Money laundering

Cumulative amount over a period (threshold aggregation)

A customer’s total over a day, a 24-hour window, or a month reaches a reporting line or the activity expected of them.

A customer’s transactions over a day, a 24-hour window, or a month add up to a total that reaches a reporting line or the activity expected of them Reporting line or expected activity Transactions Total reaches it Over a day, a 24-hour window, or a month

What it catches

This rule adds up a customer’s transactions over a window and alerts when the total reaches a set amount. It does two different jobs, and they should be kept apart:

  1. Threshold reporting. Several laws treat a series of smaller transactions as one transaction for reporting: the United States per business day, Canada within 24 hours, the UEMOA zone for linked operations, and France per calendar month. The rule finds the series so that the report is filed on time. Reaching the line is not, on its own, a suspicion.
  2. Behaviour. A customer moves far more in a month than their income, business or past activity explains. French supervisors give exactly this example: an automated system that detects “un montant total d’opérations sur une période donnée (mois, année) inhabituel ou incohérent avec les revenus ou le chiffre d’affaires du client” (ACPR-Tracfin guidelines, para 40).

The rule catches volume. It does not tell you whether the money is legitimate. Large, honest customers will cross any fixed line.

How the rule works

For each customer, sum the completed transactions of one kind and one direction inside the window, convert them to the reporting currency at a documented rate, and compare the total with the threshold. Alert once when the total crosses the threshold, not on every later transaction in the same window. For a regulatory report, keep every transaction in the window, including the small ones and those made after the alert, because the report lists them all: build or complete the report when the window closes, not from what the alert showed. FINTRAC’s worked examples of its 24-hour rule put transactions made after the line is reached, in the same window, into the same report.

The window has to match what the law says:

  • Fixed windows (a business day, a static 24-hour window you define, a calendar month) are what the reports use. In the United States, assign each transaction to its business day first: night, weekend and holiday deposits count on the next business day, so one business day can collect more than 24 clock hours of deposits.
  • A rolling window (ending at each transaction) is useful for alerting, if it is at least as long as the longest fixed window it stands in for: 24 hours for a 24-hour window, 31 days for a calendar month. Then every series that crosses the line inside a fixed window also crosses it inside the rolling window that ends at the series’ last transaction, because the whole series fits inside the rolling window. So the rolling window finds every fixed-window case, plus some series that straddle two fixed windows, which are not reportable where the report is built on a fixed window. A rolling 24 hours does not stand in for a US business day, which can be longer. Build the report on the window your regulator’s guidance describes (see Canada below, where it differs by report type).
  • Alerting again in a rolling window. A rolling window ends at every transaction, so “once per window” does not stop repeats. Alert again only once the rolling total has fallen back below the line, or once the transactions in the first alert have left the window.

Looks at

Every completed transaction, when it completes.

Measures

For each customer, kept separate by the role they play (the person carrying out the transaction, a third party it is done for, or the beneficiary), by direction (in or out) and by kind of transaction:

Every completed transaction in the local window that contains this one, small ones included. Duplicates are counted once, and each amount is converted to the reporting currency at a documented rate.

Alerts when

The total reaches the local line. Check whether your law says “more than” or “or more”.

For the behavioural job, the line is the customer’s declared or expected monthly volume and the window is longer: 7–90 days, or the calendar month.

How often

Once per customer, role, direction and kind of transaction in each fixed window. Later transactions in the same window do not alert again. With a rolling window, not again until the rolling total has fallen back below the line.

The alert shows

Every transaction in the window so far, small ones included. For a report, complete the list when the window closes: transactions made later in the same window belong in the same report.

Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.

For the behavioural job, compare the total with the customer’s own expected volume instead of the local line (declared income or turnover, or the segment’s usual monthly total) and use a longer window.

Data it needs

ShowHide
FieldUsually comes fromIf it’s missing
Amount and currencyledger or payment eventRequired.
Exchange rate and its sourcetreasury or FX feedRequired where amounts are in several currencies. Summing different currencies at 1:1 is wrong. Canada sets the rule for cash and electronic funds transfers; for virtual currency you set the rate and document it (see By country).
Timestamp, with time zonepayment eventRequired. Fixed windows need a stated time zone and start time.
Customer id and role (who conducted it, on whose behalf, who benefits)payment detailsCanada aggregates by conductor, third party or beneficiary. Without roles, aggregate by account holder and record that choice.
DirectionledgerRequired. Money in and money out are separate totals (France computes deposits and withdrawals separately; Canada reports incoming and outgoing transfers separately).
Transaction kind (cash, virtual currency, electronic funds transfer, mobile money)ledgerRequired. Each report covers one kind.
StatusprocessorCount completed transactions only.
Event or payment idsource systemNeeded to remove duplicates, which inflate sums.
Expected volume (declared income, turnover, limit)onboardingNeeded for the behavioural job. Without it, use segment percentiles.

Thresholds

Each row is a setting the rule needs. Set by law values come from the source named under “Where it comes from”. Suggested values are starting points: test them on your own history, then adjust.

ParameterValueTypeWhere it comes from
Regulatory threshold and windowthe local line and windowSet by lawSee By country
Behavioural window7 to 90 days, or the calendar monthSuggestedShorter windows catch bursts, longer ones catch slow build-ups. Use the calendar month where your terms or reports are monthly.
Behavioural thresholdthe customer’s declared or expected monthly volume; where none is recorded, a high percentile (for example the 99th) of monthly totals in the customer’s segmentSuggestedACPR-Tracfin para 40 (total inconsistent with income or turnover) and para 41 (thresholds set against the customer’s own history or the transactions of their peer group). A percentile of your own segment’s monthly totals fits the line to your book; a lower percentile alerts on more customers.
Early-warning tieran optional alert below the regulatory line, set by how many reviews the team can do before the line is reachedSuggestedNo public source gives a value.
History before trusting resultsat least one full windowSuggestedUntil a full window of data is loaded, the total measures how much history you have, not behaviour (see False positives)

By country

  • Canada. Report cash of CAD 10,000 or more received in a single transaction, or as two or more amounts within 24 consecutive hours, when you know they were conducted by the same person, on behalf of the same person, or for the same beneficiary; file within 15 calendar days (Large Cash Transaction Report, set by law, PCMLTFR s.126). Virtual currency receipts of CAD 10,000 or more follow the same rule with the same three keys, filed within 5 working days (Large Virtual Currency Transaction Report, set by law, s.129). Two or more international electronic funds transfers that total CAD 10,000 or more within 24 consecutive hours are also one transaction, filed within 5 working days, but the keys differ: transfers you initiate are grouped by the same requester, on behalf of the same person, or for the same beneficiary (s.127); transfers you finally receive only by the same requester or the same beneficiary (s.128). Some keys do not apply where the party is a public body, a listed corporation or trust with net assets of at least CAD 75 million, or the administrator of a regulated pension fund: requester and on-behalf-of for transfers initiated, beneficiary for transfers received and for virtual currency (set by law, ss.127(2), 128(2), 129(2); FINTRAC guidance, Sources 1–3 and 15). The regulations say “within 24 consecutive hours”. FINTRAC’s 24-hour rule guidance reads this as “a static 24-hour window” that you define (for example 9:00 Monday to 8:59 Tuesday), which can differ by business line, with no transaction in two windows. That guidance says it applies to large cash and virtual currency reports; for electronic funds transfers it tells you to keep applying its pre-June 2021 Interpretation Notice 4 until the new forms are available, and that notice describes a rolling 24-hour period, with a static window allowed where your system can only see one. FINTRAC’s newer electronic funds transfer guidance (June 2024) describes a static window. Document which window you use for each report and why. Convert foreign cash and foreign-currency transfers at the Bank of Canada rate in effect at the time of the transaction. For virtual currency, use the rate you set in the normal course of business and document how you set it.

    Reporting deadline

    Threshold report: cash within 15 calendar days, virtual currency and electronic funds transfers within 5 working days (FINTRAC). Suspicious transaction report: “as soon as practicable” after the measures that establish reasonable grounds to suspect (FINTRAC STR guidance, section 4).

  • United States. Multiple currency transactions are treated as one when the institution knows they are “by or on behalf of any person” and total more than USD 10,000 “during any one business day”. Night, weekend and holiday deposits count on the next business day (set by law, 31 CFR 1010.313(b)).

    Reporting deadline

    Threshold report: within 15 days of the transaction (31 CFR 1010.306(a)(1)). Suspicious transaction report: no later than 30 calendar days after initial detection (31 CFR 1020.320 for banks, 1022.320 for money services businesses). A bank that has not identified a suspect may take 30 more days to identify one, but never more than 60 days in all (31 CFR 1020.320(b)(3)).

  • WAEMU (UEMOA). Cash transactions of 15,000,000 FCFA or more are declared to the CENTIF, whether one operation or “plusieurs opérations qui apparaissent liées” (set by law, Uniform Law art. 72; Decision 021/2023 art. 8). Multiple cash transactions totalling more than 9,000,000 FCFA “en l’espace d’une journée, ou selon une fréquence inhabituelle” by or for the same person trigger identification and verification (set by law, Decision 021/2023 art. 3). A payment in cash or by bearer instrument whose “montant unitaire ou total” is 50,000,000 FCFA or more requires special examination, as does any operation of 10,000,000 FCFA or more made in unusually complex or unjustified conditions or with no apparent economic justification (set by law, Decision 021/2023 art. 4 a) and b)). The same art. 72 also covers the behavioural job: institutions apply enhanced vigilance to cash deposits and declare to the CENTIF any deposit whose amount, “pour une opération unique ou pour plusieurs opérations paraissant liées, est inhabituel ou sans rapport avec l’activité en cause” (set by law, Uniform Law art. 72, third paragraph). BCEAO Instruction 001-03-2025 (18 March 2025), whose Title I binds credit institutions, financial companies, microfinance institutions, e-money institutions, payment institutions and fintechs in the eight member states (art. 3), requires their information system to allow “le suivi des mouvements sur les comptes et la génération des alertes” (the monitoring of account movements and the generation of alerts) and “l’identification des transactions à caractère suspect ou inhabituel” (the identification of suspicious or unusual transactions), and “le recensement des opérations effectuées par un même client, qu’il soit occasionnel ou habituel” (a record of the operations carried out by the same customer, whether occasional or regular), which is the record a rule needs to add up linked operations. The system’s effectiveness is reviewed at least once a year (art. 6). Licensed bureaux de change must have a system that allows the same record of a customer’s operations and the identification of suspicious or unusual transactions (art. 15). WAEMU (UEMOA in French) is the West African Economic and Monetary Union: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, the same eight states that form the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). The BCEAO’s instructions and the Council of Ministers’ decisions cited here apply in all eight. The uniform law applies in each state through that state’s own act, which may number its articles differently. The law of a single state is covered only where that state is named.

    Reporting deadline

    Threshold report: declaration of cash transactions to the CENTIF (Uniform Law art. 72; we did not find a filing deadline for it in the texts we opened). Suspicious transaction report: report to the CENTIF “immédiatement” (Loi uniforme 2023, art. 60). The law defines “sans délai” as at most 24 hours (art. 2, point 58); “immédiatement” is not defined, and our reading is to treat 24 hours as the outer limit. Do not carry out an operation you suspect until the report is made; if it has already gone through, inform the CENTIF “sans délai” (art. 61).

  • France. Systematic reports (COSI) to Tracfin cover cash deposits or withdrawals above €10,000 cumulated over a calendar month, in euros and foreign currency together, computed separately for deposits and for withdrawals (set by law). This covers deposits and withdrawals on a deposit or payment account opened in the name of a client other than a financial institution; cash withdrawals not made on such an account are outside it. They also cover money transfers to or from abroad funded by cash or e-money from €1,000 per operation, or €2,000 cumulated per client over a calendar month; these bind the payment service provider, not an agent acting for it (set by law, ACPR-Tracfin guidelines paras 198, 199, 201, 204 and 206, citing CMF R.561-31-1 and R.561-31-2). For occasional customers, “une opération peut être constituée de plusieurs transactions liées”, and where detection is automated institutions must define linked operations and set up cumulative scenarios (para 43). The guidelines also report, from the ACPR’s 2022 thematic review, that most automated alerts come from scenarios on cumulated amounts crossing a threshold, that these “pourraient davantage s’appuyer sur des seuils propres aux données ressortant de l’historique de compte du client”, and that peer-group typologies have a high rate of conversion into suspicious transaction reports (10%) but are rarely used (Annex 2).

    Reporting deadline

    Threshold report: COSI through ERMES. Suspicious transaction report: before carrying out the operation, so that Tracfin can oppose it, and the institution holds the operation for the period stated in the report. Where the operation has already gone through (it could not be postponed, postponing it could have hindered an investigation, or the suspicion arose afterwards), report “sans délai” (CMF L.561-16, as set out in the ACPR-Tracfin guidelines, paras 156–157).

  • Nigeria. The reporting line (more than ₦5,000,000 for an individual, ₦10,000,000 for a body corporate) applies to “any single transaction, lodgment or transfer of funds” (MLPPA 2022 s.11(1)). The Act does not set an aggregation window. A cumulative rule here serves the prohibition on splitting transactions to avoid reporting (s.2(2)) and the behavioural job, not the s.11 report itself: a transaction “inconsistent with the known transaction pattern of the account or business relationship” is deemed suspicious (s.7(1)(d)). The CBN’s Baseline Standards for automated AML solutions (March 2026) require that monitoring scenarios “make risk-based use of relevant CDD/KYC/KYB attributes (such as occupation, declared income or turnover range, customer segment, product profile, geography, and delivery channel) in addition to raw transactional patterns” (section 5.5(a)(iv)), which is the behavioural job’s comparison with declared income or turnover. For stablecoin issuers and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) licensed by the CBN, its Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria (in force 5 November 2026) add an aggregation duty, still without a window: transactions “that appear to be linked or structured to avoid an applicable reporting threshold shall be reported individually and aggregated for the purpose of determining whether the reporting threshold has been met” (section 26.11.2). Due diligence is required on an occasional transaction of “USD/EUR 1,000 or its naira equivalent, whether conducted as a single operation or in several operations that appear to be linked” (section 26.3.2(b)); the Regulations do not say whether the USD or the EUR figure applies, or which rate converts it to naira, so the licensee sets both and writes them down. They require ongoing scrutiny of transactions and wallet activity against “its knowledge of the customer, the customer’s business and risk profile” (section 26.3.8(a)), and alerts on a customer acting as an undisclosed VASP, shown by “volumes, frequency or numbers of counterparties inconsistent with retail use” (section 26.7.1(h)). A P2P provider identifies customers trading as a business “having regard to transaction volume, frequency, number of counterparties and advertising of rates” (section 10.3.5).

    Reporting deadline

    Suspicious transaction report: report to the NFIU immediately, with a written report within 24 hours (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.7(1)–(2)). The NFIU’s December 2024 STR guidelines start the 24 hours once the transaction is found suspicious, after an examination of no more than 72 hours, and require written reasons for every alert closed as not suspicious (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, Part Six, para 2).

  • South Africa. Since 14 November 2022 the cash threshold report (above R49,999.99) is per transaction. The amendment deleted “or series of cash transactions” from Regulation 24(4) (Government Notice 2638 of 14 October 2022). Cumulative monitoring of smaller cash amounts feeds the suspicious and unusual transaction report decision (FIC Act s.29). Where the rule runs in an automated transaction monitoring system, FIC Directive 5 of 2019 requires the system’s detection methodology, “including algorithms, scenarios, threshold settings or rules” (this rule among them), to be documented (para 3.1.16) and, taken as a whole, “sufficient to address the associated money laundering and terrorist financing risks applicable to the reporter” (para 3.1.17), and sets the time limits for the system’s alerts given under the reporting deadline below (paras 2.1–2.3).

    Reporting deadline

    Suspicious transaction report: as soon as possible, and no later than 15 days excluding weekends and public holidays (FIC Act s.29; MLTF Control Regulations, reg. 24(3), via FIC Guidance Note 4B para 71). The 15 days run from when you became aware of the facts, which “may be, and in the majority of cases will be, before a suspicion is formed” (GN4B para 80). Where the alert comes from an automated transaction monitoring system, the reporter “is deemed to have knowledge” of the possible suspicious activity when the alert is generated: the report is due “no later than 15 days after the alert has been generated”, and work on the alert must start within 48 hours, which the FIC counts as two days without weekends and public holidays, inside the 15 (FIC Directive 5 of 2019, paras 2.1–2.3; FIC PCC 45, paras 5–8).

  • Kenya (mobile money). The Central Bank of Kenya’s 2013 AML guidelines for mobile payment services set “the limits above which investigations should be carried out”: “Any account exceeding a daily turnover of KShs 100,000” and “Any personal account transacting more than KShs 300,000 per week” (set by law, CBK, National Payment System (AML Guidelines for the Provision of Mobile Payment Services) Guidelines 2013, para 3.2(a)). The same paragraph asks providers to link the different accounts one customer holds (para 3.2(c)), so totals should be per customer, not per wallet. These figures date from 2013. We did not find a later text replacing them. Separately, reporting institutions file reports on cash transactions exceeding US$15,000 (POCAMLA Fourth Schedule, s.44(6), as substituted in 2023); the Schedule does not say whether smaller cash amounts are added together.

    Reporting deadline

    Suspicious transaction report: within two days after the suspicion arose (POCAMLA s.44(2), as replaced by the AML/CFT Laws (Amendment) Act 2023, Act No. 10 of 2023).

  • Ghana. The cash transaction report is “a mandatory daily report” (FIC Ghana, Report Types). The FIC’s page gives its threshold as GH¢50,000.00 for the banking and securities sectors, for “any deposit or withdrawal amounting to GH¢50,000.00 or more”; the BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025 sets it “with a threshold of GHS50,000.00 for banks and GHS20,000.00 for specialized deposit-taking institutions” (set by law, 2.8.5.1), without saying whether a transaction of exactly that amount is reported. Where the two differ this library follows the Guideline, which the BoG and the FIC issued under sections 52 and 61 of Act 1044 in binding terms and dated September 2025, over the undated page. Neither says whether several smaller cash transactions in a day are added together. The Guideline does require totals to be watched elsewhere. Tiered accounts for customers with limited identification have “low transaction/payment/balance limits”, and the institution “shall have monitoring systems to ensure that transaction and balance limits are observed” (3.8.1(5)). For products whose verification is deferred, “Systems are in place to detect when the threshold or time limit has been reached” (3.8.1.1(a)). Where monitoring of low-risk customers is reduced to transactions above a threshold, systems must “identify linked transactions which, when aggregated, exceed the threshold” (3.8.1.1(d)). Due diligence is due on “a receipt or transfers of a negligible yet consistently frequent amount on the customer’s account” (2.4.4(2)). Its red flags include cash paid in through many deposits “such that the amount of each deposit is relatively small, the overall total is quite significant” (Appendix E, 2d).

    Reporting deadline

    Suspicious transaction report: within 24 hours of forming the suspicion, attempted transactions included, whatever the amount (FIC Ghana, “Report Types”; BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.8.1(6) and 2.8.3(2)).

  • Argentina. Lines are in SMVM, the monthly minimum wage (Salario Mínimo, Vital y Móvil), at its value on 31 December of the previous year or 30 June of the current year, “según corresponda” (as the case may be) (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 2(u)), so each peso line moves twice a year. Monthly systematic reports to the UIF (set by law, art. 39) list everyone at or over a monthly total, whether or not anything looks wrong: the sum per person is the one this rule computes, but the report is a filing, not an alert. Collection service providers report cash deposits and payments where “la sumatoria de dichas operaciones resulte igual o superior a los DOS (2) SMVM mensuales” (the sum of those operations reaches 2 SMVM a month or more) (art. 39(b)(1)); the UIF’s instructions for that report sum the cash per person paying and count only cash loads to e-wallets, payments to building administrators, and payments to car makers or car savings plans. Payment service providers report the holders of accounts receiving cash deposits that total 2 SMVM a month or more, naming the depositors where known (art. 39(b)(2)); aggregators and sub-acquirers report users whose card transactions across all the credit cards in their name total 13 SMVM a month or more (50 SMVM for corporate cards), and advance payments or funds loaded for future card spending of 13 SMVM a month or more (100 SMVM for corporate cards) (art. 39(a), part I). Card reports are filed between the 15th and the last working day of each month, cash reports between the 1st and the 15th, each on the previous calendar month (art. 39). For low-risk customers covered by financial inclusion measures, simplified due diligence holds only while monthly credits stay within 12 SMVM, or 120 SMVM a year; above that the firm asks for information and documents and reviews the profile (set by law, art. 27). Collection and payment service providers must set “controles reforzados” (reinforced controls) on cash deposits and withdrawals (art. 38). The resolution also requires automated rules that check operations against each customer’s transactional profile (art. 34(a)), and names amounts that “no guarden relación con los antecedentes y la actividad económica” (bear no relation to the background and economic activity) of the customer, and a merchant’s significant credit balance out of line with its finances, among the circumstances to weigh in alerts (art. 34(b), circumstances 3 and 21).

    Reporting deadline

    Suspicious transaction report: money laundering, within 24 hours of concluding that the operation is suspicious, and no later than 90 calendar days from the operation, performed or attempted; terrorist financing and proliferation financing, within 24 hours of the operation (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 36(c)).

  • Mexico. Fintech institutions (crowdfunding and e-money institutions, ITFs) must follow and group each client’s operations “con independencia del monto” (whatever the amount), and apply stricter mechanisms when a client’s operations in a calendar month reach 12,500 UDIs (unidades de inversión, investment units whose peso value Banco de México publishes) in cash or virtual assets at a crowdfunding institution, or 7,500 UDIs in cash, e-money funds or virtual assets at an e-money institution, keeping a register of those clients with each operation’s date and amount (set by law, SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, art. 43). Operations in one account in one calendar month adding up to USD 5,500 or more are an unusual-operation circumstance where they do not match the client’s transactional profile (art. 70(IV)). The behavioural job is in the law too: for the first six months the profile is the client’s declared maximum monthly amount, and it must be in the alert system “con objeto de detectar inconsistencias entre la información proporcionada por el Cliente y el monto de las Operaciones que realice” (art. 35); the automated system must group a client’s operations in a consolidated base and run the alerts on declared data, history and average balances (art. 56(VI) to (VIII)). These provisions cover fintech institutions only; banks and other sectors have their own provisions and amounts.

    Reporting deadline

    Suspicious transaction report: the Communication and Control Committee rules on an unusual operation within 60 calendar days of its detection, and the report goes to SHCP, through the CNBV, within 3 business days of the end of that session; within 24 hours of the alert or staff notice where there are signs or concrete facts that the funds could come from illicit activities or be used for terrorist financing or money laundering (SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, arts. 69 and 73).

False positives and tuning

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Common innocent explanations: payroll and supplier runs on business accounts, a large borrower repaying a loan, savings moved in from another institution, seasonal trade, and an exchange or platform customer whose business is volume.

Typical causes of misfires:

  • Calendar and rolling windows fire on different customers. Early in each month a rolling 30-day sum still holds the end of last month, so it fires on customers whose activity is split across two calendar months and who never cross the line in either one. Where the result drives an automatic action, the choice changes which customers are affected, not only when. Use the window your law or your terms state.
  • Re-alerting after the crossing. A naive rule fires on every transaction after the total crosses the line, so one customer produces a stream of alerts. Alert once per fixed window; with a rolling window, not again until the total has fallen back below the line.
  • Not enough history. An accumulator over a window longer than the data loaded measures how much history you have, not customer behaviour. A one-year total run on a few days of data fires more each day simply because the sum is still filling. Wait for at least one full window before judging the alert rate.
  • Exchange rates move the line. The rate you convert at sets the effective threshold. Illustration: at 1.30 CAD per USD, CAD 10,000 is USD 7,692; at 1.40 it is USD 7,143. Where the regulator names the rate (in Canada, the Bank of Canada rate for cash and electronic funds transfers), use it; elsewhere write down one rate source and use it for both detection and the report.
  • Currency mixing. Summing raw amounts in several currencies at 1:1 overstates or understates the total. Convert first.
  • Duplicate events. A payment re-sent under a new id is counted twice. Deduplicate on a stable payment id.
  • Moves between a customer’s own accounts. Once totals are per customer rather than per account or wallet, money moved between one customer’s own accounts counts both as money in and as money out. Exclude or tag own-account transfers.
  • Reversals, refunds and chargebacks. They arrive after the transaction completed, so counting completed transactions alone leaves a reversed payment in the sum. For the behavioural job, net them out or exclude the reversed payment. Whether a reversed transaction still counts for a regulatory report is a question for your law.
  • Exempt parties. In Canada some grouping keys do not apply to public bodies, large listed corporations or trusts and regulated pension fund administrators (see By country). A rule that groups them anyway alerts on totals that need no report.
  • Volume-by-design customers. Business, platform and API customers cross consumer thresholds every day. Segment them, and set their behavioural threshold from their own declared or observed volume.

When it fires

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Two paths, depending on the job:

Threshold report (not a suspicion).

  1. Confirm the aggregation key the law uses (same conductor, on behalf of, same beneficiary) and the window.
  2. When the window closes, list every transaction in it, including those far below the line and those made after the alert, and compute the total at the documented rate.
  3. File within the deadline. Each country’s is under By country.
  4. Then assess separately whether anything is suspicious.

Behavioural alert.

  1. Compare the total with the customer’s declared income or turnover and with their own history.
  2. Look at what makes up the total: one counterparty, many small senders, rapid outflows after inflows.
  3. Ask for the source of funds and supporting documents where the total is out of line.
  4. If suspicion forms, file a suspicious transaction report. Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.

Sources

27 sourcesHide
  1. FINTRAC, “Reporting transactions to FINTRAC: The 24-hour rule”, updated 23 October 2023, sections 2 (large cash, large virtual currency, EFT) and 3 (static 24-hour window); legal references PCMLTFR SOR/2002-184 ss.126–130. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/24hour/1-eng
  2. FINTRAC, “Reporting large cash transactions to FINTRAC”, modified 19 January 2024 (15 calendar days; Bank of Canada rate). https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/lctr-doie/lctr-doie-eng
  3. FINTRAC, “Reporting large virtual currency transactions to FINTRAC”, modified 8 April 2024 (5 working days; exchange rate set in the normal course of business). https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/lvctr/lvctr-eng
  4. FINTRAC, “Reporting suspicious transactions to FINTRAC”, modified 22 May 2025. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/str-dod/str-dod-eng
  5. 31 CFR 1010.311 and 1010.313(b); 31 CFR 1020.320 and 1022.320. https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/31/1010.313 (accessed 2026-11-01).
  6. UMOA Loi uniforme LBC/FT/FP (BCEAO, March 2023 text), arts. 2 (point 58), 17 i), 21, 60, 61, 72 (first and third paragraphs). https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Loi-uniforme-LBCFTFP-Mars-2023-vf.pdf
  7. Décision n°021 du 21/12/2023/CM/UMOA, arts. 3, 4 a) and b), and 8. https://www.bceao.int/fr/reglementations/decision-ndeg021-du-21122023cmumoa-fixant-les-montants-des-seuils-pour-la-mise-en
  8. ACPR and Tracfin, joint guidelines on vigilance and reporting obligations, published 23 April 2025 (texts updated to 22 January 2025), paras 40–43, 156–157, 194–206 and Annex 2. https://acpr.banque-france.fr/system/files/2025-04/20250423_Lignes_directrices_obligations_Tracfin.pdf
  9. Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 (Nigeria), Official Gazette No. 90, 13 May 2022, ss.2(2), 7(1)–(2), 11(1), as published by the NFIU. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/LawsAndRegulations?filePath=C%3A%5CNFIU%5Cwwwroot%5Cdocuments%5CMLp_9GKCQR&fileName=Money%20Laundering%20%28Prevention%20and%20Prohibition%29%20Act%2C%202022&handler=PreviewFile
  10. South Africa, Government Notice 2638, Gazette No. 47302, 14 October 2022 (Regulations 22B and 24(4)). https://www.treasury.gov.za/legislation/GovernmentNotices/47302%2014-10%20NationalGovernment%20CTR%20Notice.pdf
  11. Financial Intelligence Centre Ghana, “Report Types”. https://fic.gov.gh/report-types.html (undated page, accessed 2026-11-01).
  12. Central Bank of Kenya, The National Payment System (Anti-Money Laundering Guidelines for the Provision of Mobile Payment Services) Guidelines, 2013, para 3.2(a) and (c). https://www.centralbank.go.ke/images/docs/NPS/Regulations%20and%20Guidelines/Guidelines%20-%20Mobile%20money%20AML%20Guidelines.pdf
  13. Kenya, AML and CFT Laws (Amendment) Act 2023 (Act No. 10 of 2023), Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 148, 1 September 2023, new POCAMLA s.44(2) and Fourth Schedule. https://brs.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/AntiMoneyLaunderingandCombatingofTerrorismFinancingLawsAmendmentAct2023.pdf
  14. FIC South Africa, Guidance Note 4B on reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions and activities, 26 March 2019, para 71 (reporting period, MLTF Control Regulations reg. 24(3)) and para 80 (when the period starts). https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019.03-Guidance-Guidance-Note-4B-STRs.pdf
  15. FINTRAC, “Reporting electronic funds transfers to FINTRAC”, modified 24 June 2024 (5 working days; static 24-hour window; Bank of Canada rate). https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/eft-dt/eft-dt-eng
  16. FINTRAC, Interpretation Notice No. 4, “The 24-Hour Rule” (pre-June 2021; “The 24-hour period is a rolling time frame”). https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/overview-apercu/fins/1-eng#s4
  17. Canada, Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations, SOR/2002-184, ss.126–130. https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-2002-184/FullText.html (accessed 2026-11-01).
  18. NFIU, Guidelines for the Identification, Verification and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001), 13 December 2024, Part Six para 2. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance?filePath=C%3A%5Cinetpub%5Cwwwroot%5CNFIU%5Cwwwroot%5Cdocuments%5CN_BRWMBQ&fileName=Guidelines%20for%20the%20Identification%2C%20Verification%20and%20Reporting%20of%20Suspicious%20Transactions&handler=PreviewFile
  19. Central Bank of Nigeria, Baseline Standards for Automated Anti-Money Laundering, Combating the Financing of Terrorism and Countering Proliferation Financing Solutions, BSD/DIR/PUB/LAB/019/002, 10 March 2026, section 5.5(a)(iv). https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/CBN%20issues%20Baseline%20Standards%20for%20Automated%20Anti-Money%20Laundering%20Solution.pdf
  20. Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 200/2024 (RESOL-2024-200-APN-UIF#MJ), 18 December 2024, Boletín Oficial no. 35571, 19 December 2024, arts. 2(u), 27, 34(a), 34(b) circumstances 3 and 21, 38 and 39(a) and (b); art. 36(c) (report deadlines). https://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/405000-409999/407429/norma.htm and the UIF’s instructions for the collection providers’ cash report (art. 39(b)(1)): https://www.argentina.gob.ar/uif/rsm-proveedores-de-servicios-de-cobro
  21. Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Mexico), “Disposiciones de carácter general a que se refiere el Artículo 58 de la Ley para Regular las Instituciones de Tecnología Financiera”, DOF 10 September 2018, arts. 35, 36, 43, 56(VI) to (VIII) and 70(IV); arts. 69 and 73 (report deadlines). https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5537449&fecha=10/09/2018 (accessed 2026-11-12).
  22. FIC South Africa, Directive 5 of 2019 on the usage of an automated transaction monitoring system for the detection and submission of regulatory reports, 29 March 2019, paras 2.1–2.3, 3.1.16 and 3.1.17. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019-DIR-Directive-5-of-2019-ATMS.pdf
  23. FIC South Africa, Public Compliance Communication 45 on Directive 5 of 2019 in relation to the use of automated transaction monitoring systems, 20 March 2020, paras 5–8. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2020.03-PCC-PCC-45-On-Directive-5-of-2019-in-relation-to-the-use-of-ATMS.pdf
  24. BCEAO, Instruction n°001-03-2025 du 18 mars 2025 on AML/CFT/CPF organisation, internal control and compliance of financial institutions, arts. 3, 6 and 15. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-04/Instruction%20n%C2%B0001-03-2025%20du%2018%20mars%2025%20portant%20modalit%C3%A9s%20de%20mise%20en%20oeuvre%20par%20les%20IF%20de%20leurs%20obligations%20en%20mati%C3%A8re%20de%20lutte%20contre%20le%20blanchiment%20de%20capitaux.pdf
  25. Central Bank of Nigeria, Payments System Policy Department, Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, November 2026, issued by circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004 of 5 November 2026, in force that day (circular, section 4.0); sections 10.3.5, 26.3.2(b), 26.3.8(a), 26.7.1(h) and 26.11.2. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/REGULATIONS%20FOR%20THE%20OPERATIONS%20OF%20NON-SECURITY%20VIRTUAL%20ASSETS%20IN%20NIGERIA.pdf
  26. Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism / Combating Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Accountable Institutions, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 12 December 2025, 2.4.4(2), 2.8.5.1, 3.8.1(5), 3.8.1.1(a) and (d), and Appendix E, red flag 2d. https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/BOG-FIC-AML-GUIDELINE-2025-FINAL-5-TO-BE-PUBLISHED.pdf
  27. 31 CFR 1010.306(a)(1) (eCFR, text as of 2026-11-01). https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-X/part-1010

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