Fraud

Shared identifiers across customers (money mule networks)

One device, phone number, card, bank account, wallet, email, or beneficiary turns up on several customers who should have nothing in common.

One device, phone number, card, bank account, wallet, email, or beneficiary turns up on several customers who should have nothing in common One identifier device, phone number, card, bank account, wallet, email, or beneficiary Customer Customer Customer Customer Should have nothing in common

What it catches

Several customers who appear unrelated share something that should belong to one person: a phone, a device, a card, a bank account or wallet they pay in from or out to, an email inbox, an address. This is how mule networks, account farms and repeat applicants show up when you look across customers rather than at one account at a time. A recruiter controls many accounts from one phone; one card funds many new accounts; one person signs up again and again under different names to borrow. Regulators describe this directly: “Common identifiers (e.g. addresses, phone numbers, etc.) are used by multiple clients that do not appear to be related” (FINTRAC); a “single static IP address or electronic device associated with multiple accounts of various account holders” (FATF, INTERPOL and Egmont).

It is one of the few signals that sees the network rather than the transaction. It also catches families, shops and shared services, so the work is in telling those apart.

How the rule works

Store each customer’s identifiers as entities, normalised so that the same thing always looks the same. When a customer adds or uses an identifier, count how many customers, this one included, used the same value within a recent window. Alert when the count reaches a threshold, or when something that belongs to one person, a national ID number or a face, turns up behind identities that disagree: one ID number under different names or dates of birth, or one face under different ID numbers.

Looks at

Every time a customer adds or uses an identifier, such as a phone number, email address, bank account or card.

Compares

How many customers, this one included, used the same identifier in the last 24 hours to 7 days.

Alerts when

Any of these is true:

  1. The identifier is shared by 3 or more customers within that window, this customer included.
  2. A national ID number or a face is shared by 2 customers or more whose identity details disagree: one ID number under different names or dates of birth, or one face under different ID numbers.
  3. This customer is connected, through any mix of identifiers other than known hubs, to a group that reaches a size above what households produce.

Counts as the same

Each identifier is written one standard way before it is compared: phone numbers in international format, bank account numbers (IBANs) in capitals without spaces, email addresses as the inbox they deliver to, and cards by a fingerprint of the card number that stays the same across customers, not by a token issued per customer, merchant or device.

Ignores

  • Identifiers on your list of known hubs: your own agents, billers, exchange deposit addresses, platform accounts and test cards.
  • Empty, placeholder and default values, such as a blank or “N/A” email address or a zeroed device ID.

Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.

Common variants:

  • Shared device or phone. Several customers sign in from one device, or register one phone number.
  • Shared payment instrument. One card, IBAN or wallet funds several customers’ accounts, or one beneficiary (bank account, mobile-money number, crypto wallet) receives from several customers.
  • Identity conflict. Two customers share a national ID number but give different names or dates of birth, or one face appears under two ID numbers. Even two is suspicious when the identities disagree.
  • Cluster size. A customer connected, directly or through others, to many customers over any combination of identifiers, with known hubs left out.

Alert on the link once, then add new members to the same case rather than re-alerting every member on every event.

Data it needs

ShowHide
FieldUsually comes fromIf it’s missing
Customer idaccount or walletRequired.
Identifier type and value (device id, phone, email, card fingerprint, IBAN or account number, wallet address, beneficiary, address, national ID)onboarding, session or device SDK, payment detailsOne identifier type is enough to start. Each type you add widens what you can see; the rule is blind to any type you don’t collect.
Which role the identifier plays (the customer’s own, a payer, a beneficiary, a contact person)how you store itRequired. Storing a payer’s account as if it were the customer’s own creates false links between unrelated customers.
Date of each use, per customer and identifieryour entity storeNeeded for the recency window. Without dates an old link counts forever, and backtests can miss links that existed at the time.
Name, date of birth, national ID number, and a face match if you run oneKYCNeeded for the identity-conflict variant and to tell one person with two accounts from two people sharing.
Customer segmentonboardingAgents, merchants and business accounts legitimately share some identifiers.
Hub listyour operations teamWithout it, a few shared business identifiers will dominate the alerts.

Thresholds

Each row is a setting the rule needs. Each value is a starting point: test it on your own history, then adjust.

ParameterStarting pointWhere it comes from
Customers per identifier3 or more, this customer includedA lower threshold brings in more households; a higher one lets small networks through.
Identity conflict2 customers behind one national ID number or one face, with different identity detailsFINTRAC lists “inconsistencies in the identification documents or different identifiers provided by the client, such as name, address, date of birth or phone number” as an indicator. Two people sharing a phone or a card is common; one ID number or one face behind two identities is not ordinary sharing (see False positives and tuning).
Cluster sizeset from your own distribution of cluster sizes, above what households produce, with known hubs left outNo public source gives a value. Leave out hubs, placeholder values and identifiers above the hub ceiling before building clusters; then count the connected customers per cluster on your book, start above the size households reach, and raise it if they dominate.
Recency window24 hours to 7 daysHow far back to count customers’ use of the identifier. A longer window catches networks that build slowly, and a new customer on an identifier someone else used weeks ago, but brings back old, stale links; widen it only after measuring. Without a window, an old link counts forever.
Hub ceilingidentifiers shared far beyond household size: review once, then allowlist or blockNo public source gives a value. The most widely “shared” identifiers are usually businesses (an exchange deposit address, a platform account).

By country

  • Nigeria. The CBN’s Baseline Standards for Automated AML Solutions (10 March 2026) require the AML solution to “Support related-party mapping, network analysis and peer-grouping to improve identification of unusual or suspicious patterns” (section 5.5(a)(v)). The NFIU’s 2023 fraud typologies report describes the mule recruitment this rule looks for, without naming a shared identifier: banks observed “frequent use of accounts opened with incomplete KYC, which eventually were used by pickers. A picker work on behalf of criminal groups to recruit money mules to move illicit funds through their bank accounts”, and money transfer operators observed “one-to-many transactions, and financial mules”. For stablecoin issuers and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) licensed by the CBN, its Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria (in force 5 November 2026) bar a P2P provider from releasing tokens unless “the name and the Bank Verification Number of the account from which the Naira payment was made, or to which it was made, match the verified customer” (section 10.3.3), and from knowingly permitting “third-party, nominee, mule, fictitious or otherwise improperly attributed accounts or wallets” (section 10.3.4). The name and BVN check of 10.3.3 is a separate payment-account control, not this rule; this rule finds the same bank account, wallet or device used by several customers, one of the signs of the accounts 10.3.4 bars. The monthly P2P return reports such transactions and the action taken (Schedule 7, Part F, item 26). Every provider must “monitor suspicious device, access, wallet and transaction patterns” (section 37.13).

    Reporting deadline

    Report to the NFIU immediately, and within 24 hours after the transaction draw up a written report and report the transaction and the action taken, whether the transaction is complete or not (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.7(1)–(3)). The NFIU’s December 2024 STR guidelines read the 24 hours as running from when the transaction is found suspicious, after an examination of no more than 72 hours, and require written reasons for every alert closed as not suspicious (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, Part Six, para 2).

  • Senegal. CENTIF Sénégal’s 2024 report describes a mobile-money agent who used elderly people’s identities to create and control e-money accounts, then “effectue des transferts vers d’autres utilisateurs avec qui il partage le même appareil” (makes transfers to other users with whom he shares the same device) (Cas 4).

    Reporting deadline

    Report to the CENTIF “immédiatement” (Loi uniforme 2023, art. 60). The law defines “sans délai” as at most 24 hours (art. 2, point 58); “immédiatement” is not defined, and our reading is to treat 24 hours as the outer limit. Do not carry out an operation you suspect until the report is made, and then only if the CENTIF has not opposed it, or if no court decision has reached you within the four days an opposition lasts (arts. 61 and 65). If it has already gone through, inform the CENTIF “sans délai” (art. 61). In Senegal the uniform law applies through Loi n° 2024-08 of 14 February 2024, which keeps the article numbers cited here.

  • West Africa (GIABA). GIABA’s 2025 cybercrime typologies list “Use of mobile phone numbers registered in other people’s names” among the methods of mobile-money fraud, with cases of one person holding many SIM cards: one used “several sim cards” and replaced each when it reached its withdrawal limit; in another, a buyer supplied “five different IDs for the activation of the sim cards” and was later found with 27 SIM cards.

  • Kenya. CBK’s 2013 mobile payment AML guidelines say the provider “should link the different accounts held by a single account holder and keep records of the same” (para 3.2(c)). That is one person with several accounts (see “One person, two ids” under “False positives and tuning”) rather than sharing across customers.

    Reporting deadline

    Within two days after the suspicion arose (POCAMLA s.44(2), as replaced by the AML/CFT Laws (Amendment) Act 2023, Act No. 10 of 2023).

  • South Africa. The FIC’s 2024 money-mule report describes how mule accounts come under someone else’s control: account holders “handing over their bank card, account number and/or the login details to another person”. For companies it lists “similar or shared directorships and signatories”.

    Reporting deadline

    As soon as possible, and no later than 15 days excluding weekends and public holidays (FIC Act s.29; MLTF Control Regulations, reg. 24(3), via FIC Guidance Note 4B para 71). The 15 days run from when you became aware of the facts, which “may be, and in the majority of cases will be, before a suspicion is formed” (GN4B para 80), and an institution “may not add additional timeframes for its internal transactional monitoring alert system processes, and / or internal investigation and review processes to the prescribed reporting period” (GN4B para 81).

  • Ghana. “Persons involved in currency transactions share an address or phone number, particularly when the address is also a business location or does not seem to correspond to the stated occupation” is a terrorist financing red flag in the BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025 (Appendix E, 6a), and identifying it “shall put AIs on enquiry and provoke further investigation” (Appendix E, introduction). The Guideline’s general fraud duties apply too: institutions licensed by the Bank of Ghana must “ensure that effective systems and policies are in place to detect and curb fraud activities” (2.14(2)) and “acquire or develop a fraud detection tool” (2.14(4)(ii)).

    Reporting deadline

    Within 24 hours of the suspicion, attempted transactions included, whatever the amount (BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.8.1(6) and 2.8.3(2)).

  • Canada. FINTRAC’s indicator: “Common identifiers (e.g. addresses, phone numbers, etc.) are used by multiple clients that do not appear to be related.”

    Reporting deadline

    File “as soon as practicable” after the measures that establish reasonable grounds to suspect (FINTRAC STR guidance, section 4).

  • United Kingdom. The FCA’s 2023 review of money-mule controls says firms “should review customers who are using 1 device to access multiple accounts to verify if their reasoning is genuine, such as being members of the same household”, and found “some firms onboarding multiple customers using the same physical address.”

    Reporting deadline

    Disclose to your nominated officer or to a person authorised by the National Crime Agency “as soon as is practicable” after the information comes to you (Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s.330(4)).

  • EU. For e-money issuers, the EBA risk factor guidelines describe monitoring systems that “can identify patterns such as the same funding instrument or the same contact details” and that “link e-money products to devices or IP addresses” (EBA/GL/2021/02, para 10.14).

  • Argentina. Three of the circumstances to weigh in alerts are shared identifiers: one natural person as authorised signatory on “numerosas cuentas a la vez, pertenecientes a diferentes personas o empresas” (many accounts at once, belonging to different people or companies) with no apparent justification; “el mismo domicilio en cabeza de distintas personas o estructuras jurídicas” (the same address held by different persons or legal structures) with no economic or legal reason; and “operaciones de distintas cuentas asociadas o vinculadas con un mismo dispositivo electrónico” (operations of different accounts linked to the same electronic device) with no apparent justification (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 34(b), circumstances 11, 14 and 15). Identity theft, which shared identifiers often reveal, is circumstance 9.

    Reporting deadline

    Money laundering, within 24 hours of concluding that the operation is suspicious, and no later than 90 calendar days from the operation, performed or attempted; terrorist financing and proliferation financing, within 24 hours of the operation (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 36(c)).

False positives and tuning

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Common innocent explanations: families sharing a phone, a device or a card; a parent paying for children’s accounts; flatmates at one address; a shop or agent whose phone or device serves many customers; a business account paying many staff or suppliers; an exchange, payment processor or biller whose account or deposit address appears for many customers; your own test cards and test devices.

Typical causes of misfires:

  • Hub identifiers. An exchange deposit address, a biller’s account, a platform’s IBAN or an agent’s phone connects hundreds of unrelated customers. Allowlist known businesses and review any identifier above a ceiling once, not per customer.
  • Households at two. Lowering the threshold from three customers to two brings in many households sharing a phone, a device or a card. Start at three, and use the identity-conflict variant for pairs.
  • Placeholder values. Empty or “N/A” email addresses, default or zeroed device IDs, emulator and fallback device IDs, a switchboard number entered for every staff account: values that identify no one behave like hubs but sit on no hub list. Drop empty, placeholder and known non-unique values before counting, and treat a device ID on an implausible number of customers as a data fault until shown otherwise.
  • Shared IP addresses. Internet providers may run a service where “a public IPv4 address would be shared by many subscribers” (RFC 6888), and office and public Wi-Fi networks also put many people behind one address. The FATF indicators speak of a “single static IP address” (FATF, INTERPOL and Egmont) and of transfers to the same virtual-asset account “from the same IP address by one or more persons” (FATF). Use an IP address only where it is static or residential, and only alongside another shared identifier.
  • Wrong role. A payer’s or contact person’s identifier stored as if it were the customer’s own creates links between customers who never shared anything. Keep identifiers attached to the role they play.
  • A contact person’s name is not an identity. When two customers name the same emergency contact or reference, relatives write that person’s name differently (nicknames, order, partial names), so a name check on the contact fires on families. Compare the customers’ own ID numbers, faces and devices, not the names they give for someone else.
  • One person, two ids. Some “shared” identifiers are the same customer under two internal ids (re-registration, a migration). Take them out of the sharing count, and send them to a duplicate-account check rather than dropping them: a re-registration after a declined or overdue account is a risk of its own.
  • Normalisation. Without it, sharing is invisible: phone numbers arrive with and without country codes or in different lengths, IBANs with spaces or lower case, and email providers that ignore dots let one inbox register many “different” addresses. One inbox can sit behind many accounts that show as unrelated until emails are normalised to the inbox. Cards are the same: a payment token “can be provisioned to a specific device, merchant, or for a specific use case” (EMVCo), so one card saved by two customers can carry two tokens; compare a fingerprint of the card number instead.
  • Links without a date. If uses carry no date, an old link counts forever, and a backtest can miss links that existed at the time. Store when each customer used each identifier.
  • A silent zero. A rule that cannot evaluate an event reports no alerts, so check that a quiet rule is running, not failing.
  • Identity conflict beats raw sharing. Two people sharing a phone, a device or a card is common and says little. One national ID number under two names or dates of birth, or one face under two ID numbers, is not ordinary sharing. Rank identity conflicts above plain sharing.

How to tune: normalise every identifier; drop placeholder values; keep the role; allowlist hubs and your own test instruments; start at three customers per identifier and two for identity conflicts; add a recency window; leave hubs out before building clusters and set the cluster size from your own data; group members of one cluster into one case.

When it fires

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Analyst checklist:

  1. List the customers sharing the identifier: names, ID numbers, onboarding dates, devices, and whether they transact with each other.
  2. Decide whether it is a household, a business, a hub or a network. Matching surnames and one address suggest a family; unrelated names, sequential sign-ups, and accounts opened within hours or days of each other suggest a farm.
  3. Look at the money: do the linked accounts receive from the same senders, pay the same beneficiaries, or drain quickly (see Rapid pass-through and Funnel account)?
  4. Check other identifiers in the cluster and whether any member has a fraud report, a chargeback, a default or a recall.
  5. Contact the account holders where appropriate. Mules often say they were offered a job, a loan or payment for “receiving money”.
  6. Escalate the cluster as one case when the links are unexplained, especially when money flows through it.

An alert is a reason to review, not a suspicion in itself: the NFIU’s 2024 STR guidelines call monitoring alerts “unusual” and say they “should not be automatically regarded as suspicious” (Part Three, paras 1–2). Under the FATF standard, suspicious transactions are reported regardless of amount, attempted transactions included (Interpretive Note to Recommendation 20, para 3). Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.

Sources

25 sourcesHide
  1. FINTRAC, “Money laundering and terrorist financing indicators—Financial entities”, modified 24 November 2025, “ML/TF indicators related to identifying the person or entity” (“Common identifiers (e.g. addresses, phone numbers, etc.) are used by multiple clients that do not appear to be related”; “There are inconsistencies in the identification documents or different identifiers provided by the client, such as name, address, date of birth or phone number”). https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/indicators-indicateurs/fin_mltf-eng
  2. FINTRAC, “Reporting suspicious transactions to FINTRAC”, modified 22 May 2025, section 4. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/str-dod/str-dod-eng
  3. FATF, INTERPOL and Egmont Group, “Illicit Financial Flows from Cyber-Enabled Fraud”, November 2023: para 23; Box 15 (a network of 147 individuals and 276 bank accounts detected through common device IDs and contact details); Annex A, “Suspicion in account user’s identity” (“Single static IP address or electronic device associated with multiple accounts of various account holders”). https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Illicit-financial-flows-cyber-enabled-fraud.pdf
  4. FATF, “Virtual Assets: Red Flag Indicators of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing”, September 2020, p.8: frequent transfers to the same VA account “from the same IP address by one or more persons”. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Virtual-Assets-Red-Flag-Indicators.pdf
  5. FCA, “Proceeds of fraud – Detecting and preventing money mules”, multi-firm review, 19 October 2023 (last updated 3 December 2025), “Areas that need improvement – Onboarding”. https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/multi-firm-reviews/proceeds-fraud-detecting-preventing-money-mules
  6. EBA, ML/TF Risk Factors Guidelines (EBA/GL/2021/02, consolidated with EBA/GL/2023/03), Guideline 10, para 10.14. The later amendment EBA/GL/2024/01 changes Guideline 10 only at para 10.2. https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2023-11/EBA%20GL%202021%2002%20-%20consolidated%20%28amended%20by%20EBA%20GL%202023%2003%29_EN.pdf
  7. NFIU, “Money Laundering Typologies Through Fraud in Nigeria”, December 2023, bank and money transfer operator responses. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng (Trends & Typologies)
  8. NFIU, “Guidelines for the Identification, Verification and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions Related to ML/FT/PF for Financial Institutions”, STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, 13 December 2024, Part Three paras 1–2 and Part Six para 2. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance
  9. Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 (Nigeria), s.7(1)–(3). https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/LawsAndRegulations
  10. Central Bank of Nigeria, Baseline Standards for Automated Anti-Money Laundering, Combating the Financing of Terrorism and Countering Proliferation Financing Solutions, circular BSD/DIR/PUB/LAB/019/002, 10 March 2026, section 5.5(a)(v). Supports the Nigeria entry. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/CBN%20issues%20Baseline%20Standards%20for%20Automated%20Anti-Money%20Laundering%20Solution.pdf
  11. GIABA, “Typologies of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Linked to Cybercrime in West Africa”, May 2025: Typology 6 methods, p.40; Case 4, p.34; Case 6, p.39; p.43. https://www.giaba.org/typologies/3495__typologies-of-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-linked-to-cybercrime-in-west-africa.html
  12. CENTIF Sénégal, Rapport d’activités 2024 (May 2025), Cas 4, pp.38–39. https://www.vie-publique.sn/docs/17b18584-068f-42ee-980e-5e3c2c65d137/centif-2024.pdf
  13. UEMOA, Loi uniforme relative à la LBC/FT/FP (March 2023), arts. 2 (point 58), 60, 61 and 65. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Loi-uniforme-LBCFTFP-Mars-2023-vf.pdf
  14. Central Bank of Kenya, “The National Payment System (Anti-Money Laundering Guidelines for the Provision of Mobile Payment Services) Guidelines, 2013”, para 3.2(c). https://www.centralbank.go.ke/images/docs/NPS/Regulations%20and%20Guidelines/Guidelines%20-%20Mobile%20money%20AML%20Guidelines.pdf
  15. Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism Financing Laws (Amendment) Act, 2023 (Kenya, Act No. 10 of 2023), amending POCAMLA s.44(2). https://brs.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/AntiMoneyLaunderingandCombatingofTerrorismFinancingLawsAmendmentAct2023.pdf
  16. FIC South Africa, Guidance Note 4B on reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions and activities, 26 March 2019, para 71 (reporting period, MLTF Control Regulations reg. 24(3)), para 80 (when the period starts) and para 81 (no time added for internal alert processes). https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019.03-Guidance-Guidance-Note-4B-STRs.pdf
  17. FIC South Africa, “Financial Crime Insights: Money mules”, June 2024, pp.8–9. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Financial-Crime-Insights-Money-mules.pdf
  18. Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (United Kingdom), s.330(4). https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/29/section/330
  19. FATF, The FATF Recommendations, Interpretive Note to Recommendation 20, para 3, read in the October 2025 edition (the FATF’s page now gives the Recommendations “as amended June 2026”). https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Fatf-recommendations.html
  20. IETF, RFC 6888, “Common Requirements for Carrier-Grade NATs (CGNs)”, April 2013, section 1. https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6888
  21. EMVCo, “EMV Payment Tokenisation” quick reference guide, 2024. https://emvco.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/FINAL_TOKENISATION-QRG-1.pdf
  22. Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 200/2024 (RESOL-2024-200-APN-UIF#MJ), 18 December 2024, Boletín Oficial no. 35571, 19 December 2024, art. 34(b), circumstances 9, 11, 14 and 15; art. 36(c) (report deadlines). https://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/405000-409999/407429/norma.htm
  23. Central Bank of Nigeria, Payments System Policy Department, Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, November 2026, issued by circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004 of 5 November 2026, in force that day (circular, section 4.0); sections 10.3.3, 10.3.4, 37.13 and Schedule 7, Part F, item 26. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/REGULATIONS%20FOR%20THE%20OPERATIONS%20OF%20NON-SECURITY%20VIRTUAL%20ASSETS%20IN%20NIGERIA.pdf
  24. Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism / Combating Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Accountable Institutions, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 12 December 2025, 2.14(2), 2.14(4)(ii) and Appendix E, introduction and red flag 6a. https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/BOG-FIC-AML-GUIDELINE-2025-FINAL-5-TO-BE-PUBLISHED.pdf
  25. Senegal, Loi n° 2024-08 du 14 février 2024 relative à la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux, le financement du terrorisme et de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive, Journal officiel n° 7716, 20 March 2024, Art. 2 (point 58), 60, 61, 65. https://www.vie-publique.sn/documents/348/JO-7716-du-20-mars-2024

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