Screening

Adverse media screening (negative news)

Customers, their owners, and, where the risk calls for it, counterparties checked against news and other public sources for reports of financial crime, at onboarding and on an ongoing basis, so that a credible report raises the customer’s risk and gets reviewed.

A news or public-source report of financial crime about a customer, owner, or counterparty, checked at onboarding and ongoing, raises their risk and is reviewed At onboarding and ongoing Report of financial crime News, public sources Customer, owner, or counterparty Risk raised and reviewed

What it catches

Customers, beneficial owners and related parties who appear in news or other public sources in connection with financial crime: fraud, corruption and bribery, money laundering, terrorism and terrorist financing, organised crime, trafficking, tax evasion and similar offences. The report may be an allegation, an investigation, a charge or a conviction. Nigeria’s Central Bank defines the control as “Continuous screening of news and open-source content to identify negative information related to customers, beneficial owners, or related parties that may indicate ML/TF/PF risk” (CBN Baseline Standards, glossary).

A hit is not a suspicion and not a list match. Sanctions and PEP screening compare names with official or curated lists; adverse media screening compares them with what has been published, which is less reliable and much larger. Its output feeds the customer’s risk rating and due diligence: it can lead to enhanced due diligence, a review of past transactions, a decision to keep or exit the relationship, and, when the review finds grounds for suspicion, a suspicious transaction report.

This rule needs a news source. Transaction and KYC data cannot produce it on their own: the institution needs a negative-news data service, a curated set of media sources it screens itself, or, for a small number of high-risk customers, documented manual searches. The choice of source decides what the rule can find.

How the rule works

Each name held for the customer, its beneficial owners and directors, and, where the risk calls for it, its counterparties, is compared with the news source. A candidate hit is kept when the article is about a financial crime category in scope, the person or company has a role in it that you keep (normally its subject), the source is credible, and no identifier contradicts the match. An analyst reads the kept hits and decides whether the article is about this customer and whether it is material.

Screening runs at onboarding, at periodic review, when the customer’s details or ownership change, and on an ongoing basis as new articles appear. After the first full review of a name, ongoing screening only needs to look at articles published since the last one. A name never screened before, such as a new alias, director or beneficial owner, gets the full look-back, and a customer whose risk rating rises is screened again at the deeper settings of its new rating.

How deep and how often to screen is a risk-based choice. The Wolfsberg Group’s FAQs on negative news screening (2022) say it “should not be a zero-tolerance process” (introduction). Customers with a high public profile, such as wealthy individuals, PEPs and large companies, suit broad searches; for “a typical retail or mass-market customer”, “more targeted searches of structured news and media sources might be more appropriate to ensure an effective use of resources”. “It may also be appropriate not to conduct NNS; an FI would not be expected to devote resources to NNS where the added value is negligible or disproportionate to its Financial Crime Risks”, and “alternative measures such as anti-fraud databases” may identify the risk better (FAQ 4). The FAQs make this approach subject to “the legal and regulatory requirements in the jurisdiction(s) in which the FI operates” (introduction): in Kenya and Nigeria, screening continues throughout the relationship (see By country).

Runs when

  • A customer is onboarded.
  • A customer’s periodic review falls due.
  • A customer’s name, ownership or other identifying details change.
  • New articles enter the news source. Existing customers are screened against them, not only new customers.

Screens

The customer, its beneficial owners and directors, and other related parties.

Counterparties too where your risk assessment calls for it, such as partner institutions and remittance or crypto counterparties.

Looks back

Over your look-back period the first time a name is screened; after that, at new articles only. A new name or owner gets the full look-back, and a customer whose risk rating rises is screened again at the deeper settings.

Keeps a hit only if

All of these are true:

  1. The names are close enough: the match score is at or above strict, near the top of your tool’s scale.
  2. The article is about a financial crime category in scope, at or past the stage you alert on.
  3. The person or company is in the article in a role you keep: normally its subject, not a victim, a plaintiff, a witness or someone quoted.
  4. The source is one you have accepted as credible.
  5. No identifier contradicts it: date of birth within your tolerance, country, gender, date of incorporation.

Alerts when

At least one hit is kept.

The alert shows

Who was screened, each article with its source, date, category and stage, and the details that were compared.

If confirmed

When an analyst confirms the article is about the customer and material, the customer’s risk rating is reviewed and the case goes to enhanced due diligence. The decision and its reasons are recorded, for false hits too.

Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.

Common variants:

  • Onboarding check. A screen before the relationship opens. On its own it misses what is published later; in Kenya and Nigeria screening continues throughout the relationship (see By country).
  • Ongoing monitoring. The customer base screened against new articles as they are published. This is what Nigeria’s Baseline Standards define as adverse media monitoring (“Continuous screening”).
  • Counterparty screening. Partner institutions, remittance partners and crypto counterparties checked for negative news before and during the relationship (see By country: Nigeria, WAEMU, Ghana, South Africa).
  • Fraud-focused screening. Includes reports that the customer or a counterparty is a known or suspected scam victim, money mule or identity-takeover case. FATF, INTERPOL and Egmont list among the indicators of cyber-enabled fraud: “Presence of material relevant and verifiable negative news on customer or counterparties, e.g., account held by a known or suspected previous victim of scam, mule, or identity takeover activity” (2023, Annex A).

Data it needs

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FieldUsually comes fromIf it’s missing
A news sourcenegative-news data service, curated media feeds, or documented manual searchesCan’t screen. Record “not screened”, never “clear”.
Full name, and every other name heldKYCCan’t screen. Screen every variant, including local-language spellings.
Date of birth, or date of incorporationKYC, KYBHits on common names can’t be cleared on identifiers. Screen anyway and use the date when the article carries one.
Nationality, country of residence or registrationKYC, KYBWeaker clearing, and no way to choose sources by geography.
Beneficial owners, directors, related partiesKYBNegative news about the people behind a company is missed.
Counterparty namespayment details, partner onboardingNeeded for the counterparty variant only.
Customer risk rating and segmentrisk assessmentNeeded to decide how deep and how often to screen; without it every customer gets the same treatment.
Article date, source, category and stagenews sourceAnalysts can’t judge recency, credibility or relevance. Show them on the alert.
Match score, analyst decision and reasonsscreening tool, case managementNo evidence that hits were reviewed. Nigeria’s Baseline Standards expect documented procedures for resolving potential matches and logs that evidence the effectiveness of screening (5.3(b)(ii) and (a)(iv)); Wolfsberg expects it too.

Thresholds

Each row is a setting the rule needs. Set by law and Standard values come from the source named under “Where it comes from”. Suggested values are starting points: test them on your own history, then adjust.

ParameterValueTypeWhere it comes from
When to screenAt onboarding, periodically and on a continuous basis, on a risk basisSet by lawCBN Baseline Standards, 5.3(b)(i), with the glossary’s “Continuous screening”; CBK Guidance on Customer Due Diligence (2025), 3.6.3.2 (initial screening before onboarding, ongoing screening throughout the relationship).
Date-of-birth tolerance for clearing a hitClose the hit when the dates of birth differ by one year or moreStandardWolfsberg Group, Negative News Screening FAQs (2022), FAQs 10 and 22 and glossary, given as an example.
Look-back the first time a name is screenedSeveral years, by offence type; after that, new articles only, except a new name or owner (full look-back) and a customer whose risk rating rises (screened again at the deeper settings)StandardWolfsberg FAQ 10: “A multi-year look-back threshold may be appropriate”; “once an initial review has been conducted (e.g., at onboarding) it may only be necessary to screen against new media events”. No number is given; set it from your own volumes.
Name-match strictnessStrict, near the top of your tool’s scaleSuggestedNo public source gives a value. Scores are not comparable between tools. Moves with how common the names among your customers are and whether articles carry identifiers.
Stage alerted onAllegation, investigation, charge or conviction, by customer riskSuggestedWolfsberg FAQ 5: alert volumes are higher at the allegation stage. EBA: the absence of a conviction alone may not be enough to dismiss an allegation (EBA/GL/2021/02, para 2.5).
Credible sourcesSources you have assessed for accuracy, independence and editorial oversightStandardWolfsberg FAQ 14; EBA/GL/2021/02, para 2.5 (“the quality and independence of the source of the data and the persistence of reporting”).

By country

  • FATF (everywhere). The FATF Recommendations do not name adverse media screening. FATF reports treat negative news as a risk indicator. The cyber-enabled fraud report written with INTERPOL and Egmont lists “Presence of material relevant and verifiable negative news on customer or counterparties” among its indicators (2023, Annex A). The trade-based money laundering indicators written with Egmont include: “A trade entity, or its owners or senior managers, appear in negative news, e.g. past money laundering schemes, fraud, tax evasion, other criminal activities, or ongoing or past investigations or convictions” (2021, p.3). Under the virtual asset guidance, a VASP need not repeat its due diligence on a counterparty VASP for every transfer “unless there is a suspicious transaction history or other information (such as adverse media, published information about regulatory or criminal penalties) indicating they should” (2021, para 196).

  • Nigeria. The CBN’s Baseline Standards for Automated AML/CFT/CPF Solutions (10 March 2026), addressed to banks, mobile money operators, international money transfer operators, other financial institutions and payment service providers, require the AML solution to “Support adverse media or negative news monitoring” (section 5.3(a)(vii)), which the glossary defines as “Continuous screening of news and open-source content to identify negative information related to customers, beneficial owners, or related parties that may indicate ML/TF/PF risk”. Under the same section the institution must “Ensure appropriate, risk-based screening at onboarding, periodically and on a continuous basis” (5.3(b)(i)) and “maintain documented procedures for triaging, reviewing, and resolving potential matches, including escalation and reporting” (5.3(b)(ii)). Full compliance is due 18 months from issuance for deposit money banks and 24 months for other financial institutions (circular). For VASPs licensed or authorised by the CBN, and for banks and other CBN-licensed institutions offering virtual asset services under an Approval to Extend Permitted Activities (26.1), counterparty due diligence includes determining “from publicly available information its reputation, regulatory history and whether it has been subject to any AML/CFT/CPF or sanctions investigation or regulatory action” (Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, in force 5 November 2026, section 26.16.1(a)).

    Reporting deadline

    Report to the NFIU immediately, with a written report within 24 hours (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.7(1)–(2)). The NFIU’s December 2024 STR guidelines start the 24 hours once the transaction is found suspicious, after an examination of no more than 72 hours, and require written reasons for every alert closed as not suspicious (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, Part Six, para 2).

  • WAEMU (UEMOA). For cross-border correspondent banking “et les autres relations similaires” (and other similar relationships), the Loi uniforme LBC/FT/FP (2023 text, as each member state adopts it), art. 31(a), requires financial institutions to assess the correspondent’s reputation and the quality of its supervision “sur la base d’informations publiquement disponibles” (on the basis of publicly available information), including whether it has been the subject of an investigation or of measures by a supervisory authority on money laundering, terrorist financing or proliferation financing. WAEMU (UEMOA in French) is the West African Economic and Monetary Union: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, the same eight states that form the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). The uniform law applies in each state through that state’s own act, which may number its articles differently. The law of a single state is covered only where that state is named.

    Reporting deadline

    Report to the CENTIF “immédiatement” (Loi uniforme 2023, art. 60). The law defines “sans délai” as at most 24 hours (art. 2, point 58); “immédiatement” is not defined, and our reading is to treat 24 hours as the outer limit. Do not carry out an operation you suspect until the report is made; if it has already gone through, inform the CENTIF “sans délai” (art. 61).

  • Kenya. The CBK’s Guidance on Customer Due Diligence (effective 1 September 2025), which applies to commercial banks, mortgage finance companies, microfinance banks, money remittance providers, foreign exchange bureaus, payment service providers and non-deposit-taking credit providers (§1.2), says institutions screen before onboarding and throughout the relationship (§3.6.3.2), and lists among what to screen against “Global Adverse Media Screening: FIs should screen customers for any negative news or media reports indicating involvement in financial crimes, fraud, corruption, or other illicit activities” (§3.6.3.2(iv)). Its CDD process table has both the customer and the beneficial owner screened against adverse media (Table 1). Among its examples of the event-driven triggers on which an automated system flags a customer for a CDD update, it gives “Negative news or sanctions screening hits” (§3.6.1(b)(ii)).

    Reporting deadline

    Within two days after the suspicion arose (POCAMLA s.44(2), as replaced by the AML/CFT Laws (Amendment) Act 2023, Act No. 10 of 2023).

  • Ghana. Under the BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, institutions licensed by the Bank of Ghana apply enhanced due diligence when a new customer is high-risk or the risk of an existing relationship may have increased. It includes obtaining more information, by requesting more documents or by “utilizing publicly available sources (e.g. scrutiny of negative media news, internet searches, use of social media)” (3.8.2.1, para 1(i)), and may include assessing “the customer’s reputation including any negative media allegations against the customer” (para 1(ii)). An institution taking on a money or value transfer service (MVTS) as a business relationship conducts due diligence that includes “screening of the Directors/ BO/Shareholders, Adverse Media findings” (2.6.8, para 1(iii)), and monitors the MVTS, its directors and beneficial owners on an ongoing basis “to detect any adverse findings” (2.6.8, para 7).

    Reporting deadline

    Within 24 hours of the suspicion, attempted transactions included, whatever the amount (BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.8.1(6) and 2.8.3(2)).

  • South Africa. For crypto asset service providers, the FIC’s Public Compliance Communication 61 of 2026 on the travel rule lists, among the factors that can make a crypto asset transfer higher risk: “Crypto assets are sent to or received from high-risk or adverse media related counterpart CASPs” (para 3.12.6). Before a transfer, the ordering provider should carry out due diligence on the counterpart provider, which includes “Whether there is negative media coverage regarding the counterpart CASP, including but not limited to, linking the entity to criminal actors” (para 3.19.3).

    Reporting deadline

    As soon as possible, and no later than 15 days excluding weekends and public holidays (FIC Act s.29; MLTF Control Regulations, reg. 24(3), via FIC Guidance Note 4B para 71). The 15 days run from when you became aware of the facts, which “may be, and in the majority of cases will be, before a suspicion is formed” (GN4B para 80).

  • EU. The EBA’s risk factor guidelines list, among the factors on a customer’s or beneficial owner’s reputation: “Are there adverse media reports or other relevant sources of information about the customer, for example are there any allegations of criminality or terrorism against the customer or the beneficial owner? If so, are these reliable and credible?” Firms judge credibility on “the quality and independence of the source of the data and the persistence of reporting”, and “the absence of criminal convictions alone may not be sufficient to dismiss allegations of wrongdoing” (EBA/GL/2021/02, para 2.5). Enhanced due diligence may include “adverse media searches” (para 4.64), and for banks “open source or adverse media searches” (para 9.13).

  • Argentina. UIF Resolution 200/2024 does not name news or media. It lists, among the circumstances to weigh specially when setting alerts and controls, “Toma de conocimiento que indique que un cliente está siendo investigado o procesado por delitos de lavado de activos y financiamiento del terrorismo, u otros relacionados” (information indicating that a customer is being investigated or prosecuted for money laundering, terrorist financing or related offences) (art. 34(b), circumstance 10), and for high-risk customers requires measures “a fin de constatar posibles antecedentes relacionados con LA/FT/FP y sanciones aplicadas por la UIF y/u otra autoridad competente” (to find any history related to ML/TF/PF and sanctions imposed by the UIF or another competent authority) (art. 29). Adverse media screening is one way to learn these facts.

    Reporting deadline

    Money laundering, within 24 hours of concluding that the operation is suspicious, and no later than 90 calendar days from the operation, performed or attempted; terrorist financing and proliferation financing, within 24 hours of the operation (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 36(c)).

False positives and tuning

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  • Namesakes. Articles rarely carry a date of birth, so common names produce hits that say nothing about whether this customer is the person in the story. Clear on identifiers (date of birth, country, gender, date of incorporation, profession) rather than on spelling, and close a hit automatically when the dates of birth are further apart than your tolerance allows.
  • The customer is in the story but not its subject. Victims, plaintiffs, witnesses, officials quoted and journalists all appear in crime reporting. Wolfsberg lists, among the grounds for discounting a hit as immaterial, “The FI’s customer is not the subject (e.g., customer is a plaintiff)” (FAQ 24). For fraud prevention, a report that the customer was a scam victim may still matter: decide which roles you keep, and set them in the rule.
  • Negative news that isn’t financial crime. Traffic offences, public disorder, civil disputes and celebrity gossip are negative but not relevant. Limit the categories in scope, and record which ones you left out and why.
  • Unreliable sources. Blogs, tabloids, social media, opinion pieces and content anyone can edit produce allegations that don’t hold. In some countries the press is controlled or polarised. Decide which sources count, and understand how your data provider rates them.
  • The same story many times. One event reported by dozens of outlets becomes dozens of hits. Group hits by event, not by article, and keep the count of independent sources on the alert: it is part of judging credibility (EBA/GL/2021/02, para 2.5; Wolfsberg FAQ 14).
  • Re-clearing old articles. Screening the whole history again at every cycle makes analysts clear the same article repeatedly. After the first review of a name, screen new articles only, and keep the earlier decision on file. A new name, director or owner still gets the full look-back, and a customer whose risk rating rises is screened again at the deeper settings.
  • Broad searches on low-profile customers. Mass-market customers rarely appear in the news, so broad unstructured searches mostly return other people. Use narrower, structured sources for them and broader searches for high-risk and high-profile customers.
  • Language and script. Local news is often in a local language or script, and names are transliterated several ways. Screen in the languages of the markets you serve, or confirm your provider covers their press.
  • Search engines are not reproducible. Results change with time, user and settings, and content can be removed. Where manual searches are used, fix the search strings and settings and keep a copy of what was found.
  • Categories mixed into other screens. Some screening datasets mix “persons of interest” or crime-related entries into PEP or sanctions data, where they become PEP or sanctions alerts. Keep the category on each hit and route adverse media hits to their own review.
  • Screening that silently returns nothing. A screen that runs before the customer’s name is stored, or a news source that has stopped updating, returns no hits, which looks the same as “screened and clear”. Check what each trigger carries and when the source was last updated.

How to tune: screen deeper and more often for high-risk and high-profile customers; choose categories and stages per segment; clear on identifiers; group duplicate articles and keep their count; screen only new articles after the first review of a name; and measure, per category and source, how many hits turned out to be about the customer and material.

When it fires

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Analyst checklist:

  1. Read the article, not just the headline. Check the role the person or company has in it (subject, victim, plaintiff or witness) and whether it is a role you keep.
  2. Compare identifiers: name, date of birth, nationality, location, profession, company details. Close the hit as a false match when they contradict, and record why.
  3. Judge the source and the claim: the source’s quality and independence, whether other credible sources report the same thing, and how far the matter has gone (allegation, investigation, charge, conviction). Under the EBA guidelines, the absence of a conviction alone may not be enough to dismiss an allegation.
  4. On a confirmed, material hit: review the customer’s risk rating, apply enhanced due diligence, and look again at past transactions in the light of the article. Escalate under your procedure. In Kenya, the hit is a trigger to update the customer’s due diligence (CBK CDD Guidance, §3.6.1).
  5. Decide whether to keep, restrict or exit the relationship, and record the decision and its reasons. Keep the reasons for every hit, false ones included.
  6. File a suspicious transaction report when the review gives grounds for suspicion. A news report is usually not a suspicion on its own: it starts a review of the customer and their transactions, and the report is filed when that review, or the article together with what you already hold, gives grounds for suspicion. The FIC South Africa’s review of money mule reporting found that “Some accountable institutions filed defensive suspicious and unusual transaction reports in response to adverse media, subpoenas or section 27 requests for information from the FIC”. Under the FATF standard, “All suspicious transactions, including attempted transactions, should be reported regardless of the amount of the transaction” (Interpretive Note to Recommendation 20, para 3). Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country. Do not tell the customer that a report is being filed: institutions are “prohibited by law from disclosing (“tipping-off”) the fact that a suspicious transaction report (STR) or related information is being filed with the FIU” (FATF Recommendation 21(b)), and “A risk exists that customers could be unintentionally tipped off when the financial institution is seeking to perform its customer due diligence (CDD) obligations in these circumstances” (Interpretive Note to Recommendation 10, para 2).

Sources

20 sourcesHide
  1. Central Bank of Nigeria, Baseline Standards for Automated Anti-Money Laundering, Combating the Financing of Terrorism and Countering Proliferation Financing Solutions, circular BSD/DIR/PUB/LAB/019/002, 10 March 2026, section 5.3(a)(vii) and (b)(i)–(ii), glossary (“Adverse Media Monitoring”), and the circular (compliance periods). https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/CBN%20issues%20Baseline%20Standards%20for%20Automated%20Anti-Money%20Laundering%20Solution.pdf
  2. Central Bank of Nigeria, Payments System Policy Department, Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, November 2026, issued by circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004 of 5 November 2026, in force that day; section 26.16.1(a). https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/REGULATIONS%20FOR%20THE%20OPERATIONS%20OF%20NON-SECURITY%20VIRTUAL%20ASSETS%20IN%20NIGERIA.pdf
  3. Central Bank of Kenya, Guidance on Customer Due Diligence (CDD), August 2025, effective 1 September 2025, §1.2, §3.6.1(b)(ii), §3.6.3.2(iv) and Table 1. https://www.centralbank.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Guidance-on-Customer-Due-Diligence.pdf
  4. Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), AML/CFT/CPF Guideline for Accountable Institutions, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 12 December 2025, 2.6.8 paras 1(iii) and 7, and 3.8.2.1 para 1(i)–(ii). https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/BOG-FIC-AML-GUIDELINE-2025-FINAL-5-TO-BE-PUBLISHED.pdf
  5. Financial Intelligence Centre (South Africa), Public Compliance Communication 61 of 2026 on the implementation of the “travel rule” relating to crypto asset transfers as directed by Directive 9 of 2024, 30 March 2026, paras 3.12.6 and 3.19.3. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/2026.3-PCC-_Travel-Rule-for-CASPS.pdf
  6. Financial Intelligence Centre (South Africa), “Financial Crime Insights: Money mules”, June 2024, p.2. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Financial-Crime-Insights-Money-mules.pdf
  7. European Banking Authority, Guidelines on customer due diligence and the factors credit and financial institutions should consider when assessing the ML/TF risk (EBA/GL/2021/02, consolidated with EBA/GL/2023/03), paras 2.5, 4.64 and 9.13. https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2023-11/EBA%20GL%202021%2002%20-%20consolidated%20%28amended%20by%20EBA%20GL%202023%2003%29_EN.pdf
  8. Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 200/2024 (RESOL-2024-200-APN-UIF#MJ), 18 December 2024, Boletín Oficial no. 35571, 19 December 2024, arts. 29, 34(b) circumstance 10, and 36(c) (report deadlines). https://www.argentina.gob.ar/normativa/nacional/norma-407429/texto
  9. FATF, INTERPOL and Egmont Group, “Illicit Financial Flows from Cyber-Enabled Fraud”, November 2023, Annex A (“Adverse information on the account holder”). https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Illicit-financial-flows-cyber-enabled-fraud.pdf
  10. FATF and Egmont Group, “Trade-Based Money Laundering: Risk Indicators”, March 2021, structural risk indicators, p.3. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Trade-Based-Money-Laundering-Risk-Indicators.pdf
  11. FATF, Updated Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach: Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers, October 2021, para 196. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Updated-Guidance-VA-VASP.html
  12. FATF, The FATF Recommendations, October 2025 edition (R.20 was not changed by the June 2026 update), Recommendation 21(b), Interpretive Note to Recommendation 10, para 2, and Interpretive Note to Recommendation 20, para 3. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Fatf-recommendations.html
  13. The Wolfsberg Group, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on Negative News Screening, 2022, introduction, FAQs 4–6, 10, 14, 17–18, 20, 22 and 24, and glossary. https://db.wolfsberg-group.org/assets/b3a010d9-7b32-4580-92d7-db9a7e78cbaf/Negative%20News%20Screening%20FAQs%20(2022).pdf
  14. UMOA, Loi uniforme relative à la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux, le financement du terrorisme et de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive (2023 text), art. 31(a). https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Loi-uniforme-LBCFTFP-Mars-2023-vf.pdf

Reporting deadlines:

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