Regulation · Ghana
Ghana: Bank of Ghana and FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline for Accountable Institutions (2025)
The Bank of Ghana and Ghana’s Financial Intelligence Centre set what every institution the Bank of Ghana licenses must do against money laundering, terrorist financing and fraud. The 2025 Guideline, published on 12 December 2025, replaces the 2022 one. It requires an automated system that monitors every transaction in real time or by close of day, and a suspicious transaction report within 24 hours. It runs to 368 requirements. This page takes you through each one: the Guideline’s own words, what an examiner will look for, and the detection rules that help you meet it.
- Issued by
- Bank of Ghana (BoG) and Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), Ghana
- Reference
- AML/CFT/CPF Guideline for Accountable Institutions (cover dated September 2025)
- Published
- Applies to
- All institutions licensed by the Bank of Ghana (“Accountable Institutions”)
- Updated
Detection rules for this regulation
22 rules in the library help meet 68 of its 368 requirements. Most of the others are about systems, governance and process, where no detection rule applies.
-
Sanctions screening
-
Large single transaction
-
New account activity (mule accounts)
-
Sudden change from a customer’s baseline
-
High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch
-
Transaction structuring (smurfing)
-
Cumulative amount over a period (threshold aggregation)
-
Transaction velocity
-
Dormant account reactivation
-
PEP screening (politically exposed persons)
-
Rapid pass-through (rapid movement of funds)
-
Adverse media screening (negative news)
-
Cash use that does not fit the customer’s activity
-
Funnel account (many senders into one account)
-
Missing originator or beneficiary information (Travel Rule)
-
Refused or failed identity verification, and false KYC data
-
Shared identifiers across customers (money mule networks)
-
Third-party funding and payment account name mismatch
-
Unlicensed virtual asset business (crypto trading through an ordinary account)
-
Account takeover (ATO)
-
Blacklist / internal watchlist match
-
Insider risk (staff in reported cases or acting outside their role)
Before the requirements
What the Guideline is
The Bank of Ghana (BoG) and Ghana’s Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) issued the “Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism / Combating Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Accountable Institutions”, dated September 2025 on its cover. It “is being issued pursuant to sections 52 and 61 of Act 1044 and section 92(2)(a)(vii) of the Banks and Specialised Deposit-Taking Institutions Act, 2016 (Act 930)”, Act 1044 being the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2020. It “comes into effect from the date of issue and replaces the BOG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline, 2022.”
It is written in binding terms (“AIs shall”) and has three parts: Part A, the obligations of the Bank of Ghana and co-operation with competent authorities; Part B, the AML/CFT/CPF regime an institution must run (policy, risk assessment, governance and the AML reporting officer, customer due diligence, higher-risk customers and products, suspicious transaction reporting, cash and electronic transaction reports, transaction monitoring, sanctions, know-your-employee, training, whistleblowing, fraud management, record keeping and statistics); and Part C, further rules on identifying and verifying customers, simplified and enhanced due diligence, and virtual assets. Six appendices follow: definitions (A), the identification documents for each type of customer (B), a pointer to the BoG’s Ghana Card guidance (C), risk assessment and risk rating (D), red flags (E) and the statutory returns (F). The PDF has 104 pages: 16 front pages, then the body and appendices printed as pages 1 to 88. Page numbers in this page are the printed ones.
Two parts matter most for a monitoring system. Section 2.8.6.1 requires every institution to “develop in-house or acquire off-the-shelf automated monitoring tool to monitor all transactions, products/services, and delivery channels aimed at detecting suspicious and unusual transactions in real time or by close of day”, and lists their minimum features: integration with the core banking software, coverage of “all delivery channels, products and services that are outside the AIs core banking system”, rules “consistent with the frequency, volume and size of transactions of customers”, embedded sanction screening, and the ability to take updates. Section 2.14 makes fraud part of the AML/CFT/CPF regime (“Fraud is one of the predicate offences of money laundering”) and requires every institution to “acquire or develop a fraud detection tool” embedded at a minimum with threshold limits, the customer profile and the features of products and services.
Who it applies to
The Guideline binds “Accountable Institutions” (AIs), which it defines as “All Bank of Ghana licensed institutions” (Appendix A). It does not list the licence types. Some paragraphs name a type: the cash transaction report line differs for “banks” and “specialized deposit-taking institutions” (2.8.5.1); section 2.6.4 sets duties for virtual asset service providers (VASPs); 2.6.8 for institutions that deal with money or value transfer services, or act as their settlement bank; 2.6.9 for institutions that take on a foreign exchange bureau as a customer; 2.6.10.3 and 2.6.10.4 for intermediary and beneficiary institutions in a wire transfer. Its list of references includes the Payment System and Services Act, 2019 (Act 987).
The BoG and the FIC have also issued two companion guidelines, both dated September 2025 on their covers and published by the BoG on 8 January 2026. The AML/CFT/CPF Guideline for Foreign Exchange Bureaux “shall apply to Bank of Ghana licensed Foreign Exchange Bureaux” and sets the bureaux’ own duties, among them their own cash transaction report (its 3.7(1), under “Reports and deadlines” below). The AML/CFT/CPF Agency Banking Guidelines “shall apply to Banks, Specialised Deposit-Taking Institutions, Electronic Money Issuers and Payment Service Providers and any other institution licensed by the Bank of Ghana to undertake agency banking activities”, and set what a principal must do about its agents. Neither lists the licence types that this Guideline’s definition covers.
Each obligation binds the institution itself. Section 2.8.6.1 also says what the monitoring system must do, and where a third party deploys it, the institution must “Adhere to the BOG third-party outsourcing directive” and “Ensure the system satisfies the minimum features” (2.8.6.1(6)).
Non-compliance “shall attract appropriate administrative sanctions as prescribed in the BOG/FIC Administrative Sanctions/Penalties for Accountable Institutions (2022), Act 1044 and Act 930”, and the “Bank of Ghana shall apply administrative sanctions as required under section 93 (3) of Act 930.”
Dates and versions
- Cover date: “SEPTEMBER, 2025”.
- 12 December 2025: the BoG published the Guideline in a news item on its site, whose download link is the PDF this page quotes. The PDF’s own creation date is the same day.
- In force: “from the date of issue”. The Guideline gives no date of issue beyond the cover’s month; the BoG’s publication of 12 December 2025 is the first public date found.
- It replaces the BOG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline, 2022.
- 8 January 2026: the BoG published the two companion guidelines named under “Who it applies to”. The bureaux guideline “replaces the notice no. BG/GOV/SEC/2025/04 AML/CFT&P Guidelines for Foreign Exchange Bureaux, 2024”.
An earlier version of the same Guideline, uploaded to the BoG site on 3 November 2025, can still be downloaded but is not the one the BoG’s publication page links. It numbers sections differently: non-profit organisations were 2.6.12, inside section 2.6, instead of a section 2.7 of their own, so every later section was numbered one lower (transaction monitoring systems were 2.7.6.1 and fraud management 2.13, where the published version has 2.8.6.1 and 2.14). It also listed non-profit organisations and charities among the high-risk customers of 2.5.2, and had a foreword that the published version leaves out. This page follows the published version of 12 December 2025, whose numbering every id uses.
The Guideline asks every institution to “conduct gap analysis of their AML/CFT/CPF policies and Risk Assessment Framework to align with the requirements of this Guideline”, and says that AML/CFT/CPF audits will be conducted “using this revised Guideline” (see the requirements under “Responsibilities of accountable institutions”).
Reports and deadlines
Appendix F, “Statutory returns”, sets the returns, who receives them and when. ORASS is the BoG’s Online Reporting Analytic Surveillance System; goAML is the FIC’s reporting system.
| Return | To | Channel | When |
|---|---|---|---|
| Compliance report (fourteen areas, among them employee training, risk assessment, new technologies and non-face-to-face transactions, monitoring of employee conduct, fraud activities, AML/CFT/CPF software, and statistics of STRs, CTRs and ECTRs) | BoG and FIC | BoG through ORASS; FIC by email | Half-yearly and at the end of the year, not later than the 15th day of the month after (2.12(8) and 2.11.1(4) give 15 July and 15 January) |
| Employee education and training programme | BoG and FIC | ORASS; email | Yearly, not later than 31 December, for the year that follows (2.12(3)) |
| Independent audit report on the AML/CFT/CPF compliance function (including transaction monitoring systems) | BoG and FIC | ORASS; email | Yearly, not later than the 15th day of the month after the end of the year (2.3.6(4): January 15) |
| Annual AML/CFT self risk assessment questionnaire | BoG | ORASS | Yearly, not later than the 15th day of the month after the end of the year |
| Quarterly returns (data capture) | BoG | ORASS | Quarterly, not later than the 15th day of the month after the end of the quarter |
| Updated PEP list | FIC | Quarterly, not later than the 15th day of the month after the end of the quarter | |
| PEP transactions | FIC | goAML | As and when (2.6.1(8): “all transactions conducted by PEPs”) |
| Fraud and defalcation report | BoG | ORASS | As and when (2.14(4)(vii): immediately on detection). 2.14(4)(x) also asks for “monthly fraud reports to the BOG through the prescribed channel”; Appendix F lists no monthly fraud return, and the Guideline does not name the channel |
| Disengaged staff return | BoG | ORASS | As and when |
| Engaged staff (BoG opinions) | BoG | Hardcopy or email | As and when |
Reports set in the text, not in Appendix F:
- Suspicious transaction report (STR) or suspicious activity report (SAR) to the FIC “within twenty-four (24) hours” of the suspicion (2.8.1(6)), attempted transactions included, “regardless of the amount involved”. The same 24 hours apply to the written findings on complex, unusual or large transactions (2.8.2(3)), to a customer whose due diligence cannot be completed (2.4.6), to a wire transfer whose required information cannot be obtained, for the ordering, intermediary and beneficiary institution (2.6.10.1(6), 2.6.10.2(4), 2.6.10.3(4), 2.6.10.4(3)), to a transfer for a money or value transfer service whose originator or beneficiary information cannot be obtained (2.6.8(6)), to the unusual and suspicious transactions a settlement bank for such a service finds (2.6.8(11)(b)), to a customer found to run virtual-asset activity (3.9(10)), and, for VASPs, to a transfer whose missing originator and beneficiary information cannot be obtained (2.6.4(9)) and to a transfer to or from a wallet on the OFAC SDN list (2.6.4(11)).
- Designated persons and entities: a report to the FIC “immediately” when a designated person or entity has funds in the institution or tries to transact (2.9(2)).
- Cash transaction report (CTR): daily, to the FIC, of cash transactions “with a threshold of GHS50,000.00 for banks and GHS20,000.00 for specialized deposit-taking institutions” (2.8.5.1). Foreign exchange bureaux report under their own guideline “all sales and purchases of foreign currencies with a threshold of Twenty Thousand Ghana Cedis (GHS20,000.00) or its foreign currency equivalent” (Guideline for Foreign Exchange Bureaux, 3.7(1)).
- Electronic currency transaction report (ECTR): “all Electronic Transactions with a threshold of $1,000.00 or its Cedi equivalent”, “through a prescribed medium” (2.8.5.2(3), which names neither the recipient nor a deadline); transfers into or out of Ghana above the amount the BoG prescribes go to the FIC within 24 hours (2.8.5.2(2)).
- The approved AML/CFT/CPF policy and manual, to the BoG “within five (5) working days” (2.3.2(3); the paragraph does not say when the five days start).
The Guideline gives each report line only as “with a threshold of” an amount, and does not say whether a transaction of exactly that amount is reported. The FIC’s “Report Types” page words the two lines differently: cash “amounting to GH¢50,000.00 or more”, and transfers “exceeding US$1000.00”.
The Guideline and the FIC’s page also differ on who reports and on what. The page gives the cash line “for instance” for “the banking and securities sectors” and does not mention the GHS20,000.00 line for specialised deposit-taking institutions. It says the ECTR “is filed by commercial banks only”, for “inward and outward transfers”, where the Guideline asks every accountable institution for “all Electronic Transactions” “for both individuals and business entities”. This library follows the Guideline where the two differ, because the Guideline is issued by the BoG and the FIC under sections 52 and 61 of Act 1044, in binding terms, and is dated September 2025, while the FIC’s page is undated. The page’s wording is given beside the Guideline’s where it helps, as the FIC’s own description.
Amounts and periods
| What | Amount or period | Where |
|---|---|---|
| Cash transaction report | Cash transactions within Ghana, any currency, “with a threshold of” GHS50,000.00 for banks and GHS20,000.00 for specialised deposit-taking institutions (or the foreign currency equivalent), reported daily; whether the amount itself is included is not said (see “Reports and deadlines”) | 2.8.5.1 |
| Foreign exchange bureaux, cash transaction report | Sales and purchases of foreign currencies “with a threshold of” GHS20,000.00 or the foreign currency equivalent | Guideline for Foreign Exchange Bureaux, 3.7(1) |
| Electronic currency transaction report | Electronic transactions “with a threshold of” $1,000.00 or its cedi equivalent, “for both individuals and business entities”; whether the amount itself is included is not said | 2.8.5.2(3) |
| Cross-border wire transfers | Full originator and beneficiary information at USD 1,000 (or cedi equivalent) or more; less below it; the beneficiary institution verifies the beneficiary at USD 1,000 or more | 2.6.10.1, 2.6.10.4 |
| VASPs | Enhanced due diligence on transactions above USD/EUR 1,000 | 2.6.4(1) |
| Beneficial owners | 5% or more controlling interest | 2.4.2(12) |
| Updating customer records | Every year for high-risk customers, every three years for medium-risk, at least every five years for low-risk | 2.4.4(3) |
| New business for an existing customer | Risk-based due diligence where there has been no contact for 24 months, or a dormant account is reactivated | 2.4.5(1) |
| Identification evidence where business starts first | Within 90 days of first contact, failing which all activity for the customer stops and the relationship is ended; for new customers, a 90-day deferral with a post-no-debit on the account | 3.6(2), Appendix B |
| Customers without full identification | Ghana Card within 90 days (tiered accounts); a further 30 days in the financial inclusion case | 3.8.1(5), 3.8.1.2(3) |
| Suspicious transaction report | Within 24 hours | 2.8.1(6), 2.8.2(3) |
| Records | At least five years after the relationship ends or the occasional transaction | 2.15.1(2) |
| Policy reviews | Key AML/CFT/CPF policies and procedures reviewed quarterly (board mechanism) | 2.3.2(2) |
| Transaction monitoring system | Audited yearly | 2.8.6.1(8) |
| Risk assessment | Reviewed within a two-year cycle, and after a significant occurrence or results from the national risk assessment; Appendix D also asks for updates when the risk profile changes, and calls reassessment within a two-year cycle “a sound practice” | 2.1(2)(v), Appendix D |
The red flags of Appendix E
Appendix E lists red flags in eight groups: (1) transactions perceived as suspicious, (2) money laundering using cash, (3) money laundering using accounts at institutions, (4) trade-based money laundering, (5) lending, (6) terrorist financing, (7) other unusual activities, including employee conduct, and (8) proliferation financing. They “are not necessarily indicative of actual ML/TF/PF if they are consistent with a customer’s legitimate business”, but “Identification of any of the types of transactions listed here shall put AIs on enquiry and provoke further investigation to determine their true legal status.”
Red flags that a library rule looks for:
- Transaction structuring: “amounts that are just below the stipulated reporting threshold” (1d); many small cash deposits whose “overall total is quite significant” (2d); proceeds paid out “by multiple cheques, each below the prescribed reporting threshold” (3l).
- High-risk jurisdiction: “Transactions involving high-risk countries/jurisdictions” (1a).
- Sudden change from a customer’s baseline and New account activity: “Significant increases in cash deposits of an individual or business entity without apparent cause” (2a); “Sudden and unexpected increase in account activity or balance”, typically in an account “opened with a small amount which subsequently increases rapidly and significantly” (3i).
- Rapid pass-through: deposits “subsequently transferred within a short period out of the account” (2a); “Accounts with large volumes of activity but low balances” (3f); numerous deposits followed soon after by transfers out, “leaving only small balances” (3h); accounts “used as temporary repositories for funds” (3j).
- Large single transaction: “Unusually large cash deposits made by an individual or a business entity whose normal business is transacted by cheques and other non-cash instruments” (2b); customers “depositing or withdrawing large amounts of cash with no apparent business source” (3e); “Customers making large deposits and maintaining large balances with no apparent rationale” (3g).
- Cumulative amount over a period: many small cash deposits whose “overall total is quite significant” (2d).
- Dormant account reactivation: “Large cash withdrawals from a previously dormant/inactive account” (3q).
- Funnel account: “Large number of individuals making payments into the same account without an adequate explanation” (3t, and again 8a).
- Transaction velocity: “High velocity of funds that reflects the large volume of money flowing through an account” (3u); a “Large number of incoming or outgoing funds transfers” through a business account with no logical purpose (6c).
- Shared identifiers across customers: “Persons involved in currency transactions share an address or phone number” (6a).
- Sanctions screening: a customer or counterparty whose address “is the same or similar to that of an individual or entity found on publicly available sanctions lists” (8f).
- Cash use that does not fit the customer’s activity: “Unusually large cash deposits made by an individual or a business entity whose normal business is transacted by cheques and other non-cash instruments” (2b); customers “depositing or withdrawing large amounts of cash with no apparent business source or in a manner inconsistent with the nature and volume of the business” (3e).
- Refused or failed identity verification, and false KYC data: “Minimal, vague or fictitious information on the transaction provided by a customer that the AI is not in a position to verify” (3a); “Lack of reference or identification in support of an account opening application by a person who is unable or unwilling to provide the required documentation” (3b).
What this page covers and leaves out
One requirement for each obligation that binds an institution’s AML, CFT, CPF or fraud controls, in the Guideline’s order: 368 requirements. A paragraph that lists several duties as separate items is split into one requirement per item where each item stands alone (for example the five minimum features of a monitoring system in 2.8.6.1(5)), and kept whole where the items only make sense together.
Left out, because they set no obligation on an institution, or only describe or define:
- The introduction, objective, definitions and abbreviations, the scope of unlawful activities (the predicate offences) and the overview.
- Part A, sections 1.0 and 1.1: the Bank of Ghana’s own functions and its co-operation with other authorities. Paragraph 1.2(3), which says what the BoG will do.
- Paragraph 2.3.6(3), a power of the BoG; the exemptions from due diligence in 2.4.1(2); the definition of a PEP in 2.6.1(1); the description of correspondent banking in 2.6.2(1) and (2); the introduction to new technologies in 2.6.3(1), and the BoG’s statement in 2.6.3(6) that it will keep monitoring them; the descriptions that open 2.7, 2.7.1 and 2.7.3; the sanction statement of 2.8.1(8), given in the heading of that group; the definitions and examples of tipping off and the legal protection of reporters in 2.8.4(1), (2), (3)(a) and (5); the definition of transaction monitoring in 2.8.6(1); the description of sanctions in 2.10(1) and (2).
- Part C: the description of identity in 3.1(1), (2) and (4) and 3.2(1); the parts of 3.3 that describe rather than require; 3.8.1(3), which says when simplified due diligence may apply; the definitions and description of virtual-asset risk in 3.9(1) to (3).
- “Regulatory reporting obligations”, paragraph 3, and “Sanctions for non-compliance”, given under “Who it applies to”.
- Appendix A (definitions); the table of Appendix B, of which only the heading’s 90-day deferral rule is a requirement; Appendix C, which only points to the BoG’s separate supervisory guidance note on the Ghana Card (2025); the individual red flags of Appendix E, which are indicators, not obligations (the two duties in its introduction are requirements, and the flags are listed above); the table of Appendix F, given above under “Reports and deadlines”, whose duty to file is the Regulatory reporting obligations, para 1; and the references.
Every requirement
All 368, in the regulation’s own order. Open a part to read it.
About this page
This page lists every obligation that binds an institution’s AML, CFT, CPF or fraud controls, in the Guideline’s own order and quoted from the Bank of Ghana’s PDF, with what an examiner will look for, what meeting it can look like and, where one exists, a detection rule from this library that helps. Section 2.8.6.1 sets the minimum features of the monitoring system, and section 2.14 the minimum for fraud management; each is listed on its own.
The Bank of Ghana and the FIC have published no guidance on the evidence they expect for these paragraphs, so every examiner note is our reading of what evidence fits the paragraph. Where a note names a report, a channel or a deadline, it is taken from the Guideline itself.
Each obligation binds the institution itself, and the Bank of Ghana supervises each institution. Where this page points to an Archer feature, it is an example of what a requirement can look like, not a statement that the requirement is met.
Responsibilities of accountable institutions (page iv)
3 requirements
An unnumbered page before the table of contents sets three duties that frame the rest of the Guideline.
Responsibilities, para 1 Gap analysis against this Guideline, submitted to BoG and the FIC
All AIs must conduct gap analysis of their AML/CFT/CPF policies and Risk Assessment Framework to align with the requirements of this Guideline and submit the following to Bank of Ghana and the Financial Intelligence Centre
- What an examiner will look for
- A dated gap analysis of the AML/CFT/CPF policies and the risk assessment framework against this Guideline, and proof it was sent to the BoG and the FIC. The sentence ends without saying what “the following” is; expect the gap analysis itself and the remediation plan that comes out of it.
- What this can look like
- A table of every paragraph of the 2025 Guideline against the current policy, with the gaps, owners and dates, sent to both regulators.
Responsibilities, para 2 AML audits run against this Guideline
AIs will be required to conduct their AML/CFT/CPF audits using this revised Guideline.
- What an examiner will look for
- The scope of the latest AML/CFT/CPF audit, citing the 2025 Guideline rather than the 2022 one.
- What this can look like
- Internal audit’s AML work programme is rebuilt on the 2025 paragraphs, including the transaction monitoring system audit of 2.8.6.1.
Responsibilities, para 3 Six named functions answer for implementing the Guideline
For a robust AML/CFT/CPF function, the following officers of an AI shall be responsible for the effective implementation of this Guideline and other AML/CFT/CPF legislations. i. Anti-Money Laundering Reporting Officer (AMLRO) ii. Board and Management iii. Internal Audit iv. Heads of Business Units v. Human Resource Team vi. Customer Services Officers
- What an examiner will look for
- Job descriptions or a responsibility matrix that gives each of the six functions its part of the Guideline.
- What this can look like
- A RACI table: the AMLRO, the board and management, internal audit, business heads, HR and customer service, each with the paragraphs it owns.
1.2 Accountable institutions co-operation with competent authorities
2 requirements
Sections 1.0 and 1.1 set out what the Bank of Ghana does (supervision, information sharing, penalties); they bind the BoG, not the institution, and have no requirements.
1.2(1) Comply with requests from the BoG, the FIC and other competent authorities
AIs shall comply with all requests made pursuant to the law, regulations, guidelines and other enforceable means and provide information to the BOG, FIC and other relevant competent authorities. Failure to comply with such requests shall attract sanctions.
- What an examiner will look for
- A register of requests received from the BoG, the FIC and other authorities, with the date answered.
- What this can look like
- Every regulator or law enforcement request is logged, assigned and answered, and the log shows the turnaround.
1.2(2) Search records at once, report the result, keep requests confidential
AIs’ procedures for responding to authorised requests for information on ML/TF/PF shall be such that it can: i. immediately search the institution’s records to enable it to respond to the request; ii. report promptly to the requesting authority the outcome of the search; and iii. protect the security and confidentiality of such requests.
- What an examiner will look for
- The written procedure for authority requests; evidence that records (customers, accounts, transactions) can be searched across systems at once; access to requests limited to named staff.
- What this can look like
- One search across customers, accounts and transactions answers a request the same day, and the request file is visible only to the compliance team.
2.0 AML/CFT/CPF institutional policy framework
2 requirements
2.0(1) Policies committing to AML/CFT/CPF compliance
All AIs shall develop and implement policies indicating their commitment to comply with AML/CFT/CPF obligations under Act 1044, this Guideline and other relevant regulations to prevent ML/TF/PF risks.
- What an examiner will look for
- The board-approved AML/CFT/CPF policy, citing Act 1044 and this Guideline.
- What this can look like
- A current, approved policy that names the laws and the Guideline it implements.
2.0(2) Internal rules, procedures and controls that deter criminals
AIs shall formulate and implement internal rules, procedures and other controls that will deter criminals from using their facilities for ML/TF/PF activities and shall ensure compliance with the relevant laws and regulations.
- What an examiner will look for
- The procedures and controls that put the policy into effect, and evidence they run.
- What this can look like
- Procedures for onboarding, screening, monitoring and reporting that staff follow and that internal audit tests.
2.1 Assessing AML/CFT/CPF risks and applying risk-based approach
12 requirements
2.1(1) Risk assessment integrated with the ERM framework, by customer, country, product, transaction and channel
The AI’s AML/CFT/CPF risk assessment framework must be aligned and integrated with their overall Enterprise Risk Management Framework (ERMF). AIs are required to take appropriate steps to identify, assess and understand their ML/TF/PF risks in relation to their customers, countries or geographical areas, products and services, transactions or delivery channels.
- What an examiner will look for
- The ML/TF/PF risk assessment, showing each of the five risk areas, and the place it takes in the enterprise risk management framework. Appendix D gives the minimum content (see the Appendix D requirements).
- What this can look like
- The AML risk assessment is a chapter of the enterprise risk framework and scores customers, countries, products, transactions and channels.
2.1(2)(i) Risk assessment policies, controls and procedures
develop ML/TF/PF risk assessment policies, controls and procedures.
- What an examiner will look for
- The written methodology for the risk assessment.
- What this can look like
- A methodology document saying how risks are identified, scored and mitigated.
2.1(2)(ii) Consider all relevant risk factors before setting the risk level and mitigation
consider all the relevant risk factors before determining the level of overall risk, the specific risk level and type of mitigation to be applied.
- What an examiner will look for
- The risk factors the assessment used, mapped to the overall rating and to the mitigation chosen for each risk.
- What this can look like
- Each risk rating cites the factors behind it and the control that answers it.
2.1(2)(iii) Document every risk assessment
document all risk assessments undertaken.
- What an examiner will look for
- Every risk assessment carried out, dated and kept.
- What this can look like
- An archive of each risk assessment, including product and new-technology assessments.
2.1(2)(iv) Board or senior management approval before implementation
obtain Board/Senior Management approval prior to implementation.
- What an examiner will look for
- Board or senior management minutes approving the risk assessment before it took effect.
- What this can look like
- The risk assessment goes to the board before it is used, and the minutes show the approval.
2.1(2)(v) Review at least every two years, and after a significant event or a new NRA
keep the assessment up-to-date through a periodic review within a two-year cycle. However, in the event of a significant occurrence and or results from the NRA, the AI shall review and update its risk assessment policies, controls and procedures.
- What an examiner will look for
- The dates of the last two reviews, no more than two years apart, and a review after each significant event or National Risk Assessment result.
- What this can look like
- A review calendar with a two-year maximum, plus an extra review when the NRA is published or a major incident happens.
2.1(2)(vi) Monitor implementation to find new risk areas
monitor the implementation of the ML/TF/PF risk assessment policies, controls and procedures to identify new risk areas.
- What an examiner will look for
- Monitoring reports on how the risk assessment controls are working, and the new risks they surfaced.
- What this can look like
- Quarterly compliance testing feeds a list of emerging risks back into the assessment.
2.1(2)(vii) Update for new risk areas
update ML/TF/PF risk assessment policies, controls and procedures with identified new areas of potential ML/TF/PF risks.
- What an examiner will look for
- Version history showing new risks added to the assessment.
- What this can look like
- When a new typology appears (for example a new mobile-money fraud), the assessment and the controls are updated.
2.1(2)(viii) Send the updated assessment to the board, senior management, the BoG and the FIC
provide the updated ML/TF/PF risk assessment policies, controls and procedures to Board/Senior Management, BOG and FIC.
- What an examiner will look for
- Proof the updated assessment was sent to all four.
- What this can look like
- Each update goes to the board pack and, by letter or ORASS, to both regulators.
2.1(2)(ix) Additional controls for newly identified risks
design additional controls and procedures in their AML/CFT/CPF operational Guidelines for the newly identified risks and
- What an examiner will look for
- The operational procedures changed for each new risk.
- What this can look like
- A new risk leads to a new or changed procedure, with its date.
2.1(2)(x) Further risk assessments when the BoG or FIC ask
conduct additional risk assessment as and when required by the BOG and FIC.
- What an examiner will look for
- Assessments made at the regulators’ request, with the request.
- What this can look like
- A thematic assessment (for example of virtual-asset exposure) delivered when the regulator asks.
2.1(3) Use the National Risk Assessment
AIs shall be guided by the results of the National Risk Assessment (NRA)Reports in conducting their respective risk assessments.
- What an examiner will look for
- A mapping from the National Risk Assessment findings to the institution’s own risk ratings.
- What this can look like
- The risk assessment quotes the NRA’s high-risk sectors and products and says how each applies to the institution.
2.2 AML/CFT/CPF risk assessment for new products and new technologies
3 requirements
2.2(1) Assess new products and technologies and submit to the BoG for approval before launch
AIs shall review, identify and record areas of potential ML/TF/PF risks and submit to BOG for approval before new products and new technologies are launched.
- What an examiner will look for
- For each launch: the risk assessment, its date, and the BoG approval received before the launch date.
- What this can look like
- No product or technology goes live until its AML risk assessment has been sent to and approved by the BoG.
2.2(2) Review the framework periodically for new-product risks
AIs shall review their AML/CFT/CPF risk assessment frameworks periodically to determine their adequacy and identify other areas of potential risks associated with the new products and new technologies.
- What an examiner will look for
- Periodic reviews that look again at products and technologies launched since the last review.
- What this can look like
- The annual review revisits every product launched in the year.
2.2(3) Follow Appendix D on risk assessment and risk rating
AIs shall adopt further Guidance on Risk Assessment and Risk Rating as provided in Appendix D.
- What an examiner will look for
- A methodology that follows Appendix D: its sources, steps and risk factors (see the Appendix D requirements).
- What this can look like
- The methodology cross-references each part of Appendix D.
2.3 AML/CFT/CPF governance framework
8 requirements
2.3.1(1) A comprehensive AML/CFT/CPF compliance programme
AIs shall have a comprehensive AML/CFT/CPF compliance programme to guide its compliance efforts and to ensure the diligent implementation of its guidelines.
- What an examiner will look for
- The written compliance programme and its plan for the year.
- What this can look like
- An annual compliance plan covering monitoring, testing, training and reporting.
2.3.2(1) Board oversight, documented in minutes
The Board has ultimate responsibility for ensuring the effectiveness of the AML/CFT/CPF compliance programme. In this regard, the Board’s oversight in respect of AML/CFT/CPF shall align with international best practices, including the Bank of Ghana’s Corporate Governance Directive. The Board must ensure that there is documented evidence of its oversight function, for example, in minutes of meetings of the Board (or committees of the Board).
- What an examiner will look for
- The Guideline names the evidence: minutes of the board or its committees that show AML/CFT/CPF oversight.
- What this can look like
- AML is a standing item of the board risk committee, and the minutes record the discussion and decisions.
2.3.2(2) The board’s ten key responsibilities, including four AMLRO reports a year
Key responsibilities of the Board include: i. Approving the appointment and ensuring the independence of the AMLRO. ii. Approving AML/CFT/CPF policy/manual. iii. Approving the AML/CFT/CPF compliance programme, training programme, compliance reports, and AML/CFT/CPF Risk Assessment Framework and Report. iv. Ensuring the establishment of appropriate mechanisms to review key AML/CFT/CPF policies and procedures quarterly. v. Approving new business relationships, products and services and its associated specific ML/TF risk. vi. Ensuring the establishment of an AML/CFT/CPF risk management framework with clearly defined lines of authority and responsibility for AML/CFT/CPF and effective separation of duties between those implementing the policies and procedures and those enforcing the controls. vii. Ensuring that the Board receives the requisite training on AML/CFT/CPF generally, as well as on the institution’s specific AML/CFT &P risks and controls at least once a year. viii. Ensuring that the AMLRO receives training on an ongoing basis to effectively perform his duties. ix. Ensuring that the AMLRO is resourced adequately in terms of personnel, IT systems and budget to implement, administer and monitor the AML/CFT/CPF programme effectively. x. Ensuring receipt of at minimum four (4) compliance reports in a year on the AI’s AML/CFT/CPF function from the AMLRO for its information and necessary action including but not limited to: a. Remedial action plans if any, to address the results of independent audits (either internal or external); regulatory reports received from the Bank of Ghana or other regulators on its assessment of the institution’s AML/CFT/CPF programme; b. results of compliance testing and self-identified instances of non-compliance with AML/CFT/CPF requirements; c. Recent developments in AML/CFT/CPF laws and regulations and their implications if any, to the AIs; d. Details of recent significant risk events and potential impact on the AI; and e. Statistics of statutory report to the FIC, orders from law enforcement agencies, refused or declined business and de-risked relationships.
- What an examiner will look for
- Minutes and papers for each item: AMLRO appointment and independence, approval of the policy, programme, training and risk assessment, quarterly policy reviews, approval of new products, separation of duties, board training at least once a year, AMLRO training and resources (“personnel, IT systems and budget”), and at least four AMLRO compliance reports a year with the contents listed in (a) to (e).
- What this can look like
- A board calendar with four AMLRO reports a year (audit remediation, compliance testing, legal changes, risk events, statistics of reports to the FIC and of declined and de-risked business), an annual board AML training, and the AMLRO’s budget and systems approved.
2.3.2(3) Send the approved policy and manual to the BoG within five working days
AIs shall submit copies of the approved AML/CFT/CPF policy and manual to the BOG within five (5) working days.
- What an examiner will look for
- The approval date and the date the policy and manual reached the BoG, no more than five working days apart.
- What this can look like
- Board approval on a Monday, policy and manual with the BoG by the following Monday.
2.3.3(1) Senior management ensures policies are risk-based, lawful and applied across the group
Senior Management shall be responsible and ensure adherence to established AML/CFT/CPF policies and procedures. Among other things, Senior Management shall ensure that policies and procedures: i. Are risk-based, proportional and adequate to mitigate ML/TF/PF risks of the AI; ii. Comply with all relevant AML/CFT/CPF laws, regulations and guidelines; and iii. Are implemented effectively across business areas or throughout the financial group as applicable. contains succession planning for the AMLRO function.
- What an examiner will look for
- Senior management’s review of the policies against the three tests, and a succession plan for the AMLRO.
- What this can look like
- Management signs off that each policy is risk-based and applied in every business line and subsidiary, and names a deputy for the AMLRO.
2.3.3(2) Review policies periodically; assess new products, channels and technologies before launch
Senior Management must review policies and procedures periodically for consistency with the AI’s AML/CFT/CPF Programme. Attention shall be paid to identification, assessing and understanding of ML/TF/PF risks associated with new products/services and delivery channels; new business practices and new or developing technologies for new and existing products; and put measures in place to manage and mitigate such risks. Risk assessments shall take place prior to the launch or use of such products/services, channel, business practices and technologies.
- What an examiner will look for
- Dated policy reviews, and a risk assessment dated before each new product, channel, practice or technology went live.
- What this can look like
- A launch checklist that cannot close until the AML risk assessment is signed.
2.3.3(3)(i) Address audit and regulator recommendations in time
All significant recommendations made by internal and external auditors and regulators in respect of the AML/CFT/CPF programme are addressed in a timely manner;
- What an examiner will look for
- A tracker of audit and regulatory findings with owners, due dates and closure evidence.
- What this can look like
- Every finding from the yearly independent test and from BoG examinations has a dated action and is closed on time.
2.3.3(3)(ii) Employee training at least twice a year
There is an ongoing employee training programme (at least twice a year) which enables employees to have adequate and relevant knowledge to understand and discharge their AML/CFT/CPF responsibilities.
- What an examiner will look for
- Training records showing at least two sessions a year for employees.
- What this can look like
- Two AML training rounds a year for all staff, with attendance records.
2.3.4 Role and duties of the Anti-Money Laundering Reporting Officer (AMLRO)
16 requirements
2.3.4(1) Appoint an AMLRO of at least senior management grade
AIs shall appoint an Anti-Money Laundering Reporting Officer (AMLRO) of a key managerial level and of minimum Senior Management grade/status in accordance with section 50(1)(b) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2020 (Act 1044), Regulation 5(1) of L.I. 1987, section 156 of Act 930 and the BOG Corporate Governance Directive.
- What an examiner will look for
- The appointment letter showing senior management grade, and the BoG’s approval (section 1.0 says the BoG approves the appointment).
- What this can look like
- An AMLRO at senior manager level whose appointment the BoG approved.
2.3.4(2) AMLRO sits on the highest management body
The AMLRO shall be a member of the highest Management Decision-Making Body of the AI.
- What an examiner will look for
- The membership of the executive committee, with the AMLRO on it.
- What this can look like
- The AMLRO is a full member of the executive committee.
2.3.4(3) AMLRO reports to the board or a board committee
The AMLRO shall report to the Board or a Sub-Committee of the Board to ensure operational independence.
- What an examiner will look for
- The reporting line in the organisation chart and the board committee’s terms of reference.
- What this can look like
- The AMLRO reports to the board audit or risk committee, not to a business head.
2.3.4(4) Authority, confidential identity and a professional qualification
The AMLRO must have sufficient authority, independence and seniority to be able to effectively carry out duties in accordance with the Act 1044 and this Guideline. The identity of the AMLRO must be treated with the strictest confidence by the employees of the AI. The AI shall ensure that the AMLRO acquires a professional qualification in anti-money laundering and financial crime.
- What an examiner will look for
- The AMLRO’s mandate, the measures that keep their identity confidential among staff, and their professional AML qualification.
- What this can look like
- A written mandate, a reporting channel that does not reveal the AMLRO to the wider staff, and a recognised AML certification.
2.3.4(5)(i) AMLRO: written policies kept up to date and board-approved
Develop written AML/CFT/CPF policies and procedures that are kept up to date and approved by the Board;
- What an examiner will look for
- Current policies with their approval dates.
- What this can look like
- Policies reviewed at least yearly by the AMLRO and approved by the board.
2.3.4(5)(ii) AMLRO: oversight of the compliance programme
Have oversight of the AML/CFT/CPF compliance programme in line with the institution’s identified risk and other emerging risks;
- What an examiner will look for
- The compliance plan owned by the AMLRO, tied to the risk assessment.
- What this can look like
- The AMLRO’s plan covers the highest risks in the assessment first.
2.3.4(5)(iii) AMLRO: receive and vet internal suspicious activity reports
Receive and vet suspicious (unusual) transaction/activity reports from the employees;
- What an examiner will look for
- The register of internal reports from staff, each with the AMLRO’s decision.
- What this can look like
- Staff raise an internal report in one place; the AMLRO decides each one and records why.
2.3.4(5)(iv) AMLRO: regular risk assessments, including new products and technologies
Conduct regular risk assessments of the inherent ML/TF/PF risks including assessments of new products, services, new technologies, processes and business initiatives to identify potential ML/TF/PF risks and develop appropriate control mechanisms;
- What an examiner will look for
- Risk assessments led by the AMLRO, including those for new products and technologies.
- What this can look like
- The AMLRO signs each product risk assessment and the controls it calls for.
2.3.4(5)(v) AMLRO: file STRs, ECTRs, PEP reports, CTRs and other returns
File suspicious, Electronic Currency, Politically Exposed Persons, Cash Transaction Reports and other relevant regulatory reports with the BOG and FIC (where applicable);
- What an examiner will look for
- Filing records for each report type, with dates against the deadlines (see “Reports and deadlines”).
- What this can look like
- A filing calendar and a log of every STR, CTR, ECTR and PEP transaction report submitted.
2.3.4(5)(vi) AMLRO: systems and resources, including fraud control, to detect and report suspicious and attempted transactions
Ensure systems, resources, including fraud control management are in place to detect and report suspicious transactions and attempted transactions,
- What an examiner will look for
- The monitoring and fraud systems in use, their coverage, and evidence that attempted transactions are caught and reported too.
- What this can look like
- Monitoring and fraud rules see declined and attempted payments as well as completed ones, and the AMLRO reviews their coverage.
2.3.4(5)(vii) AMLRO: training current and given to all staff, senior management and the board
Ensure that ongoing training programmes on ML/TF/PF are current and relevant and are carried out for all employees, senior management and the Board;
- What an examiner will look for
- Training content with its last update, and attendance for staff, management and the board.
- What this can look like
- Training material refreshed each year with new typologies, and attended by the board as well as staff.
2.3.4(5)(viii) AMLRO: at least four reports a year to the board and senior management
Submit at minimum four (4) reports to the Board and Senior Management regarding the adequacy of the AML/CFT/CPF framework or any associated issues; and
- What an examiner will look for
- At least four AMLRO reports in the last twelve months, in board and management papers.
- What this can look like
- A quarterly AMLRO report to the board and the executive committee.
2.3.4(5)(ix) AMLRO: liaison with the BoG and the FIC, and contact point for staff
Serve both as a liaison officer with the BOG and the FIC and a point-of-contact for all employees on issues relating to ML/TF/PF.
- What an examiner will look for
- Correspondence with the regulators handled by the AMLRO, and staff guidance naming the AMLRO as contact.
- What this can look like
- All BoG and FIC correspondence on AML goes through the AMLRO’s office.
2.3.4(6) AMLRO has timely access to CDD data and transaction records
AIs shall ensure that the AMLRO has access to all information that may be relevant to him/her in consideration of a suspicious or unusual transaction/activity report which includes timely access to customer identification data, CDD information, transaction records and other relevant information.
- What an examiner will look for
- The AMLRO’s system access: customer identification, CDD files and transaction records, available without delay.
- What this can look like
- The AMLRO and analysts see the customer’s KYC file and full transaction history on the same screen as the alert.
2.3.4(7) AMLRO, with audit and operations, is responsible for fraud management
The AMLRO in collaboration with audit and operational team shall be responsible for fraud management within the AI.
- What an examiner will look for
- The fraud management framework naming the AMLRO as responsible, with audit and operations.
- What this can look like
- Fraud incidents and fraud rule changes come to the AMLRO, who runs fraud management with audit and operations.
2.3.4(8) A structure that keeps the AMLRO operationally independent
AIs shall put in place a structure that ensures the operational independence of the AMLRO.
- What an examiner will look for
- The organisation chart, reporting line and budget arrangements that make the AMLRO independent of the business.
- What this can look like
- The AMLRO’s pay and budget are set by the board committee, not by the business lines they oversee.
2.3.5 Internal controls, compliance and audit
6 requirements
2.3.5(1) The programme’s seven components, including transaction monitoring
AIs are required to implement programmes against ML/TF/PF which have regard to the ML/TF/PF risks and the size of the business which include the following internal policies, procedures and controls: a. Compliance management arrangements (including the appointment of AMLRO at management level) b. Screening procedures to ensure high standards when hiring employees c. KYC/CDD/EDD procedures d. Ongoing employee training programme e. Independent audit function to test the system f. Monitoring of transactions for the detection and reporting of unusual and suspicious transactions g. Record-keeping
- What an examiner will look for
- Each of the seven components in place: compliance management with an AMLRO, staff screening at hiring, KYC/CDD/EDD, ongoing training, an independent audit function, transaction monitoring for detecting and reporting unusual and suspicious transactions, and record keeping.
- What this can look like
- A programme document with one chapter per component and an owner for each.
2.3.5(2) Communicate policies, procedures and controls to employees
AIs shall communicate these internal policies, procedures and controls to their employees.
- What an examiner will look for
- Evidence that staff received the policies: intranet publication, acknowledgements.
- What this can look like
- Every employee acknowledges the AML policy each year.
2.3.6(1) Independent testing of the compliance programme
AIs shall make a policy commitment and subject their AML/CFT/CPF compliance programme to independent testing.
- What an examiner will look for
- The policy commitment and the latest independent test report.
- What this can look like
- A yearly independent review of the whole AML programme.
2.3.6(2) Testers trained in AML; they judge adequacy, completeness and effectiveness
It is important that these reviews are performed by auditors (internal or External) who have had appropriate AML/CFT/CPF training and experience in respect of ML/TF/PF risk and an appropriate level of knowledge of the regulatory requirements and guidelines. It is required that the auditor shall determine the adequacy, completeness and effectiveness of the AML/CFT/CPF compliance programme.
- What an examiner will look for
- The auditors’ AML training and experience, and a report that concludes on adequacy, completeness and effectiveness. Appendix F lists what the independent audit report may cover, including “Transaction Monitoring Systems” and “Filing of CTRs/STRs/ECTRs”.
- What this can look like
- An audit report that tests the monitoring system and the filings, not only the policy documents.
2.3.6(4) Independent test report to the BoG and the FIC by 15 January
The report of the independent testing/review of AML/CFT/CPF compliance programme shall be submitted to the BOG and FIC not later than January 15 of every financial year.
- What an examiner will look for
- Proof of submission to both regulators by 15 January. Appendix F gives the same report a yearly deadline of the 15th day of the month after the end of the year.
- What this can look like
- The independent test report reaches the BoG through ORASS and the FIC by email by 15 January.
2.3.6(5) Fix weaknesses promptly and update the BoG and the FIC
The AI shall promptly address any identified weaknesses or inadequacies and provide an update to BOG and FIC.
- What an examiner will look for
- A remediation plan for the test findings and the updates sent to the regulators.
- What this can look like
- Each finding from the independent test has an owner and date, and progress is reported to both regulators.
2.4 Customer due diligence programme
8 with rules 34 requirements
2.4(1) Risk-based CDD policies; the risk assessment identifies who needs EDD
AIs shall develop and implement risk-based policies and procedures to mitigate the ML/TF/PF risks identified in their business and customer risk assessments. The risk assessment framework shall identify which customers or categories of customers present higher risk and require the application of enhanced due diligence (EDD).
- What an examiner will look for
- CDD procedures tied to the risk assessment, and the list of customer categories that get EDD.
- What this can look like
- The customer risk model sets a rating at onboarding, and high-rated customers go to EDD automatically.
2.4(2) SDD at least as stated in the Guideline for low-risk customers
Where the AIs determine that a customer or a category of customers presents low risk, a simplified due diligence (SDD) measure shall, at a minimum, be applied as stated in this Guideline.
- What an examiner will look for
- The low-risk categories and the simplified measures applied to them, matching 3.8.1 and 3.8.1.1.
- What this can look like
- Low-risk products use the minimum SDD measures of 3.8.1.1, no less.
2.4(3) Policies state the rationale for SDD
Where SDD measures are applied on the basis of an assessment of low ML/TF/PF risk, the AML/CFT/CPF policies and procedures shall clearly articulate the rationale and the applicable measures to be undertaken.
- What an examiner will look for
- For each SDD category, the written reason it is low risk and the measures applied.
- What this can look like
- The policy explains why a salary-only account is low risk and what is still checked.
2.4.1(1) When CDD is required, including linked occasional transactions and any suspicion
AIs shall undertake customer due diligence (CDD) in accordance with section 30 of Act 1044 when: a. business relationships are established; b. carrying out occasional transactions. This may include transactions carried out in a single operation or several operations that appear to be linked. It may also involve carrying out occasional transactions such as money transfers, including those applicable to cross-border and domestic transfers; c. Acquisition of prepaid credit cards; d. There is a suspicion of ML/TF/PF regardless of any exemptions or any other thresholds referred to in this Guideline; e. There are doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data;
- What an examiner will look for
- CDD at each of the five moments: a new relationship, occasional transactions (including linked ones and transfers), prepaid card purchases, any suspicion whatever the threshold, and doubts about earlier identification data.
- What this can look like
- Occasional customers sending money are identified; repeated small transfers by the same person are linked and treated as one.
2.4.1(3) CDD covers customer and beneficiary, and continuous monitoring
CDD is the identification and verification of both the customer and beneficiary, including but not limited to continuous monitoring of the business relationship by the AIs.
- What an examiner will look for
- Identification of the beneficiary as well as the customer, and ongoing monitoring of each relationship.
- What this can look like
- Beneficiary details are captured on payments, and every relationship is monitored for as long as it lasts.
2.4.1(4) No anonymous or fictitious-name accounts
AIs are not permitted to operate anonymous accounts or accounts in fictitious names.
- What an examiner will look for
- Evidence that every account is tied to a verified identity.
- What this can look like
- Account opening cannot complete without a verified Ghana Card or other required identity.
2.4.2(1) Identify and verify with the Ghana Card at onboarding
AIs shall identify and verify customers’ identities using the Ghana Card during onboarding.
- What an examiner will look for
- Onboarding records showing Ghana Card verification for every customer who holds one (Appendix B sets the documents for others).
- What this can look like
- The Ghana Card number is checked against the National Identification Authority at onboarding.
2.4.2(2) Verify with the Ghana Card for transactions on a risk-based approach
AIs shall verify customers using the Ghana Card for financial transactions on a risk-based approach.
- What an examiner will look for
- The policy saying which transactions need Ghana Card verification, and evidence it is applied.
- What this can look like
- High-value or high-risk transactions require a fresh Ghana Card check.
2.4.2(3)(i) Identify and biometrically verify all third-party transactions
Identify and biometrically verify all third-party transactions
- What an examiner will look for
- Biometric verification records for every transaction made by a third party on someone else’s account.
- What this can look like
- A person depositing or withdrawing for an account holder is verified by fingerprint or face against the Ghana Card.
2.4.2(3)(ii) Multifactor authentication and liveness check on mobile banking onboarding
Implement multifactor authentication and liveness check for all transactions on mobile banking application during onboarding.
- What an examiner will look for
- Evidence that the mobile app enforces multifactor authentication and a liveness check during onboarding.
- What this can look like
- The app requires a selfie liveness check matched to the Ghana Card and a second factor before the first transaction.
2.4.2(4) Follow Appendix B for KYC requirements
AIs shall refer to Appendix B for KYC/CDD/EDD requirements during onboarding and ongoing due diligence.
- What an examiner will look for
- Onboarding checklists matching Appendix B for each customer type.
- What this can look like
- Each customer type (individual, sole proprietor, company, NPO, trust) has the document list of Appendix B.
2.4.2(5) Purpose and intended nature of the relationship
AIs shall obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship of their potential customers.
- What an examiner will look for
- The purpose and intended nature recorded on each customer file.
- What this can look like
- Onboarding asks why the account is opened and what activity is expected.
2.4.2(6) Ongoing due diligence at a frequency set by risk
AIs shall conduct ongoing due diligence on the business relationship with existing customers in line with the risk associated with the customer, i.e. high-risk, yearly etc.
- What an examiner will look for
- Review dates by risk rating; 2.4.4(3) sets one, three and five years.
- What this can look like
- High-risk customers are reviewed yearly, and the system raises a task when a review falls due.
2.4.2(7) Transactions consistent with the customer’s business, risk profile and source of funds
Where the ongoing due diligence includes scrutinizing the transactions undertaken by the customer, AIs shall ensure that the transactions being conducted are consistent with the AI’s knowledge of the business, risk profile, and the source of funds of the customer.
- What an examiner will look for
- Monitoring that compares transactions with the customer’s declared business, risk profile and source of funds, and the alerts it raised.
- What this can look like
- A salaried customer receiving business-size inflows raises an alert against the declared income.
2.4.2(8) Screen at onboarding against domestic and international sanctions lists and the institution’s internal list
AIs shall screen customers at onboarding and against all domestic, international sanctions lists and internal list developed by the AI.
- What an examiner will look for
- Screening results at onboarding for every customer, against the domestic lists, the international lists and the institution’s own internal list.
- What this can look like
- Onboarding screens the customer against UN, OFAC, EU, HM Treasury, AU and ECOWAS lists, Ghana’s domestic lists and the institution’s internal list before the account opens.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening, Blacklist / internal watchlist match
2.4.2(9) Rescreen existing customers on transaction patterns and new lists
For existing customers, AIs shall screen existing customers based on transaction patterns and the receipt of new international sanctions list from the relevant authorities (United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), European Union (EU), His Majesty’s Treasury, African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
- What an examiner will look for
- Rescreening of the whole customer base each time one of the named lists changes, with dates matching the list updates.
- What this can look like
- When OFAC or the UN publishes a new designation, every existing customer is rescreened that day.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
2.4.2(10) Keep KYC documents, data and information up to date
AIs shall ensure that documents, data or information collected under the KYC/CDD/EDD process are kept up-to-date.
- What an examiner will look for
- Expired documents and stale data flagged and refreshed.
- What this can look like
- An expired ID or an outdated address triggers a refresh request.
2.4.2(11) Legal persons: verify who acts for them, legal status, and licences
In respect of customers that are legal persons or legal arrangements, AIs shall: i. verify the identity of the person purporting to have been authorized to act on behalf of such a customer and ii. verify the legal status of the legal person or legal arrangement by obtaining proof of incorporation from the competent authority responsible for the registration and licensing of legal persons and legal arrangements. iii. where applicable, request and verify any additional license (or statutory certification) from a competent authority or similar evidence of establishment or existence and any other relevant information.
- What an examiner will look for
- For each legal person: the verified representative, proof of incorporation from the registrar, and any licence required.
- What this can look like
- A company file holds the registrar’s certificate, the signatory’s verified ID and the sector licence.
2.4.2(12) Identify and verify beneficial owners with 5% or more
AIs shall identify a beneficial owner(s) (BOs) and take measures to verify the identity of the BOs using relevant information or data obtained from a reliable source to satisfy that the AI knows who the B/O(s) is/are (BOs with 5% or more controlling interest).
- What an examiner will look for
- The beneficial owners at the 5% line, verified from a reliable source.
- What this can look like
- Every person with 5% or more of a corporate customer is identified and verified with the Ghana Card or equivalent.
2.4.2(13) Find out whether a customer acts for someone else; identify that third party
AIs shall in respect of all customers, determine whether or not a customer is acting on behalf of another person. Where the customer or any other third party is acting on behalf of another person or making deposits and withdrawals, the AI shall take reasonable steps which include obtaining sufficient identification data (the name, address, contact, purpose of transaction, and signature) and verifying the identity of the third party (acting on behalf of the other person).
- What an examiner will look for
- The question asked at onboarding and on transactions, and the third party’s name, address, contact, purpose and signature with verification.
- What this can look like
- A cash deposit made for someone else records the depositor’s identity and the purpose.
- Rules that help
- Third-party funding and payment account name mismatch
2.4.2(14) Understand ownership and control; find the natural persons in control
AIs shall take measures in respect of customers that are legal persons or legal arrangements to: i. understand the ownership and control structure; and ii. determine the natural persons who exercise ultimate ownership and/or control of such a customer.
- What an examiner will look for
- An ownership chart for each legal customer, down to the natural persons.
- What this can look like
- Layered ownership is traced to the individuals at the top.
2.4.2(15) Listed companies: risk-based identification of shareholders
Where the customer or the owner of the controlling interest is a public company subject to regulatory disclosure requirements (i.e. a public company listed on a recognised stock exchange), the AI shall apply a risk-based approach to identify and verify the identity of the shareholders of such a public company.
- What an examiner will look for
- The risk-based approach used for listed companies and the shareholders identified.
- What this can look like
- For a listed company, shareholders above the institution’s threshold are identified from the exchange’s filings.
2.4.3(1) Verify before or during onboarding or the transaction
AIs shall verify the identity of the customer, beneficial-owner and occasional customers before or during the course of establishing a business relationship or conducting transactions.
- What an examiner will look for
- Verification dates no later than the account opening or the transaction.
- What this can look like
- The account opens or the transfer goes through only once the identity check has passed.
2.4.3(2) Use before verification: risk-based procedures and a documented reason
Where a customer is permitted to utilize the business relationship prior to verification in order not to interrupt the business or transaction, AIs are required to adopt risk-based procedures to effectively mitigate ML/TF/PF risks and document the rationale for such an activity.
- What an examiner will look for
- For each case of use before verification: the documented reason and the risk controls applied.
- What this can look like
- A customer allowed to transact before verification has the reason recorded on file.
2.4.3(3) Limits on the number, types and amount of transactions before verification
AIs shall follow procedures that include measures such as limits on the number, types and amount of transactions that can be performed.
- What an examiner will look for
- The limits configured for unverified customers and evidence the system enforces them.
- What this can look like
- An unverified account can receive but not send, and only up to a set amount, until verification completes.
- Rules that help
- New account activity (mule accounts)
2.4.3(4) Use before verification only once
AIs shall undertake the activity of paragraph 2 above only on one occasion.
- What an examiner will look for
- Evidence that no customer was allowed a second use before verification.
- What this can look like
- The system blocks a second pre-verification transaction.
2.4.4(1) CDD/EDD on existing customers by materiality and risk
AIs shall apply CDD/EDD requirements to existing customers on the basis of materiality and risk and to continue to conduct due diligence on such existing relationships at appropriate times.
- What an examiner will look for
- The plan for bringing existing customers up to standard, by risk.
- What this can look like
- Older accounts without a Ghana Card are remediated, high risk first.
2.4.4(2) Trigger events for CDD/EDD on existing customers
The appropriate time to conduct CDD/EDD by AIs shall include, when: i. a transaction of significant value takes place, ii. a receipt or transfers of a negligible yet consistently frequent amount on the customer’s account iii. customer documentation change substantially, iv. there is a material change in the way that the account is operated, v. the institution becomes aware that it lacks sufficient information about an existing customer. vi. customer is onboarded onto a high-risk product/service of the AI.
- What an examiner will look for
- A due diligence review for each trigger: a significant-value transaction, negligible but frequent receipts or transfers, a substantial change in documents, a material change in how the account is run, a lack of information, or a move onto a high-risk product.
- What this can look like
- A rule that catches a significant transaction, frequent small receipts or a change in account behaviour also opens a CDD review of the customer.
2.4.4(3) Update records every year (high risk), three years (medium), five years (low)
In the absence of the above, AIs shall take appropriate steps to update customer records within a one-year (1-year) cycle for high-risk customers, three-year (3-year) for medium-risk customers and at least five-year (5-year) for low-risk customers.
- What an examiner will look for
- For a sample of customers, the date of the last update within one, three or five years according to their rating.
- What this can look like
- Review tasks are scheduled by risk rating: yearly, every three years, every five years.
2.4.4(4) Identification records available to the AMLRO and the authorities
An AI shall properly identify the customer in accordance with the criteria above. The customer identification records shall be made available to the AMLRO and competent authorities as and when needed.
- What an examiner will look for
- Identification records retrievable on request.
- What this can look like
- Any customer’s identification file can be pulled within minutes.
2.4.5(1) Risk-based CDD on new business, including when a dormant account is reactivated
When an existing customer closes one account and opens another or enters into a new agreement to purchase products or services, the AI shall apply a risk-based approach in the CDD/EDD procedures. This is particularly important: a. if there was an existing business relationship with the customer and identification evidence had not previously been obtained; b. or if there had been no recent contact or correspondence with the customer within the past twenty-four (24) months; or c. when a previously dormant account is reactivated.
- What an examiner will look for
- CDD carried out on new accounts and products for existing customers, and on each reactivated dormant account.
- What this can look like
- A dormant account that becomes active again is held for a CDD refresh before large movements.
- Rules that help
- Dormant account reactivation
2.4.5(2) Link previous accounts and identification to the new account
In the circumstances above, details of the previous account(s) and any identification evidence previously obtained or any introduction records shall be updated and linked to the new account records and retained for the prescribed period in accordance with section 32 of Act 1044.
- What an examiner will look for
- New account records linked to the previous accounts and their identification evidence.
- What this can look like
- The customer record links all accounts, open and closed, with their documents.
2.4.6(1)(i) No account, business or transaction if CDD cannot be completed
An AI that is unable to perform the CDD requirements under this Guideline: i. shall not open the account, commence business or perform the transaction; and
- What an examiner will look for
- Cases where CDD failed, each with no account opened and no transaction done.
- What this can look like
- Onboarding that cannot verify the customer stops; the transaction is not processed.
2.4.6(1)(ii) STR to the FIC within 24 hours when CDD cannot be completed
shall submit a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) / Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) to the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) within twenty-four hours.
- What an examiner will look for
- For each failed CDD, a SAR or STR filed within 24 hours.
- What this can look like
- A failed onboarding raises a case that must be decided and, where it applies, reported within 24 hours.
2.5 Categories of customers, transactions or products
1 with rules 5 requirements
2.5.1(1) Simplified measures where risks are low
AIs shall apply reduced or simplified measures where there are low risks.
- What an examiner will look for
- The low-risk categories used, matching the examples in 2.5.1 or the NRA.
- What this can look like
- Pension schemes funded from payroll are rated low risk and get simplified measures.
2.5.1(2) No SDD on suspicion or high risk; EDD is then mandatory
SDD procedures shall not be applied to a customer whenever there is suspicion of ML/TF/PF or specific high-risk scenarios. In such a circumstance, enhanced due diligence is mandatory.
- What an examiner will look for
- Customers moved from SDD to EDD when a suspicion or high-risk factor appeared.
- What this can look like
- An alert on a low-risk customer lifts them to EDD.
2.5.2(1) EDD for high-risk customers, relationships and transactions
AIs shall perform enhanced due diligence (EDD) for high-risk categories of customers, business relationships or transactions. In adopting the EDD procedures in determining the risk profile, AIs shall have regard to the type of customer, product, transaction, the location of the customer and other relevant factors.
- What an examiner will look for
- EDD files for high-risk customers, and the factors used to rate them.
- What this can look like
- High-risk customers have EDD on file before their relationship is approved.
2.5.2(2) High-risk customer categories, including PEPs, religious groups and VASPs
Examples of high-risk customer categories include but not limited to: i. Non-resident customers; ii. Private/Prestige banking customers; iii. Legal persons or legal arrangements such as trusts, customer account that are personal-assets holding vehicles; iv. Companies that have nominee-shareholders or shares in bearer form; v. Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) and their associates; vi. High Net Worth individuals; vii. Religious Groups and Leaders; viii. Virtual Assets (VAs) and Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs) ix. Chief Executives and Board Members of privately-owned companies/corporations of High-Risk industries/sectors as defined by the NRA, emerging trends/AI’s policy. x. Cross-border banking and business relationships; xi. Natural or legal persons who do business in precious metals/minerals, petroleum xii. Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions; xiii. Beneficial-owners of pooled-accounts held and managed by either a law firm or lawyer. xiv. Any customer deemed high-risk by the AI; and xv. other high-risk categories as may be determined by the NRA findings.
- What an examiner will look for
- A customer risk model that rates each of the fifteen categories as high risk, or explains why not.
- What this can look like
- Non-resident, private banking, PEP, VASP and precious-metals customers are high risk in the model.
- Rules that help
- PEP screening (politically exposed persons)
2.5.2(3) Consider NRA trends in CDD/EDD
AIs shall take into consideration emerging trends and patterns in implementing CDD/EDD procedures relating to the products/services and other business relationship stated in the NRA.
- What an examiner will look for
- CDD/EDD procedures updated for trends in the NRA.
- What this can look like
- Products the NRA flags get extra due diligence.
2.6.1 Politically exposed persons (PEPs)
3 with rules 8 requirements
Paragraph 1 defines PEPs: individuals “who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions both in Ghana or in foreign countries and people or entities associated with them”, including those entrusted with a prominent function by an international organisation. Its examples go beyond the FATF list: signatories of Ministries, Departments and Agencies and of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies, political party executives down to constituency level, legal entities belonging to a PEP, and traditional rulers. The definition sets no end to PEP status (“are or have been”).
2.6.1(2) Systems to identify PEPs, domestic and foreign, and their family and close associates
AIs are required to have appropriate risk-management systems and procedures to identify when their customer (or the beneficial owner of a customer) is a PEP (domestic and foreign). and to manage any elevated risks. Business relationships with the family and known close associates of a PEP (domestic and foreign) shall also be subjected to greater scrutiny. These requirements are intended to be preventive and shall not be interpreted as stigmatising all PEPs as being involved in criminal activity.
- What an examiner will look for
- The PEP screening in place for customers and beneficial owners, covering domestic and foreign PEPs, with family members and close associates under greater scrutiny.
- What this can look like
- Customers and beneficial owners are screened against PEP data at onboarding and on each update of the data, and matches with relatives and associates are reviewed too.
- Rules that help
- PEP screening (politically exposed persons)
2.6.1(3) Determine whether a prospective or existing customer or beneficial owner is a PEP
AIs shall, in addition to performing EDD procedures, put in place appropriate risk management systems to determine whether a potential customer or existing customer or the BO is a PEP (domestic and foreign).
- What an examiner will look for
- Screening results for prospective customers, existing customers and beneficial owners.
- What this can look like
- The whole customer base is rescreened when the PEP data changes, so a customer who becomes a PEP is found.
- Rules that help
- PEP screening (politically exposed persons)
2.6.1(4) Senior management approval before a relationship with a PEP or any high-risk customer
AIs shall obtain senior management approval before they establish a business relationship with a PEP (domestic and foreign) and all other high-risk customers.
- What an examiner will look for
- For each PEP and high-risk customer, a senior management approval dated before the account opened.
- What this can look like
- A confirmed PEP match holds onboarding until a senior manager approves.
2.6.1(5) Senior management approval to continue when a customer becomes a PEP or high risk
Where a customer has been accepted or has an ongoing relationship with the AI and the customer or BO is subsequently found to be or becomes a PEP (domestic and foreign) or high-risk, the AI shall obtain senior management approval in order to continue the business relationship.
- What an examiner will look for
- For customers who became PEPs or high risk later, the approval to continue and its date.
- What this can look like
- A rescreening hit on an existing customer opens a case that needs senior management sign-off to keep the account.
- Rules that help
- PEP screening (politically exposed persons)
2.6.1(6) Source of wealth and funds for PEPs and high-risk customers; report anomalies to the FIC at once
AIs shall take measures to establish the source of wealth and the sources of funds of customers and BOs identified as PEPs (domestic and foreign) or high-risk which include obtaining information and the use of source of wealth form and report all anomalies immediately to the FIC and other relevant authorities.
- What an examiner will look for
- Source of wealth forms on file for each PEP and high-risk customer, and reports of anomalies to the FIC.
- What this can look like
- A completed source-of-wealth form with supporting documents; a mismatch is reported to the FIC without waiting.
2.6.1(7) Enhanced ongoing monitoring of PEPs and high-risk customers
AIs in business relationships with PEPs (domestic and foreign) or high-risk customers are required to conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of that relationship.
- What an examiner will look for
- Monitoring settings that are stricter for PEP and high-risk customers, and more frequent reviews (3.8.2.2 lists examples).
- What this can look like
- PEP accounts have lower alert thresholds and a review every year.
2.6.1(8) Report every PEP transaction to the FIC
AIs shall report to the FIC all transactions conducted by PEPs (domestic and foreign).
- What an examiner will look for
- PEP transaction reports filed with the FIC. Appendix F gives the channel (goAML) and the frequency (“As and When”).
- What this can look like
- Every transaction on a PEP-flagged account generates a PEP transaction report to the FIC through goAML.
2.6.1(9) Flag the account and file an STR at once on an abnormal PEP transaction
In the event of any transaction/activity that is abnormal, AIs are required to flag the account and file an STR/SAR immediately to the FIC.
- What an examiner will look for
- For abnormal activity on PEP accounts: the account flag and an STR or SAR filed without delay.
- What this can look like
- An unusual transfer on a PEP account flags it and goes to the AMLRO for an immediate report.
2.6.2 Cross-border correspondent banking
2 requirements
Paragraphs 1 and 2 describe correspondent banking.
2.6.2(3) EDD on correspondents: business, reputation, controls, Wolfsberg questionnaire, senior approval, records
In relation to cross-border and correspondent banking and other similar relationships, AIs shall, in addition to performing the EDD procedures, among others take the following measures: i. Gather sufficient information about a correspondent institution to understand fully the nature of its business; and to determine from publicly available information the reputation of the institution and the quality of supervision, including whether or not it has been subjected to an ML/TF/PF investigation or a regulatory action; ii. Assess the correspondent institution’s AML/CFT/CPF controls and ascertain that the latter are in compliance with FATF standards; iii. Assess the correspondent institutions in relation to the Wolfsberg Questionnaire; iv. Obtain approval from senior management before establishing correspondent relationships; and v. Document and keep records of the EDD procedures undertaken.
- What an examiner will look for
- A file per correspondent with the information gathered, the assessment of its AML/CFT/CPF controls against FATF standards, the Wolfsberg questionnaire, senior management approval before the relationship began, and the EDD record.
- What this can look like
- Each correspondent has a completed Wolfsberg questionnaire, an adverse-media and supervision check, and a senior manager’s approval on file.
2.6.2(4) Payable-through accounts: EDD on customers with direct access
Where a correspondent relationship involves the maintenance of payable through-accounts, the AI shall: i. perform EDD on its customers that have direct access to the accounts of the correspondent bank; and ii. provide relevant EDD information and customers identification upon request to the correspondent bank.
- What an examiner will look for
- EDD on the customers who use payable-through accounts, and responses to the correspondent’s requests.
- What this can look like
- Customers using a payable-through account are under EDD and their information can be sent to the correspondent on request.
2.6.3 New technologies and non-face-to-face transactions
9 requirements
Paragraph 1 describes the risk of new technologies; paragraph 6 says the Bank of Ghana will keep monitoring them.
2.6.3(2) Assess and document the risks of new products, changes and new technologies
AIs shall assess and document the specific ML/TF/PF risks associated with the introduction of: i. New financial products and services and/or changes to existing products and services; ii. New or developing technologies used to provide products and services.
- What an examiner will look for
- A documented risk assessment for each new product, change to a product, and new technology.
- What this can look like
- A product change (for example raising a wallet limit) gets its own documented risk assessment.
2.6.3(3) Assess and document emerging trends from new technologies
AI shall assess and identify emerging trends and patterns associated with new technologies, products and services and document same.
- What an examiner will look for
- A documented review of emerging trends linked to the institution’s technologies and products.
- What this can look like
- A yearly note on new fraud and laundering patterns on digital channels, feeding the risk assessment.
2.6.3(4)(i) Policies to prevent misuse of new technology
AIs shall have policies in place or take such measures as may be needed to prevent the misuse of new technological developments against ML/TF/PF risks.
- What an examiner will look for
- The policy or measures for new technology.
- What this can look like
- A digital channels policy with the controls each channel needs.
2.6.3(4)(ii) Non-face-to-face risks: policies applied automatically at onboarding and in ongoing due diligence
AIs shall have policies and procedures in place to address any specific risks associated with non-face-to-face product/services, business relationships or transactions. These policies and procedures shall be applied automatically when establishing customer relationships and conducting ongoing due diligence.
- What an examiner will look for
- Non-face-to-face procedures, and evidence that they run automatically (system controls rather than manual steps).
- What this can look like
- The app’s onboarding enforces the remote-onboarding checks itself; no staff step can skip them.
2.6.3(4)(iii) Third-party technology providers are regulated and meet KYC and reliance rules
AIs that rely on third-party service providers in deploying such new technologies, products or services shall satisfy themselves that the third-party is a regulated and supervised institution and has measures in place to comply with the requirements of KYC/CDD/EDD and reliance on intermediaries and other third parties as contained in this Guideline.
- What an examiner will look for
- Due diligence on each technology provider: regulated status and KYC compliance.
- What this can look like
- The onboarding-technology vendor’s licence and KYC controls are checked before contract.
2.6.3(4)(iv) Obtain from the third party what is needed to report to the FIC
AIs that rely on such third-party shall have measures in place to obtain the necessary information concerning proceeds which has been laundered, or which constitute proceeds of unlawful activities or means used to or intended for use in the commission of ML/TF/PF or any other unlawful acts to report to the FIC or other Competent Authorities.
- What an examiner will look for
- Contract terms giving access to the information needed for reports.
- What this can look like
- The vendor contract obliges it to hand over transaction and identity data for an STR.
2.6.3(4)(v) Identification data available from the third party without delay
AIs shall satisfy itself that copies of identification data and other relevant documentation relating to the KYC/CDD/EDD requirements will be made available from the third party upon request without delay.
- What an examiner will look for
- A tested retrieval of identification data from the third party.
- What this can look like
- A sample request to the vendor returns the customer’s identity documents the same day.
2.6.3(4)(vi) Biometric, liveness and multifactor checks at onboarding and on ongoing transactions
AIs shall verify customers during onboarding and ongoing transactions by adopting biometric, liveness checks and multifactor authentication tools, where applicable.
- What an examiner will look for
- Biometric and liveness checks at onboarding and multifactor authentication on transactions, with the cases where they apply.
- What this can look like
- Face match and liveness against the Ghana Card at sign-up, a second factor on payments.
2.6.3(5) Remote onboarding platforms: records, biometric liveness against the Ghana Card, unique identification
AIs in developing new technologies/products/services that would onboard customers through a non-face-to-face channel shall ensure the platform; i. collects and keeps records of all identification documents and KYC/CDD/EDD requirements ii. biometrically verify the customer using liveness check against the Ghana Card. iii. identifies the customer uniquely during the course of business. iv. aligns with the requirements in the Supervisory Guidance Note and this Guideline.
- What an examiner will look for
- The remote onboarding platform’s records, its biometric liveness check against the Ghana Card, how it identifies each customer uniquely, and its alignment with the BoG’s Supervisory Guidance Note on the Ghana Card.
- What this can look like
- Remote onboarding keeps every document, matches a live selfie to the Ghana Card, and ties each customer to one Ghana Card number.
2.6.4 Virtual assets (VAs) and virtual asset service providers (VASPs)
2 with rules 11 requirements
These paragraphs bind VASPs. Parliament passed a Virtual Asset Service Providers Bill in December 2025 (Bank of Ghana press release of 22 December 2025); this page does not cover that Act.
2.6.4(1) VASPs: EDD at onboarding and on transactions above USD/EUR 1,000
VASPs shall undertake EDD measures when a. Establishing business relations; and b. Carrying out transactions above the applicable designated threshold (USD/EUR 1000).
- What an examiner will look for
- EDD files at onboarding, and EDD applied to every transaction above USD or EUR 1,000.
- What this can look like
- A transfer above USD 1,000 cannot complete until the EDD checks for it are done.
2.6.4(2) VASPs: obtain and hold accurate originator and beneficiary information
VASPs shall require, obtain and hold the accurate originator and beneficiary information on the virtual assets transfer.
- What an examiner will look for
- Originator and beneficiary data held for every virtual-asset transfer.
- What this can look like
- Each withdrawal records who sends and who receives, not only the wallet address.
2.6.4(3) VASPs: the minimum originator and beneficiary data, including the Ghana Card number
The minimum required information; a. Required originator information: i. the name of the originator; and ii. the originator account address, account number where such an account is used to process the transaction or, in the absence of an account, a unique transaction reference number which permits traceability of the transaction iii. the Ghana Card number or the national identification document for foreign nationals, date and place of birth b. Required beneficiary information: i. the name of the beneficiary; and ii. the beneficiary account address, account number where such an account is used to process the transaction or, in the absence of an account, a unique transaction reference number which permits traceability of the transaction iii. the Ghana Card number or the national identification document for foreign nationals, date and place of birth
- What an examiner will look for
- For a sample of transfers: names, account addresses or numbers (or a unique reference), and the Ghana Card number or foreign ID with date and place of birth, for both sides.
- What this can look like
- The transfer message carries both parties’ names, addresses or account numbers, ID numbers and dates and places of birth.
2.6.4(4) VASPs: transmit the information immediately and securely; make it available on request
VASPs shall obtain and transmit the above information to the beneficiary VASPs or AI (if any) immediately and securely and make it available on request to the appropriate authorities.
- What an examiner will look for
- Evidence that the data travels with the transfer to the beneficiary VASP or institution, securely.
- What this can look like
- A travel-rule message goes with each outgoing transfer.
2.6.4(5) VASPs: bundled transfers carry full, traceable information
Where several VA transfers from a single originator are bundled (mixed) in a block for transmission to beneficiaries, the block should be accompanied by the required and accurate originator information and full beneficiary information that is fully traceable.
- What an examiner will look for
- Batch transfers with the originator and full beneficiary information.
- What this can look like
- A batch payout lists each beneficiary in full.
2.6.4(6) VASPs: account address or number, or a unique reference
VASP shall require and obtain the originator and the beneficiary account address, account number where such an account is used to process the transaction or, in the absence of an account, a unique transaction reference number which permits traceability of the transaction.
- What an examiner will look for
- For each transfer, the account address or a unique reference that traces it.
- What this can look like
- Every transfer has a wallet address or a unique reference on both sides.
2.6.4(7) VASPs: below USD 1,000, names and account numbers or references
Whereas the cross-border wire/electronic transfers and payment transactions is below the threshold (USD 1,000 or cedi equivalent), VASP shall require, obtain and hold the following: a. Required originator information: i. the name of the originator; and ii. the originator account number where such an account is used to process the transaction or, in the absence of an account, a unique transaction reference number which permits traceability of the transaction
- What an examiner will look for
- For transfers below USD 1,000, both names and account numbers or references.
- What this can look like
- Small transfers still carry both parties’ names and accounts.
2.6.4(8) VASPs: obtain and verify missing information
VASP shall take measures to obtain and verify the missing originator and beneficiary information.
- What an examiner will look for
- The procedure for missing data and cases where it was chased.
- What this can look like
- A transfer arriving without originator data is held while the sender’s VASP is asked for it.
2.6.4(9) VASPs: no execution without the information, and an STR within 24 hours
In cases where the missing originator and beneficiary information cannot be obtained, the VASP shall not execute the trade, transfer, conversions (fiat to crypto and crypto to fiat) and file a suspicious transaction to the FIC within twenty-four (24) hours.
- What an examiner will look for
- Transfers refused for missing data, each with an STR within 24 hours.
- What this can look like
- Missing travel-rule data that cannot be obtained stops the trade or conversion, and the case is reported within a day.
2.6.4(10) VASPs: freeze and refuse transactions with UN-designated persons
In processing wire/electronic transfers, VASPs shall take freezing action and comply with prohibitions from conducting transactions with designated persons and entities as per obligations set out in the relevant UNSCRs relating to the prevention and suppression of terrorism and terrorist financing, such as UNSCRs 1267 and 1373 and successor resolutions.
- What an examiner will look for
- Screening of transfers against UN designations, and freezes applied on a match.
- What this can look like
- Both sides of each transfer are screened before it is executed, and a UN match is frozen.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
2.6.4(11) VASPs: freeze OFAC SDN wallets, addresses, persons and entities; report within 24 hours
In processing wire/electronic transfer, VA transfers and/or payment transactions, VASPs shall take freezing action and comply with prohibitions from conducting transactions with VA wallet, digital currency addresses, persons or entities listed on the OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list and file a report to the FIC within twenty-four (24) hours.
- What an examiner will look for
- Screening of wallets and digital currency addresses against the OFAC SDN list, freezes on a match, and reports to the FIC within 24 hours.
- What this can look like
- Deposit and withdrawal addresses are checked against the OFAC SDN list; a hit freezes the funds and is reported the same day.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
2.6.5 Reliance on intermediaries and third-party service providers for CDD procedures
7 requirements
2.6.5(1) Reliance on third parties for CDD; responsibility stays with the institution
AIs are permitted to rely on third-party service providers to perform elements of KYC/CDD/EDD measures, such as identification of customers, identification of Beneficial Owner and nature of business. The ultimate responsibility for KYC/CDD/EDD measures shall remain with the AI relying on the third party.
- What an examiner will look for
- The list of CDD elements done by third parties, and the institution’s own oversight of them.
- What this can look like
- An eKYC provider verifies identities, but the institution reviews its results and answers for them.
2.6.5(2) Third party complies with KYC and Ghana Card rules, supplies data, is regulated, keeps records
AI shall undertake the following in relation to the third-party service provider; i. ensure the third-party complies with elements of KYC/CDD/EDD measures set out in this guideline and the Ghana Card requirements. ii. take steps to satisfy itself that copies of identification data and other relevant documentation relating to KYC/CDD/EDD requirements would be made available from the third-party upon request without delay. iii. satisfy itself that the third party is regulated and supervised, and monitored iv. has measures in place for compliance with record-keeping requirements as set out in this guideline and section 32 of Act 1044. v. Whereas the third-party service provider is outside Ghana, the AI shall ensure that it is regulated and supervised or monitored in a jurisdiction that complies with FATF standards and assess the level of risk within the jurisdiction
- What an examiner will look for
- For each third party: compliance with the Guideline’s KYC and Ghana Card requirements, data available on request, regulated status, record keeping, and for a foreign provider a FATF-compliant jurisdiction and a risk assessment.
- What this can look like
- A due diligence file per provider covering its licence, its records and its jurisdiction.
2.6.5(3) Before engaging a third party: due diligence, risk assessment, board approval, contract, CDD capability, BoG approval, ongoing monitoring
AIs shall undertake the following prior to establishing a business relationship with third-party service providers i. conduct due diligence on the third party, which covers any adverse information about the company and directors/BOs etc. ii. assess the risks associated with the third-party relationship and the solution/tool/software iii. ensure board approval to engage the third-party service provider. iv. ensure that there is a signed binding agreement v. Ensure the third-party solution can undertake the following CDD measures: (a) Identifying the customer and verifying that customer’s identity using reliable, independent source documents, data or information. (b) Identifying the beneficial owner and taking measures to verify the identity of the beneficial owner, such that the AI is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner is. For legal persons and arrangements, this shall include AIs’ understanding of the ownership and control structure. (c) Storing and keeping records. vi. seek Bank of Ghana approval. vii. conduct ongoing monitoring and assessment of the solution/tools/software to ensure it meets the KYC/CDD/EDD requirement as prescribed by the AML/CFT/CPF law, regulation and Guideline.
- What an examiner will look for
- Dated before go-live: due diligence on the provider and its directors, a risk assessment of the provider and its tool, board approval, a signed agreement, a test that the tool identifies customers and beneficial owners and keeps records, and BoG approval; then ongoing monitoring of the tool.
- What this can look like
- An eKYC tool goes live only after board and BoG approvals and a test of its identity and beneficial-owner checks.
2.6.5(4) Group third parties meet the same requirements
AIs that rely on a third-party service provider that is part of the financial group, shall comply with the above requirements.
- What an examiner will look for
- The same files for group providers.
- What this can look like
- A sister company doing KYC goes through the same approvals as an outside vendor.
2.6.5(5) Group reliance: group-wide programme, group supervision, country risk mitigated
AIs that rely on a third party that is part of the same financial group, shall ensure that (a) the group applies CDD, record-keeping requirements, as well as measures in relation to PEPs as stated in Act 1044 and this Guidelines. Additionally, AIs must ensure that the financial groups has implemented group-wide programmes against ML/TF/PF which have regard to the ML/TF/PF risks and the size of the business and are applicable, and appropriate to, all branches and majority-owned subsidiaries of the financial group. (b) the implementation of those CDD and record-keeping requirements and AML/CFT/CPF programmes is supervised at a group level by a competent authority; and (c) any higher country risk is adequately mitigated by the group’s AML/CFT/CPF policies.
- What an examiner will look for
- Evidence of the group-wide programme, its supervision at group level, and how country risk is mitigated.
- What this can look like
- The group AML policy applies to all subsidiaries and is supervised by the home regulator.
2.6.5(6) Responsibility for identification remains with the institution
The ultimate responsibility for customer identification and verification remains with the AIs when relying on intermediaries and third-party service providers.
- What an examiner will look for
- The institution’s own checks on third-party identification results.
- What this can look like
- A sample of third-party verifications is re-checked by the institution each quarter.
2.6.5(7) Follow the BoG outsourcing directive
AIs in addition to all above, shall adhere to the BOG third-party outsourcing directive.
- What an examiner will look for
- Compliance with the BoG Outsourcing Directive for each provider.
- What this can look like
- Each outsourcing arrangement is registered and approved as the outsourcing directive requires.
2.6.6 High-risk countries
3 with rules 4 requirements
2.6.6(1) EDD for relationships and transactions with persons from FATF-listed countries
AIs shall be required to apply enhanced due diligence, appropriate to the risks, to business relationships, transactions with natural and legal persons (including financial institutions) from countries as published by FATF.
- What an examiner will look for
- The FATF lists used, kept current, and EDD on customers and transactions connected to those countries.
- What this can look like
- Customers and counterparties from FATF-listed countries are flagged and go through EDD.
- Rules that help
- High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch
2.6.6(2) Countermeasures, when asked and on the institution’s own initiative
AIs shall apply countermeasures proportionate to the risk: a. When called upon to do so by the regulator/FIC b. Independently of any call by the regulator/FIC
- What an examiner will look for
- The countermeasures applied, both those the BoG or FIC asked for and those the institution chose.
- What this can look like
- Transfers to a country under a FATF call for action are blocked or need senior approval.
2.6.6(3) Report suspicious transactions with no apparent purpose by customers from high-risk countries
AIs shall report suspicious transactions that have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose by customers from high-risk countries to the FIC.
- What an examiner will look for
- STRs filed on such transactions.
- What this can look like
- A transfer from a high-risk country without a clear purpose is reviewed and reported.
- Rules that help
- High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch
2.6.6(4) Measures for countries that apply FATF insufficiently, including enhanced monitoring of all their transactions
AIs that do business with foreign institutions which, do not continue to apply or insufficiently apply the provisions of FATF Recommendations are required to take measures such as the following: i. Stringent requirements for identifying customers and beneficial owners before business relationships are established from that jurisdiction; ii. Enhanced monitoring on all financial transactions from such high-risk countries. iii. AIs, in considering requests for licensing or approval for the establishment of subsidiaries or branches or representative offices, shall take into account that the country does not have adequate AML/CFT/CPF systems and as such conduct the appropriate EDD procedures; iv. Advise customers that transact with natural or legal persons within that country that there is a high-risk of ML/TF/PF and. shall thus limit business relationships or financial transactions with the identified country or persons in that country.
- What an examiner will look for
- Stricter identification before relationships from those countries, enhanced monitoring of all transactions from them, EDD for subsidiaries or branches there, and advice to customers that limits business with them.
- What this can look like
- Every transaction from a listed country gets a lower monitoring threshold and a review.
- Rules that help
- High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch
2.6.7 Foreign branches and subsidiaries
6 requirements
2.6.7(1) Foreign branches and subsidiaries follow group procedures consistent with Act 1044 and FATF
AIs shall ensure that their foreign branches and subsidiaries observe group AML/CFT/CPF procedures consistent with the provisions of Act 1044 and FATF standards and to apply them to the extent that the local/host country’s laws and regulations permit.
- What an examiner will look for
- The group AML procedures applied in each foreign branch and subsidiary.
- What this can look like
- Subsidiaries abroad use the group’s AML manual, adjusted only where local law requires.
2.6.7(2) Apply the higher standard where home and host rules differ
AIs shall ensure that the above principle is observed with respect to their branches and subsidiaries in countries which do not or insufficiently apply such requirements as contained in this Guideline. Where these minimum AML/CFT/CPF requirements and those of the host country differ, branches and subsidiaries or the parent of AIs in the host country are required to apply the higher standard and such must be applied to the extent that the host country’s laws, regulations or other measures permit.
- What an examiner will look for
- A comparison of Ghana and host rules, and the higher standard applied.
- What this can look like
- Where the host country’s CDD is weaker, the subsidiary applies Ghana’s.
2.6.7(3) Home-jurisdiction measures abroad; extra measures and notice to the home supervisor if not permitted
AIs shall be required to ensure that their foreign branches and majority-owned subsidiaries apply AML/CFT/CPF measures consistent with the home jurisdiction’s requirements. This is to avoid regulatory gaps where the minimum AML/CFT/CPF requirement of the host jurisdiction is less strict than that of the home jurisdiction, to the extent that host jurisdiction laws and regulations permit. If the host jurisdiction does not permit the proper implementation of AML/CFT/CPF measures consistent with the home jurisdiction requirement, financial groups shall be required to apply appropriate additional measures to manage ML/TF/PF risks and inform their home supervisors.
- What an examiner will look for
- Measures in foreign branches and majority-owned subsidiaries, and notices to the BoG where the host forbids them.
- What this can look like
- Where host law blocks a Ghana requirement, extra controls are added and the BoG is told.
2.6.7(4) Group information sharing with safeguards against tipping off
These measures may include: i. Policies and procedures for sharing information required for the purposes of CDD/EDD and ML/TF/PF risk management. ii. the provisions, at group level compliance, audit and/or AML/CFT/CPF function, of customer, account and transaction information from branches and subsidiaries when necessary for AML/CFT/CPF purposes. This should include information and analysis of transactions or activities which appear unusual. Similarly, branches and subsidiaries should receive such information from these group-level functions when relevant and appropriate to risk management. iii. adequate safeguards on the confidentiality and use of information, including safeguards to prevent tipping off.
- What an examiner will look for
- Group information-sharing procedures, including unusual transaction analysis, and confidentiality safeguards.
- What this can look like
- Group compliance receives subsidiaries’ unusual-activity analysis under a confidentiality protocol.
2.6.7(5) Tell the BoG in writing when a branch or subsidiary cannot comply
AIs shall inform the BOG in writing when their foreign branches or subsidiaries are unable to observe the appropriate AML/CFT/CPF procedures because of a conflict with laws, regulations or other measures between the parent country (Ghana) and the host country (foreign).
- What an examiner will look for
- Letters to the BoG about each conflict.
- What this can look like
- A written notice to the BoG when host law prevents a group procedure.
2.6.7(6) Group-level KYC taking account of the customer across branches and subsidiaries
AIs are subject to these AML/CFT/CPF principles and shall therefore apply consistently the KYC/CDD/EDD procedures at their group level taking into account the activity of the customer with the various branches and subsidiaries.
- What an examiner will look for
- A group view of each customer across entities.
- What this can look like
- A customer’s risk rating takes into account their accounts in every group entity.
2.6.8 Money or value transfer services (MVTS)
3 with rules 12 requirements
These paragraphs bind institutions that take on an MVTS as a customer or partner, and, in paragraphs 8 and 9, the MVTS provider itself.
2.6.8(1) Before a relationship with an MVTS: licence, three years, due diligence, AML programme, STR procedures, board and BoG approval
AIs shall undertake the following when establishing business relationship with an MVTS: i. Ensure that it is licensed and supervised in a jurisdiction that complies with FATF standards and has been in operation for at least three (3) years ii. Obtain and verify the license of the MVTS iii. Conduct due diligence on the MVTS to include among other things; screening of the Directors/ BO/Shareholders, Adverse Media findings iv. Ensure the MVTS has a robust AML/CFT/CPF program in place v. Ensure the MVTS has procedures in place to file STRs vi. Seek Board and BOG Approval
- What an examiner will look for
- An MVTS file: licence in a FATF-compliant jurisdiction, three years in operation, verified licence, screening and adverse media on directors, owners and shareholders, its AML programme, its STR procedure, and board and BoG approvals.
- What this can look like
- A remittance partner is onboarded only with three years of operation, a checked licence and board and BoG approval.
2.6.8(2) MVTS comply with FATF Recommendation 16
AIs shall ensure that MVTS comply with all the relevant requirements of Recommendation 16 of FATF standards as stated in Part 2.6.10 of this Guideline.
- What an examiner will look for
- Evidence that the MVTS sends the originator and beneficiary data of 2.6.10.
- What this can look like
- Inbound remittances arrive with complete payer and payee data.
2.6.8(3) MVTS keep originator and beneficiary data, including purpose of transaction
AI shall ensure that the MVTS obtains and maintains sufficient information on the originator and beneficiary side of the wire/electronic transfer, and in accordance with section 32 of Act 1044. a. Required originator information: i. the name of the originator; ii. the originator unique transaction reference number, which permits traceability of the transaction; iii. the originator’s address, national identity number and/or customer identification number, or date and place of birth
- What an examiner will look for
- For a sample of MVTS transfers: originator name, reference, address and ID or date and place of birth, purpose; beneficiary name, account or wallet or reference, address and Ghana Card or customer number or date and place of birth.
- What this can look like
- Each remittance record carries both parties’ identity details and the purpose.
2.6.8(4) Monitor, by close of day or in real time, for transfers missing originator or beneficiary data
AIs shall be required to undertake monitoring of transactions either by close of day or real-time, to identify cross-border wire/electronic transfers and payment transactions that lack required originator information or required beneficiary information.
- What an examiner will look for
- A daily or real-time check that flags cross-border transfers with missing data, and its results.
- What this can look like
- An end-of-day report lists every cross-border transfer with an empty originator or beneficiary field.
- Rules that help
- Missing originator or beneficiary information (Travel Rule)
2.6.8(5) Obtain and verify missing data
AIs shall take measures to obtain and verify the missing originator and beneficiary information.
- What an examiner will look for
- Follow-up requests for missing data and their outcome.
- What this can look like
- The partner is asked for the missing data before the payout.
2.6.8(6) Do not execute without the data; STR within 24 hours
Where the AI is unable to obtain the required originator and/or beneficiary information associated with the wire/electronic transfers, the AI shall not execute the transfer and file a suspicious transaction to the FIC within twenty-four (24) hours.
- What an examiner will look for
- Transfers not executed for missing data, each with an STR within 24 hours.
- What this can look like
- An incomplete remittance is not paid out and is reported the same day.
2.6.8(7) Ongoing due diligence and monitoring of the MVTS
AIs shall conduct ongoing due diligence and monitoring of the MVTS regarding its operations, Directors/BOs and business to detect any adverse findings and review the decision to continue the business relationship.
- What an examiner will look for
- Periodic reviews of each MVTS and of its directors and owners, with the decision to continue.
- What this can look like
- Each remittance partner is rescreened and reviewed every year.
- Rules that help
- Adverse media screening (negative news)
2.6.8(8) MVTS controlling both sides: use both sides’ information and report in the affected country
In the case of an MVTS provider that controls both the ordering and the beneficiary side of a wire/electronic transfer, the MVTS provider shall be required to: i. take into account, obtain and maintain records of all the information from both the ordering and beneficiary sides ii. file an STR/SAR in the country affected by the suspicious wire/electronic transfer, and make relevant transaction information available to the FIU/FIC.
- What an examiner will look for
- For an MVTS with both sides: records from both, and STRs filed where the suspicious transfer has effect.
- What this can look like
- A remittance company paying out its own transfers looks at sender and receiver together before deciding on a report.
2.6.8(9) MVTS: freeze and refuse transactions with UN-designated persons
In processing wire/electronic transfers, MVTS shall take freezing action and comply with prohibitions from conducting transactions with designated person and entities as per obligations set out in the relevant UNSCRs relating to the prevention and suppression of terrorism and terrorist financing such as UNSCRs 1267 and 1373 and their successor resolution.
- What an examiner will look for
- Screening of both parties of each transfer against UN designations, and freezes applied on a match.
- What this can look like
- Sender and receiver are screened before payout; a UN match is frozen.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
2.6.8(10) MVTS comply with Act 1044 and the Guideline
AIs shall ensure that the MVTS comply with the provisions of Act 1044 and this Guideline.
- What an examiner will look for
- Contract terms and reviews showing the MVTS’s compliance.
- What this can look like
- The partner agreement requires compliance with Ghana’s AML law and is checked in the annual review.
2.6.8(11) Settlement banks for MVTS: PSP approval, monitoring with STRs within 24 hours, PSP’s due diligence on the MVTS
AIs acting as a settlement bank in an MVTS business arrangement shall ensure to undertake the following due diligence a. Obtain and verify the regulatory approval of the payment service provider (PSP) to process payment for an MVTS b. Monitor transactions to report any unusual and suspicious transactions to the FIC within 24 hours. c. Obtain and satisfy itself that the PSP has undertaken due diligence on the MVTS which includes requirements specified in paragraph 2.6.8 (1).
- What an examiner will look for
- The PSP’s regulatory approval, monitoring of the settlement flows with reports within 24 hours, and the PSP’s due diligence file on the MVTS.
- What this can look like
- A settlement bank monitors the MVTS settlement account and reports unusual flows within a day.
2.6.9(1) Verify the bureau’s licence and do due diligence first
AIs shall obtain and verify the operating license of the Foreign Exchange Bureaux and conduct due diligence before establishing any business relationship.
- What an examiner will look for
- The verified licence and due diligence for each bureau customer.
- What this can look like
- A forex bureau’s account opens only after its BoG licence is checked.
2.6.10 Wire/electronic transfers and payment transactions
4 with rules 29 requirements
Four parts: cross-border transfers (2.6.10.1), domestic transfers (2.6.10.2), intermediary institutions (2.6.10.3) and beneficiary institutions (2.6.10.4). The threshold for full originator and beneficiary information on cross-border transfers is USD 1,000 or its cedi equivalent.
2.6.10.1(1) Full originator and beneficiary information on cross-border transfers of USD 1,000 or more
AIs shall require, obtain and hold the following information accompanying all cross-border wire/electronic transfers and payment transactions of USD 1,000 (or its cedi equivalent) or more a. Required originator information: i. the name of the originator; ii. the originator account number where such an account is used to process the transaction or, in the absence of an account, a unique transaction reference number which permits traceability of the transaction; iii. the originator’s address, and contact information (telephone number and/or email) or national identity number and/or customer identification number, or date and place of birth
- What an examiner will look for
- For cross-border transfers at or above USD 1,000: originator name, account or reference, address and contact or ID, purpose; beneficiary name, account or reference, address and Ghana Card or foreign ID or customer number or date and place of birth.
- What this can look like
- The payment message for a USD 1,500 transfer abroad carries both parties’ identity data and the purpose.
2.6.10.1(2) Batch transfers: full traceable information and the originator’s account or reference
Where several individual cross-border wire/electronic transfers and payment transactions from a single originator are bundled in a batch file for transmission to beneficiaries, the batch file shall contain required and accurate originator information, and full beneficiary information, that is fully traceable within the beneficiary country; and the financial institution shall be required to include the originator’s account number or unique transaction reference number.
- What an examiner will look for
- Batch files with complete data for every beneficiary.
- What this can look like
- A bulk payroll payment abroad lists each beneficiary in full.
2.6.10.1(3) Below USD 1,000: names and account numbers or references
Whereas the cross-border wire/electronic transfers and payment transactions is below the minimum threshold (USD 1,000 or cedi equivalent), AI shall require, obtain and hold the following: a. Required originator information: i. the name of the originator; and ii. the originator account number where such an account is used to process the transaction or, in the absence of an account, a unique transaction reference number which permits traceability of the transaction
- What an examiner will look for
- For transfers below USD 1,000, both names and account numbers or references.
- What this can look like
- Small transfers abroad still carry both names and accounts.
2.6.10.1(4) Below USD 1,000: verify the information on suspicion
AI shall require, obtain and hold the information stated above. However, the AI shall verify the information when there is a suspicion of ML/TF/PF.
- What an examiner will look for
- Verification of sub-threshold data when a suspicion arose.
- What this can look like
- A suspicious small transfer triggers verification of the sender’s identity.
2.6.10.1(5) Obtain and verify missing information
AI shall take measures to obtain and verify the missing originator and beneficiary information.
- What an examiner will look for
- Follow-up of transfers with missing data.
- What this can look like
- Transfers with gaps are held while the data is requested.
2.6.10.1(6) Do not execute without the information; STR within 24 hours
In cases where the required information in point 1 cannot be obtained, the AI shall not execute the transfer and file a suspicious transaction to the FIC within twenty-four (24) hours.
- What an examiner will look for
- Transfers not executed for missing data, each with an STR within 24 hours.
- What this can look like
- A transfer that stays incomplete is not sent, and is reported within a day.
2.6.10.1(7) Freeze and refuse transfers with UN-designated persons
In processing wire/electronic transfers AIs shall take freezing action and comply with prohibitions from conducting transaction with designated persons and entities as per obligations set out in the relevant UNSCRs relating to the prevention and suppression of terrorism and terrorist financing such as UNSCRs 1267 and 1373 and successor resolutions.
- What an examiner will look for
- Screening of both parties of each cross-border transfer against UN designations, and freezes on a match.
- What this can look like
- Each outgoing and incoming international transfer is screened before it completes.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
2.6.10.2(1) Policies to execute, reject or suspend transfers lacking information, and the follow-up
AI shall be required to have policies and procedures for determining: i. when to execute, reject, or suspend a wire/electronic transfer and payment transactions lacking required originator or required beneficiary information; and ii. the appropriate follow-up action.
- What an examiner will look for
- The written decision rules for incomplete transfers and the follow-up.
- What this can look like
- A procedure that says when an incomplete transfer is held, rejected or sent, and what happens next.
2.6.10.2(2) Ordering institution includes originator and beneficiary information on domestic transfers
For domestic wire/electronic transfers and payment transactions, the ordering AI shall be required to ensure that the information accompanying the wire/electronic transfer and payment transactions includes originator and beneficiary information as indicated above
- What an examiner will look for
- Domestic payment messages with originator and beneficiary data.
- What this can look like
- Domestic transfers carry the sender’s and receiver’s names and accounts.
2.6.10.2(3) Obtain and verify missing information
AI shall take measures to obtain and verify the missing originator and beneficiary information.
- What an examiner will look for
- Follow-up of incomplete domestic transfers.
- What this can look like
- An incomplete domestic transfer is held while the data is requested.
2.6.10.2(4) Do not execute without the information; STR within 24 hours
Whereas in cases the information cannot be obtained, the AI shall not execute the transfer and file a suspicious transaction to the FIC within twenty-four (24) hours.
- What an examiner will look for
- Domestic transfers not executed for missing data, each with an STR within 24 hours.
- What this can look like
- An incomplete domestic transfer that stays incomplete is refused and reported.
2.6.10.2(5) Make the information available in investigations
In cases of investigation, the ordering AI shall make available the information accompanying the domestic wire/electronic transfer and payment transactions shall be made available to the beneficiary AI and/or appropriate authorities.
- What an examiner will look for
- Responses to investigation requests with the transfer data.
- What this can look like
- Transfer data can be produced for the beneficiary bank or an authority on request.
2.6.10.2(6) An account number or reference is enough if traceable; information by close of day of a request
The ordering AI needs only to make available the account number or a unique transaction reference number, provided that this number or identifier will permit the transaction to be traced back to either the originator or the beneficiary. The ordering AI shall be required to make the information available by the close of the day of receiving the request from the beneficiary AI and/or from appropriate competent authorities.
- What an examiner will look for
- Requests from beneficiary institutions or authorities, answered by close of day.
- What this can look like
- A request received in the morning is answered with full originator data that day.
2.6.10.2(7) Produce information for law enforcement investigations
In cases of investigation by LEAs, Ordering and/or beneficiary AI shall make available production of information relevant to the case.
- What an examiner will look for
- Responses to law enforcement production requests.
- What this can look like
- Production orders are answered from the payment records.
2.6.10.2(8) Keep records of originator and beneficiary information
The ordering and beneficiary AI shall be required to maintain records of originator and beneficiary information collected, in accordance with Act 1044 and FATF Recommendation 11.
- What an examiner will look for
- Payment records with both parties’ data, kept for the retention period.
- What this can look like
- Originator and beneficiary data are stored with each payment for at least five years.
2.6.10.2(9) No execution of domestic transfers that do not meet these requirements
The ordering AI shall not be allowed to execute the domestic wire/electronic transfers and payment transactions if it does not comply with the requirements specified above. (cross-border/wire/electronic transfers originator and beneficiary information)
- What an examiner will look for
- Controls that stop incomplete domestic transfers.
- What this can look like
- The payment system rejects a domestic transfer with empty originator or beneficiary fields.
2.6.10.2(10) Freeze and refuse domestic transfers with UN-designated persons
In processing wire/electronic transfers AIs shall take freezing action and comply with prohibitions from conducting transaction with designated persons and entities as per obligations set out in the relevant UNSCRs relating to the prevention and suppression of terrorism and terrorist financing such as UNSCRs 1267 and 1373 and successor resolutions
- What an examiner will look for
- Screening of domestic transfers against UN designations.
- What this can look like
- Domestic payees and payers are screened like international ones.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
2.6.10.3(1) Intermediaries: policies to execute, reject or suspend incomplete transfers
Intermediary AI shall be required to have policies and procedures for determining: a. when to execute, reject, or suspend a wire/electronic transfer and payment transactions lacking required originator or required beneficiary information; and b. the appropriate follow-up action.
- What an examiner will look for
- The intermediary’s decision rules for incomplete transfers.
- What this can look like
- A written rule for what happens to an incomplete transfer passing through.
2.6.10.3(2) Intermediaries keep the information with the transfer
For cross-border wire/electronic transfers and payment transactions, an intermediary AI shall be required to ensure that all originator and beneficiary information that accompanies a wire/electronic transfer and payment transactions is retained with it.
- What an examiner will look for
- Evidence that the data passes through unchanged.
- What this can look like
- The onward message carries every field received.
2.6.10.3(3) Technical limits: identify missing information and keep records
Where technical limitations prevent the required originator or beneficiary information accompanying a cross-border or domestic wire/electronic transfer and payment transactions, the AI shall take steps to identify the missing information and keep records of all information obtained in accordance with section 32 of Act 1044.
- What an examiner will look for
- Records of information obtained where the format could not carry it.
- What this can look like
- Where a domestic format drops fields, they are kept on file.
2.6.10.3(4) Intermediaries refuse and report within 24 hours when the information cannot be obtained
Whereas in cases where the information cannot be obtained, Intermediary AI shall refuse the transfer and file a suspicious transaction to the FIC within twenty-four (24) hours.
- What an examiner will look for
- Refused transfers with STRs within 24 hours.
- What this can look like
- An incomplete transfer is refused and reported.
2.6.10.3(5) Intermediaries monitor straight-through transfers for missing information
Intermediary AI shall be required to monitor and identify transactions which are consistent with straight-through processing, to identify cross-border wire/electronic transfers and payment transactions that lack required originator information or required beneficiary information.
- What an examiner will look for
- Monitoring results on straight-through transfers with missing data.
- What this can look like
- Automated checks flag straight-through transfers with empty fields.
- Rules that help
- Missing originator or beneficiary information (Travel Rule)
2.6.10.3(6) Suspend and ask the originating institution for the missing data
In the case of point 4 above, the Intermediary AI shall suspend the transaction and require the originating institution to provide the missing required originator and/or beneficiary information.
- What an examiner will look for
- Suspended transfers and the requests sent.
- What this can look like
- The transfer is held and the sending bank is asked for the missing data.
2.6.10.3(7) Reverse the transaction if the information cannot be obtained
Whereas in cases the information cannot be obtained, Intermediary AI shall reverse the transaction.
- What an examiner will look for
- Reversed transfers.
- What this can look like
- A held transfer that is never completed is returned to the sender’s bank.
2.6.10.4(1) Beneficiaries monitor, by close of day or in real time, for missing information
Beneficiary AIs shall be required to undertake monitoring of transactions either by close of day or real-time, to identify cross-border wire/electronic transfers and payment transactions that lack required originator information or required beneficiary information.
- What an examiner will look for
- A daily or real-time check of incoming cross-border transfers for missing data.
- What this can look like
- Incoming international transfers with empty fields are listed before close of day.
- Rules that help
- Missing originator or beneficiary information (Travel Rule)
2.6.10.4(2) Beneficiaries obtain and verify missing information
Beneficiary AIs shall take measures to obtain and verify the missing originator and beneficiary information.
- What an examiner will look for
- Requests to sending institutions for missing data.
- What this can look like
- The sending bank is asked for missing originator data before the funds are credited.
2.6.10.4(3) Beneficiaries do not execute without the information; STR within 24 hours
Whereas in cases the information cannot be obtained, the Beneficiary AI shall not execute the transfer and file a suspicious transaction to the FIC within twenty-four (24) hours.
- What an examiner will look for
- Incoming transfers not credited for missing data, each with an STR within 24 hours.
- What this can look like
- An incoming transfer that stays incomplete is not credited and is reported.
2.6.10.4(4) Verify the beneficiary’s identity on incoming transfers of USD 1,000 or more
For cross-border wire/electronic transfers and payment transactions of a threshold USD 1000 or Cedi equivalent or more, a beneficiary AI shall be required to verify the identity of the beneficiary. If the identity has not been previously verified and maintained, this new information shall be retained in accordance with Act 1044 and FATF standards.
- What an examiner will look for
- Verified beneficiary identity for incoming transfers at or above USD 1,000.
- What this can look like
- An inbound USD 2,000 remittance is paid only to a verified beneficiary.
2.6.10.4(5) Beneficiaries: risk-based policies to execute, reject or suspend incomplete transfers
Beneficiary AIs shall be required to have risk-based policies and procedures for determining: a. when to execute, reject, or suspend a wire/electronic transfer and payment transactions lacking required originator or required beneficiary information; and b. the appropriate follow-up action.
- What an examiner will look for
- The beneficiary’s written decision rules for incomplete transfers.
- What this can look like
- A procedure for incoming transfers with gaps: hold, reject or credit, and the follow-up.
2.6.11 and 2.6.12 Safe custody; shell banks and shell companies
2 requirements
2.6.11(1) Precautions on safe custody; EDD for non-account holders
AIs shall take precautions in relation to requests to hold boxes, parcels and sealed envelopes in safe custody. Where such facilities are made available to non-account holders, the EDD procedures set out in this Guideline shall apply.
- What an examiner will look for
- EDD files for non-account holders using safe custody.
- What this can look like
- A non-customer renting a safe deposit box goes through EDD.
2.6.12(1) No relationships with shell banks or shell companies
AIs are prohibited from establishing business relationships with shell banks and shell companies.
- What an examiner will look for
- Checks at onboarding of correspondents and companies for physical presence and real activity.
- What this can look like
- A corporate customer without a real address or activity is refused.
2.7 Requirements for non-profit organisations (NPOs)
1 with rules 8 requirements
Paragraph 1 describes NPOs. Paragraph 2.7.1(1) says an NPO “shall be registered in Ghana or as a foreign NPO”; 2.7.3(1) says a religious organisation is expected by law to be registered. Both describe the customer, not a duty of the institution, and have no requirements.
2.7(2) Ten factors for an NPO’s risk assessment
To assess the risk, an AI shall consider: a. The evidence of registration under applicable laws of the home and local operation; b. The purpose, ideology or philosophy of the organisation; c. The geographic areas served (including headquarters and operational areas); d. organisational structure; e. The organisation’s donor, volunteer and member base; f. Funding and disbursement criteria (including basic beneficiary information); g. Record keeping requirements; h. Affiliation with other organisation, Governments or groups; i. Identity of all signatories to the account; and j. Identity of board members and trustees, where applicable.
- What an examiner will look for
- NPO risk assessments covering registration, purpose, areas served, structure, donors and members, funding and disbursement criteria, records, affiliations, signatories and board members.
- What this can look like
- An NPO onboarding form with each of the ten factors, scored.
2.7(3) NPOs against terrorist lists, and ongoing monitoring of their funds
AIs shall carry out due diligence on these organisations against publicly available terrorist lists and monitor on an ongoing basis the movement of funds.
- What an examiner will look for
- Screening of NPOs and their officers against terrorist lists, and monitoring of their flows.
- What this can look like
- NPO customers and signatories are screened, and their incoming and outgoing funds are monitored.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
2.7.1(2) Confirm a foreign NPO with its overseas authority
AI shall contact the appropriate overseas competent authority to confirm the existence of the foreign NPO.
- What an examiner will look for
- Confirmation from the foreign registrar.
- What this can look like
- A foreign NPO’s registration is confirmed with its home registrar.
2.7.1(3) Keep a copy of the NPO’s registration
AI in conducting due diligence shall obtain and maintain a copy of the registration document of the NPO.
- What an examiner will look for
- The registration document on file.
- What this can look like
- Each NPO file holds its registration certificate.
2.7.1(4) Monitor that NPO transactions match its purpose
AI shall monitor transactions to ensure that the purpose of transactions aligns with the business of the NPO.
- What an examiner will look for
- Monitoring of NPO accounts against their stated purpose, and alerts raised.
- What this can look like
- A charity’s transfers to unrelated businesses or high-risk countries raise alerts.
2.7.2(1) EDD on charities: two verified signatories, name and address confirmed, no unregistered charities
AIs shall subject charities to EDD procedures to include; 1. Identification procedures required for onboarding. For emphasis, accounts for charities in Ghana shall be operated by a minimum of two signatories, duly verified and documentation evidence obtained. 2. Obtain and confirm the name and address of the charity concerned. 3. Verification of all signatories. 4. AIs shall not undertake business relationship with unregistered/unincorporated charities.
- What an examiner will look for
- Charity files with two verified signatories, confirmed name and address, and registration.
- What this can look like
- A charity account needs two verified signatories, and an unregistered charity is refused.
2.7.3(2) Verify a religious organisation with the registrar
AIs shall verify the identity of an RO by reference to the competent authority responsible for the registration and licensing of legal persons and legal arrangements.
- What an examiner will look for
- Registrar confirmation of the religious organisation.
- What this can look like
- The church’s registration number is checked with the registrar.
2.7.3(3) At least two verified signatories, and two to sign
AIs shall identify and verify at least two signatories and require the mandate of at least two to sign.
- What an examiner will look for
- Signatory records and a mandate requiring two signatures.
- What this can look like
- Payments from a religious organisation’s account need two of its verified signatories.
2.8.1 Development and implementation of institutional policy on SARs/STRs
7 requirements
Paragraph 8 adds that non-compliance “shall be sanctionable”.
2.8.1(1) A written policy to monitor, detect and report; Appendix E’s red flags are the minimum guide
AIs shall have a written policy framework to monitor, detect and report suspicious activity/transactions. A list of ML/TF/PF “Red Flags” is provided in the Appendix of this Guideline as guide at minimum.
- What an examiner will look for
- The written policy, and a mapping from the red flags of Appendix E to the institution’s monitoring scenarios or procedures.
- What this can look like
- Each red flag in Appendix E that fits the institution’s products is covered by a rule, a report or a staff procedure.
2.8.1(2) The AMLRO supervises monitoring and reporting, and documents it
AMLROs shall supervise the monitoring and reporting of suspicious transactions/activities and document same.
- What an examiner will look for
- The AMLRO’s documented oversight: reviews of alert handling and of filed reports.
- What this can look like
- A monthly note by the AMLRO on alert volumes, backlog and reports filed.
2.8.1(3) Be alert to ML/TF/PF patterns and give staff a checklist
AIs shall be alert to the various patterns of customer transactions and behaviour known to be suggestive of ML/TF/PF and maintain a checklist of such transactions/activities, which shall be disseminated to the relevant employees for guidance.
- What an examiner will look for
- The checklist of suspicious patterns, and evidence it reached front-line staff.
- What this can look like
- Tellers and account officers have a one-page list of red flags and where to report them.
2.8.1(4) Staff report red flags promptly to the AMLRO; every action documented
When an employee of AI detects any “red flag” or suspicious ML/TF/PF activity/transaction, the employee is required to promptly report to the AMLRO. Every action taken shall be documented.
- What an examiner will look for
- Internal reports from staff, with dates and the AMLRO’s actions recorded.
- What this can look like
- A staff report goes to the AMLRO the day the red flag is seen, and each step on it is logged.
2.8.1(5) Confidentiality of investigations and reports; safeguards against tipping off
The AI and its employees shall maintain confidentiality in respect of such investigation and any suspicious transaction report that may be filed with the FIC and put safeguards against tipping off.
- What an examiner will look for
- Access controls on investigations and reports, and the anti-tipping-off procedure.
- What this can look like
- Only compliance staff can see an STR; front-line staff are told how to handle the customer without revealing it.
2.8.1(6) Report suspicions to the FIC within 24 hours, attempts included, whatever the amount
AIs that suspect or has reason to suspect that funds or the proceeds of unlawful activities are related to ML/TF/PF, shall report within twenty-four (24) hours its suspicions to the FIC. All suspicious transactions, including attempted transactions, are to be reported regardless of the amount involved.
- What an examiner will look for
- For each STR: when the suspicion was formed and when the report was filed, no more than 24 hours apart; reports on attempted transactions; no minimum amount.
- What this can look like
- The case records the moment the analyst decides it is suspicious, and the STR goes to the FIC within 24 hours of it, even for a blocked attempt.
2.8.1(7) No disclosure that a report is due or has been filed
AIs, their directors and employees (permanent and temporary) are prohibited from disclosing the fact that a report is required to be filed or has been filed with the FIC and any competent authority.
- What an examiner will look for
- The confidentiality rule in staff contracts and training, and how breaches are handled.
- What this can look like
- Staff, including temporary staff, sign a confidentiality clause covering reports.
2.8.2 to 2.8.4 Complex, unusual or large transactions; suspicious transaction reporting; tipping off and confidentiality
1 with rules 7 requirements
Paragraphs 2.8.4(1) and (2) define tipping off and give examples; (3)(a) gives the legal protection of those who report in good faith; (5) says any tipping off “is sanctionable under Act 1044”.
2.8.2(1) Special attention to complex, unusual or large transactions and unusual patterns
AIs shall pay special attention to all complex, unusual or large transactions or unusual patterns of transactions that have no apparent or visible economic or lawful purpose. Examples of such transactions or patterns of transactions include significant transactions relative to a relationship, transactions that exceed prescribed limits, very high account turnover inconsistent with the size of the balance or transactions that fall out of the regular pattern of the account activity.
- What an examiner will look for
- Monitoring scenarios for each example the paragraph gives: transactions large for the relationship, transactions over prescribed limits, high turnover against a small balance, and activity out of the account’s usual pattern.
- What this can look like
- Rules that flag a transfer far above the customer’s usual size, an account whose turnover is many times its balance, and a sudden change in how the account is used.
2.8.2(2) Examine background and purpose, and write down the findings
AIs are required to examine as far as possible the background and purpose of such transactions and to set forth their findings in writing.
- What an examiner will look for
- For each such transaction, a written note of the background and purpose found.
- What this can look like
- The analyst records what the customer said and what the documents showed before closing the alert.
2.8.2(3) Report the findings to the FIC within 24 hours of suspicion
AIs are required to report such findings to the FIC within twenty-four (24) hours after the knowledge or the grounds of reasonable suspicion.
- What an examiner will look for
- Reports filed within 24 hours of the suspicion.
- What this can look like
- A suspicious large transaction is reported the day the suspicion forms.
2.8.3(1) Report suspicions promptly to the FIC
AIs shall report promptly its suspicions to the FIC if it suspect or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related to ML/TF/PF.
- What an examiner will look for
- STRs filed, with the dates the suspicion arose.
- What this can look like
- An analyst’s suspicion goes to the AMLRO and then to the FIC without delay.
2.8.3(2) All suspicious transactions, attempts included, whatever the amount
AIs shall report all suspicious transactions, including attempted transactions, regardless of the amount of the transaction.
- What an examiner will look for
- STRs on attempted and on small transactions.
- What this can look like
- A blocked fraud attempt and a small suspicious transfer are reported like any other.
2.8.4(3)(b) No tipping off
prohibited by law from disclosing (“tipping-off”) the fact that a suspicious transaction report (STR) or related information is being filed with the FIC.
- What an examiner will look for
- Anti-tipping-off training and procedures. Paragraph 2 gives examples to train on: telling a customer they are investigated, telling a third party about an SAR/STR, and changing how an account is handled in a way that alerts the customer.
- What this can look like
- Account restrictions after a report are applied in a way that does not reveal the report.
2.8.4(4) Confidentiality policies do not block sharing within the group
AIs in formulating policies on tipping off and confidentiality shall ensure that sharing of information within foreign branches and subsidiaries is not inhibited.
- What an examiner will look for
- The confidentiality policy with its group-sharing provision.
- What this can look like
- Group compliance can see a subsidiary’s reports under the group protocol.
2.8.5 Transaction reporting
3 with rules 4 requirements
The cash transaction report (CTR) and the electronic currency transaction report (ECTR). Paragraph 2.8.5.2(2) adds a report, within 24 hours, of transfers into or out of Ghana above the amount the BoG prescribes.
2.8.5.1(1) Daily CTR of cash transactions of GHS 50,000 (banks) or GHS 20,000 (specialised deposit-taking institutions)
AIs shall submit daily reports to the FIC through a prescribed medium all cash transactions within Ghana in any currency and with a threshold of GHS50,000.00 for banks and GHS20,000.00 for specialized deposit-taking institutions (or its foreign currency equivalent) or amounts as may be determined by the FIC in consultation with the BOG periodically.
- What an examiner will look for
- Daily CTR submissions, and a reconciliation of the cash transactions that meet the line with the reports filed. The Guideline says only “with a threshold of” and does not say whether a transaction of exactly the line amount is reported; the FIC’s “Report Types” page reports cash “amounting to GH¢50,000.00 or more”, for the banking and securities sectors (see “Reports and deadlines”).
- What this can look like
- Every cash deposit or withdrawal that meets the line is listed automatically and sent to the FIC the same day.
- Rules that help
- Large single transaction, Transaction structuring (smurfing)
2.8.5.2(1) Policies so that transfers into or out of Ghana meet the AML regulations
AIs shall institute policies and procedures to ensure funds transfer into or out of Ghana satisfy AML/CFT/CPF Regulations.
- What an examiner will look for
- Cross-border transfer procedures.
- What this can look like
- A procedure for international transfers covering data, screening and reporting.
2.8.5.2(2) Report transfers above the BoG amount within 24 hours
When an AI through electronic means and in accordance with the Foreign Exchange Act 2007 (Act 723) and Regulations made under that Act: a. transfers currency outside the country, or b. Receives currency from outside the country on behalf of a customer which exceeds the amount prescribed by the Bank of Ghana, the AI shall within twenty-four (24) hours after the transfer or receipt of the currency, report the particulars of the transfer or receipt to the FIC
- What an examiner will look for
- Reports of qualifying transfers within 24 hours of the transfer or receipt.
- What this can look like
- Each transfer above the prescribed amount is reported within 24 hours of the transfer or receipt.
- Rules that help
- Large single transaction
2.8.5.2(3) ECTR of electronic transactions with a threshold of USD 1,000, for individuals and businesses
AIs shall submit through a prescribed medium all Electronic Transactions with a threshold of $1,000.00 or its Cedi equivalent for both individuals and business entities or amounts as may be determined by the FIC in consultation with the BOG periodically.
- What an examiner will look for
- ECTR submissions, and a reconciliation of the electronic transactions that meet the USD 1,000 line with the reports. The Guideline says only “with a threshold of” and does not say whether a transaction of exactly $1,000.00 is reported; the FIC’s “Report Types” page says transfers “exceeding US$1000.00”, and that the ECTR “is filed by commercial banks only”, which the Guideline does not say (see “Reports and deadlines”).
- What this can look like
- Transfers that meet the USD 1,000 line, or the cedi equivalent, are reported through the prescribed medium.
- Rules that help
- Large single transaction
2.8.6 Transaction monitoring
1 with rules 4 requirements
Paragraph 1 defines transaction monitoring as “an ongoing process of reviewing financial transactions to detect suspicious or unusual patterns or activities that may indicate money laundering, terrorist financing, or other financial crimes.”
2.8.6(2) Monitoring tailored to customer, product, service and geography risk; enhanced for high risk
AIs shall tailor their monitoring systems based on the risk level of customers, products, services, and geographical locations; i.e. high-risk relationships require enhanced monitoring.
- What an examiner will look for
- Monitoring settings that differ by customer risk, product and geography, with stricter settings for high-risk relationships.
- What this can look like
- High-risk customers have lower thresholds and more scenarios than low-risk ones.
2.8.6(3) Monitor transactions against the customer’s profile, including large, complex or unusual ones
AIs shall monitor transactions as part of ongoing due diligence to ensure that transactions are consistent with the AI’s knowledge of the customer, their business, and risk profile. This includes monitoring large, complex, or unusual transactions without an apparent economic or lawful purpose.
- What an examiner will look for
- Scenarios that compare transactions with the customer’s known business and risk profile, and that catch large, complex or unusual transactions.
- What this can look like
- Monitoring covers typical laundering patterns (structuring, pass-through, sudden changes, dormant accounts, high-risk countries) and each alert is checked against the customer’s profile.
- Rules that help
- Transaction structuring (smurfing), Cumulative amount over a period (threshold aggregation), Large single transaction, Rapid pass-through (rapid movement of funds), Funnel account (many senders into one account), Dormant account reactivation, New account activity (mule accounts), Sudden change from a customer’s baseline, High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch, Cash use that does not fit the customer’s activity, Third-party funding and payment account name mismatch, Unlicensed virtual asset business (crypto trading through an ordinary account), Transaction velocity
2.8.6(4) Document the review of every alert
AIs shall document reviews and due diligence that are conducted on transactions triggered (alerts) by the monitoring system.
- What an examiner will look for
- For a sample of alerts, the review recorded: who, when, what was checked and the decision.
- What this can look like
- Every alert closes with a reason and a comment, and the decision is stored with the analyst’s name and the time.
2.8.6(5) File an STR or SAR when a suspicious transaction is detected
Where a suspicious transaction/activity is detected, AIs shall file an STR or SAR with the FIC.
- What an examiner will look for
- STRs and SARs filed from monitoring alerts.
- What this can look like
- An alert confirmed as suspicious becomes a report to the FIC.
2.8.6.1 Transaction monitoring systems
5 with rules 13 requirements
The Guideline’s requirements for the monitoring system itself. Paragraph 5 lists the minimum features.
2.8.6.1(1) Processes that detect activity inconsistent with the customer’s risk profile
AIs shall have appropriate processes in place that allow for the detection of unusual transactions, patterns and activities that are not consistent with the customer’s risk profile.
- What an examiner will look for
- Detection logic that uses the customer’s risk profile, not only fixed amounts.
- What this can look like
- A rule compares each customer’s activity with their declared profile and their own history.
2.8.6.1(2) Technology matched to size and complexity, integrating customer data with core banking
AIs in the adoption of these transaction monitoring processes shall utilise new technologies that are in scope or sophistication (automated and complex systems which integrate the customer data information with the core banking application), depending on the size, volumes and complexity of the business operations.
- What an examiner will look for
- The monitoring technology in use, how customer data reaches it from the core banking system, and why its sophistication fits the institution’s size, volumes and complexity.
- What this can look like
- The monitoring system reads customer data and transactions from the core banking system automatically.
2.8.6.1(3) Monitoring in real time or after the event
Monitoring shall be either: i. In real time, in that transactions and/or activities can be reviewed as they take place or are about to take place; or ii. After the event, through an independent review of the transactions and/or activities that a customer has undertaken.
- What an examiner will look for
- Which transactions are reviewed in real time (as they take place or before) and which after the event.
- What this can look like
- Card and transfer payments are checked before they complete; other activity is reviewed after the event.
2.8.6.1(4) An automated tool monitoring all transactions, products and channels in real time or by close of day
AIs shall develop in-house or acquire off-the-shelf automated monitoring tool to monitor all transactions, products/services, and delivery channels aimed at detecting suspicious and unusual transactions in real time or by close of day.
- What an examiner will look for
- The automated tool, its coverage of every transaction type, product and channel, and evidence that each runs in real time or by close of day.
- What this can look like
- An automated system receives every transaction from every channel and raises alerts the same day.
- Rules that help
- Transaction structuring (smurfing), Cumulative amount over a period (threshold aggregation), Large single transaction, Rapid pass-through (rapid movement of funds), Funnel account (many senders into one account), Dormant account reactivation, New account activity (mule accounts), Sudden change from a customer’s baseline, High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch, Cash use that does not fit the customer’s activity, Third-party funding and payment account name mismatch, Unlicensed virtual asset business (crypto trading through an ordinary account), Transaction velocity
2.8.6.1(5)(i) Minimum feature: integrates with the core banking software
Ability to integrate into the core banking software.
- What an examiner will look for
- The integration between the monitoring system and core banking, and what data passes.
- What this can look like
- Transactions and customer records flow from core banking into the monitoring system without manual uploads.
2.8.6.1(5)(ii) Minimum feature: covers channels, products and services outside core banking
Covers all delivery channels, products and services that are outside the AIs core banking system.
- What an examiner will look for
- A map of channels and products (mobile money, cards, agents, internet banking) and the feed that brings each into monitoring.
- What this can look like
- Mobile app, card and agent transactions reach the monitoring system as well as core banking postings.
2.8.6.1(5)(iii) Minimum feature: rules fit the frequency, volume and size of customers’ transactions in context
The rules/scenarios/parameters should be consistent with the frequency, volume and size of transactions of customers, in the context of the risk profile, product risk, geographic and delivery channels.
- What an examiner will look for
- The rules and their parameters, and the analysis showing how they were set from customers’ usual transaction frequency, volume and size, by risk profile, product, geography and channel.
- What this can look like
- Thresholds are set per segment from the customers’ own data: count rules for frequency, total-over-period rules for volume, single-amount rules for size, and comparisons with each customer’s history.
2.8.6.1(5)(iv) Minimum feature: sanction screening embedded
Embedded with sanction screening tools
- What an examiner will look for
- Sanction screening running inside the monitoring system, on customers and on transactions.
- What this can look like
- The same system that monitors transactions screens customers and payment parties against sanctions lists, and matches go to the same queue.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
2.8.6.1(5)(v) Minimum feature: agile enough for system and rule updates
Agile to accommodate updates, such as system updates, update of monitoring rules and any others.
- What an examiner will look for
- Change records showing rules and system updates made, and how long a rule change takes.
- What this can look like
- The compliance team changes a rule and puts it live without a vendor release.
2.8.6.1(6) A third-party system follows the BoG outsourcing directive and meets the minimum features
Where the AI engages a third party in the deployment of the transaction monitoring system, the following shall be undertaken. i. Adhere to the BOG third-party outsourcing directive. ii. Ensure the system satisfies the minimum features as stated in paragraph 4
- What an examiner will look for
- For a vendor system: compliance with the BoG Outsourcing Directive, and an assessment against the minimum features. The clause says “paragraph 4”; the features are listed in paragraph 5.
- What this can look like
- Before contract, the vendor’s system is tested against each of the five features, and the outsourcing is registered with the BoG.
2.8.6.1(7) Keep customer information current so the system can detect unusual activity such as dormant accounts
AIs shall also have systems and procedures to update customer information to ensure that the transaction monitoring system can detect unusual activity, such as dormant accounts or relationships.
- What an examiner will look for
- Customer data feeding the monitoring system kept up to date, and a scenario that detects dormant accounts or relationships.
- What this can look like
- An account inactive for the institution’s dormancy period that suddenly moves money raises an alert.
- Rules that help
- Dormant account reactivation
2.8.6.1(8) A yearly audit of the monitoring system
AIs shall conduct an audit on the transaction monitoring system on a yearly basis to ensure that the system is performing as expected and remains relevant in line with its business operations and ML/TF/PF typologies.
- What an examiner will look for
- The yearly audit report on the monitoring system: does it perform as expected, and do its rules still fit the business and current typologies. Appendix F lists “Transaction Monitoring Systems” among the areas of the yearly independent audit report.
- What this can look like
- Each year an auditor tests that every scenario fires on test cases, checks data completeness, and reviews the rules against new typologies.
2.8.6.1(9) Procedures to analyse alerts and decide whether they are suspicious
AIs shall develop and implement procedures to analyse transactions, patterns and activities (alerts) from the transaction monitoring system to determine if they are suspicious or not.
- What an examiner will look for
- The alert-handling procedure and its use on a sample of alerts.
- What this can look like
- An alert-handling manual: what to check, when to escalate, how to close.
2.9 Identification of designated entities and persons and freezing and unfreezing of funds
10 with rules 11 requirements
2.9(1) Identify designated persons and follow reporting, freezing and unfreezing instructions
AIs must be able to identify and to comply with reporting, freezing and unfreezing instructions issued by the FIC or any other Competent Authority regarding individuals and entities designated as terrorist entities by the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), European Union (EU), His Majesty’s Treasury, African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), third-party lists or a competent authority.
- What an examiner will look for
- The lists screened (UN, OFAC, EU, HM Treasury, AU, ECOWAS, third-party lists, competent authorities), and the handling of each FIC instruction.
- What this can look like
- All the named lists are loaded and refreshed, and every FIC freezing instruction is applied and logged.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
2.9(2) Report to the FIC at once when a designated person has funds or tries to transact
In accordance with section 63 of Act 1044, AIs shall have specific obligations to immediately report to the FIC where any of the following apply: i. A person or entity named by the entities in paragraph 1 above has funds in the AI; ii. The AI has reasonable grounds to believe that the designated person or entity has funds in Ghana; and iii. If the designated person or entity attempts to enter into a transaction or continue a business relationship, a suspicious transaction/activity report must be submitted immediately to the FIC.
- What an examiner will look for
- Reports to the FIC filed immediately after a confirmed match on funds held or an attempted transaction.
- What this can look like
- A match is reported to the FIC at once, as soon as it is confirmed.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
2.9(3) No transaction with a designated person; funds stay frozen
The AI shall not enter into or continue such a transaction with the designated person or entity. Funds already deposited with or held by the AI must remain frozen, subject to the laws of Ghana.
- What an examiner will look for
- Refused transactions and frozen balances for confirmed matches.
- What this can look like
- A confirmed match blocks the payment and freezes the account.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
2.9(4) Third-party lists carry an immediate freezing duty
It shall be noted that third-party lists as set out in section 63 of Act 1044 and Act 762 as amended include an obligation to immediately freeze the funds of the listed person or entity.
- What an examiner will look for
- Third-party lists treated like the UN lists, with an immediate freeze on a match.
- What this can look like
- A match on a foreign country’s list that Ghana gives effect to is frozen at once.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
2.9(5) Funds of a listed person in Ghana are treated as frozen
In such cases, where the AI identifies funds of a listed person or entity in Ghana, the AI shall treat such funds as frozen pursuant to Act 1044 and Act 762 as amended.
- What an examiner will look for
- Frozen funds of listed persons.
- What this can look like
- Funds of a listed person are frozen as soon as they are found.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
2.9(6) Terrorist screening for every customer, whatever the risk; screen customers and transactions against current lists
Terrorist screening is not a risk-based due diligence measure and must be carried out regardless of the customer’s risk profile. AIs shall have processes in place to screen customer details and transactions against the designated lists of persons and entities and to ensure that the lists being screened against are up to date.
- What an examiner will look for
- Screening of every customer and transaction, with no exemption for low-risk customers, and the dates the lists were last updated. Paragraph 7(i) of the same section asks for “Continuous risk-based screening of customer records”; the Guideline does not say how the two fit together.
- What this can look like
- Low-risk and simplified-due-diligence customers are screened exactly like high-risk ones, against lists refreshed daily.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
2.9(7)(i) Continuous risk-based screening of customer records
Continuous risk-based screening of customer records;
- What an examiner will look for
- Rescreening of the customer base whenever lists or customer data change. Paragraph 6 of the same section says “Terrorist screening is not a risk-based due diligence measure and must be carried out regardless of the customer’s risk profile”; the Guideline does not say how the two fit together.
- What this can look like
- Every list update rescreens all customers, and every customer data change rescreens that customer.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
2.9(7)(ii) Screen one-off or occasional transactions before they complete
Immediate screening of one-off or occasional transactions before the transaction is completed;
- What an examiner will look for
- Screening results timed before completion for occasional transactions.
- What this can look like
- A walk-in remittance is screened before it is paid.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
2.9(7)(iii) Procedures to screen payment messages
Procedures to screen payment messages; and
- What an examiner will look for
- Screening of payment messages (names, addresses, free text) before release.
- What this can look like
- Outgoing and incoming payment messages are screened, including the free-text fields.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
2.9(7)(iv) Screen payment details so originator, intermediary and beneficiary details are included
Procedures to screen payment details on wire/electronic transfers and payment transactions and remittances to reasonably ensure that originator, intermediary and beneficiary details are included on the transfers.
- What an examiner will look for
- Checks that each transfer carries originator, intermediary and beneficiary details, and that they are screened.
- What this can look like
- A transfer missing beneficiary details is held; complete ones are screened on every party.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
2.9(8) Screening policies: sources, roles, review frequency, periodic screening, match resolution, escalation
AI’s policies and procedures shall address: i. The information sources used by the AIs for screening (including commercial databases used to identify designated individuals and entities); ii. The roles and responsibilities of the AI’s employees and officers involved in the screening, reviewing and dismissing of alerts, maintaining and updating of the various screening databases and escalating potential matches; iii. The frequency of review of such policies, procedures and controls; iv. The frequency of periodic screening; v. How potential matches from screening are to be resolved by the AI’s employees and officers, including the process for determining that an apparent match is a positive hit and for dismissing a potential match as a false match; and vi. The steps to be taken by the AMLRO for escalating potential or positive matches and reporting suspicious or positive matches to the FIC.
- What an examiner will look for
- A screening policy that covers each of the six points: list sources, roles for reviewing and dismissing alerts and maintaining lists, review frequency, periodic screening frequency, how a match is confirmed or dismissed, and the AMLRO’s escalation and reporting.
- What this can look like
- A screening procedure saying which lists are used, who decides matches, how a false match is closed with a reason, and how a true match is escalated to the AMLRO and the FIC.
2.10 Trade/economic sanctions
2 with rules 2 requirements
Paragraphs 1 and 2 describe economic and trade sanctions and the forms they take.
2.10(3) Know which sanctions affect the business; screen payment instructions before execution
AIs shall be aware of such sanctions and consider whether these affect their operations and any implications to the AI’s policies and procedures, particularly concerning international transfers and its correspondent relationships. In addition to screening payment instructions to identify designated terrorists, AIs shall screen or filter payment instructions prior to their execution in order to prevent making funds available in breach of sanctions, embargoes or other measures.
- What an examiner will look for
- An assessment of the sanctions regimes that touch the institution’s transfers and correspondents, and screening of payment instructions before they are executed.
- What this can look like
- International payments are screened against sanctions and embargo lists before release, not after.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
2.10(4) Freeze and refuse transfers with UN-designated persons
In processing wire/electronic transfers and payment transactions, AIs shall take freezing action and comply with prohibitions from conducting transactions with designated persons and entities, as per obligations set out in the relevant UNSCRs relating to the prevention and suppression of terrorism and terrorist financing, such as UNSCRs 1267 and 1373 and their successor resolutions.
- What an examiner will look for
- Freezes and refusals on confirmed matches in payments.
- What this can look like
- A payment to a UN-designated person is stopped and the funds frozen.
- Rules that help
- Sanctions screening
2.11 Know your employee
1 with rules 14 requirements
2.11(1) Know-your-employee procedures and a recruitment policy for integrity and competence
In addition to knowing the customer, AIs shall have robust procedures in place for knowing its employees. In this regard, every AIs shall have a recruitment policy to attract and retain employees with the highest levels of integrity and competence.
- What an examiner will look for
- The recruitment policy and know-your-employee procedures.
- What this can look like
- An HR policy with integrity checks for every hire.
2.11(2) Due diligence on employees before and during employment, including the BoG Engaged and Disengaged Database
Consequently, AIs shall undertake due diligence on prospective employees and throughout the course of employment. At a minimum, the AIs shall: i. Verify the applicant’s identity and personal information, including employment history and background and also consider credit history checks on a risk-based approach; ii. Develop a risk-based approach to determine when pre-employment background screening is considered appropriate or when the level of screening shall be increased, based upon the position and responsibilities associated with a particular position. The sensitivity of the position or the access level of an individual employee may warrant additional background screening, which shall include verification of references, experience, education and professional qualifications; iii. Maintain an ongoing approach to screening for specific positions, as circumstances change, or for a comprehensive review of employees over a period of time. Internal policies and procedures shall be in place (e.g. codes for conduct, ethics, conflicts of interest) for assessing employees; iv. Have a policy that addresses appropriate actions when pre-employment or subsequent due diligence detects information contrary to what the applicant or employee provided. v. Verification shall generally include the following: a. Checking the authenticity of academic qualifications b. Verifying Employment History c. Police background checks d. Integrity checks against BOG Engaged and Disengaged Database
- What an examiner will look for
- For a sample of staff: identity, history and references verified, screening scaled to the role, ongoing screening, the policy for discrepancies, and checks of qualifications, employment, police records and the BoG Engaged and Disengaged Database.
- What this can look like
- New hires are checked against the BoG Engaged and Disengaged Database and police records before they start.
2.11(3) Document and keep evidence of employee checks
AIs shall document and keep evidence of the above processes.
- What an examiner will look for
- Employee check records.
- What this can look like
- Each personnel file holds its vetting results.
2.11(4) Records of employees’ names, addresses, positions and titles
AIs shall in addition maintain records of the names, addresses, position, titles and other official information pertaining to employees appointed or recruited in accordance with section 32 of Act 1044.
- What an examiner will look for
- Employee records kept as Act 1044 section 32 requires.
- What this can look like
- HR keeps current records of every employee’s position and details.
2.11(5) Same recruitment policies abroad
AIs, to the extent permitted, shall ensure similar recruitment policies are followed by its branches, subsidiaries and associate companies abroad, especially in those countries which are not sufficiently compliant with FATF standards.
- What an examiner will look for
- Recruitment policies of foreign branches and subsidiaries.
- What this can look like
- Subsidiaries abroad vet staff to the group standard.
2.11(6) Ongoing monitoring of employees
In addition to a robust recruitment policy, AIs shall implement ongoing monitoring of employees to ensure that they continue to meet the institution’s standards of integrity and competence.
- What an examiner will look for
- Periodic employee rescreening and reviews.
- What this can look like
- Staff in sensitive roles are re-vetted every year.
2.11(7) High recruitment standards, including fit and proper criteria
AIs shall establish and maintain procedures to ensure high recruitment standards of integrity among employees, including the meeting of statutory “fit and proper” criteria of the officers of the AI.
- What an examiner will look for
- Fit and proper assessments for officers.
- What this can look like
- Officers pass the statutory fit and proper test before appointment.
2.11(8) A code of ethics with disciplinary procedures and sanctions
AI shall develop a code of ethics which shall be accessible to all employees. The code of ethics shall have disciplinary procedures and dissuasive and appropriate sanctions in the event of breaches of these rules.
- What an examiner will look for
- The code of ethics and its disciplinary procedure.
- What this can look like
- A published code with a sanctions grid for breaches.
2.11(9) Code of ethics content: gifts, social ties, disclosure, confidentiality, unusual wealth
The code of ethics shall include: i. acceptance of gifts from customers; ii. social liaisons with customers; iii. disclosure of information about customers who may be engaged in criminal activity; iv. confidentiality; v. detection of any unusual growth in employees’ wealth; and vi. deterring employees from engaging in illegal activities that can be detected by reference to his investment records.
- What an examiner will look for
- A code covering the six points listed.
- What this can look like
- The code covers gifts, relations with customers, reporting of criminal customers, confidentiality and unexplained wealth.
2.11.1(1) Monitor employees’ accounts and lifestyles; investigate unexplained changes and shortages
AIs shall monitor employees’ accounts for potential signs of ML/TF/PF and also pay particular attention to employees whose lifestyles cannot be supported by their salary or known financial circumstances. AMLRO shall investigate observed substantial changes in their lifestyles which do not match their financial position. Internal procedures shall provide for special investigation of employees who are associated with unexplained shortages of funds.
- What an examiner will look for
- Monitoring of staff accounts, lifestyle reviews, and investigations of unexplained changes and cash shortages.
- What this can look like
- Staff accounts run through the same monitoring, with an extra review of staff with unexplained wealth or shortages.
2.11.1(2) Employees’ accounts under the same AML procedures, supervised by the AMLRO
AIs shall also subject employees’ accounts, including accounts of key management personnel, to the same AML/CFT/CPF procedures as applicable to other customers’ accounts. This is required to be performed under the supervision of the AMLRO.
- What an examiner will look for
- Staff and key management accounts in monitoring, with AMLRO oversight.
- What this can look like
- Executives’ accounts are monitored like customers’ and reviewed by the AMLRO.
2.11.1(3) The AMLRO’s account reviewed by internal audit or a designated senior officer
The AMLRO’s account is to be reviewed by the Internal Auditor or any other Senior Officer designated by the Management of the AI.
- What an examiner will look for
- Reviews of the AMLRO’s own account by internal audit.
- What this can look like
- Internal audit reviews the AMLRO’s account each half year.
2.11.1(4) Lifestyle audit and staff account findings in compliance reports by 15 July and 15 January
Compliance reports shall include a lifestyle audit and findings on employees accounts, and shall be submitted to the BOG and FIC on or before 15th July (half-year) and on or before 15th January (End of Year) of the following year.
- What an examiner will look for
- Compliance reports with the lifestyle audit, sent to the BoG and the FIC by 15 July and 15 January.
- What this can look like
- The half-year compliance report has a section on staff accounts and lifestyle audit findings.
2.11.1(5) AML performance part of each employee’s annual appraisal
The AML/CFT/CPF performance review of employees shall be part of employees’ annual performance appraisal.
- What an examiner will look for
- Appraisal forms with an AML section.
- What this can look like
- Every appraisal scores AML compliance.
2.12 Employee education and training programme
9 requirements
2.12(1) Comprehensive training to make staff aware and skilled
AIs shall design comprehensive employee education and training programmes not only to make employees fully aware of their obligations but also to equip them with relevant skills required for the effective discharge of their AML/CFT/CPF tasks. Indeed, the establishment of such an employee training programme is not only considered best practice but also a statutory requirement.
- What an examiner will look for
- The training programme and its learning objectives.
- What this can look like
- A training plan by role, covering awareness and practical skills.
2.12(2) Training tailored, covering reporting officers, new staff, operations, audit and managers
The timing, coverage and content of the employee training programme shall be tailored to meet the perceived needs of the AIs. A comprehensive training programme is, however, required to encompass employees/areas such as reporting officers; new employees (as part of the orientation programme for those posted to the front office); banking operations/branch office employees (particularly cashiers, account opening, mandate, and marketing employees); internal control/audit employees and managers.
- What an examiner will look for
- Training coverage by group: reporting officers, new front-office staff, operations and branch staff, internal control and audit, managers.
- What this can look like
- Cashiers and account-opening staff get modules on the red flags they meet.
2.12(3) Annual training programme to the BoG and the FIC by 31 December
AIs are required to submit their annual AML/CFT/CPF employee training programme for the ensuing year to the BOG and FIC not later than December 31 every financial year.
- What an examiner will look for
- Proof of submission of next year’s programme by 31 December.
- What this can look like
- Next year’s training plan reaches the BoG through ORASS and the FIC by email before year end.
2.12(4) Programme developed under the AMLRO with senior management
The employee training programme is required to be developed under the guidance of the AMLRO in collaboration with the senior Management.
- What an examiner will look for
- The programme’s sign-off by the AMLRO and senior management.
- What this can look like
- The AMLRO owns the training plan and management approves it.
2.12(5) Minimum training measures: tailored programme, documented approach, AMLRO known, schedules, acknowledgement, effectiveness, manuals
At a minimum, an AI shall; i. Develop an appropriately tailored training and awareness programme consistent with the AI’s size, resources and type of operation to enable relevant employees to be aware of the risks associated with ML/TF/PF. The training shall also ensure employees understand how the institution might be used for ML/TF/PF; enable them to recognize and handle potential ML/TF/PF transactions; and to be aware of new techniques and trends in money laundering and terrorist financing; ii. Document, as part of their AML/CFT/CPF policy/manual, their approach to training, including the frequency, delivery channels and content; iii. Ensure that all employees are aware of the identity and responsibilities of the AMLRO to whom they shall report unusual or suspicious transactions; iv. Establish and maintain a regular schedule of new and refresher programmes, appropriate to their risk profile, for the different types of training required for: a. new employees; b. operations employees; c. agents; d. supervisors/line managers; e. board and senior management; and f. audit and compliance employees. v. Obtain an acknowledgement from each employee on the training received; vi. Assess the effectiveness of training; and vii. Provide all relevant employees with reference manuals/materials that outline their responsibilities and the institution’s policies. These shall complement rather than replace formal training programmes.
- What an examiner will look for
- Each of the seven: a tailored programme, the documented approach (frequency, channels, content), staff knowing the AMLRO, a schedule for each of the six groups (agents included), acknowledgements, an assessment of effectiveness, and reference materials.
- What this can look like
- Agents and their staff are in the training schedule, and each trainee signs an acknowledgement and takes a test.
2.12(6) Training content, including red flags, trade-based laundering and fraud
The employee training programme shall include but not limited to the following: i. AML regulations and offences; ii. The nature of ML/TF/PF; iii. Money laundering ‘red flags’ and suspicious transactions, including trade-based money laundering typologies; iv. AML/CFT/CPF Reporting requirements; v. Customer due diligence; vi. Risk-based approach to AML/CFT/CPF regime; vii. Record keeping and retention policy; viii. Fraud and ix. Any other relevant AML/CFT/CPF Topic
- What an examiner will look for
- Training material covering each of the listed topics, fraud included.
- What this can look like
- The course has modules on red flags, trade-based laundering, reporting duties, CDD, record keeping and fraud.
2.12(7) Training records: content, names, dates, test results, training plan
AIs are also required to maintain records of employee training, which at a minimum shall include: i. Details of the content of the training programmes provided; ii. The names of employees who have received the training; iii. The date on which the training was delivered; iv. The results of any testing carried out to measure employees’ understanding of the anti-money laundering requirements; and v. An ongoing training plan.
- What an examiner will look for
- Training records with the five items.
- What this can look like
- The learning system keeps who took which module, when, and their score.
2.12(8) Half-yearly compliance report by 15 July and 15 January
AIs shall submit a half-yearly report on their level of compliance to the BOG and FIC by July 15 of the year under review and January 15 of the following year.
- What an examiner will look for
- Half-year and year-end compliance reports filed on time; Appendix F lists their content.
- What this can look like
- Compliance reports reach the BoG through ORASS and the FIC by email by 15 July and 15 January.
2.12(9) Take part in the BoG and FIC AML programmes
AIs shall fully participate in all AML/CFT/CPF interactive programmes organised by BOG and/or FIC, and failure to attend shall attract administrative sanctions.
- What an examiner will look for
- Attendance at regulator programmes.
- What this can look like
- Compliance staff attend every BoG and FIC session they are invited to.
2.13 Whistleblower policy
1 requirement
2.13(1) A whistleblower policy: co-operation, reporting violations to the AMLRO or internal audit, protection
AIs shall develop a whistleblower policy. These policies shall, at a minimum: a. direct their employees in writing and ensure that they always co-operate fully with the Regulators and Law Enforcement Agencies; b. make provisions for directors, officials and employees to report any violations of the institution’s AML/CFT/CPF compliance programme to the AMLRO; c. In cases where the violations involve the AMLRO, employees are required to report such to a designated higher authority, such as the Internal Auditor; and d. inform their employees in writing to make such reports confidential and that they will be protected from victimisation for making them.
- What an examiner will look for
- The whistleblower policy with its four elements, and the written notices to staff.
- What this can look like
- Staff can report AML breaches to the AMLRO, or to internal audit if the AMLRO is involved, and are told in writing they are protected.
2.14 Fraud management
3 with rules 14 requirements
Fraud is treated as part of the AML/CFT/CPF regime. Paragraph 4 sets the minimum, including a fraud detection tool.
2.14(1) BoG directives require banks to report every fraud incident and defalcation
Bank of Ghana’s Directives titled “Inspection and Internal Audit Report for Banks” dated 15/4/87 and “Bank Frauds” dated 11/5/88, and BSD/33/2007 require all banks to submit reports of all fraud incidents and defalcation to the BOG. The purpose is to help the BOG identify emerging fraud trends and notify the banking sector of same, making recommendations where necessary to help combat fraud and mitigate the effect on the banking sector.
- What an examiner will look for
- Fraud and defalcation reports filed with the BoG for each incident.
- What this can look like
- Every fraud incident, including staff defalcation, is reported to the BoG.
2.14(2) Fraud is a predicate offence: effective systems and policies to detect and curb fraud
Fraud is one of the predicate offences of money laundering and must be considered as part of the AI’s AML/CFT/CPF compliance regime. AIs are to ensure that effective systems and policies are in place to detect and curb fraud activities.
- What an examiner will look for
- The fraud detection systems and policies, and evidence they work: alerts, cases, losses prevented.
- What this can look like
- Fraud rules run on payments and logins, and fraud cases feed the AML side when they show laundering.
2.14(3) The AMLRO ensures fraud mitigation controls are in place
An AMLRO, as part of its responsibilities, shall ensure that AI puts in place fraud mitigation controls.
- What an examiner will look for
- The AMLRO’s review of the fraud controls.
- What this can look like
- The AMLRO reports on fraud controls to the board alongside AML.
2.14(4)(i) A board-approved fraud policy: detection, prevention, reporting, remedies, board oversight, audit role
AIs shall develop policy and procedures on fraud management, which shall be approved by the Board. The policy and procedure shall include: a. Detection b. Prevention c. Reporting and d. Remedial actions. e. The Board of Directors’ oversight in fraud management, i.e. frequency of fraud report submission f. Role of audit function in fraud management
- What an examiner will look for
- The board-approved fraud policy covering the six elements, including how often fraud reports go to the board.
- What this can look like
- A fraud policy approved by the board, with a quarterly fraud report to it.
2.14(4)(ii) Acquire or develop a fraud detection tool
AIs shall acquire or develop a fraud detection tool. The fraud detection tool may vary in scope or sophistication depending on the size, volumes and complexity of the business operations.
- What an examiner will look for
- The fraud detection tool in use and why its scope fits the institution’s size, volumes and complexity.
- What this can look like
- An automated fraud system checks payments and account events as they happen.
2.14(4)(iii) The fraud tool is embedded with threshold limits, customer profile and product features
The fraud detection tool shall at a minimum be embedded with a. Threshold limits b. Customer profile c. Features of products and services
- What an examiner will look for
- The tool’s configuration showing amount thresholds, the customer profile it compares against, and the product features it takes into account.
- What this can look like
- Fraud rules use amount limits per product, each customer’s usual behaviour, and product features (for example a wallet’s transfer limits).
- Rules that help
- Large single transaction, Sudden change from a customer’s baseline
2.14(4)(iv) Rotate employees’ roles
AIs shall ensure that employees are routinely assigned other roles.
- What an examiner will look for
- A rotation schedule for staff.
- What this can look like
- Tellers and operations staff rotate roles on a schedule.
2.14(4)(v) Fraud awareness training for employees
AIs shall organise fraud awareness training for employees
- What an examiner will look for
- Fraud training records.
- What this can look like
- All staff take a yearly fraud awareness course.
2.14(4)(vi) Fraud awareness campaign for customers
AIs shall organise a fraud awareness campaign for customers.
- What an examiner will look for
- Customer campaigns run.
- What this can look like
- In-app and SMS warnings about current scams.
2.14(4)(vii) Report each fraud to the BoG at once and through ORASS as it occurs
AIs shall immediately report any fraud incident to BOG upon detection and file a fraud report through the Online Reporting Analytic Surveillance System (ORASS) as and when fraud occurs.
- What an examiner will look for
- Fraud reports in ORASS dated at detection. Appendix F lists the Fraud and Defalcation Report to the BoG through ORASS “As and When”. 2.14(4)(x) also asks for “monthly fraud reports”, which Appendix F does not list.
- What this can look like
- A confirmed fraud case creates the ORASS report the day it is detected.
2.14(4)(viii) An investigation team and a fraud investigation report to management and the board
AIs shall constitute an investigation team and generate a fraud investigation report to Management and Board.
- What an examiner will look for
- The investigation team’s terms and its reports.
- What this can look like
- Each significant fraud gets an investigation report to management and the board.
2.14(4)(ix) Investigation report and remedial actions to the BoG promptly
AIs shall submit the investigation report together with remedial action(s) to BOG promptly.
- What an examiner will look for
- Investigation reports sent to the BoG with remedies.
- What this can look like
- The investigation report and the fixes go to the BoG as soon as they are done.
2.14(4)(x) Monthly fraud reports to the BoG
AIs shall submit monthly fraud reports to the BOG through the prescribed channel.
- What an examiner will look for
- Monthly fraud reports to the BoG, twelve a year. Appendix F lists the Fraud and Defalcation Report “As and When” only, with no monthly fraud return, and the Guideline does not name “the prescribed channel”; 2.14(4)(vii) also asks for an ORASS report as each fraud occurs.
- What this can look like
- A monthly fraud return is filed through the prescribed channel.
2.14(4)(xi) Follow up frauds reported to law enforcement and update the BoG
AIs shall follow through on all fraud incidents reported to the Law Enforcement Agencies and Competent Authorities and update the BOG by submitting an updated Fraud Report through the prescribed channel.
- What an examiner will look for
- Updated fraud reports showing the status of cases with law enforcement.
- What this can look like
- Open police cases are tracked and their status updated in the fraud report.
2.15 Record keeping and 2.16 Statistics
9 requirements
2.15(1) Keep books and records on customers and transactions under section 32 of Act 1044
AIs shall keep books and records (both hardcopy and electronic) with respect to customers and transactions as set out in section 32 of Act 1044
- What an examiner will look for
- The records kept, paper and electronic.
- What this can look like
- Customer and transaction records are kept in a searchable archive.
2.15.1(1) Records of all domestic and international transactions
AIs are required to maintain all necessary records of transactions, both domestic and international, in accordance with section 32 of Act 1044.
- What an examiner will look for
- Transaction records for domestic and international transactions, with the components paragraph 5 lists: names, addresses, nature, date, currency, amount, identification and instruments.
- What this can look like
- Each transaction record carries both parties, the amount, currency, date and the instrument used.
2.15.1(2) Keep CDD records, files, correspondence and analysis for at least five years after the relationship ends
AIs shall keep all records obtained through CDD measures, account files and business correspondence and results of any analysis undertaken for at least five (5yrs) years following the termination of the business relationship or after the date of the occasional transaction.
- What an examiner will look for
- A retention schedule of at least five years from the end of the relationship or the occasional transaction, including the results of alert analysis.
- What this can look like
- Closed customers’ KYC files and their alert investigations are kept five years after closure.
2.15.1(3) Records readily available on request
AIs shall maintain these records in a manner that upon request by the BOG, FIC or any other competent authority can be made readily available.
- What an examiner will look for
- A test retrieval of records for a closed account.
- What this can look like
- Records for an account closed four years ago are produced in a day.
2.15.1(4) Applies whether the relationship is ongoing or terminated
The above requirements apply regardless of whether the account or business relationship is ongoing or has been terminated.
- What an examiner will look for
- Retention applied to closed accounts.
- What this can look like
- Closing an account does not delete its records.
2.15.1(6) Records of identification data, account files and correspondence
AIs shall maintain records of the identification data, account files and business correspondence in accordance with section 32 of Act 1044.
- What an examiner will look for
- Identification records on file.
- What this can look like
- Identity documents and correspondence are archived with the account.
2.15.1(7) Customer and transaction records available on a timely basis
AIs shall ensure that all customer-transaction records and information are made available on a timely basis.
- What an examiner will look for
- Response times to record requests.
- What this can look like
- Record requests are answered within the deadline set by the requester.
2.15.1(8) CDD and transaction records available swiftly to authorities
AIs shall ensure that all CDD information and transaction records are available swiftly to competent authorities.
- What an examiner will look for
- Response times to authority requests.
- What this can look like
- An authority request is answered from one search across systems.
2.16(1) Statistics on CTRs, ECTRs and STRs reported and not reported, with reasons
AIs shall maintain comprehensive statistics on matters relevant to the effectiveness and efficiency of their AML/CFT/CPF systems. This shall include statistics on the CTRs, ECTRs, STRs reported, and those not reported with reasons. These statistics shall be easily retrievable whenever there is a request from competent authorities. Where there are discrepancies in the statistics provided to BOG or FIC, the AI would be expected to provide justification to such.
- What an examiner will look for
- Statistics on reports filed, and on cases not reported with the reason, retrievable on request and consistent with what the regulators received.
- What this can look like
- A dashboard counts STRs filed, alerts closed without a report and why, CTRs and ECTRs, and matches the figures sent to the FIC.
3.0 to 3.7 Establishing and verifying identity
4 with rules 28 requirements
Part C gives “further guidance” on KYC, CDD and EDD, in binding terms (“shall”). Paragraphs 3.1(1), (2) and (4) and 3.2(1) explain what identity is; 3.1(2) says identity follows the National Identity Register Act and “the Bank of Ghana notice on the use of the Ghana card as the sole identifier”. Section 3.7 starts at paragraph 2 in the published text.
3.0(1) No relationship until every party is identified and verified and the business ascertained
AIs shall not establish a business relationship until all relevant parties to the relationship have been identified, verified and the nature of the business they intend to conduct ascertained. Once an on-going business relationship is established, any inconsistent activity can then be examined to determine whether or not there is an element of ML/TF/PF suspicion.
- What an examiner will look for
- Onboarding records showing identification and verification of every party before the relationship began.
- What this can look like
- An account cannot be activated until every signatory and owner is verified and the expected business is recorded.
3.1(3) Diplomats’ passports: number, date and place of issue, expiry recorded
Where an international passport is taken as evidence of identity for diplomats, the number, date and place/country of issue (as well as expiry date where applicable) shall be recorded.
- What an examiner will look for
- The passport details recorded on diplomats’ files.
- What this can look like
- The onboarding form for diplomats captures passport number, issue date and place, and expiry.
3.2(2) No business until certain of identity; identify both customer and agent or trustee
AIs shall not carry out or agree to carry out financial business or provide advice to a customer or potential customer unless they are certain of the identity of that customer. If the customer is acting on behalf of another (the funds are supplied by someone else or the investment is to be held in the name of someone else) then the AI has the obligation to identify and verify the identity of both the customer and the agent/trustee unless the customer is itself an AI.
- What an examiner will look for
- Identification of both the customer and anyone acting for them before business is done.
- What this can look like
- Where funds come from someone else, both the account holder and the funder are identified.
3.2(3) Obtain identification evidence for customers and all relevant parties from the outset
AIs have the duty to obtain identification evidence in respect of their customers and all other relevant parties to the relationship from the outset.
- What an examiner will look for
- Identification evidence dated at the start of each relationship.
- What this can look like
- Evidence for every party is collected at onboarding, not later.
3.3(1) Identification continues for the life of the relationship
The customer identification process shall not end at the point of establishing the relationship but continue as far as the business relationship subsists. The process of verification, validating and updating identity, and the extent of obtaining additional KYC/CDD/EDD information shall be the sole prerogative of the National Identification Authority (NIA) for individuals’ resident/working in Ghana and the competent authority responsible for the registration and licensing of legal persons and legal arrangements.
- What an examiner will look for
- Updates to identity records during the relationship, verified with the National Identification Authority or the registrar.
- What this can look like
- Identity data are re-verified with the NIA at reviews and when the customer changes details.
3.3(2)(a) Nature of business, expected pattern of transactions, purpose, origin of funds, occupation and source of wealth
AIs shall obtain sufficient information on the: i. nature of the business that their customer intends to undertake, including the expected or predictable pattern of transactions; ii. purpose and reason for opening the account or establishing the relationship; iii. nature of the activity that is to be undertaken; iv. expected origin of the funds to be used during the relationship; and v. details of occupation/employment/business activities and sources of wealth or funds (income).
- What an examiner will look for
- For each customer: the declared business and expected transaction pattern, purpose, activity, expected origin of funds, occupation and source of wealth or income.
- What this can look like
- Onboarding records the expected monthly volume and the source of funds, so monitoring can compare actual activity with it.
- Rules that help
- New account activity (mule accounts)
3.3(2)(b) Keep information up to date; record what the customer says and keep it on file
AIs shall take reasonable steps to keep the information up to date as the opportunities arise, such as when an existing customer opens a new account. Information obtained during any meeting, discussion or other communication with the customer shall be recorded and kept in the customer’s file to ensure, as far as practicable, that current customer information is readily accessible to the AMLRO or relevant regulatory bodies.
- What an examiner will look for
- Customer files with notes of meetings and calls, and updates made when the customer opens new accounts.
- What this can look like
- A call note on what the customer said about a large incoming payment is saved to the customer file.
3.4(1) Verify identity at onboarding, account opening, one-off transactions, third parties and linked transactions
Identity shall be verified whenever a business relationship a. is to be established; b. involves account opening; c. during a one-off transaction(s); d. third party; e. when series of linked transactions take place.
- What an examiner will look for
- Verification at each of the five moments, including when a series of linked transactions takes place.
- What this can look like
- Repeated occasional transactions by the same person are linked, and once linked the person is verified.
- Rules that help
- Transaction structuring (smurfing)
3.4(2) Verify account holders on their own transactions, risk-based
AIs shall verify the identity of account holders when conducting transactions on their own account using a risk-based approach in line with the AI’s AML/CFT/CPF policy.
- What an examiner will look for
- The risk-based rule for verifying account holders on transactions.
- What this can look like
- A large over-the-counter withdrawal requires the Ghana Card to be checked.
3.4(3) Keep records up to date once the relationship is established
Once identification procedures have been satisfactorily completed and the business relationship established, AIs shall maintain and keep records up to date.
- What an examiner will look for
- Current identification records.
- What this can look like
- Records are refreshed at each review.
3.5(1) Verify that customers are who they say they are
AIs shall verify the identity of customers (natural/legal) to ascertain that the customer is the very person he/she claim to be.
- What an examiner will look for
- Verification results for individuals and legal persons.
- What this can look like
- Each customer’s identity is matched with an independent source.
3.5(2) Verify people acting for others and the others involved
AIs shall verify the identity of the person acting on behalf of another and obtain and verify the identities of the other persons involved.
- What an examiner will look for
- Verification of representatives and of the persons they act for.
- What this can look like
- A representative opening an account for a company is verified, and so are the persons behind it.
3.5(3) Verify directors and signatories with a controlling interest
AIs shall take appropriate steps to verify directors and/or all signatories with a controlling interest in an account.
- What an examiner will look for
- Verification of directors and controlling signatories.
- What this can look like
- Every director and signatory is verified with the Ghana Card or non-citizen card.
3.5(4) Verify all parties in joint accounts
AIs shall verify all parties in joint accounts.
- What an examiner will look for
- Verification of every joint holder.
- What this can look like
- A joint account opens only when all holders are verified.
3.5(5) High-risk private companies: EDD on beneficial owners and controllers
For high-risk business undertaken for private companies (i.e. those not listed on the stock exchange) sufficient evidence of identity and EDD procedures shall be conducted in respect of: i. the principal underlying beneficial owner(s); and ii. persons with a controlling interest in the company.
- What an examiner will look for
- EDD files on beneficial owners and controllers of high-risk private companies.
- What this can look like
- For a high-risk private company, the ultimate owners get source-of-wealth checks.
3.5(6) Watch for significant changes in a business or its ownership
AIs shall be alert to circumstances that might indicate any significant changes in the nature of the business or its ownership (controlling interest) and make enquiries accordingly, and to observe the additional provisions for High-Risk Categories of Customers as provided in this Guideline.
- What an examiner will look for
- Enquiries made on changes in a corporate customer’s business or ownership.
- What this can look like
- A change of directors or a new line of business triggers a review.
3.5(7) Trusts: verify settlors, those who provide funds or decide, and controllers
Trusts – AIs shall obtain and verify the identity of those providing funds for the trust. They include the settlor and those who are authorized to invest, transfer funds or make decisions on behalf of the trust such as the principal trustees and controllers who have power to remove the trustees.
- What an examiner will look for
- Verification of settlors, trustees and controllers of trusts.
- What this can look like
- A trust file identifies the settlor, the trustees and whoever can remove them.
3.5(8) Acquisitions: identify all acquired customers and check the acquired institution’s compliance
When one AI acquires the business and accounts of another AI, it shall identify all the acquired customers. It is also mandatory to carry out due diligence procedures to confirm that the acquired institution had conformed with the requirements in this Guideline prior to the acquisition.
- What an examiner will look for
- A KYC review of acquired customers and a due diligence report on the acquired institution.
- What this can look like
- After an acquisition, every acquired customer goes through KYC remediation.
3.6(1) Business before identification only in exceptional, risk-justified cases
An acceptable time span for obtaining satisfactory evidence of identity will be determined by the nature of the business, the geographical location of the parties and whether it is possible to obtain the evidence before commitments. However, any occasion when business is conducted before satisfactory evidence of identity has been obtained must be exceptional and can only be those circumstances justified with regard to the risk appetite of the AI.
- What an examiner will look for
- The exceptions allowed and their justification.
- What this can look like
- Business before identification is rare and each case is justified in writing.
3.6(2)(i) Identification evidence within 90 days of first contact
obtain identification evidence within ninety (90) days after it has contact with a customer with a view to agreeing with the customer to carry out an initial transaction; or reaching an understanding (whether binding or not) with the customer that it may carry out future transactions;
- What an examiner will look for
- For deferred cases, identification obtained within 90 days.
- What this can look like
- The system tracks the 90-day deadline from first contact.
3.6(2)(ii) Stop all activity if the customer does not supply it
where the customer does not supply the required information as stipulated above, the AI shall immediately discontinue any activity it is conducting for the customer; and bring to an end any understanding reached with the customer; and
- What an examiner will look for
- Relationships ended when evidence was not supplied.
- What this can look like
- At day 90 without evidence, the account is closed to activity.
3.6(2)(iii) STR or SAR where unusual or ML/TF/PF risk is suspected
where the AI suspects any unusual or ML/TF/PF risks, the AI shall file an STR/SAR to FIC
- What an examiner will look for
- Reports filed in such cases.
- What this can look like
- A customer who will not provide identity and behaves unusually is reported.
3.6(3) Processing may start, but nothing is paid out to a third party before identification
AI shall, however, start processing the business or application immediately, provided that it: i. promptly takes appropriate steps to obtain identification evidence; and ii. does not transfer or pay any money out to a third party until the identification requirements have been satisfied.
- What an examiner will look for
- Controls that block payments to third parties until identification is complete. For new customers Appendix B goes further: during its 90-day deferral “A POST-NO-DEBIT SHALL BE PLACED ON THE ACCOUNT”, which stops every debit, not only payments to a third party; the Guideline does not reconcile the two.
- What this can look like
- A new, unverified account can receive funds but cannot send to anyone else.
- Rules that help
- New account activity (mule accounts)
3.6(4) STR or SAR when an applicant does not provide identification within 90 days
The failure or refusal by an applicant (prospective customer) to provide satisfactory identification evidence within a reasonable time frame of ninety (90) days may lead to a suspicion that the applicant is engaged in ML/TF/PF. The AI shall therefore make an STR/SAR to the FIC based on the available information on the applicant.
- What an examiner will look for
- Reports filed on applicants who did not provide identification within 90 days.
- What this can look like
- Day-90 failures open a case for the AMLRO to report.
- Rules that help
- Refused or failed identity verification, and false KYC data
3.6(5) Written policies to close accounts or reverse transactions without identity
AIs shall have in place written and consistent policies for closing an account or reversing a transaction where satisfactory evidence of identity cannot be obtained.
- What an examiner will look for
- The written policy, and accounts closed or transactions reversed under it.
- What this can look like
- A documented closure-and-reversal procedure, applied the same way every time.
3.6(6) Respond promptly to competent authorities
AIs shall respond promptly to inquiries made by competent authorities.
- What an examiner will look for
- Response times to inquiries.
- What this can look like
- Inquiries are logged and answered quickly.
3.7(2) Verify documents with the issuing authority, against identity fraud
In order to guard against the dangers of identity fraud and ML/TF/PF risks, AIs shall take adequate steps to verify the authenticity of the documents with the issuing authority and keep evidence of same.
- What an examiner will look for
- Evidence of document checks with the issuing authority (for example the NIA for the Ghana Card).
- What this can look like
- Every Ghana Card presented is verified online with the NIA, and the result is saved.
3.7(3) Risk-based KYC; verify records during the relationship
AIs shall take a risk-based approach to the KYC/CDD requirements for all customers, verify the customer’s records during the relationship and keep records of same.
- What an examiner will look for
- Re-verification during the relationship, by risk, with records.
- What this can look like
- High-risk customers are re-verified yearly.
3.8.1 Low risk / simplified due diligence (SDD)
3 with rules 12 requirements
Paragraph 3 says the Guideline identifies when SDD may be applied.
3.8.1(1) SDD proportionate to low risk, never a full exemption, never on suspicion
With a risk-based approach, where the identified ML/TF/PF risks are low, AIs shall apply SDD. SDD shall be proportionate with the identified low risk factors (e.g. the simplified measures may relate only to customer acceptance measures or to aspects of ongoing monitoring). It shall be noted that SDD never means a complete exemption or absence of CDD measures, but rather, AIs may adjust the frequency and intensity of measures to satisfy the minimum CDD standards. AIs are reminded that simplified measures are not acceptable whenever there is suspicion of ML/TF/PF risks or where a specific high-risk is determined.
- What an examiner will look for
- For SDD customers, the reduced measures applied and the minimum CDD still met.
- What this can look like
- Low-risk accounts still have identity, screening and monitoring, only less often reviewed.
3.8.1(2) Straw-man suspicion in financial inclusion: EDD, internal report and FIC report
With respect to beneficial ownership in a financial inclusion context, the beneficial owner will, in most instances, be the customer himself or a closely related family member. Where there is a suspicion of ML/TF/PF that the account owner is being used as a ‘straw man’ and is not the beneficial owner, enhanced due diligence measures shall be applied, and an internal suspicious report must be filed with the AMLRO and a subsequent report to FIC.
- What an examiner will look for
- EDD and reports on inclusion accounts suspected of being used for someone else.
- What this can look like
- An inclusion account that receives and forwards funds for others is moved to EDD and reported.
3.8.1(4) SDD for defined low-risk customers such as salary-only accounts and pensioners
In addition, AIs shall, based on their risk assessments, apply SDD to specifically defined low risk customers or products and services. Such instances may include but are not limited to: i. Customers whose sole source of funds is a salary credit to an account or with a regular source of income from a known source which supports the activity being undertaken; and ii. Pensioners, social benefit recipients or customers whose income originates from their spouses’/partners’ employment.
- What an examiner will look for
- The defined SDD categories and the customers in them.
- What this can look like
- Salary-only accounts and pensioners are in a defined SDD segment.
3.8.1(5) Tiered accounts: low limits, monitoring that limits are observed, Ghana Card within 90 days
For customers who do not have photo identification or have limited identification documentation or those who are socially or economically vulnerable such as the persons with disability, elderly, minors, a ‘tiered’ SDD approach allows financial access with limited functionality. For example, AI shall offer banking accounts with low transaction/payment/balance limits with reduced documentation requirements. Access to additional services such as higher transaction limits or account balances or access to diversified delivery channels shall only be allowed if and when the customer can satisfy additional identification requirements. Where this applies AIs shall have monitoring systems to ensure that transaction and balance limits are observed. The AIs shall ensure that the customer shall provide the valid identification (Ghana Card) within ninety (90) days.
- What an examiner will look for
- The tier limits, monitoring that enforces them, and Ghana Card collection within 90 days.
- What this can look like
- A tier-1 wallet has low transaction and balance caps that the system enforces, and a 90-day countdown for the Ghana Card.
3.8.1(6) No SDD on suspicion
Where there is suspicion of ML/TF/PF risk, the AIs shall not apply SDD measures.
- What an examiner will look for
- SDD removed where suspicion arose.
- What this can look like
- An alert on an SDD customer moves them out of SDD.
3.8.1.1(1)(a) Deferred verification: never a de facto exemption, low limits, systems that detect when they are reached
Adjust the timing of SDD where the product or transaction has features that limit its use for ML/TF/PF purposes. AIs shall verify the customer’s or beneficial owner’s identity after the establishment of the business relationship where financial products or services provided have limited functionality or restricted services to certain types of customers for financial inclusion purposes. For example, limits shall be imposed on the number or total value of transactions per week/month; the product or service shall only be offered to nationals or only domestic transactions shall be allowed. Similarly, general insurance products such as car insurance present low ML/TF/PF risk so verification of identity may be postponed until there is a claim or until the customer requests additional insurance products. In such instances, AIs must ensure that: i. This does not result in a de facto exemption from SDD and that the customer or beneficial owner’s identity will ultimately be verified. ii. The threshold or time limit is set at a reasonably low level; iii. Systems are in place to detect when the threshold or time limit has been reached; and iv. SDD is not deferred or obtaining relevant information about the customer is not delayed where high-risk factors exist or where there is suspicion of ML/TF/PF.
- What an examiner will look for
- For deferred-verification products: the limits set, the system that detects when the threshold or time limit is reached, and evidence that verification then happens.
- What this can look like
- A limited wallet stops at its monthly cap until the customer is verified.
- Rules that help
- Cumulative amount over a period (threshold aggregation)
3.8.1.1(1)(b) Rely on the source of funds where risk is very low
Adjust the quality or source of information obtained for identification, verification or monitoring purposes Where the risk associated with all aspects of the relationship is very low, AIs shall rely on the source of funds to meet some of the SDD requirements. For example, the purpose and intended nature of the relationship shall be inferred where the sole inflow of funds are government pension or benefit payments.
- What an examiner will look for
- Where relied on, the source of funds that supports the SDD.
- What this can look like
- An account funded only by government pension credits has its purpose inferred.
3.8.1.1(1)(c) Less frequent SDD updates, triggered by events, without exemption
Adjust the frequency of SDD updates and reviews of the business relationship This shall be applied for example when trigger events occur such as the customer requesting a new product or service or when a certain transaction threshold is reached. AIs shall ensure that this does not result in a de facto exemption from keeping SDD information up-to-date.
- What an examiner will look for
- Trigger events defined for SDD updates.
- What this can look like
- An SDD customer asking for a new product gets a KYC refresh.
3.8.1.1(1)(d) Reduced monitoring above a threshold only, with linked transactions aggregated
Adjust the frequency and intensity of transaction monitoring, for example by monitoring transactions above a certain threshold only. Where AIs choose to do SDD procedures, they shall ensure that the threshold is set at a reasonable and/or prescribed level by regulation and that systems are in place to identify linked transactions which, when aggregated, exceed the threshold.
- What an examiner will look for
- Where monitoring is reduced: the threshold, and a system that aggregates linked transactions against it.
- What this can look like
- Low-risk accounts are monitored only above a threshold, but a rule sums linked smaller transactions so splitting does not escape it.
3.8.1.2(1) A financial inclusion policy
AIs shall have financial inclusion policy and procedures for the socially and financially disadvantaged citizens in Ghana.
- What an examiner will look for
- The financial inclusion policy.
- What this can look like
- A policy for customers without full identification.
3.8.1.2(2) Do not exclude people only for lack of identification; give staff procedures
Access to basic banking facilities and other financial services is a necessary requirement for most adults. It is important therefore that the socially and financially disadvantaged shall not be excluded from opening accounts or obtaining other financial services merely because they do not possess evidence to identify themselves. In circumstances where they cannot reasonably do so, the internal procedures of the AIs shall make allowance for such persons by way of providing appropriate procedures in line with the AIs policy to employees on how to undertake due diligence.
- What an examiner will look for
- Procedures for staff on due diligence where identity evidence is lacking.
- What this can look like
- Staff guidance on onboarding a customer without a Ghana Card.
3.8.1.2(3) Guarantor letter, guarantor’s Ghana Card, basic account, 90-day plus 30-day deferral, STR and termination on suspicion
Where an AI has reasonable grounds to conclude that an individual customer is not able to produce the detailed evidence of his/her identity and cannot reasonably be expected to do so, the AI shall do the following: i. accept as identification evidence a letter or statement from a person in a position of responsibility(guarantor) who knows the customer and can confirm that the customer is who he/she says he/she is, including confirmation of his/her permanent address; ii. accept and verify the Ghana Card of the guarantor; iii. offer basic low risk account services; iv. have a 90-day deferral for the customer to obtain the Ghana Card; v. where the customer does not supply the required information as stipulated above, the AI shall give the customer an additional 30-day deferral before the decision to discontinue the business relationship is made. and vi. where the AI suspects any unusual or ML/TF/PF risks, the AI shall file an STR to FIC and terminate the business relationship.
- What an examiner will look for
- For such customers: the guarantor letter and the guarantor’s verified Ghana Card, a basic account, the 90-day and 30-day deferrals tracked, and reports where suspicion arose.
- What this can look like
- A basic account opened on a guarantor’s letter, with the Ghana Card due within 90 days and a further 30-day grace.
3.8.2 Enhanced due diligence (high risk)
6 with rules 21 requirements
3.8.2(1) EDD for high-risk customers, relationships and transactions, including those in the NRA
AIs are required to apply EDD for such categories of customers, business relationships or transactions that are determined to present high ML/TF/PF risk due to business activity, ownership structure, nationality, residence status, politically exposed status or other high-risk indicators and as stated in the NRA or sectoral risk assessment.
- What an examiner will look for
- EDD applied to the categories the institution rates high risk and those in the NRA.
- What this can look like
- EDD is applied automatically to customers the model rates high.
3.8.2(2) Policy lists higher-risk customer types and EDD; senior management approves with enough information
The AI’s policy framework shall therefore include a description of the type of customers that are likely to pose higher than average risk and the EDD procedures to be applied in such instances. The commencement of a business relationship with a high-risk customer shall be approved by senior management. Senior management shall receive sufficient information to make an informed decision on the level of ML/TF/PF risk the institution would be exposed to if it enters into or continues that business relationship and how well equipped it is to manage that risk effectively.
- What an examiner will look for
- The policy’s list of higher-risk types and EDD steps, and senior management approvals with the information they were given.
- What this can look like
- The approval memo for a high-risk customer sets out the risk and the controls before management signs.
3.8.2(3) Monitoring tailored to high-risk relationships, with reports to the board and senior management
AIs shall also ensure that monitoring systems are appropriately tailored and provide timely and comprehensive reports to facilitate effective monitoring of such relationships and periodic reporting on such relationships to Board and senior management.
- What an examiner will look for
- Monitoring settings for high-risk relationships, and periodic reports on them to the board and senior management.
- What this can look like
- A quarterly report to the board on high-risk relationships and their alerts.
3.8.2(4) EDD always: FATF-deficient countries, complex or unusual transactions, NRA high risk, correspondents, PEPs, non-face-to-face
Act 1044 and this Guideline identify specific instances that AIs must always treat as high-risk and to which EDD must be applied. EDD shall be applied in the following circumstances: i. Business transactions with persons and AIs in or from other countries which do not or insufficiently comply with the FATF Standards; ii. Complex, unusual or large transactions, whether completed or not, to all unusual patterns of transaction and to insignificant but periodic transactions which have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose; iii. Where ML/TF/PF risks are high as stated in the National Risk Assessment; iv. When establishing correspondent banking relationships; v. Where a customer has been identified as a PEP; and vi. Non-face-to-face business relationships or transactions
- What an examiner will look for
- EDD applied in each of the six cases, including “insignificant but periodic transactions which have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose”.
- What this can look like
- Rules flag the six cases (high-risk countries, unusual or large transactions, small periodic transactions without purpose, PEPs) and send them to EDD.
3.8.2(5) Caution with persons from jurisdictions named in public statements
AIs shall exercise due caution if entering into business relationships or otherwise doing business with persons from high-risk jurisdictions named in Public Statements issued by international organisations such as OFAC, EU, His Majesty’s Treasury (UK), UNSCRs, FATF, AU and ECOWAS.
- What an examiner will look for
- The list of jurisdictions named by OFAC, the EU, HM Treasury, the UN, FATF, the AU and ECOWAS, kept current, and the extra steps taken.
- What this can look like
- Customers and counterparties linked to listed jurisdictions are flagged and reviewed before business.
- Rules that help
- High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch
3.8.2.1(1)(i) EDD: more information, including negative media and internet searches
Increase the quantity/quality of information obtained for EDD purposes (e.g. request additional information as to the customer’s residential status, employment, salary details and other sources of income) and requesting additional documentary evidence or utilizing publicly available sources (e.g. scrutiny of negative media news, internet searches, use of social media).
- What an examiner will look for
- EDD files with the additional information and the public-source searches.
- What this can look like
- An EDD file has adverse media results and extra income evidence.
- Rules that help
- Adverse media screening (negative news)
3.8.2.1(1)(ii) EDD: ownership and control structure, and reputation
Understand the customer’s ownership and control structure to ensure that the risk associated with the relationship is well-known. This may include obtaining and assessing information regarding the customer’s reputation including any negative media allegations against the customer.
- What an examiner will look for
- Ownership charts and reputation checks.
- What this can look like
- The EDD file shows the ownership chart and adverse media checks on the owners.
- Rules that help
- Adverse media screening (negative news)
3.8.2.1(1)(iii) EDD: intended nature, expected number, size and frequency, and regular monitoring against the profile
Understand the intended nature of the business relationship and the reasons for intended or performed transactions. This may include obtaining information on the number, size and frequency of transactions that are likely to be conducted. It may be appropriate to request a customer’s, business plans, cash flow projections, copies of contracts with vendors etc. The AI shall understand why the customer is requesting a certain service or product particularly when it is unclear why the customer is seeking to establish business relationships in another jurisdiction from where he is domiciled. The account shall be regularly monitored to establish a full view of the nature of activity and whether it fits with the initial risk profile of the customer.
- What an examiner will look for
- The expected number, size and frequency of transactions on file, and monitoring that compares actual activity with them.
- What this can look like
- The EDD file records expected volumes, and a rule alerts when actual activity departs from them.
3.8.2.1(1)(iv) EDD: source of funds and source of wealth, verified where risk is elevated
Establish the source of funds and source of wealth of the customer. Where the risk associated with the customer is particularly elevated, intrusive measures to verify the source of funds and wealth may be the only adequate risk mitigation measure. Possible sources may be reference to VAT and income tax returns, pay-slips, title deeds or, if from an inheritance, request a copy of the will or documentation to evidence divorce settlement or sale of property or other assets.
- What an examiner will look for
- Source of funds and wealth evidence, verified for the highest risk.
- What this can look like
- Tax returns or title deeds support the declared wealth of a high-risk customer.
3.8.2.1(1)(v) EDD: evaluate principals, reference checks and database checks
Evaluate the principals and conduct reference checks and checks of electronic databases;
- What an examiner will look for
- Reference and database checks on principals.
- What this can look like
- Principals are checked in credit and adverse-media databases.
3.8.2.1(1)(vi) EDD: review current financial statements
Review current financial statements; and
- What an examiner will look for
- Current financial statements reviewed.
- What this can look like
- The latest accounts of a high-risk company are on file and reviewed.
3.8.2.1(1)(vii) EDD: enhanced ongoing monitoring with more controls and more frequent reviews
Conduct enhanced, ongoing monitoring of the business relationship, by increasing the number and timing of controls applied, and through more frequent formal reviews.
- What an examiner will look for
- More monitoring controls and more frequent reviews for EDD customers.
- What this can look like
- High-risk customers have extra scenarios and a review twice a year.
3.8.2.1(2) Link CDD information held in different parts of the business
The availability and use of other financial information held is important for reducing the additional costs of collecting customer due diligence information and can help increase AI’s understanding of the risk associated with the business relationship. Where appropriate and practical, and where there are no data protection restrictions, AIs shall take reasonable steps to ensure that where customer due diligence information is available in one part of the business, there are information sharing mechanisms to link it to information held in another.
- What an examiner will look for
- Information sharing between business lines on the same customer.
- What this can look like
- One customer record links the customer’s data from every product.
3.8.2.1(3) EDD records, including enhanced monitoring and due diligence on the first payment
AIs, in addition to undertaking EDD measures, shall obtain and maintain records of; i. additional information on the customer (e.g. occupation, volume of assets, information available through public databases, internet, etc.), and updating ii. additional information on the intended nature of the business relationship. iii. information on the source of funds or the source of wealth of the customer. iv. information on the reasons for intended or performed transactions. v. the approval of senior management to commence or continue the business relationship. vi. enhanced monitoring of the business relationship, transaction by increasing the number and timing of monitoring applied, and selecting patterns of transactions that need further examination. vii. require the first payment to be carried into the customer’s account to be subjected to due diligence measures.
- What an examiner will look for
- EDD records of the seven items, including the selection of transaction patterns for examination and due diligence on the first payment into the account.
- What this can look like
- The first payment into a high-risk account is checked before it is credited.
3.8.2.2(1)(i) More frequent reviews and stricter thresholds for updating EDD
Conducting more frequent reviews of the business relationship and establishing more stringent thresholds for updating EDD information;
- What an examiner will look for
- Review frequency and update thresholds for high-risk customers.
- What this can look like
- High-risk customers are reviewed more often and their EDD refreshed at lower triggers.
3.8.2.2(1)(ii) Business limits or parameters that trigger early warnings and mandatory review
Setting specific business limits or parameters regarding accounts or transactions that would trigger early warning signals and require mandatory review;
- What an examiner will look for
- Limits or parameters set on high-risk accounts, and the reviews they triggered.
- What this can look like
- A high-risk account has its own amount, total and count limits; breaching one opens a mandatory review.
3.8.2.2(1)(iii) Senior management approval for transactions in products new to the customer
Requiring senior management approval at the transaction level for products and services that are new for the customer;
- What an examiner will look for
- Approvals for transactions in new products.
- What this can look like
- A high-risk customer’s first international transfer needs a senior manager’s approval.
3.8.2.2(1)(iv) More frequent review against red flags; purpose and destination of funds
Reviewing transactions more frequently against red flag indicators relevant to the relationship. This may include establishing the purpose and destination of funds and obtaining more information on the beneficiary before conducting the transaction;
- What an examiner will look for
- Red-flag reviews of high-risk accounts and beneficiary information gathered.
- What this can look like
- Before a large transfer from a high-risk account, the purpose and beneficiary are confirmed.
3.8.2.2(1)(v) Flag unusual activity and escalate to senior management
Flagging unusual activities and escalating concerns and transactions for senior management’s attention.
- What an examiner will look for
- Escalations to senior management.
- What this can look like
- Alerts on high-risk customers are escalated to a senior manager.
3.8.3(1) Minors outside tertiary education: relationship through a parent’s trust
For customers who are minors i.e. below the age of eighteen (18) and are not in the tertiary education system, AI shall establish a business relationship through the trust of a parent.
- What an examiner will look for
- Minors’ accounts held in trust by a parent.
- What this can look like
- A child’s account is opened in the parent’s trust, with the parent’s Ghana Card.
3.8.3(2) Tertiary students: direct relationship with required due diligence
For customers who are students and in the tertiary education system (i.e., University/ Training Schools). AI shall establish business with the customer and subject the customer to required due diligence procedures.
- What an examiner will look for
- Student accounts with due diligence.
- What this can look like
- A university student opens an account with a Ghana Card, student ID and introductory letter.
3.9 Virtual assets (VAs) and virtual asset service providers (VASPs)
1 with rules 7 requirements
Paragraphs 1 to 3 give the FATF definitions and describe the risk.
3.9(4) Identify and assess risks of new products and practices such as virtual assets
AIs shall identify and assess the ML/TF/PF risks that may arise in relation to the development of new products and new business practices such as virtual assets and virtual asset service providers.
- What an examiner will look for
- A virtual-asset risk assessment.
- What this can look like
- The risk assessment has a section on virtual-asset exposure.
3.9(5) Risk assessment before launching or onboarding virtual-asset business
AIs shall undertake risk assessment prior to the launch, use of such VA/VASP or establishment of business relationship with customers in such products, practices and technologies.
- What an examiner will look for
- A risk assessment dated before any virtual-asset product or customer.
- What this can look like
- No VASP customer is onboarded before the assessment is approved.
3.9(6) Manage and mitigate the risks
AIs shall take appropriate measures to manage and mitigate the risks.
- What an examiner will look for
- Mitigation measures for virtual-asset risks.
- What this can look like
- Limits and EDD for virtual-asset-related customers.
3.9(7) Identify and assess risks from virtual-asset activities and VASPs
AIs shall identify and assess the ML/TF/PF risks emerging from virtual assets activities and the activities or operations of VASPs.
- What an examiner will look for
- The assessment of VASP-related risk.
- What this can look like
- A review of flows to and from exchanges.
3.9(8) Risk-based measures proportionate to the risk
AIs, based on their understanding of their risks shall apply a risk-based approach to ensure that measures to prevent or mitigate ML/TF/PF are proportionate with the risk identified.
- What an examiner will look for
- Controls scaled to the assessed virtual-asset risk.
- What this can look like
- Stricter monitoring where exposure to exchanges is high.
3.9(9) Identify persons carrying out VASP activities and mitigate
AIs shall take steps to identify natural or legal persons that carry out VASP activities and put in place measures to mitigate any ML/TF/PF risks associated with such activities.
- What an examiner will look for
- How customers acting as VASPs are identified (declared activity, transaction patterns), and the measures applied.
- What this can look like
- Customers whose accounts look like an informal crypto exchange (many peer-to-peer payments with exchange references) are identified and reviewed.
3.9(10) Report identified VASP activities to the FIC within 24 hours
AIs shall report SAR/STR on identified VASP activities to the FIC within 24 hours.
- What an examiner will look for
- Reports filed within 24 hours of identifying VASP activity.
- What this can look like
- Once a customer is found to run VASP activity, a report goes to the FIC within a day.
Regulatory reporting obligations (page 52)
2 requirements
Paragraph 3 says the Bank of Ghana will apply administrative sanctions under section 93(3) of Act 930. The page that follows, “Sanctions for non-compliance”, points to the BOG/FIC Administrative Sanctions/Penalties for Accountable Institutions (2022), Act 1044 and Act 930.
Regulatory reporting obligations, para 1 Submit the thirteen reports and returns of Appendix F
AIs shall submit the underlisted reports and returns to the Bank of Ghana and FIC as indicated in Appendix F of this guideline. a. Compliance Report (Half-year and end-of-year) b. Self-Risk Assessment Questionnaire c. Data Capture Return d. Engaged Staff (BOG Opinion) e. Disengaged Staff f. Fraud and Defalcation Return g. Employee Education Training Programme h. Independent Audit Report i. Updated PEP List j. CTR/ECTR k. Suspicious Transaction Report l. PEP Transaction Report m. Any other report or return as prescribed by the competent authority.
- What an examiner will look for
- Each report filed with the right body, through the right channel and at the frequency in Appendix F (see “Reports and deadlines”).
- What this can look like
- A reporting calendar with every return, its recipient, channel and due date.
Regulatory reporting obligations, para 2 Meet the reporting deadlines
AIs shall adhere to the reporting deadlines and submissions to relevant authorities.
- What an examiner will look for
- Filing dates against deadlines for the last year.
- What this can look like
- No return filed late in the year.
Appendix B Information to establish identity
1 with rules 1 requirement
Appendix B is a table of the identification documents required for each type of customer (Ghanaian citizens, Ghanaians abroad, foreigners, students, minors, refugees, diplomats, sole proprietors, companies, government bodies, financial institutions, NPOs, clubs and trusts). The table is not quoted here; its heading sets one control.
Appendix B New customers: 90-day deferral for documents, with a post-no-debit on the account meanwhile
FOR NEW CUSTOMERS, A 90-DAY DEFERRAL SHALL BE APPLIED TO DOCUMENT REQUESTS/ACQUISITIONS WHERE APPLICABLE DURING THIS 90-DAY PERIOD, A POST-NO-DEBIT SHALL BE PLACED ON THE ACCOUNT
- What an examiner will look for
- For new customers with deferred documents: the 90-day deadline and a post-no-debit restriction in place on the account until the documents are in. The post-no-debit stops every debit, where 3.6(3) lets business start and forbids only paying “any money out to a third party” before identification; the Guideline does not reconcile the two.
- What this can look like
- A new account with documents outstanding can receive money, but no debit goes through until the documents arrive. If they have not arrived after 90 days, the relationship is ended (3.6(2)), or, in the financial-inclusion case, a further 30 days is given (3.8.1.2(3)).
- Rules that help
- New account activity (mule accounts)
Appendix D Further guidance on risk assessment and business/customer risk rating
1 with rules 11 requirements
Section 2.2(3) makes this appendix binding (“AIs shall adopt further Guidance on Risk Assessment and Risk Rating as provided in Appendix D”). Its risk assessment template “is not intended as a substitute” for the institution’s own methodology.
Appendix D Use internal and external sources, including FIC typologies and the NRA
When conducting or updating risk assessments, the AI shall consider information obtained from relevant internal and external sources, such as: i. The AI’s heads of business lines and relationship managers; ii. Internal/external audit and regulatory findings; iii. Sectoral emerging risks and typologies; iv. Corruption indices and country risk reports; v. Guidance issued by regulators; vi. Threat reports and typologies issued by the FIC and law enforcement agencies; vii. National Risk Assessment Reports; viii. Independent and public assessment of a country’s or jurisdiction’s overall AML/CFT/CPF regime such as Mutual Evaluation report and IMF Financial Sector Assessment Programme Reports. ix. Public sources of adverse news or relevant public criticism of a country or jurisdiction, including FATF, GIABA and public statements.
- What an examiner will look for
- The sources cited in the risk assessment, covering the nine listed: business heads, audit and regulator findings, sector typologies, corruption indices, regulator guidance, FIC and law enforcement typologies, the NRA, mutual evaluations and public statements.
- What this can look like
- The risk assessment has a sources page listing the NRA, FIC typology reports, the latest mutual evaluation and the FATF and GIABA statements used.
Appendix D Three steps: identification, assessment, exposure; group-wide where the business is complex
A risk assessment shall consist of three but related steps: i. identification of ML/TF/PF risk, and ii. assessment of the ML/TF/PF risk and iii. the exposure of the AI to ML/TF/PF. The steps taken to identify and assess ML/TF/PF risk must be proportionate to the nature, size and complexity of the AI. AIs that do not offer complex products or services and have limited or no international exposure may not need an overly sophisticated risk assessment. However, where products and services offered by the AI are more varied and where there are multiple subsidiaries and different business units catering to a more diverse customer base through multiple delivery channels, the AI shall conduct a more comprehensive risk assessment and identify and assess the ML/TF/PF risks on a group-wide level across all its business units, product lines and delivery channels.
- What an examiner will look for
- A methodology with the three steps, and for complex groups an assessment across all business units, product lines and channels.
- What this can look like
- Each risk is identified, scored for likelihood and impact, and mapped to the institution’s exposure, for every subsidiary.
Appendix D Risk factors on customers, countries, and products, services, transfers and channels
In conducting the risk assessment to identify those areas of its business that may be susceptible to ML/TF/PF risk, the AI shall consider the following risk factors where applicable: i. In relation to customers: • Target customer markets and segments; • Profile and number of customers identified as higher risk; • Complexity, volume and size of its customers’ transfers, considering the usual activity and the risk profile of its customers (e.g. whether the ownership structure is highly complex; whether the customer is a PEP; whether the customer’s employment income supports account activity). ii. In relation to the countries or jurisdictions the AI is exposed to, either through its cross border and international operations or through the activities of its customers, including correspondent relationships, the AI shall consider the countries or jurisdictions: • The AML/CFT laws, regulations and standards of the country or jurisdiction and quality and effectiveness of implementation of the AML/CFT regime; • Contextual factors such as political stability, maturity and sophistication of the regulatory and supervisory regime, level of corruption, financial inclusion etc. iii. In relation to the products, services, transfers and delivery channels of the AI, shall consider: • Nature, scale, diversity and complexity of the financial institution’s business activities including its geographical diversity; • Nature of products and services offered by the financial institution; • Delivery channels, including the extent to which there is direct interaction between the financial institutions and the customer or the extent to which reliance is placed on technology, intermediaries, third parties, correspondents or non-face to face access; • the degree to which the operations are outsourced to other entities in the Group or third parties; and • The development of new products and new business practices, including new delivery mechanisms and partners; or the use of new or developing technologies for both new and pre-existing products.
- What an examiner will look for
- The assessment covering each listed factor: customer segments and higher-risk numbers, complexity, volume and size of transfers; country regimes and context; business nature, products, channels, outsourcing and new products.
- What this can look like
- The assessment scores mobile, agent and online channels separately, and says how much the institution relies on third parties.
Appendix D Identify customers, countries, products, services, transactions and channels unique to the institution
The first step of the risk assessment process is to identify at a minimum customers, countries or geographic areas, products, services, transactions and delivery channels unique to the AI. Although attempts to launder money, finance terrorism, proliferation financing or conduct other illegal activities through an AI can emanate from many different sources, certain customers, countries or geographic areas; and products, services, transactions or delivery channels may be more vulnerable or have been historically abused by money launderers and criminals. Depending on the specific characteristics of the particular product, service, or customer, the risks are not always the same. Various factors, such as the number and volume of transactions, geographic locations, and nature of the customer relationships, shall be considered when the AI prepares its risk assessment.
- What an examiner will look for
- A list of the institution’s own customer types, countries, products, services, transactions and channels, with the volumes behind each.
- What this can look like
- The assessment starts from the institution’s product and customer inventory, with transaction counts and values.
Appendix D Customer risk factors: unusual circumstances, non-residents, asset-holding vehicles, cash-intensive business, complex ownership
In addition, AIs shall consider the following customer risk factors; 1. The business relationship is conducted in an unusual circumstance (e.g. significant unexplained geographic distance between the AI and the customer). 2. Non-resident customers. 3. Legal persons or arrangements that are personal asset-holding vehicles. 4. Business that are cash-intensive. 5. The ownership structure of the company appears unusual or excessively complex given the nature of the company’s business.
- What an examiner will look for
- The customer risk model’s factors, including the five listed.
- What this can look like
- The customer risk score rises for non-residents, cash-intensive businesses and complex ownership.
Appendix D Understand and evaluate the risks of geographic locations
AIs shall understand and evaluate the specific risks associated with doing business in, opening accounts for customers from, or facilitating transactions involving certain geographic locations.
- What an examiner will look for
- Geographic risk ratings, local and international, using the four international factors listed (weak AML systems, sanctions, corruption, terrorism support).
- What this can look like
- Each region of Ghana and each foreign country has a risk rating used in the customer score and in monitoring.
- Rules that help
- High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch
Appendix D Identify and evaluate the risks of each delivery channel
AI’s in its risk assessment framework shall identify the risks various delivery channels pose. AIs shall understand and evaluate the specific risks associated with their delivery channels.
- What an examiner will look for
- A channel-by-channel risk evaluation (branch, mobile, ATM/POS, tele-banking, self-service, internet).
- What this can look like
- Mobile and internet channels are rated separately from branches, with their own controls.
Appendix D Take account of risk variables: purpose, amounts, duration, location and channel
When assessing the ML/TF/PF risks relating to types of customers, countries or geographic areas, and particular products, services, transactions or delivery channels risk, an AI shall take into account risk variables relating to those risk categories. These variables, either singly or in combination, may increase or decrease the potential risk posed, thus impacting the appropriate level of CDD measures.
- What an examiner will look for
- The variables used and how they change the CDD level.
- What this can look like
- The expected size of deposits and the channel used raise or lower the CDD level.
Appendix D Programme built on the risk assessment; risk-based monitoring; audit reviews the assessment; more robust programme for high risk
The management of AI shall structure the bank’s AML/CFT/CPF compliance programme to adequately address its risk profile, as identified by the risk assessment. Management shall understand the AI’s AML/CFT/CPF risk exposure and develop the appropriate policies, procedures, and processes to monitor and control AML/CFT/CPF risks. For example, the AI’s monitoring systems to identify, research, and report suspicious activity shall be risk-based, with particular emphasis on high-risk products, services, customers, entities, transactions and geographic locations as identified by the AI’s AML/CFT/CPF risk assessment. Audit shall review the AI’s risk assessment for adequacy and completeness. Additionally, management shall consider the staffing resources and the level of training necessary to promote adherence with these policies, procedures, and processes. For those AIs that assume a high-risk AML/CFT/CPF profile, management shall provide a more robust AML/CFT/CPF compliance programme that specifically monitors and controls the high-risk s that management and the board have accepted.
- What an examiner will look for
- A link from each high risk in the assessment to the monitoring and controls that address it, and audit’s review of the assessment.
- What this can look like
- Monitoring rules are prioritised for the products, customers and places the risk assessment rates highest.
Appendix D Assess risk by business line and across the group; continually reassess and review customer ratings
AI that implement a consolidated or partially consolidated AML/CFT/CPF compliance programme shall assess risk both individually within business lines and across all activities and legal entities. Aggregating AML/CFT/CPF risks on a consolidated basis for larger or more complex organizations may enable an organization to better identify risks and risk exposures within and across specific lines of business or product categories. Consolidated information also assists senior management and the board of directors in understanding and appropriately mitigating risks across the organization. To avoid having an outdated understanding of the AML/CFT/CPF risk exposures, the bank shall continually reassess its AML/CFT/CPF risks, review its risk rating of customers and communicate with business units, functions, and legal entities. The identification of an AML/CFT/CPF risk or deficiency in one area of business may indicate concerns elsewhere in the organization, which management shall identify and control.
- What an examiner will look for
- Business-line and consolidated assessments, and the reviews of customer ratings.
- What this can look like
- A group-level risk view, and customer risk ratings that are recalculated as activity changes.
Appendix D Update the assessment when the risk profile changes; reassess within a two-year cycle
An effective AML/CFT/CPF compliance programme controls risks associated with the AI’s products, services, customers, entities, and geographic locations; therefore, an effective risk assessment shall be an ongoing process, not a one-time exercise. Management shall update its risk assessment to identify changes in the AI’s risk profile, as necessary (e.g., when new products and services are introduced, existing products and services change, high-risk customers open and close accounts, or the bank expands through mergers and acquisitions). Even in the absence of such changes, it is a sound practice for AIs to periodically reassess their AML/CFT/CPF risks within a two-year cycle.
- What an examiner will look for
- Assessment updates after new products, changes, high-risk customer movements or acquisitions, and a reassessment at least every two years.
- What this can look like
- A product launch or an acquisition triggers an update; otherwise the full assessment is redone every two years.
Appendix E Money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing “red flags”
1 with rules 2 requirements
The appendix lists red flags in eight groups (see “The red flags of Appendix E” above). Its introduction sets two duties.
Appendix E Effective and efficient transaction monitoring programmes
Monitoring and reporting of suspicious transactions is key to AML/CFT/CPF effectiveness and compliance. AIs are, therefore, required to put in place effective and efficient transaction monitoring programmes to facilitate the process.
- What an examiner will look for
- The transaction monitoring programme and measures of its effectiveness and efficiency, for example alert volumes and the share of alerts that lead to a report.
- What this can look like
- A monitoring programme whose rules, alert volumes and outcomes are reviewed regularly.
Appendix E A red flag puts the institution on enquiry and calls for investigation
Identification of any of the types of transactions listed here shall put AIs on enquiry and provoke further investigation to determine their true legal status.
- What an examiner will look for
- For transactions matching a red flag: an investigation recorded, with its conclusion.
- What this can look like
- A rule built on each relevant red flag opens a case, and the analyst records why the activity is or is not legitimate.
- Rules that help
- Transaction structuring (smurfing), Cumulative amount over a period (threshold aggregation), Large single transaction, Rapid pass-through (rapid movement of funds), Funnel account (many senders into one account), Shared identifiers across customers (money mule networks), Sudden change from a customer’s baseline, New account activity (mule accounts), Dormant account reactivation, High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch, Transaction velocity, Sanctions screening, Cash use that does not fit the customer’s activity, Refused or failed identity verification, and false KYC data
Sources
- Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism / Combating Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Accountable Institutions, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 12 December 2025, 104 pages.
- Bank of Ghana, news item “Anti-Money Laundering / Combatting the Financing of Terrorism / Combatting Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline”, 12 December 2025 (the publication page, linking source 1).
- Bank of Ghana, earlier upload of the same Guideline, 3 November 2025, not linked from the publication page (used only to compare versions).
- Financial Intelligence Centre Ghana, “Report Types” (CTR, STR, ECTR), the FIC’s description of the cash and electronic transaction report lines, compared with the Guideline under “Reports and deadlines”.
- Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism & Combating the Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Foreign Exchange Bureaux, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 8 January 2026, 40 pages. Read for its applicability and effective date and for 3.7(1), the bureaux’ cash transaction report.
- Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering, Combating the Financing of Terrorism & Combating the Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Agency Banking Guidelines, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 8 January 2026, 11 pages. Read for its applicability.
Ask us
A question about this regulation?
A person at Archer reads every question and answers by email.
Got it. Where should we send the answer?
We’ll use your email to answer you. Privacy policy
Thanks. We’ve got your question.
The Fraud & AML Library is a practical reference, not legal advice. What binds is the regulator’s own text, which every rule and regulation page links.