform the FIU “immediately afterwards” (Art. 35).

  • Nigeria. The law names frequency directly. Where a transaction “involves a frequency which is unjustifiable or unreasonable”, it “shall be deemed to be suspicious” and must be reported to the NFIU immediately, “whether the transaction is complete or not” (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.7(1)(a) and (3)). The CBN’s 2022 AML/CFT/CPF Regulations repeat this “regardless of the amount” (Reg. 38(1)(a) and (4)), and count “very high account turnover inconsistent with the size of the balance” as an “unusual pattern of transactions” (Reg. 37(3)). The NFIU’s 2024 STR guidelines say alerts from a monitoring system are “unusual” and “should not be automatically regarded as suspicious” (Part Three, para 1). Both hold: an alert is unusual until it is reviewed, and once the review finds the frequency unjustifiable, s.7 deems the transaction suspicious. The guidelines set the review and filing deadlines below. The CBN’s Baseline Standards for Automated AML Solutions (10 March 2026) require every institution to “deploy automated fraud-monitoring capabilities appropriate to their fraud-risk profiles” (section 4(j)) and, where the AML solution is also used for fraud monitoring, to “Monitor activities across relevant channels (e.g. cards, e-channels, deposits, lending) in real time or near real time to detect unusual patterns indicative of fraud” (section 5.6(a)(i)). The standards do not name velocity rules. For stablecoin issuers and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) licensed by the CBN, its Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria (in force 5 November 2026) require the automated monitoring system to alert on “large-value or rapid-succession transactions inconsistent with the customer’s profile” and on a customer whose “volumes, frequency or numbers of counterparties” are “inconsistent with retail use” (section 26.7.1(e) and (h)). Fraud controls must “monitor suspicious device, access, wallet and transaction patterns and promptly investigate fraud alerts” (section 37.13). A P2P provider judges whether a customer trades as a business by “transaction volume, frequency, number of counterparties and advertising of rates” (section 10.3.5).

    Reporting deadline

    Report to the NFIU immediately, with a written report within 24 hours (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.7(1)–(2)). The NFIU’s December 2024 STR guidelines start the 24 hours once the transaction is found suspicious, after an examination of no more than 72 hours, and require written reasons for every alert closed as not suspicious (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, Part Six, para 2).

  • Argentina. Operations that “por su magnitud, habitualidad o periodicidad excedan las prácticas usuales” (by their size, frequency or regularity exceed usual practice) are among the circumstances to weigh in alerts (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 34(b), circumstance 2). The resolution sets no count or window.

    Reporting deadline

    Money laundering, within 24 hours of concluding that the operation is suspicious, and no later than 90 calendar days from the operation, performed or attempted; terrorist financing and proliferation financing, within 24 hours of the operation (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 36(c)).

False positives and tuning

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Many velocity alerts are not bursts of customer activity at all. They come from the data counting the wrong thing. Fix these before touching the threshold:

  • Failed retries counted as transactions. When a payment fails, apps and customers retry, and each retry often gets a new transaction id. When failures are retried, a short-window rule that counts attempts fires on customers whose payments are failing, not on bursts of real payments. Count completed transactions. Keep failed-attempt velocity as its own rule: many failures in a row is a real probing signal (see card testing). A suspicious burst of attempts is still reportable: Nigeria’s law, the UEMOA uniform law and the EU directive cover attempted transactions too (MLPPA s.7(3); Loi uniforme art. 60, “les tentatives d’opérations”; Directive (EU) 2015/849, Art. 33(1)). Catch it with the failed-attempt rule.
  • Merchant- or lender-initiated debits. Recurring billing, instalment collections and dunning retries are initiated by the merchant, not the customer. A lender retrying a failed instalment can produce several debits within minutes. Exclude these debits by initiation type, not by merchant name; incoming payments still count.
  • Duplicate deliveries. Some integrations send the same event more than once, each with its own event id. Duplicates can account for many of a rule’s alerts. Deduplicate on content (amount, timestamp, account, counterparty) when ids aren’t stable.
  • Platform plumbing. Fees, own-account conversions, refunds and settlement legs appear as transactions and can crowd out real bursts. Exclude internal types.
  • A filter on a value that never occurs. A rule that counts a transaction type the data never contains, or an event name that does not match the real one, stays silent and looks like a rule that “just doesn’t fire”. Before trusting a quiet rule, count how many rows match each filter value.
  • One threshold for every customer. Business and partner accounts run at counts that are extreme for retail. Check that the business threshold is the higher one. Segment thresholds by customer type, but don’t exclude a whole segment to cut noise: a compromised partner key looks exactly like a busy partner.
  • One customer split across identifiers. Two cards, or two ids for the same borrower, split the count and double the alerts. Link identifiers first.
  • Window length vs retry cadence. Very short windows behave differently per platform. Where retries are spaced out, a very short window rarely fills; where retry loops run in seconds, it fills with retries. Look at your retry timing before picking the window.
  • Calendar effects. Batch jobs (nightly expiry, end-of-day settlement) can stamp many transactions with the same time. Paydays and month-ends raise everyone’s counts.

Warm-up: a daily or hourly rule needs only a few days of history, but run it in observation first and read a sample of alerts before acting on them.

When it fires

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  1. Check what was counted: are the transactions completed, distinct, and not debits started by a merchant or lender? If not, close as a data issue and fix the rule.
  2. Look at the burst: direction, amounts, counterparties, devices and IP addresses. Many payments to one recipient, or many senders paying in then a quick cash-out, point to mule activity. Many small outflows to new recipients after a login from a new device point to account takeover.
  3. Compare with the customer’s profile and declared purpose. Is this a business that legitimately runs at this rate?
  4. For suspected takeover, contact the customer through a known channel and consider holding outbound payments. For suspected laundering, ask for the purpose of the payments and the source of funds.
  5. Document why each alert was closed or escalated. If you form a suspicion, file a suspicious transaction report. Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.

Sources

24 sourcesHide
  1. FATF, Virtual Assets Red Flag Indicators of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, September 2020, para 11 “Size and frequency of transactions”: “Making multiple high-value transactions – in short succession, such as within a 24-hour period”; para 12 “Transactions concerning all users”: “Making frequent transfers in a certain period of time (e.g. a day, a week, a month, etc.) to the same VA account”. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/Virtual-assets-red-flag-indicators.html
  2. EBA, Guidelines on ML/TF risk factors (EBA/GL/2021/02, consolidated version amended by EBA/GL/2023/03), guideline 10.6: “The customer purchases several e-money products from the same issuer, frequently reloads the product or make several cash withdrawals in a short period of time and without an economic rationale”. https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2023-11/EBA%20GL%202021%2002%20-%20consolidated%20%28amended%20by%20EBA%20GL%202023%2003%29_EN.pdf
  3. JMLSG, Prevention of money laundering/combating terrorist financing, Guidance for the UK financial sector, Part I, October 2026 edition, para 5.7.10: “the unusual nature of a transaction: e.g., abnormal size or frequency for that customer or peer group”; para 7.35: “large numbers of electronic transfers into and out of the account”. https://www.jmlsg.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/JMLSG-Guidance-Part-I_Oct-2026.pdf
  4. UMOA, Loi uniforme relative à la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux, le financement du terrorisme et de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive, March 2023, Art. 2 (point 58), Art. 17(i), Art. 20, Art. 60, Art. 61. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Loi-uniforme-LBCFTFP-Mars-2023-vf.pdf
  5. FIC South Africa, Guidance Note 4B on reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions and activities, 26 March 2019, para 42 (indicators), para 71 (reporting period), para 80 (when the period starts) and para 81 (no extra time for alert review). https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019.03-Guidance-Guidance-Note-4B-STRs.pdf
  6. FINTRAC, Money laundering and terrorist financing indicators—Financial entities, modified 2025-11-24, “ML/TF indicators based on atypical transactional activity” and “…surrounding the financial transactions in relation to the person/entity profile”. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/indicators-indicateurs/fin_mltf-eng
  7. FINTRAC, Reporting suspicious transactions to FINTRAC, section 4 “When to submit a Suspicious Transaction Report”. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/str-dod/str-dod-eng
  8. GIABA, Typologies of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Linked to Cybercrime in West Africa, May 2025, Typology 6 red flags, p.40. https://www.giaba.org/typologies/3495__typologies-of-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-linked-to-cybercrime-in-west-africa.html
  9. CBK, The National Payment System (Anti-Money Laundering Guidelines for the Provision of Mobile Payment Services) Guidelines, 2013, para 3.2(a). https://www.centralbank.go.ke/images/docs/NPS/Regulations%20and%20Guidelines/Guidelines%20-%20Mobile%20money%20AML%20Guidelines.pdf
  10. CBN, AML/CFT/CPF of WMD in Financial Institutions Regulations, 2022 (Official Gazette No. 94, Vol. 109, 20 May 2022), Reg. 37(3), Reg. 38(1)(a) and (4) (Gazette pp. B 2089–2090). https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2022/FPRD/AML%20CIRCULAR%20AND%20REGULATIONS%20MERGED.pdf
  11. Kenya, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism Financing Laws (Amendment) Act, 2023 (Act No. 10 of 2023), replacing POCAMLA s.44(2). https://brs.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/AntiMoneyLaunderingandCombatingofTerrorismFinancingLawsAmendmentAct2023.pdf
  12. Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 (Nigeria), s.7(1)–(3). Listed at https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/LawsAndRegulations
  13. NFIU, Guidelines for the Identification, Verification and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions … for Financial Institutions, ref. STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, 13 December 2024, Part Three paras 1–2 and Part Six para 2. Listed at https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance
  14. CBN, Baseline Standards for Automated Anti-Money Laundering, Combating the Financing of Terrorism and Countering Proliferation Financing Solutions, circular BSD/DIR/PUB/LAB/019/002, 10 March 2026, section 4(j) and section 5.6(a)(i). https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/CBN%20issues%20Baseline%20Standards%20for%20Automated%20Anti-Money%20Laundering%20Solution.pdf
  15. Kenya, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism Financing Laws (Amendment) Act, 2025 (Act No. 6 of 2025, Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 94, 20 June 2025), Schedule (amendments to POCAMLA, none to s.44). https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/act/2025/6/eng@2025-06-20
  16. CBK, press release Increase in Mobile Money Transaction and Wallet Limits to Support Digitization of Payments, 8 September 2023. https://www.centralbank.go.ke/uploads/press_releases/823121420_Press%20Release%20-Increase%20in%20Mobile%20Money%20Transaction%20and%20Wallet%20Limits.pdf
  17. Senegal, Loi n° 2024-08 du 14 février 2024 relative à la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux, le financement du terrorisme et de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive, Journal officiel n° 7716, 20 March 2024, Art. 2 (point 58), 17(i), 20, 60, 61. https://www.vie-publique.sn/documents/348/JO-7716-du-20-mars-2024
  18. EU, Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, consolidated text of 30 June 2021, Art. 33(1) and Art. 35. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02015L0849-20210630
  19. Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 200/2024 (RESOL-2024-200-APN-UIF#MJ), 18 December 2024, Boletín Oficial no. 35571, 19 December 2024, art. 34(b), circumstance 2; art. 36(c) (report deadlines). https://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/405000-409999/407429/norma.htm
  20. BCEAO, Instruction n°001-03-2025 du 18 mars 2025 on AML/CFT/CPF organisation, internal control and compliance of financial institutions, arts. 3, 6 and 15. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-04/Instruction%20n%C2%B0001-03-2025%20du%2018%20mars%2025%20portant%20modalit%C3%A9s%20de%20mise%20en%20oeuvre%20par%20les%20IF%20de%20leurs%20obligations%20en%20mati%C3%A8re%20de%20lutte%20contre%20le%20blanchiment%20de%20capitaux.pdf
  21. Central Bank of Nigeria, Payments System Policy Department, Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, November 2026, issued by circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004 of 5 November 2026, in force that day (circular, section 4.0); sections 10.3.5, 26.7.1(e) and (h) and 37.13. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/REGULATIONS%20FOR%20THE%20OPERATIONS%20OF%20NON-SECURITY%20VIRTUAL%20ASSETS%20IN%20NIGERIA.pdf
  22. Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism / Combating Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Accountable Institutions, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 12 December 2025, 2.8.6.1(5)(iii), 2.14(2), 2.14(4)(ii), 3.8.2.2(1)(ii) and Appendix E, red flags 3u and 6c. https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/BOG-FIC-AML-GUIDELINE-2025-FINAL-5-TO-BE-PUBLISHED.pdf
  23. FIC South Africa, Directive 5 of 2019 on the usage of an automated transaction monitoring system for the detection and submission of regulatory reports, 29 March 2019, paras 2.1–2.3, 3.1.16 and 3.1.17. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019-DIR-Directive-5-of-2019-ATMS.pdf
  24. FIC South Africa, Public Compliance Communication 45 on Directive 5 of 2019 in relation to the use of automated transaction monitoring systems, 20 March 2020, paras 5–8. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2020.03-PCC-PCC-45-On-Directive-5-of-2019-in-relation-to-the-use-of-ATMS.pdf

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