Money laundering
Insider risk (staff in reported cases or acting outside their role)
A member of staff keeps turning up in cases later reported as suspicious, or does things in the back office that their role does not include.
What it catches
Staff who help criminals from the inside. Every other rule in this library looks at customers and the people they pay. This one looks at the institution’s own people: employees, officers, directors, and others who act in its name, such as attorneys holding its power of attorney or agents who onboard customers. It has two tests:
- Involvement in reported cases. The same person keeps turning up in the history of customers or operations later reported as suspicious: they onboarded the customer, approved the identity check, raised the limit, cleared an earlier alert or approved the payment. Mexico’s provisions for fintech institutions name this circumstance: a director, officer, employee or attorney who, “sin causa justificada” (without justified cause), “haya intervenido de manera reiterada en la realización de Operaciones que hayan sido reportadas como Operaciones Inusuales” (has repeatedly taken part in operations reported as unusual).
- Acting outside the role. A person does things their job does not include: a marketing employee changing a customer’s limit, a support agent unblocking an account, someone exporting customer data with no case open. The same provisions name “una falta de correspondencia entre las funciones que se le encomendaron … y las actividades que de hecho lleva a cabo” (a mismatch between the functions assigned and the activities actually carried out), again without justified cause.
The rule finds a pattern in the institution’s own records, not a crime. Most hits have an innocent reason: a person who handles the riskiest customers will see more reported cases, and a person covering for an absent colleague does work outside their role. An analyst in compliance, not the person’s manager, decides which is which.
How the rule works
The rule needs two things that transaction monitoring does not usually see: who did each step, and what each person’s role allows. It joins the back-office audit log (every action a person takes on a customer, an operation or a setting) with the case register (which customers and operations were reported, and when) and the staff directory (each person’s role and duties).
Looks at
Every action a person takes in the back office, and every case closed with a suspicious or unusual transaction report.
Counts
- Reported cases per person: the cases reported in the look-back window in whose history the person took a step before the case opened: onboarding or approving the customer, approving an operation, changing a limit or the customer’s details, clearing an earlier alert on that customer, or adding the customer to a whitelist or exemption, or changing a rule or threshold that applies to them.
- Work per person: how many customers and operations the person handled in the same window, so that a busy person is not mistaken for a suspicious one.
- Actions against the role: each action compared with the duties of the person’s role, and the person’s rate of sensitive actions (limit changes, overrides, unblocking, changes of contact details, data exports, and any action on a customer under open investigation by someone outside the investigating team) compared with others in the same role.
Leaves out
- From the count of reported cases, steps taken after a case opened, such as investigating it or filing the report: compliance staff take part in every reported case by design.
- From the count of reported cases, cases the person raised themselves: reporting a concern is what staff are asked to do.
- Steps done by the system with no person behind them. A step the system took under a whitelist, an exemption or a rule change counts for the person who made that change.
- Test accounts and test transactions, labelled as such before the rule runs.
Alerts when
Either of these is true:
- A person took part in at least your minimum number of reported cases, and their share of reported cases among the work they handled is well above their peers’.
- A person takes an action their role’s duties do not include, or takes sensitive actions at about twice the rate of others in the same role.
How often
At most one alert per person per test per look-back window. Alerts go to a queue only compliance can see, never to the person’s manager.
Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.
Look-back window How far back to count reported cases and actions. Make it long enough that a typical person in the role has handled enough work for a share to mean something; reported cases take weeks or months to close, so a short window misses most of them. Set it from your own case volumes.
Minimum number of reported cases Mexico’s provisions say “repeatedly” and set no number. Set a floor from your own data so that one or two cases, which anyone handling risky customers will meet, do not alert on their own.
Peer comparison Compare each person with others doing the same job on similar customers, not with the whole staff: people who onboard high-risk customers see more reported cases. No public source gives a multiple; set it from your own spread of shares.
Rate of sensitive actions Start at about twice the average rate of others in the same role. That starting value is given publicly for overrides; it is used here for the other sensitive actions too. Overrides and changes have honest uses, so alert on a person who stands out from their peers, not on every one.
Common variants:
- One action that should never happen. Some actions alert on their own, whatever the rate: the same person creating a payee or changing a customer’s details and then approving a payment to it; a person acting on their own account or a relative’s; a person acting under another person’s log-on. With proper separation of duties these should be impossible, so any instance means a control failed.
- Outside working hours. Back-office actions or customer record views at times the person’s role does not work.
- Looking without working. A person viewing many customer records with no case, request or operation to explain it.
- Staff and customers. Payments between staff accounts and customer accounts, or a staff member’s phone, device, address or bank account appearing on customers’ records (see Shared identifiers across customers).
- Staff as customers. Where staff hold accounts at the institution, run the customer rules on a staff segment. Ghana and Nigeria require staff accounts to go through the same AML procedures as customers’ accounts, under the compliance officer’s supervision; Argentina requires staff operations to be part of a specific monitoring procedure that only the compliance officer’s team can see. Ghana also asks for attention to staff whose lifestyle their salary cannot support, as does Mexico (see By country), so a comparison of what comes into the account with the person’s known salary fits here.
- Agents. The same two tests on agents who onboard customers or handle cash for the institution, with the agent’s id in place of the staff id.
Data it needs
ShowHide
Most of this data lives outside the systems that run transaction monitoring: in the staff directory, the access-control policy, the back-office tool and the case register. The first job is to bring it together.
| Field | Usually comes from | If it’s missing |
|---|---|---|
| Staff id (one per person, never shared) | identity provider or HR system | Required. A shared log-on, a generic “admin” or a service account makes every action anonymous, and the rule cannot run. Names alone do not work: many staff share a name with customers or with each other. |
| Role, department and manager | HR system | Required for the peer comparison and to keep alerts away from the person’s own manager. Keep the history: a person who changed role must be judged against the role they held at the time. |
| Duties of each role (what the role is meant to do) | access-control policy, job descriptions | Required for the out-of-role test. System permissions are often wider than duties (“admin” for everyone in operations); compare actions with duties, not only with permissions. |
| Back-office audit log: actor, action, target customer or operation, before and after values, timestamp, who approved it; changes to rules, thresholds, whitelists and exemptions, with who made them | back-office tool, core banking, card or wallet platform, case management, the monitoring system’s own change log | Required. If the log records only that a setting changed and not who changed it, neither test can run. Logs that are overwritten or kept only a few weeks cut the look-back short. |
| Actor on customer lifecycle steps: onboarding, identity check decision, limit change, alert disposition, payment approval | onboarding and KYC tools, case management | Required for the involvement test. Without it the rule sees reported cases but not who handled them. |
| Case outcome and report date (reported as suspicious or unusual, closed, open) | case management or the register of reports filed | Required for the involvement test. Use the date the case opened to tell steps before it from investigation steps after it. |
| Test accounts and test transactions | product and engineering teams | Needed: staff testing a product with their own cards or accounts look exactly like staff paying customers. |
| Staff’s own accounts at the institution | core banking or wallet platform, matched on the staff id | Needed for the staff-as-customers variant. |
| Phones, addresses and bank accounts staff have declared, and the institution’s work devices | HR system, device inventory, matched to customer records | Needed for the staff-and-customers variant. Use what the institution already holds lawfully; this variant does not call for collecting staff’s personal devices. |
| Declared relatives and other conflicts of interest | conflict-of-interest declarations | Needed to catch a person acting on a relative’s account. |
| Working hours or shifts per role, and dates of annual leave (not the reason for an absence) | HR or rota system | Optional. Needed for the outside-hours variant and for the “never takes leave” sign. |
| Agent id on onboardings and cash operations | agent network management | Needed for the agents variant. |
The data is sensitive. Staff monitoring data and its alerts should be visible only to compliance (Argentina requires this for staff transaction monitoring, and Mexico requires the channel for staff reports to keep them from the reporting person’s line manager and from the people named in them), and employment and data protection law may limit what can be collected and how; check both before switching the rule on.
Thresholds
Each row is a setting the rule needs. Set by law values come from the source named under “Where it comes from”. Suggested values are starting points: test them on your own history, then adjust.
| Parameter | Value | Type | Where it comes from |
|---|---|---|---|
| Minimum number of reported cases per person | set from your own data | Suggested | Mexico’s provisions ask for “repeatedly” (de manera reiterada) and set no number. A floor stops one or two cases, which anyone handling risky customers will meet, from alerting on their own. |
| Share of reported cases against peers | well above peers in the same role; set from your own spread | Suggested | No public source gives a multiple. Compare like with like: people who handle high-risk customers see more reported cases. |
| Rate of sensitive actions against peers | about twice the peer average | Suggested | A starting value. A public rule list gives an override rate two or more times the peer-group average; used here for the other sensitive actions too. Lower catches more but adds people covering for colleagues; higher misses a person who stays just under it. |
| Look-back window | set from your own case volumes | Suggested | No public source gives a value. Reported cases can take weeks or months to close, so the window must be long enough to hold them. |
| Amount (United States, banks) | none: insider abuse is reported “regardless of the amount involved” | Set by law | 12 CFR 21.11(c)(1) (national banks), 12 CFR 208.62(c)(1) (state member banks), 12 CFR 353.3(a)(1) (FDIC-supervised institutions). |
By country
Mexico. For fintech institutions (crowdfunding and e-money institutions, ITFs), conduct of the institution’s own board members, sole administrator, shareholders, partners, owners, directors, officers, attorneys and employees, whatever the form of their engagement, that could breach or evade the law or the provisions, or is doubtful because it could favour, or fail to flag, terrorist financing or money laundering, is an Internal Concerning Operation (Operación Interna Preocupante) and is reported like an unusual operation (SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, arts. 2(XXII) and 75). To decide which operations are Internal Concerning Operations, the institution must consider, among others and whether they occur alone or together, these circumstances (art. 75): a director, officer, employee or attorney “mantiene un nivel de vida notoriamente superior al que le correspondería, de acuerdo con los ingresos que percibe de ella” (keeps a standard of living notably above what their pay from the institution would allow) (I); “sin causa justificada, … haya intervenido de manera reiterada en la realización de Operaciones que hayan sido reportadas como Operaciones Inusuales” (without justified cause, has repeatedly taken part in operations reported as unusual) (II); suspicion that the person may have committed acts or operations that could amount to terrorist financing or money laundering (III); and “sin causa justificada, exista una falta de correspondencia entre las funciones que se le encomendaron … y las actividades que de hecho lleva a cabo” (without justified cause, a mismatch between the functions assigned and the activities actually carried out) (IV). Circumstances II and IV are this rule’s two tests. The automated systems must give staff a secure, confidential and auditable way to report possible unusual or internal concerning operations to the relevant internal areas (art. 56(X)), and the channel to the Compliance Officer’s area must ensure that the reporting person’s line manager and the people named “no tengan conocimiento de este” (do not learn of it) (art. 91). These provisions cover fintech institutions only.
Reporting deadline
The Communication and Control Committee rules on an internal concerning operation within 60 calendar days of its detection by the institution’s system, model, process or any employee, whichever comes first, and the report goes to SHCP, through the CNBV, within 3 business days of the end of that session (art. 75).
United States. Banks file a suspicious activity report for “Insider abuse involving any amount”: a known or suspected federal criminal violation against the bank or through it, where the bank “has a substantial basis for identifying one of its directors, officers, employees, agents or other institution-affiliated parties as having committed or aided in the commission of a criminal act, regardless of the amount involved in the violation” (12 CFR 21.11(c)(1) for national banks and federal branches and agencies of foreign banks; 12 CFR 208.62(c)(1) for state member banks; 12 CFR 353.3(a)(1) for FDIC-supervised institutions).
Reporting deadline
No later than 30 calendar days after the initial detection of facts that may constitute a basis for filing. Only if no suspect was identified on the date of detection may the bank take 30 more days to identify one, never more than 60 days after initial detection; where the bank already has a substantial basis for identifying the insider, that extra time does not apply. Where a violation needs immediate attention, such as when it is ongoing, the bank also notifies law enforcement and its regulator immediately by telephone (12 CFR 21.11(d); 208.62(d); 353.3(b)).
United Kingdom. The FCA’s Financial Crime Guide, which applies to firms under its financial crime rules and to e-money and payment institutions, gives as good practice that “To guard against insider fraud, staff in high risk positions (e.g. finance department, trading floor) are subject to enhanced vetting and closer scrutiny” and that “‘Four eyes’ procedures … are in place” (FCG 4.2.1). Its Financial Crime Thematic Reviews, in the chapter on the 2010 review of small firms by its predecessor the FSA, which applies to small firms and to small e-money and payment institutions, give as poor practice a firm that “had the same computer log-on used by all staff in the office no matter what their role” (FCTR 10.3.17G). Both are guidance, not rules.
Ghana. Institutions licensed by the Bank of Ghana monitor employees’ accounts for potential signs of money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing, pay particular attention to employees “whose lifestyles cannot be supported by their salary or known financial circumstances”, and their internal procedures “shall provide for special investigation of employees who are associated with unexplained shortages of funds”. Employees’ accounts, key management’s included, go through the same AML/CFT/CPF procedures as customers’ accounts under the AMLRO’s supervision, and the AMLRO’s own account is reviewed by the Internal Auditor or a designated senior officer. Compliance reports include a lifestyle audit and findings on employees’ accounts, due to the Bank of Ghana and the FIC by 15 July (half-year) and 15 January (BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.11.1(1)–(4)). The red flags of the Guideline include “Employee fails to comply with approved operating guidelines, particularly in private banking” and “Employee is reluctant to take a vacation” (Appendix E, 7b and 7c).
Reporting deadline
Within 24 hours of the suspicion, attempted transactions included, whatever the amount (BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.8.1(6) and 2.8.3(2)).
Nigeria. Financial institutions supervised by the CBN “shall monitor their employees’ accounts for potential signs of ML, TF and PF” and subject them to the same AML, CFT and CPF procedures as other customers’ accounts, under the supervision of the Chief Compliance Officer, whose own account is reviewed by the Chief Internal Auditor or a person of similar seniority. Compliance reports including the findings go to the CBN and the NFIU at the end of June and December every year (CBN AML/CFT/CPF Regulations 2022, reg. 42(1)–(4)).
Reporting deadline
Report to the NFIU immediately, with a written report within 24 hours (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.7(1)–(2)). The NFIU’s December 2024 STR guidelines start the 24 hours once the transaction is found suspicious, after an examination of no more than 72 hours (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, Part Six, para 2).
Argentina. For payment service providers and non-financial lenders, monitoring of the operations that directors, managers, employees and contractors carry out through the institution or its group, according to their risk grading, “deben formar parte del procedimiento específico de monitoreo de operaciones, al que podrán acceder únicamente el oficial de cumplimiento y el equipo de soporte que ejecuta las tareas correspondientes” (must be part of a specific transaction monitoring procedure, which only the Compliance Officer and the support team doing that work may access) (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 20).
Reporting deadline
Money laundering, within 24 hours of concluding that the operation is suspicious, and no later than 90 calendar days from the operation, performed or attempted; terrorist financing and proliferation financing, within 24 hours of the operation (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 36(c)).
False positives and tuning
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Common innocent explanations: a person who handles the institution’s riskiest customers or products; a team lead who approves for the whole team; a person covering for a colleague on leave, or moved to new duties before the role records were updated; compliance and fraud staff, whose job is to touch suspicious cases; an engineer fixing a customer’s record during an incident; staff testing a new product with their own accounts and cards.
Typical causes of misfires:
- Counting the investigation. If steps taken after the case opened count as involvement, compliance analysts top every list. Count only steps before the case opened.
- Counting the people who report. A person who spots trouble and raises it took a step before the case opened. Leave out cases the person raised, or the rule ranks highest the staff who report.
- Counting what is not a report. A block or list entry applied automatically by another rule is not a reported case. Counted as one, it measures that rule, not the person.
- Comparing unlike jobs. A person who onboards business customers or works a high-risk queue will have more reported cases than one who handles salaried individuals. Compare each person with peers on the same work.
- Comparing different periods. Outcomes often arrive in batches, such as a clean-up of old files or a new blocking rule, that fall on customers taken on in a few months. A person who was busiest then looks worse than their peers. Compare each person with peers on customers taken on in the same months.
- Floors and chance. A minimum number of cases together with a share well above peers means a person who handles little work can never alert. A test of whether the gap could be chance, used alone, does the reverse: the busiest people reach it on small gaps. Use both: a gap with peers large enough to matter, and a test that it is not chance.
- Permissions wider than duties. Where everyone in operations has “admin”, the out-of-role test has nothing to compare with. Write down each role’s duties first; the gap between permissions and duties is itself a finding.
- Shared and service log-ons. Actions done under a shared account, a generic admin or an automated job cannot be put on a person. Count them and fix them before trusting the rule.
- Staff matched by name. A list of staff names matches many customers with the same name. Match staff on a staff id, phone number, account number or device instead.
- Test traffic. Staff testing payments or new set-ups with their own cards and accounts look like staff moving money to customers, and fire customer rules too. Label test accounts and transactions before the rule runs.
- Staff flags and lists never filled. Customer records often have a field meant to mark staff that nobody fills, and a rule that matches against a staff list never fires if the list was never loaded. Check both before relying on them to build the staff segment.
- Support devices. Devices that support staff use to reproduce a customer’s problem log in to many customers’ accounts and link them together in device rules. Keep a list of support devices.
How to tune: start with the one-off actions that should never happen, which need no threshold; build peer groups by role, type of work and period; count only pre-case steps that the person did not raise themselves; agree what counts as a justified cause (covering, incidents) and record it with the action, so the rule can skip it; and review the alerts with someone who knows the team’s work, inside compliance.
When it fires
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Analyst checklist:
- Keep the alert and the case inside compliance; do not tell the person or their manager about it. Mexico requires the same for the reports staff send through its internal channel: the reporting person’s line manager and the people named must not learn of them (art. 91).
- List the reported cases and the actions behind the alert, with dates, and what the person did in each.
- Check whether there is a justified cause: the person’s queue or portfolio, covering for someone, an incident, a manager’s written instruction, a role change not yet recorded.
- Compare with peers on the same work over the same period.
- Look for links between the person and the customers in the cases: shared phones, devices, addresses or bank accounts, payments between them, or the same introducer.
- Look at the person’s other signs where the law allows: unexplained wealth or shortages, refusal to take leave, actions outside hours, access under another person’s log-on.
- Escalate to the body that rules on reports (in Mexico, the Communication and Control Committee) when there is no justified cause. Preserve the audit log before anyone is told.
An alert is a reason to review, not a finding about a person. Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.
Related rules
- Shared identifiers across customers: a staff member’s phone, device or account on customers’ records.
- Account takeover: back-office changes to a customer’s contact details look like a takeover from outside.
- Internal watchlist match: former staff dismissed for misconduct, matched if they come back as customers or counterparties.
- Sudden change from baseline and Cumulative amount over a period: run on staff accounts, the staff-as-customers variant.
Sources
11 sourcesHide
- Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Mexico), “Disposiciones de carácter general a que se refiere el Artículo 58 de la Ley para Regular las Instituciones de Tecnología Financiera”, DOF 10/09/2018, arts. 2(XXII), 56(X), 75 and 91. https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5537449&fecha=10/09/2018
- 12 CFR 21.11, “Suspicious Activity Report” (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, national banks), paragraphs (c)(1) and (d), eCFR, read 12 November 2026. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-12/chapter-I/part-21/subpart-B/section-21.11
- 12 CFR 208.62, “Suspicious activity reports” (Federal Reserve, state member banks), paragraphs (c)(1) and (d), eCFR, read 12 November 2026. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-12/chapter-II/subchapter-A/part-208/subpart-F/section-208.62
- 12 CFR 353.3, “Reports and records” (FDIC-supervised institutions), paragraphs (a)(1) and (b), eCFR, read 12 November 2026. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-12/chapter-III/subchapter-B/part-353/section-353.3
- Financial Conduct Authority, FCA Handbook, Financial Crime Guide: A firm’s guide to countering financial crime risks (FCG), May 2026 release, FCG 4.1.1 and FCG 4.2.1 (examples of good practice). https://handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/fcg4/fcg4s2
- Financial Conduct Authority, FCA Handbook, Financial Crime Thematic Reviews (FCTR), May 2026 release, FCTR 10.1.1, 10.1.2 and 10.3.17G (Staff/Internal fraud). https://handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/fctr10/fctr10s3
- Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism / Combating Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Accountable Institutions, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 12 December 2025, 2.8.1(6), 2.8.3(2), 2.11.1(1)–(4) and Appendix E, red flags 7b and 7c. https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/BOG-FIC-AML-GUIDELINE-2025-FINAL-5-TO-BE-PUBLISHED.pdf
- Central Bank of Nigeria, AML/CFT/CPF of WMD in Financial Institutions Regulations, 2022 (Official Gazette No. 94, Vol. 109, 20 May 2022), reg. 42 (Gazette p. B 2093). https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2022/FPRD/AML%20CIRCULAR%20AND%20REGULATIONS%20MERGED.pdf
- Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 (Nigeria), s.7(1)–(2). https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/LawsAndRegulations
- NFIU, “Guidelines for the Identification, Verification and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions Related to ML/FT/PF for Financial Institutions”, STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, 13 December 2024, Part Six para 2. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance
- Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 200/2024 (RESOL-2024-200-APN-UIF#MJ), 18 December 2024, Boletín Oficial no. 35571, 19 December 2024, arts. 1, 20 and 36(c). Text quoted from argentina.gob.ar (content licensed CC BY 4.0): https://www.argentina.gob.ar/normativa/nacional/norma-407429/texto
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The Fraud & AML Library is a practical reference, not legal advice. What binds is the regulator’s own text, which every rule and regulation page links.