Fraud

Test transfer before a large transfer

A tiny transfer that checks an account works, followed soon by a much larger transfer between the same two accounts or from the same source.

A tiny test transfer, then soon after a much larger transfer, either between the same two accounts or from the same source to another account Same two accounts Sender Receiver Tiny test first Soon after, a much larger one or Same source Sender An account Another one Tiny test Much larger

What it catches

A tiny transfer, often worth about USD 1 or less, followed soon by a much larger one along the same route. Criminals send the tiny amount first to check that an account is open, reachable and not yet blocked, then move the real money. The FATF describes fraud syndicates that “perform ‘tests’ by carrying out small value transactions so that they can change the destination of the funds if the tests fail”, and lists as a risk indicator a “small payment to a beneficiary, which once successfully completed, is rapidly followed by larger value payments to the same beneficiary”.

The pattern shows up on both sides of a payment:

  • Sending side. Your customer pays a small amount to a beneficiary, then a large amount to the same beneficiary. This is the form the FATF lists as a risk indicator.
  • Receiving side. Your customer receives a tiny credit, then a large credit from the same source. This fits criminals checking that an account they use has not been flagged before they move money through it: the FATF describes criminals testing because accounts may already have been flagged before the laundering. The rule sees it only when the test and the large transfer come from the same account.

Two things to settle before switching it on. Customers routinely test a new account with a small transfer from their own account elsewhere, and that is not suspicious, so the own-account case has to be handled (see False positives). And a criminal may test one of your accounts and then pay a different one (the FATF describes criminals changing the destination when a test fails), so the match should also work across all your customers, not only within one, and count a test that failed on one account when the large transfer goes to another.

What it does not catch: tests made through another channel (a card payment, a different bank), tests large enough to look ordinary, a large transfer sent without any test, or a test from one account followed by the large credit from a different one (for example a victim’s payment into an account the criminal tested first).

How the rule works

On each large incoming transfer, look back over a window for a tiny transfer from the same source account, to this customer or to any of your customers. Leave out sources you know verify accounts with tiny deposits as a matter of course. When the source account is in the customer’s own name, send the alert to a low-priority queue rather than dropping it. Match on the account identifier, never on the name alone.

The sending side is the mirror image: a tiny outgoing payment to a counterparty, then a large one to the same counterparty.

Looks at

Every large incoming transfer and every large outgoing payment. Large means at or above a floor set at above what new accounts on your product usually receive. Incoming transfers that failed are skipped.

Alerts when receiving side

The same sending account made 1 or more tiny transfers, each above zero and below about USD 1 equivalent, within a few hours before the large transfer. They count whether they went to this customer or to any of your other customers. A failed tiny transfer counts only when it went to a different customer: a test that failed on one account, followed by the large transfer to another, is the case the FATF describes. Returns and reversals are not tests.

Alerts when sending side

The customer completed a tiny payment, above zero and below about USD 1 equivalent, to the same counterparty account within a few hours before the large payment. Failed tiny payments do not count: the FATF’s indicator is a small payment “once successfully completed”.

Counts as the same account

The same account identifier, written in one standard format on every record.

Ignores

On the receiving side:

  • Transfers from senders you know verify accounts with tiny deposits.
  • US ACH micro-entries (“ACCTVERIFY” in the Company Entry Description), which do not count as tests. Keep them as an input to mule detection rather than discarding them.
  • Crypto deposits from a self-hosted address the customer has proved is their own.

Sends to low priority

Alerts where the other account is in the customer’s own name: the sender’s name on the receiving side, the counterparty’s name on the sending side. Raise them if the money moves on quickly.

The alert shows

The large transfer or payment and the tiny ones before it.

Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.

The own-name match should tolerate case, accents and word order. Do not treat a shared surname as the same person.

Data it needs

ShowHide
FieldUsually comes fromIf it’s missing
Sender account identifier on every credit (IBAN or account number, wallet address, mobile money number); counterparty identifier on every debitPayment messageThe rule cannot run on that rail. On some integrations, instant and wire credits arrive without the sender’s account number, or with it masked or truncated; those credits cannot be matched.
One normalised format for the identifier on both directionsYour integrationSpaces, case or a different format on the sending and receiving records stop the same account matching itself.
Sender name on credits; counterparty name on debitsPayment messageNeeded to send own-name matches to low priority. Without it, own-account tests land in the main queue. On-chain crypto credits carry no sender name.
Customer’s own name(s), including transliterationsOnboarding dataSame as above.
Amount, currency, status, timestampPayment messageTests are amounts above zero: returns, reversals and negative entries pass a “below the ceiling” test without being tests. Use the status to apply the failed-test rules on the card; compare amounts in one currency.
A list of account-verification senders (platforms, marketplaces, payment providers); for US ACH, the Company Entry Description; for crypto, the self-hosted addresses each customer has proved are theirsBuilt from your own data; ACH batch header; your address-ownership checksPlatform micro-deposits can make up a large part of the alerts. US ACH micro-entries must carry “ACCTVERIFY” in the Company Entry Description (Nacha), which identifies them without a list.

Thresholds

Each row is a setting the rule needs. Scheme rule values come from the source named under “Where it comes from”. Suggested values are starting points: test them on your own history, then adjust.

ParameterValueTypeWhere it comes from
Test ceilingBelow about USD 1 equivalent (EUR 1, or the same value in local currency); above zeroSuggestedRaise it where the smallest transfer a rail accepts is larger.
Account-verification micro-deposit (US ACH)Credit under USD 1.00Scheme ruleNacha Operating Rules, Micro-Entries: “A credit Micro-Entry must be in the amount of less than $1.00”. A payment-scheme rule, not a law. These are the legitimate tests the rule must not alert on.
Large-transfer floorset above what new accounts on your product usually receiveSuggestedNo public source gives a value. Too low and every “test the new account, then fund it” customer fires.
WindowA few hours; up to several days if tests come further aheadSuggestedThe FATF says “rapidly”. A longer window catches tests made further ahead, at the cost of more noise.
Tests required1 or moreSuggestedOne test is the pattern. Several tests from one source to several customers is stronger.

No regulator sets a test amount, floor or window for this pattern.

By country

  • France. The FATF report (Box 17) cites an analysis by the French supervisory authorities in the first half of 2021 of the payment service providers mainly used to receive fraudulent wire transfers. These were typically “banking as a service” providers, some with a branch in France only to offer French IBANs. Criminals opened accounts with a misused identity and checked whether they had been flagged “by trying first to carry out transactions of small amounts and change the funds destination if necessary”, then moved the funds quickly to one or several accounts, splitting amounts to stay under the provider’s internal monitoring thresholds.

    Reporting deadline

    Report to Tracfin before carrying out an operation you suspect, and do not carry it out within the time stated in the report; where it has already gone through (it could not be held, or the suspicion arose afterwards), report “sans délai” (Code monétaire et financier, art. L.561-16, as set out in the ACPR-Tracfin guidelines, paras 156–157 and 164).

  • United States. Nacha’s Micro-Entries rule covers small ACH credits (under USD 1.00) and offsetting debits used to verify a receiver’s account. Since 17 March 2023, originators of micro-entries must use “commercially reasonable fraud detection”, including monitoring forward and return micro-entry volumes. Nacha suggests receiving banks fold incoming micro-entry activity into their fraud, AML and money mule detection. Nacha’s 2026 fraud monitoring rules go further for receiving banks: they must “establish and implement risk-based processes and procedures designed to identify credit Entries initiated due to fraud”, from 20 March 2026 for those that received 10 million or more ACH entries in 2023 and from 19 June 2026 for all others. The rule “does not require pre-posting monitoring of credit entries”. Its red flags include a high-dollar credit atypical for the account or a series of similar credits in a short period, sent “to a new account, a dormant account, or to an account acting as a mule”.

    Reporting deadline

    No later than 30 calendar days after initial detection (31 CFR 1020.320 for banks, 1022.320 for money services businesses). A bank that has not identified a suspect may take 30 more days, never more than 60 in all (1020.320(b)(3)).

  • Nigeria.

    Reporting deadline

    Report to the NFIU immediately, with a written report within 24 hours (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.7(1)–(2)). The NFIU’s December 2024 STR guidelines start the 24 hours once the transaction is found suspicious, after an examination of no more than 72 hours, and require written reasons for every alert closed as not suspicious (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, Part Six, para 2).

  • Kenya.

    Reporting deadline

    Within two days after the suspicion arose (POCAMLA s.44(2), as replaced by the AML/CFT Laws (Amendment) Act 2023, Act No. 10 of 2023).

  • WAEMU (UEMOA).

    Reporting deadline

    Report to the CENTIF “immédiatement” (Loi uniforme 2023, art. 60). The law defines “sans délai” as at most 24 hours (art. 2, point 58); “immédiatement” is not defined, and our reading is to treat 24 hours as the outer limit. Do not carry out an operation you suspect until the report is made; if it has already gone through, inform the CENTIF “sans délai” (art. 61). WAEMU (UEMOA in French) is the West African Economic and Monetary Union: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, the same eight states that form the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). The BCEAO’s instructions and the Council of Ministers’ decisions cited here apply in all eight. The uniform law applies in each state through that state’s own act, which may number its articles differently. The law of a single state is covered only where that state is named.

  • Canada.

    Reporting deadline

    File “as soon as practicable” after the measures that establish reasonable grounds to suspect (FINTRAC STR guidance, section 4).

False positives and tuning

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The most common innocent explanation: a customer opens an account and sends themselves a small amount first, from their own account elsewhere, before moving larger savings. Family members do the same for each other.

Typical causes of misfires:

  • Matching on names instead of accounts. A rule that matches the large transfer to an earlier test by fuzzy name similarity, because it cannot compare account numbers, flags namesakes and people sharing a surname. Match on the account identifier.
  • Platform micro-deposits. Payment platforms and marketplaces verify new accounts with tiny deposits and later pay them larger amounts. They can account for a large part of cross-customer hits. Exclude them, ideally by their account identifiers: their names arrive in several spellings.
  • Own-name tests. The customer’s own external account sending a test and then the real money is a true match on the account number and still usually benign. The same holds on the sending side, when a customer tests a payment to their own new account elsewhere. Recognise it with a name comparison that tolerates case and word order; an exact string comparison fails on “Maria Silva” versus “SILVA MARIA”.
  • Why own-name matches go to low priority, not out. A criminal holding accounts in the same stolen or borrowed identity at two institutions also passes the own-name test (the FATF’s France case describes accounts opened with a misused identity and tested with small amounts). Route own-name matches to a low-priority queue, and raise them if the money moves on quickly (see rapid pass-through).
  • Family top-ups. A relative with the same surname tests and then funds the account. A loose name match would send them to low priority, and with them a mule who shares a surname. Leave them in the main queue.
  • Crypto ownership checks. In the EU, a crypto-asset service provider checking that a self-hosted address belongs to its customer may have the customer send “a predefined amount (preferably the smallest denomination of a given crypto-asset)” from that address (EBA Travel Rule Guidelines, para 83(c)), for transfers of EUR 1,000 or more (paras 81–82). That makes a tiny credit followed by a large one from the same address by design. On-chain credits carry no sender name, so a name comparison cannot recognise it: exclude addresses the customer has proved are their own.
  • Returns, reversals and masked identifiers. A return, a reversal or a negative entry passes a “below the ceiling” test without being a test: count only amounts above zero. A masked or truncated sender identifier silently stops the match.
  • New-customer cohorts. Among new customers, expect a large part of the hits to be the ordinary “test the new account first” habit. Treat this as a review rule, not a block, and expect precision to depend on the exclusions above.

When it fires

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Analyst checklist:

  1. Who sent the test and the large transfer? Is the sender a person or a business, and what is their relationship to the customer?
  2. Did the same source send tests to other customers of yours? Several accounts tested from one source is a strong mule-network signal.
  3. What happened next? Funds moved out within hours to a new beneficiary, cash-out or crypto is the mule pattern (see rapid pass-through).
  4. For the sending side: was the beneficiary new, and was there a recent device, password or phone change (see new beneficiary)?
  5. Ask the customer for the purpose and the source of funds, without revealing the alert or any report. Ask the sending institution about the source where your network allows it.

The FATF notes that one indicator alone may not warrant suspicion. File a suspicious transaction report when the review gives grounds to suspect, within your FIU’s deadline. Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.

Sources

11 sourcesHide
  1. FATF, INTERPOL and Egmont Group, Illicit Financial Flows from Cyber-Enabled Fraud, November 2023. Paragraph 26: “criminals may perform ‘tests’ by carrying out small value transactions so that they can change the destination of the funds if the tests fail”. Annex A, “Transaction patterns”: “Small payment to a beneficiary, which once successfully completed, is rapidly followed by larger value payments to the same beneficiary”. Box 17 (France): “trying first to carry out transactions of small amounts and change the funds destination if necessary”. Supports the pattern. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/illicit-financial-flows-cyber-enabled-fraud.html
  2. Nacha, Micro-Entries (Nacha Operating Rules), Technical section: “A credit Micro-Entry must be in the amount of less than $1.00”; Impact section, for receiving banks: “Incorporating incoming micro-entry activity into existing fraud detection, AML, and money mule detection”. Also: “In the Company Entry Description field, the Rule requires the use of ‘ACCTVERIFY’”. Supports the threshold and the legitimate-use exclusion. https://www.nacha.org/micro-entries
  3. Nacha, Micro-Entries (Phase 2): “Originators of Micro-Entries are required to use commercially reasonable fraud detection”, “including the monitoring of Micro-Entry forward and return volumes”; effective 17 March 2023. https://www.nacha.org/rules/micro-entries-phase-2
  4. Loi uniforme relative à la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux, le financement du terrorisme et de la prolifération (UEMOA), March 2023, BCEAO copy, arts. 60–61: “Les personnes assujetties sont tenues de déclarer immédiatement à la CENTIF”; art. 2, point 58: “Sans délai : un délai maximal de 24 heures”. Supports the reporting duty. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Loi-uniforme-LBCFTFP-Mars-2023-vf.pdf
  5. Nigeria, Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s. 7(2): “shall within 24 hours after the transaction referred to in subsection (1) … report the suspicious transaction and actions taken to the Unit”; NFIU, Guidelines for the Identification, Verification and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions …, STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, 13 December 2024, Part on “The period for forming a suspicion”: “once a transaction is termed suspicious … it is only then that the 24-hour period for the report to NFIU is activated”, examination “not later than 72 hours”. Supports the reporting duty. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/LawsAndRegulations and https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance
  6. Kenya, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism Financing Laws (Amendment) Act 2023 (No. 10 of 2023), replacing POCAMLA s. 44(2): “within two days after the suspicion arose”. Supports the reporting duty. https://brs.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/AntiMoneyLaunderingandCombatingofTerrorismFinancingLawsAmendmentAct2023.pdf
  7. FINTRAC, Reporting suspicious transactions to FINTRAC, section 4: “You must submit the Suspicious Transaction Report to FINTRAC as soon as practicable after you have completed measures …”. Supports the reporting duty. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/str-dod/str-dod-eng
  8. Nacha, Risk Management Topics (Fraud Monitoring Phase 2): RDFIs must “establish and implement risk-based processes and procedures designed to identify credit Entries initiated due to fraud”; Phase 1 on 20 March 2026 for RDFIs with 10 million or more ACH receipts in 2023, Phase 2 on 19 June 2026 for all others; “does not require pre-posting monitoring of credit entries”; red flags include a high-dollar transaction atypical for the account or a series of similar credits in a short period, “to a new account, a dormant account, or to an account acting as a mule”. Supports the receiving banks’ monitoring duty in the US (a scheme rule, not a law). https://www.nacha.org/rules/risk-management-topics-fraud-monitoring-phase-2
  9. EBA, Guidelines on information requirements in relation to transfers of funds and certain crypto-assets transfers under Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 (‘Travel Rule Guidelines’), EBA/GL/2024/11, 4 July 2024, section 4.8.4, paras 81–83: to assess whether a self-hosted address is owned or controlled by the customer, CASPs use at least one method, including “c) sending of a predefined amount (preferably the smallest denomination of a given crypto-asset), set by the CASP, from and to the self-hosted address to the CASP’s account”, for transfers that amount to or exceed EUR 1,000. Supports the crypto false positive. https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2024-07/6de6e9b9-0ed9-49cd-985d-c0834b5b4356/Travel%20Rule%20Guidelines.pdf
  10. 31 CFR 1020.320(b)(3) (“A bank is required to file a SAR no later than 30 calendar days after the date of initial detection”; “In no case shall reporting be delayed more than 60 calendar days”) and 31 CFR 1022.320(b)(3) (money services businesses, 30 calendar days). Supports the reporting duty. https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/31/1020.320 and https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/31/1022.320
  11. ACPR and Tracfin, Lignes directrices conjointes … relatives aux obligations de vigilance sur les opérations et aux obligations de déclaration et d’information à Tracfin, published 23 April 2025 (texts updated to 22 January 2025), para 156 (L.561-16, first paragraph: the report is sent “préalablement à l’exécution de la transaction”; “l’organisme s’abstient d’effectuer l’opération … dans le délai qu’il a renseigné”), para 157 and para 164 (after execution, the report is sent “sans délai”). Supports the reporting duty. https://acpr.banque-france.fr/system/files/2025-04/20250423_Lignes_directrices_obligations_Tracfin.pdf

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