Fraud
Card testing
Many small or declined card attempts that check whether stolen card details work, often followed by a larger payment.
What it catches
Fraudsters who hold stolen or guessed card details check which ones work before using them. They submit many small payments or card verifications, mostly declined, and keep the cards that are approved. The good cards are then used for a larger purchase or sold. Visa defines account testing as “a scheme where fraudsters submit one to two low-amount transactions to test or validate if an illicitly obtained payment account is active”, and an enumeration (or brute force) attack as systematically submitting card-not-present attempts across one or more BINs, “iterating through various combinations” of card number, expiry date, CVV2 and postal code until one is approved. Other names: BIN testing or BIN attack, card stuffing, card tumbling, Credit Master attack, brute force attack.
It hurts the cardholders whose cards are used afterwards, the merchant or platform whose checkout is used for the testing (authorisation and processing fees, disputes, operational costs, and exposure in Visa’s risk monitoring programmes), and the issuer. Visa’s acquirer monitoring programme requires acquirers to take proactive steps to keep their merchants below its enumeration thresholds.
The merchant is not always the victim. Visa lists fraudulent merchant accounts opened “for enumeration and account testing purposes”, merchant account takeovers and cloned terminals or gateways among the ways testers get in, and tells acquirers to watch activity “originating from new or inactive / dormant merchants”.
What it does not catch: a stolen card used once for a large purchase without a test, tests made at another merchant, slow testing spread thinly across many merchants, and one or two approved small tests on each of many cards that raise no BIN or merchant spike (when they come from one device, email or IP address, see Card cycling and cross-merchant card use, form B).
How the rule works
Run it in three forms. Each uses a different grouping, because testers rotate cards, devices and IP addresses.
- Form A, failure burst. Count declined or failed attempts, including 3-D Secure authentications that fail or are not completed, per card, per customer, per device and per IP address in a short window. Alert at the count. The card key catches enumeration, many tries on one card; the customer, device and IP keys catch testing spread over many cards. Visa reports testers moving to “a high volume of authentication attempts”, which is why authentications are counted.
- Form B, small then large. A small attempt or a zero-value card check on a card, followed within minutes or hours by a larger attempt on the same card.
- Form C, merchant or BIN spike. A sudden rise in attempts, approved or declined, for one BIN range at one merchant or checkout. Visa notes that account testing generally hits many cards “within the same issuing BIN”, and tells merchants to alert on “a large volume of approvals or declines from a similar BIN range”. This is the acquirer’s and the platform’s view.
Looks at
Every card payment attempt, card verification and 3-D Secure authentication, whether approved, declined, failed or not completed.
Alerts when form A: failure burst
Checked separately for each card, each customer, each device and each IP address. Both of these are true:
- An attempt is declined or failed, or a 3-D Secure authentication fails or is not completed.
- Counting this one, the same card, customer, device or IP address has had at least 5–10 such attempts within an hour.
No approvals are needed: a burst in which every attempt fails is the strongest case.
Alerts when form B: small then large
Both of these are true:
- An attempt on a card is for a larger amount, at or above a floor of about USD 500.
- In the few minutes to 3 hours before it, the same card had at least one small attempt: a payment under USD 5–10, or a zero-value card verification that is not part of a recurring or instalment set-up.
Amounts are compared in one reference currency.
Alerts when form C: BIN or merchant spike
Checked every check interval you choose, for each BIN range at each merchant in recent attempts:
The declines in that interval, or all attempts in it, approved and declined, are more than the usual number for that BIN range at that merchant, multiplied by your spike factor.
The alert shows
- Form A: the card, customer, device or IP address, and the attempt that reached the count.
- Form B: the larger attempt and the small attempts before it.
- Form C: the merchant, the BIN range, and whether declines or all attempts spiked.
Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.
Failed attempts How many declined or failed attempts on one card, customer, device or IP address set off form A. Start at 5–10 within an hour, and use a much higher count for IP addresses, which many genuine customers can share. Add a slower daily version at a higher count for testers who spread their attempts out.
Form A window How far back form A counts declined or failed attempts. Start at an hour, with the slower daily version alongside it.
Follow-up floor The smallest attempt that counts as the larger use of a tested card. Start at about USD 500 equivalent, lower where most genuine payments are small, or set it from your own distribution of attempt amounts. A high floor keeps the rule quiet but misses testers who then spend modest amounts.
Form B window How far back from the larger attempt to look for a small one on the same card. Start at a few minutes to 3 hours. Minutes catch only immediate follow-ups; a longer window also catches testers who wait, at the cost of more innocent pairs.
Small attempt The amount under which an attempt counts as a test. Start under USD 5–10 equivalent, set below your smallest common genuine payment, per currency. Zero-value card verifications count too, except those that set up a recurring or instalment payment.
Check interval How often form C runs, and the period whose declines it counts. No public source gives a value; set it from your own decline history.
Spike factor How many times the usual number of declines for a BIN range at a merchant counts as a spike. No public source gives a value; set it from your own decline history.
Data it needs
ShowHide
| Field | Usually comes from | If it’s missing |
|---|---|---|
| Every attempt, including declines and failures, with outcome and decline reason | Authorisation responses from the processor or issuer | The rule is close to blind: a customer retrying looks the same as a tester. Ask for outcomes before relying on Form B alone. |
| Card fingerprint or token (never the full card number), BIN | Processor or card vault | Without a stable card key, retries of one card split across identifiers and nothing pairs. Key on the card, not on a per-checkout customer id. |
| Amount and currency | Attempt | Convert to one currency, but watch the band edges (see tuning). |
| Kind of attempt: payment, zero-value verification, recurring or instalment set-up, retry | Processor fields | Zero-value verifications at recurring set-up look like tests. |
| 3-D Secure authentication attempts and their results, including challenges not completed | 3-D Secure server or processor | Testing moved onto authentication goes unseen. |
| Reversals and voids, with the time since approval | Processor | Visa advises alerting on a rise in reversals, because testers sometimes “immediately send a reversal after an authorization receives an approval”. Without them, approved and reversed tests look like ordinary approvals. |
| IP address, device id, email | Checkout session | Forms A and C lose the keys testers do not rotate as easily as cards. |
| Merchant or checkout id | Attempt | Form C cannot run. |
Thresholds
Each row is a setting the rule needs. Scheme rule values come from the source named under “Where it comes from”. Suggested values are starting points: test them on your own history, then adjust.
| Parameter | Value | Type | Where it comes from |
|---|---|---|---|
| Small attempt | Under USD 5 to 10 equivalent | Suggested | Visa: “Attack transactions are often less than $10 USD”. Set it below your smallest common genuine payment, per currency. |
| Form A failed attempts | 5 to 10 per card, customer, device or IP within an hour | Suggested | Visa’s nearby public value counts all attempts, not only failures: it gives “five authorizations from one IP address or PAN within a set timeframe” as an example of when to challenge with CAPTCHA. Use a much higher count for IP addresses. Add a slower daily version at a higher count for testers who spread attempts out. |
| Form B window | A few minutes to 3 hours | Suggested | A window of minutes catches only immediate follow-ups; a longer one also catches testers who wait, at the cost of more innocent pairs. |
| Form B follow-up floor | About USD 500 equivalent, lower where most genuine payments are small, or set from your own distribution of attempt amounts | Suggested | Setting it from your own amount distribution fits it to your book. A high floor keeps the rule quiet but misses testers who then spend modest amounts. |
| Visa enumeration threshold (acquirer programme) | Two measures: enumeration ratio, enumerated authorisations (approved and declined) ≥ 2,000 bps (20%) of all authorisations; enumerated transaction count ≥ 300,000. “Enumerated” means identified as such by Visa. Visa monitors monthly. | Scheme rule | Visa Acquirer Monitoring Program fact sheet 2025. A card-scheme programme rule, not a law, measured per merchant per month by Visa; a business cannot compute it exactly from its own data. A monitoring rule should fire long before this. |
By country
Nigeria. The NFIU’s 2023 report on money laundering through fraud records that payment service providers and money transfer operators who answered its survey observed card testing (and, for transfer operators, BIN attacks) among the fraud patterns linked to money laundering (chapter 6). The CBN’s Baseline Standards for Automated AML Solutions (10 March 2026) require that, where the AML solution is also used for fraud monitoring, it monitors channels such as cards “in real time or near real time to detect unusual patterns indicative of fraud”, with controls for card and electronic channels “calibrated to the faster intervention timelines appropriate to those channels” (section 5.6(a)(i)).
Reporting deadline
Report to the NFIU immediately, with a written report within 24 hours (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.7(1)–(2)). The NFIU’s December 2024 STR guidelines start the 24 hours once the transaction is found suspicious, after an examination of no more than 72 hours, and require written reasons for every alert closed as not suspicious (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, Part Six, para 2).
Kenya.
Reporting deadline
Within two days after the suspicion arose (POCAMLA s.44(2), as replaced by the AML/CFT Laws (Amendment) Act 2023, Act No. 10 of 2023).
WAEMU (UEMOA).
Reporting deadline
Report to the CENTIF “immédiatement” (Loi uniforme 2023, art. 60). “Immédiatement” is not defined; the law’s only defined deadline is “sans délai”, at most 24 hours (art. 2, point 58), so confirm with your CENTIF. Do not carry out an operation you suspect until the report is made; if it has already gone through, inform the CENTIF “sans délai” (art. 61). WAEMU (UEMOA in French) is the West African Economic and Monetary Union: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, the same eight states that form the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). The BCEAO’s instructions and the Council of Ministers’ decisions cited here apply in all eight. The uniform law applies in each state through that state’s own act, which may number its articles differently. The law of a single state is covered only where that state is named.
Canada.
Reporting deadline
File “as soon as practicable” after the measures that establish reasonable grounds to suspect (FINTRAC STR guidance, section 4).
All markets. Visa’s acquirer monitoring programme is global (programmes for Brazil, Chile and India were to be announced separately).
False positives and tuning
ShowHide
Common innocent explanations: a customer mistyping the CVV or expiry date several times, a card declined for insufficient funds and retried, a customer trying a second card after the first is declined, subscription retries, zero-value card checks when a recurring payment is set up, and a merchant’s own test traffic.
Typical causes of misfires:
- A success requirement hides the worst cases. A rule that requires a high ratio of failed to completed attempts, with at least one completed attempt as the baseline, drops customers with only failures, the clearest probing, because they have no baseline. A plain failure count keeps them.
- No outcomes. If every attempt arrives as “pending”, the rule cannot see declines at all. Small attempts are then mostly ordinary small payments, and a customer retrying the same small amount looks like a tester. Get decline outcomes before trusting the rule.
- Zero-value verifications. A merchant that checks a card with a zero-value authorisation when a payment plan is set up, then takes the first instalment minutes later, matches “small then large” every time. Exclude zero-value verifications tied to a recurring set-up from Form B, but keep failed ones in Form A: Visa recommends monitoring for excessive failed account verification attempts. Visa’s account verification messages carry an amount of zero by design.
- Small then slightly larger. A genuine small payment followed minutes later by a larger one matches a low follow-up floor. The follow-up floor is what keeps Form B quiet; the cost is missing testers who then spend modest amounts.
- Retries and dunning. Each retry is a separate attempt, and a spike of retries with a low success rate looks like card testing. Count distinct cards or distinct amounts, or exclude your own retry schedule.
- Test and staff traffic in production. Scheme test card numbers, test BIN ranges and small payments from staff cards satisfy the small leg. Exclude them by BIN and card.
- Outages. An issuer, processor or 3-D Secure outage produces a burst of declines for one BIN range at one merchant, which is what Form C looks for. Visa notes that some issuers’ decline codes reach the acquirer converted to a generic “Do Not Honor”, so a decline spike alone does not prove an attack. Check whether the same BIN is declining everywhere, and look for many distinct cards before treating it as testing.
- Shared IP addresses. Mobile networks, company gateways and public Wi-Fi put many unrelated customers behind one IP address, so a per-IP count of a few failures an hour fires on ordinary traffic. Use a much higher count for IP than for card or device, or count distinct cards.
- Declines that mean “not allowed”, not “wrong”. A card not enabled for online or international payments, or a payment declined because strong customer authentication is required and then retried, declines several times on one card; genuine customers also abandon 3-D Secure challenges. Leave those decline reasons out of the per-card count, or count distinct cards.
- The wrong key. If the customer identifier is a per-checkout id, a card’s retries arrive under different ids and never pair. Key on the card fingerprint, and also on device and IP.
- Band edges move with exchange rates. A small-amount band set in USD moves when the rate moves; a common local minimum payment near the edge can flip in and out of the band.
- A quiet rule is not a proven rule. A card-testing rule that fires zero times on live traffic may be well tuned or may be blind. Test it on a known attack or a synthetic one before relying on it.
When it fires
ShowHide
Analyst checklist:
- How many distinct cards, BINs, devices and IP addresses are involved? Many cards from one device or IP, many cards in one BIN, or sequential card numbers (Visa) is an attack, not a customer.
- Which attempts were approved? Those cards are compromised. Void or refund approved test charges before they become disputes (Visa recommends this).
- Was the larger follow-up approved, and was the goods or value delivered? Stop fulfilment or withdrawal where you can.
- Is the attack coming through your checkout or API? Add CAPTCHA, rate limits and 3-D Secure on the targeted endpoint, and rotate API keys if the attack goes straight to the API (Visa).
- As an acquirer or platform, if the spike is at a new, dormant or recently changed merchant, review the merchant account itself: it may have been opened for testing or taken over (Visa).
- Tell your acquirer or processor; as an issuer, block and reissue the tested cards.
Card testing is mostly handled as fraud with the acquirer and the scheme. If your own customer account was used to run the testing, or the funds obtained move through your platform, review it for a suspicious transaction report under your local rules. Declined attempts are not out of scope: in Nigeria, the UEMOA and Canada the duty covers attempted transactions as well as completed ones (MLPPA 2022 s.7(3), “whether the transaction is complete or not”; Loi uniforme art. 60, “les opérations ou les tentatives d’opérations”; FINTRAC STR guidance, “both attempted transactions and completed transactions”). Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.
Related rules
- Transaction velocity: too many transactions in a window.
- Card cycling and cross-merchant card use: many cards on one account.
- New beneficiary, high-value payment: first use of a new card for a large amount.
- Test transfer before a large transfer: the bank-transfer equivalent.
- High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch: a card issued in one country paying in another.
- New account activity: an account in its first days or weeks, where repeated failed attempts to fund it can be card testing.
Sources
9 sourcesHide
-
NFIU (Nigeria), Money Laundering Typologies Through Fraud in Nigeria, December 2023, chapter 6 “Analysis of questionnaire responses”: payment service providers, “the specific fraud patterns observed that are commonly linked to money laundering activities include card theft, card testing and chargeback fraud” (p. 75); IMTOs, “card theft, card testing, internet fraud, BIN attacks, phishing scams, one-to-many transactions, and financial mules were observed” (p. 76). Survey responses, not an NFIU finding of its own. Supports the pattern. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/Trendstypo
-
Visa, Visa Guidance to Guard Against Enumeration Attacks and Account Testing Schemes, Visa Business News article AI11312, 13 September 2021 (first run 12 August 2021), section “Enumeration and Account Testing Attacks Background”: account testing definition quoted above, other names, “Generally, account testing attacks occur on multiple payment accounts within the same issuing BIN”; “Ecosystem Impacts”: fees, operational impacts, fraud impacts, risk exposure; “Recent Trends and Observations”: “Enumeration through authentication … a high volume of authentication attempts”; “Protect the payment system from unauthorized access”: merchant application fraud (“open fraudulent merchant accounts for enumeration and account testing purposes”), merchant account takeovers, merchant cloning; section “Best Practices for Acquirers, TPAs, Processors, and Merchants”: velocity checks for “velocity to the same issuer or issuing BIN, sequential PANs … identical or similar amounts, and activity originating from new or inactive / dormant merchants” and declines with fraud-indicative response codes (14, 54, 55, 59, 82, N7), with the note that some codes “may be converted to Response Code 05—Do Not Honor”. Supports the pattern. https://usa.visa.com/content/dam/VCOM/global/support-legal/documents/visa-guidance-to-guard-against-enumeration-sept.pdf
-
Visa, Enumeration Mitigation and Considerations for Merchants, V1.3, June 2026, section “Protecting the Ecosystem”, “Velocity thresholds”: “Attack transactions are often less than $10 USD”; “Technical Tools”: “example five authorizations from one IP address or PAN within a set timeframe”; “Account Verification Implementation”: account verification requests carry an amount of zero; “Monitor for and block excessive failed AV attempts”; “Anomaly detection”: “Alert on transactions with a large volume of approvals or declines from a similar BIN range” and “Alert on an increase in reversals being sent. Occasionally, fraudsters will immediately send a reversal after an authorization receives an approval”. Supports the pattern and the suggested values. https://usa.visa.com/content/dam/VCOM/global/support-legal/documents/anti-enumeration-and-account-testing-best-practices-merchant.pdf
-
Visa, Visa Acquirer Monitoring Program Overview (fact sheet 2025), FAQ “What are the program performance thresholds?”: “VAMP Enumeration Ratio, defined as [Count of Enumerated Authorization Transactions (Approved + Declined)] ÷ [Count of Authorization Transactions (Approved+ Declined)], ≥ 2000 bps” and “VAMP Enumeration Transaction Count … ≥ 300,000”; thresholds effective 1 June 2025. Supports the scheme threshold. https://corporate.visa.com/content/dam/VCOM/corporate/visa-perspectives/security-and-trust/documents/visa-acquirer-monitoring-program-fact-sheet-2025.pdf
-
Loi uniforme relative à la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux, le financement du terrorisme et de la prolifération (UEMOA), March 2023, BCEAO copy (a model text, each member state adopts it by its own law), arts. 60–61: “Les personnes assujetties sont tenues de déclarer immédiatement à la CENTIF … les opérations ou les tentatives d’opérations”; art. 2, point 58: “Sans délai : un délai maximal de 24 heures”. Supports the reporting duty. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Loi-uniforme-LBCFTFP-Mars-2023-vf.pdf
-
Nigeria, Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s. 7(2): “shall within 24 hours after the transaction referred to in subsection (1) … report the suspicious transaction and actions taken to the Unit”; s. 7(3): “shall apply whether the transaction is complete or not”; NFIU, Guidelines for the Identification, Verification and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions …, STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, 13 December 2024, Part on “The period for forming a suspicion”: “once a transaction is termed suspicious … it is only then that the 24-hour period for the report to NFIU is activated”, examination “not later than 72 hours”. Supports the reporting duty. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/LawsAndRegulations and https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance
-
Kenya, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism Financing Laws (Amendment) Act 2023 (No. 10 of 2023), replacing POCAMLA s. 44(2): “within two days after the suspicion arose”. Supports the reporting duty. https://brs.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/AntiMoneyLaunderingandCombatingofTerrorismFinancingLawsAmendmentAct2023.pdf
-
FINTRAC, Reporting suspicious transactions to FINTRAC, opening notes: “All references to transactions should be read to include both attempted transactions and completed transactions”; section 4: “You must submit the Suspicious Transaction Report to FINTRAC as soon as practicable after you have completed measures …”. Supports the reporting duty. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/str-dod/str-dod-eng
-
Central Bank of Nigeria, Baseline Standards for Automated Anti-Money Laundering, Combating the Financing of Terrorism and Countering Proliferation Financing Solutions, circular BSD/DIR/PUB/LAB/019/002, 10 March 2026, section 5.6 “Fraud Monitoring and Detection”, (a)(i): “Monitor activities across relevant channels (e.g. cards, e-channels, deposits, lending) in real time or near real time to detect unusual patterns indicative of fraud … Fraud monitoring controls, particularly for card and electronic channels, shall be calibrated to the faster intervention timelines appropriate to those channels.” Applies “Where the AML Solution is also used for fraud monitoring”. Supports a monitoring duty for card fraud in Nigeria; it does not name card testing. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/CBN%20issues%20Baseline%20Standards%20for%20Automated%20Anti-Money%20Laundering%20Solution.pdf
Ask us
A question about this rule?
A person at Archer reads every question and answers by email.
Got it. Where should we send the answer?
We’ll use your email to answer you. Privacy policy
Thanks. We’ve got your question.
The Fraud & AML Library is a practical reference, not legal advice. What binds is the regulator’s own text, which every rule and regulation page links.