Money laundering

Large single transaction

One transaction above a set amount, with the amount set per market, currency, and customer type.

One transaction above a set amount, with the amount set per market, currency, and customer type Set amount per market, currency, and customer type One transaction

What it catches

A single transaction large enough to need attention. There are two reasons to look at one:

  1. A law sets a reporting or scrutiny line. Nigeria requires a report of any single transaction or transfer above ₦5,000,000 for an individual. Kenya, South Africa, Ghana, Canada, the United States, France, the UEMOA zone and Mexico set cash or transfer lines, and Argentina a cash identification line of 20 SMVM (twenty times the monthly minimum wage, the Salario Mínimo, Vital y Móvil) (see By country). The reports are due whether or not anything is suspicious.
  2. The amount is unusual for this customer. The UEMOA Uniform Law requires special examination of “toute opération … d’un montant inhabituellement élevé, eu égard au profil du client” (art. 21 c).

On its own this is a weak signal. Most large payments are legitimate. The rule is useful for reporting coverage and for sending a payment to a person before it settles. It does not tell you that something is wrong.

How the rule works

Compare each transaction’s amount, in the local currency of its market, with the line for that market, payment method and customer type. Count each real payment once: drop duplicate events (the same event or payment id arriving twice), and fold a repeated attempt of the same amount on the same instrument into the earlier alert when the earlier attempt did not complete.

Looks at

Every transaction, with its amount in the local currency of its market.

Compares

The amount with the line set for the transaction’s market, payment method and customer type, with separate lines for individuals and businesses.

The line is the local reporting or scrutiny line where the law sets one, and a high percentile of completed amounts where it does not.

Alerts when

The amount is at or above the line. Check whether your law says “more than” or “or more”, and match it.

If the line is a legal reporting line, the alert also opens a task to file the threshold report once the payment completes. A declined attempt is not a transaction to report.

Repeat attempts

An event whose event or payment id was already seen is a duplicate and is dropped.

A transaction that repeats a payment already alerted on, with the same customer, instrument and amount on the same day, is added to the existing alert when the earlier attempt did not complete.

If the earlier payment did complete, the second one is new money and alerts on its own.

Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.

Screening before the payment (on the attempt) catches it in time to hold it. Screening after completion fits reporting. Choose per use, and say which one the rule does. A rule that screens attempts opens the threshold-report task when the payment’s completion arrives, not on the attempt.

A variant compares the amount with the customer’s own history (for example, 10 times their usual transaction). That is a different rule; see Related rules.

Data it needs

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FieldUsually comes fromIf it’s missing
Amount and currencypayment eventRequired.
Market (country of the transaction)payment event or merchantNeeded to apply the right local line. Without it, one line applies everywhere, which is the most common misfire (see below).
Customer type (individual or company)onboardingNigeria sets different lines. Without it, use the lower line.
Payment method or rail (cash, transfer, card, mobile money, virtual currency)payment eventLines differ by rail (cash-only lines in South Africa, UEMOA).
Status (attempt, completed, failed)processorDecide whether you screen attempts or completed payments.
Instrument id (card, wallet, account)payment eventNeeded to collapse re-attempts of the same payment.
Event or payment idsource systemNeeded to drop duplicates.
Timestamppayment eventRequired.
Exchange rate sourceFX feedRequired where a legal line is set in another currency, such as US dollars “or its equivalent” (Nigeria s.3(1), Kenya, Ghana’s transfer report): convert at the time of the transaction, at a documented rate (the regulator’s where it names one, such as the Bank of Canada rate for Canadian transfers), and keep the rate used. Monitoring lines can be set in local currency, so they need no conversion.

Thresholds

Each row is a setting the rule needs. Set by law values come from the source named under “Where it comes from”. Suggested values are starting points: test them on your own history, then adjust.

ParameterValueTypeWhere it comes from
Legal linethe local reporting or scrutiny line, by rail and customer typeSet by lawSee By country
Monitoring line where no law sets oneset in local currency, per market and segment, at a high percentile (for example the 99th) of completed amounts, then tuned on the first month’s alertsSuggestedA percentile line follows each market’s own amounts. Set retail and business lines separately. A lower percentile adds alerts; a higher one misses more.
Separate lines by customer typeindividual and businessSet by law / SuggestedNigeria (MLPPA s.11(1)). Businesses move larger amounts than individuals, so one line for both floods one segment or misses the other.

By country

  • Nigeria. Report to the NFIU within seven days any “single transaction, lodgment or transfer of funds in excess of” ₦5,000,000 for an individual or ₦10,000,000 for a body corporate (set by law, MLPPA 2022 s.11(1)). It applies to transfers of funds, not only cash, so card, wallet and loan-repayment flows need the line too. Separately, a transfer to or from a foreign country of more than US$10,000 “shall be reported” to the NFIU, the Central Bank of Nigeria and the Securities and Exchange Commission within one day of the transaction (set by law, MLPPA s.3(1)). The section does not say who files; the NFIU expects reporting entities to file it as a currency transaction report on goAML (NFIU FAQ, Q-9 and Q-25). The FAQ does not cover the copies to the Central Bank and the SEC that the Act names; ask your supervisor how to send them. The FAQ writes both lines as “and above” (₦5 million, $10,000) where the Act says “in excess of” and “exceeding”, so alerting at the amount itself covers both readings. For stablecoin issuers and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) licensed by the CBN, its Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria (in force 5 November 2026) require an automated monitoring system that alerts on “transactions exceeding thresholds prescribed by the Bank or set in its risk assessment” and on “large-value or rapid-succession transactions inconsistent with the customer’s profile” (section 26.7.1(a) and (e)). They apply the MLPPA reports to virtual assets: reports to the NFIU of transactions “equal to or exceeding the thresholds prescribed under the MLPPA” and of “transfers of funds or virtual assets to or from a foreign country” over the MLPPA or NFIU thresholds, with virtual assets “valued at the time of the transaction in Naira or the applicable foreign currency” (sections 26.11.1 and 26.11.2).

    Reporting deadline

    Threshold report: within seven days (MLPPA s.11(1)), and international transfers above US$10,000 within one day (s.3(1)). Suspicious transaction report: report to the NFIU immediately, with a written report within 24 hours (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.7(1)–(2)). The NFIU’s December 2024 STR guidelines start the 24 hours once the transaction is found suspicious, after an examination of no more than 72 hours, and require written reasons for every alert closed as not suspicious (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, Part Six, para 2).

  • Kenya. A reporting institution files reports on “all cash transactions exceeding US$ 15,000 or its equivalent in any other currency” (set by law, POCAMLA Fourth Schedule, s.44(6), as substituted by the AML and CFT Laws (Amendment) Act 2023, in force 15 September 2023).

    Reporting deadline

    Suspicious transaction report: within two days after the suspicion arose (POCAMLA s.44(2), as replaced by the AML/CFT Laws (Amendment) Act 2023, Act No. 10 of 2023).

  • South Africa. Cash above R49,999.99 is reported under FIC Act s.28 (set by law, Regulation 22B, in force 14 November 2022), “as soon as possible but not later than 3 days” after becoming aware of it (Regulation 24(4) as amended). Where the rule runs in an automated transaction monitoring system, FIC Directive 5 of 2019 requires the system’s detection methodology, “including algorithms, scenarios, threshold settings or rules” (this rule among them), to be documented (para 3.1.16) and, taken as a whole, “sufficient to address the associated money laundering and terrorist financing risks applicable to the reporter” (para 3.1.17), and sets the time limits for the system’s alerts given under the reporting deadline below (paras 2.1–2.3).

    Reporting deadline

    Threshold report: within 3 days (Regulation 24(4)). Suspicious transaction report: as soon as possible, and no later than 15 days excluding weekends and public holidays (FIC Act s.29; MLTF Control Regulations, reg. 24(3), via FIC Guidance Note 4B para 71). The 15 days run from when you became aware of the facts, which “may be, and in the majority of cases will be, before a suspicion is formed” (GN4B para 80). Where the alert comes from an automated transaction monitoring system, the reporter “is deemed to have knowledge” of the possible suspicious activity when the alert is generated: the report is due “no later than 15 days after the alert has been generated”, and work on the alert must start within 48 hours, which the FIC counts as two days without weekends and public holidays, inside the 15 (FIC Directive 5 of 2019, paras 2.1–2.3; FIC PCC 45, paras 5–8).

  • Ghana. Institutions licensed by the Bank of Ghana report to the FIC every day cash transactions within Ghana, in any currency, “with a threshold of GHS50,000.00 for banks and GHS20,000.00 for specialized deposit-taking institutions (or its foreign currency equivalent)”, and report electronic transactions “with a threshold of $1,000.00 or its Cedi equivalent for both individuals and business entities” on the electronic currency transaction report (set by law, BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.8.5.1 and 2.8.5.2(3); the FIC may change either line in consultation with the BoG). The Guideline does not say whether a transaction of exactly the line amount is reported. The FIC’s Report Types page words the lines differently and more narrowly: cash “amounting to GH¢50,000.00 or more” for the banking and securities sectors, and an electronic currency transaction report “filed by commercial banks only”, for transfers “exceeding US$1000.00”. Where the two differ this library follows the Guideline, which the BoG and the FIC issued under sections 52 and 61 of Act 1044 in binding terms and dated September 2025, over the undated page. Foreign exchange bureaux report “all sales and purchases of foreign currencies with a threshold of Twenty Thousand Ghana Cedis (GHS20,000.00) or its foreign currency equivalent” under their own guideline (BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline for Foreign Exchange Bureaux 2025, 3.7(1)). Large transactions with no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose get special attention, written findings and a report to the FIC within 24 hours (2.8.2), and the fraud detection tool every institution must have is embedded at a minimum with threshold limits (2.14(4)(iii)). The Guideline’s red flags include “Unusually large cash deposits made by an individual or a business entity whose normal business is transacted by cheques and other non-cash instruments” (Appendix E, 2b), customers “depositing or withdrawing large amounts of cash with no apparent business source” (3e), and “Customers making large deposits and maintaining large balances with no apparent rationale” (3g).

    Reporting deadline

    Threshold report: on the daily cash transaction report (FIC Ghana; BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.8.5.1), and on the electronic currency transaction report, for which the Guideline states no deadline (2.8.5.2(3)), with transfers into or out of Ghana above the amount the BoG prescribes reported within 24 hours (2.8.5.2(2)). Suspicious transaction report: within 24 hours of forming the suspicion, attempted transactions included, whatever the amount (FIC Ghana, “Report Types”; BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.8.1(6) and 2.8.3(2)).

  • WAEMU (UEMOA). Cash transactions of 15,000,000 FCFA or more are declared to the CENTIF (set by law, Uniform Law art. 72; Decision 021/2023 art. 8). Special examination is required for a cash or bearer-instrument payment of 50,000,000 FCFA or more, alone or in total (“montant unitaire ou total”), made in normal conditions, and for any operation of 10,000,000 FCFA or more made in unusually complex or unjustified conditions or with no apparent economic purpose (set by law, Decision 021/2023 art. 4). BCEAO Instruction 001-03-2025 (18 March 2025), whose Title I binds credit institutions, financial companies, microfinance institutions, e-money institutions, payment institutions and fintechs in the eight member states (art. 3), requires their information system to allow “le suivi des mouvements sur les comptes et la génération des alertes” (the monitoring of account movements and the generation of alerts) and “l’identification des transactions à caractère suspect ou inhabituel” (the identification of suspicious or unusual transactions). The system’s effectiveness is reviewed at least once a year (art. 6). Licensed bureaux de change must have a system that allows the identification of suspicious or unusual transactions (art. 15). WAEMU (UEMOA in French) is the West African Economic and Monetary Union: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, the same eight states that form the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). The BCEAO’s instructions and the Council of Ministers’ decisions cited here apply in all eight. The uniform law applies in each state through that state’s own act, which may number its articles differently. The law of a single state is covered only where that state is named.

    Reporting deadline

    Suspicious transaction report: report to the CENTIF “immédiatement” (Loi uniforme 2023, art. 60). The law defines “sans délai” as at most 24 hours (art. 2, point 58); “immédiatement” is not defined, and our reading is to treat 24 hours as the outer limit. Do not carry out an operation you suspect until the report is made; if it has already gone through, inform the CENTIF “sans délai” (art. 61).

  • Canada. Cash of CAD 10,000 or more received in one transaction is reported within 15 calendar days (Large Cash Transaction Report). Virtual currency of CAD 10,000 or more received is reported within 5 working days (Large Virtual Currency Transaction Report); it counts as received when the transaction can no longer be reversed or cancelled. International electronic funds transfers of CAD 10,000 or more, initiated or finally received, are reported within 5 working days (Electronic Funds Transfer Report; set by law, FINTRAC guidance). Foreign currency is converted at the Bank of Canada rate in effect at the time of the transaction; virtual currency at the rate you establish in the normal course of your business, since the Bank of Canada publishes none.

    Reporting deadline

    Threshold report: within 15 calendar days for cash and 5 working days for virtual currency and electronic funds transfers (FINTRAC). Suspicious transaction report: “as soon as practicable” after the measures that establish reasonable grounds to suspect (FINTRAC STR guidance, section 4).

  • United States. A cash transaction of more than USD 10,000 is reported on a Currency Transaction Report (set by law, 31 CFR 1010.311).

    Reporting deadline

    Threshold report: within 15 days of the transaction (31 CFR 1010.306(a)(1)). Suspicious transaction report: no later than 30 calendar days after initial detection (31 CFR 1020.320 for banks, 1022.320 for money services businesses). A bank that has not identified a suspect may take 30 more days, never more than 60 in all (1020.320(b)(3)).

  • France. Money transfers to or from abroad funded by cash or e-money are reported to Tracfin (COSI) from €1,000 per operation (set by law, ACPR-Tracfin guidelines paras 199 and 201, citing CMF R.561-31-1).

  • Argentina. Every obligated subject under UIF Resolution 200/2024 (collection and payment service providers, card issuers and non-financial lenders) must identify anyone who makes a cash deposit or payment of 20 SMVM or more, asking for their national identity document and recording its number, name and surname (set by law, art. 39(b)). SMVM is the monthly minimum wage (Salario Mínimo, Vital y Móvil) at its value on 31 December of the previous year or 30 June of the current year, “según corresponda” (as the case may be) (art. 2(u)), so the peso line moves twice a year. The identification happens when the cash is taken; a rule on recorded transactions can find cash of 20 SMVM or more accepted without it. Smaller cash amounts can count toward the monthly 2 SMVM cash reports of collection and payment providers (art. 39(b)(1) and (2)). The resolution sets no single-transaction report line. Among the circumstances to weigh in alerts are operations whose size exceeds usual practice and “montos inusualmente elevados” (unusually high amounts) (art. 34(b), circumstances 2 and 4); cash deposits and withdrawals need reinforced controls (art. 38); and for public bodies, special attention goes to “retiros de dinero en efectivo significativos” (significant cash withdrawals) (art. 34(d)).

    Reporting deadline

    Suspicious transaction report: money laundering, within 24 hours of concluding that the operation is suspicious, and no later than 90 calendar days from the operation, performed or attempted; terrorist financing and proliferation financing, within 24 hours of the operation (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 36(c)).

  • Mexico. Fintech institutions (crowdfunding and e-money institutions, ITFs) report each quarter, within the first ten business days of January, April, July and October, every cash operation of USD 5,000 or more (a Relevant Operation, converted at the Banxico rate of the previous banking day) (set by law, SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, arts. 2(XXIV) and 66). The UIF asks for a nil report for a quarter without one only from institutions that hold the CNBV authorisation to receive or pay out cash (UIF formats resolution of 13 March 2020, art. 7); without that authorisation of art. 45 of the Fintech Law an ITF may take no cash and send no transfers to or from accounts abroad. The provisions also set a quarterly report of every foreign-currency cash operation of USD 500 or more, a monthly report, within fifteen business days, of every international transfer of USD 1,000 or more, sent or received (arts. 67 and 68), and, for e-money institutions that provide money transmission, a monthly report of every international money transfer of USD 1,000 or more (art. 102). As of 12 November 2026 no official format for these three reports had been published in the DOF, and under the provisions’ third transitory article they are due only once one is issued. “Los montos inusualmente elevados” (unusually high amounts) are an unusual-operation circumstance (art. 70(III)). These provisions cover fintech institutions only; banks and other sectors have their own provisions and amounts.

    Reporting deadline

    Threshold report: for fintech institutions, in the quarterly Relevant Operation report, within the first ten business days of January, April, July and October (SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, art. 66). Suspicious transaction report: the Communication and Control Committee rules on an unusual operation within 60 calendar days of its detection, and the report goes to SHCP, through the CNBV, within 3 business days of the end of that session; within 24 hours of the alert or staff notice where there are signs or concrete facts that the funds could come from illicit activities or be used for terrorist financing or money laundering (SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, arts. 69 and 73).

Several of these duties also count linked or same-day transactions, which a rule on one transaction cannot see. The UEMOA cash declaration covers “une opération unique ou … plusieurs opérations qui apparaissent liées” (Uniform Law art. 72), and the special examination a “montant unitaire ou total” (Decision 021/2023 art. 4 a)). Canada’s 24-hour rule adds up two or more amounts received within a consecutive 24-hour window for cash and for virtual currency (FINTRAC). Reporting coverage therefore needs Cumulative amount over a period next to this rule.

False positives and tuning

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Common innocent explanations: a known product price (annual subscriptions, school fees, travel), loan disbursements and large loan repayments, business payments, savings moved between the customer’s own accounts, refunds, reversals and chargebacks sent as transactions, and test traffic.

Typical causes of misfires:

  • One line in US dollars across markets. A common failure is one dollar line applied to several markets: price levels and exchange rates differ, so it fires almost only where local prices are high in dollar terms and stays silent elsewhere. Set monitoring lines in each market’s local currency.
  • Re-attempts counted as new payments. Customers restart checkout, so the same card tries the same amount again the same day under a new payment id; on card books this can be a large share of alerts. Group these under one alert by customer, instrument, amount and day, but alert again if the earlier payment had completed: the second one is new money.
  • A feed that carries attempts only. Some feeds send the payment before its outcome is known and never update its status. The rule then counts attempts, declined ones included, and cannot tell a second payment from a retry or know when to open a threshold report. Check that the status field changes before relying on the completion conditions above; until it does, group repeats by customer, instrument, amount and day, and take completion for reporting from settlement data.
  • Recurring instalments. Scheduled instalments of the same large amount fire every period. Exclude merchant-initiated recurring series, or alert only on the first.
  • Test cards in production. Test traffic with large amounts fires in live data. Exclude known test instruments.
  • Data errors. Implausible amounts sit at the top of the distribution: a multiple of a real amount, a test value, or an amount sent in minor units (cents, kobo) instead of major units, which inflates every amount a hundredfold. Add a sanity ceiling, check the amount unit per currency, and look at the account’s history before trusting the largest flags.
  • Large loans repaid normally. A fixed line cannot tell a borrower repaying a large loan in ordinary instalments from an outsized payment. Compare the payment with the customer’s own loan size where you have it.
  • The amount field is empty for some event types. A rule that reads a field the integration never fills validates and goes live, but never fires. Check the field is populated for the events the rule reads.
  • An automatic block on a mis-set line. A line set far too low with an automatic reject attached can reject most payments. Start new lines as alerts only, measure the volume, then add actions.

How to tune: start from each market’s amount distribution of completed payments, separate individuals from businesses, and review the first month’s alerts by market. Expect most alerts to be legitimate. Judge the rule on whether it covers the reporting duty and whether reviewers can keep up, not only on how many alerts lead to a report.

When it fires

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  1. If the line is a legal reporting line, file the threshold report once the payment has gone through, whatever the review finds: the reports are for transactions carried out or amounts received (Kenya, Fourth Schedule; FINTRAC), not declined attempts. Each country’s deadline for it is under By country.
  2. Check that this is one real payment (not a re-attempt, duplicate or data error).
  3. Compare it with the customer’s profile: declared income or turnover, past payment sizes, the purpose given at onboarding.
  4. Look at the counterparty and what happens next: a new beneficiary, a high-risk country, or funds moved out quickly raise the priority.
  5. Where the amount is out of line with the profile, ask for the purpose and source of funds, with documents.
  6. If suspicion forms, file a suspicious transaction report. Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.

Sources

21 sourcesHide
  1. Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 (Nigeria), ss.3(1), 7 and 11(1), Official Gazette No. 90 Vol. 109, 13 May 2022, as published by the NFIU. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/LawsAndRegulations
  2. South Africa, Government Notice 2638, Gazette No. 47302, 14 October 2022 (Regulations 22B and 24(4)), in force 14 November 2022. https://www.treasury.gov.za/legislation/GovernmentNotices/47302%2014-10%20NationalGovernment%20CTR%20Notice.pdf
  3. Financial Intelligence Centre Ghana, “Report Types” (CTR, STR, ECTR). https://fic.gov.gh/report-types.html (undated page, accessed 2026-11-01).
  4. UMOA Loi uniforme LBC/FT/FP (BCEAO, March 2023 text), arts. 2 (point 58), 21, 60, 61, 72. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Loi-uniforme-LBCFTFP-Mars-2023-vf.pdf
  5. Décision n°021 du 21/12/2023/CM/UMOA, arts. 4 and 8. https://www.bceao.int/fr/reglementations/decision-ndeg021-du-21122023cmumoa-fixant-les-montants-des-seuils-pour-la-mise-en
  6. FINTRAC, “Reporting large cash transactions to FINTRAC” (modified 19 January 2024) and “Reporting large virtual currency transactions to FINTRAC” (modified 8 April 2024); “Reporting transactions to FINTRAC: The 24-hour rule” (updated 23 October 2023) for EFTs; “Reporting suspicious transactions to FINTRAC” (modified 22 May 2025). https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/lctr-doie/lctr-doie-eng
  7. 31 CFR 1010.306(a)(1) and 1010.311; 31 CFR 1020.320 and 1022.320 (eCFR, text as of 2026-11-01). https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-X/part-1010
  8. ACPR and Tracfin, joint guidelines on vigilance and reporting obligations, published 23 April 2025 (texts updated to 22 January 2025), paras 199 and 201. https://acpr.banque-france.fr/system/files/2025-04/20250423_Lignes_directrices_obligations_Tracfin.pdf
  9. Kenya, AML and CFT Laws (Amendment) Act 2023 (Act No. 10 of 2023), Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 148, 1 September 2023, new POCAMLA s.44(2) and Fourth Schedule (cash transaction reports above US$15,000). https://brs.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/AntiMoneyLaunderingandCombatingofTerrorismFinancingLawsAmendmentAct2023.pdf
  10. FIC South Africa, Guidance Note 4B on reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions and activities, 26 March 2019, para 71 (reporting period, MLTF Control Regulations reg. 24(3)) and para 80 (when the period starts). https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019.03-Guidance-Guidance-Note-4B-STRs.pdf
  11. FINTRAC, “Reporting electronic funds transfers to FINTRAC”, modified 24 June 2024 (5 working days; Bank of Canada rate). https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/eft-dt/eft-dt-eng
  12. NFIU, Guidelines for the Identification, Verification and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions Related to Money Laundering, Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (ML/TF/PF) for Financial Institutions, STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, 13 December 2024, Part Six para 2. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance
  13. NFIU, FAQ, Q-9 (“How many types of reports can be filed on goAML?”) and Q-25 (“How is an STR different from a CTR?”). https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/Faqs (undated page, accessed 2026-11-12).
  14. Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 200/2024 (RESOL-2024-200-APN-UIF#MJ), 18 December 2024, Boletín Oficial no. 35571, 19 December 2024, arts. 2(u), 34(b) circumstances 2 and 4, 34(d), 38 and 39(b); art. 36(c) (report deadlines). https://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/405000-409999/407429/norma.htm
  15. Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Mexico), “Disposiciones de carácter general a que se refiere el Artículo 58 de la Ley para Regular las Instituciones de Tecnología Financiera”, DOF 10 September 2018, arts. 2(XXIV), 66 to 68, 70(III) and 102, and third transitory article; arts. 69 and 73 (report deadlines). https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5537449&fecha=10/09/2018 (accessed 2026-11-12). With: Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera (SHCP), resolution issuing the ITFs’ official report formats, DOF 24 March 2020, art. 7, https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5590171&fecha=24/03/2020; and Ley para Regular las Instituciones de Tecnología Financiera, DOF 9 March 2018, art. 45, https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5515623&fecha=09/03/2018 (both accessed 2026-11-12).
  16. FIC South Africa, Directive 5 of 2019 on the usage of an automated transaction monitoring system for the detection and submission of regulatory reports, 29 March 2019, paras 2.1–2.3, 3.1.16 and 3.1.17. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019-DIR-Directive-5-of-2019-ATMS.pdf
  17. FIC South Africa, Public Compliance Communication 45 on Directive 5 of 2019 in relation to the use of automated transaction monitoring systems, 20 March 2020, paras 5–8. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2020.03-PCC-PCC-45-On-Directive-5-of-2019-in-relation-to-the-use-of-ATMS.pdf
  18. BCEAO, Instruction n°001-03-2025 du 18 mars 2025 on AML/CFT/CPF organisation, internal control and compliance of financial institutions, arts. 3, 6 and 15. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-04/Instruction%20n%C2%B0001-03-2025%20du%2018%20mars%2025%20portant%20modalit%C3%A9s%20de%20mise%20en%20oeuvre%20par%20les%20IF%20de%20leurs%20obligations%20en%20mati%C3%A8re%20de%20lutte%20contre%20le%20blanchiment%20de%20capitaux.pdf
  19. Central Bank of Nigeria, Payments System Policy Department, Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, November 2026, issued by circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004 of 5 November 2026, in force that day (circular, section 4.0); sections 26.7.1(a) and (e), 26.11.1 and 26.11.2. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/REGULATIONS%20FOR%20THE%20OPERATIONS%20OF%20NON-SECURITY%20VIRTUAL%20ASSETS%20IN%20NIGERIA.pdf
  20. Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism / Combating Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Accountable Institutions, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 12 December 2025, 2.8.2, 2.8.5.1, 2.8.5.2(2)–(3), 2.14(4)(iii) and Appendix E, red flags 2b, 3e and 3g. https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/BOG-FIC-AML-GUIDELINE-2025-FINAL-5-TO-BE-PUBLISHED.pdf
  21. Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism & Combating the Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Foreign Exchange Bureaux, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 8 January 2026, 3.7(1). https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/AML-CFT-CPF-Guidelines-for-Foreign-Exchange-Bureaus-2025-1.pdf

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