Crypto
Transfers with unlicensed or high-risk counterparty VASPs
A virtual asset transfer to or from another provider that is unlicensed or unregistered, missing from your counterparty register, overdue for review, or rated high risk.
What it catches
A customer sends virtual assets to, or receives them from, another virtual asset service provider (VASP: an exchange, a broker, a custodial wallet, a payment processor) that should not be dealt with, or not without more checks: one that is not licensed or registered where it has to be, one on a regulator’s list of unauthorised operators, one in a country that does not license VASPs at all, one rated high risk, or one the institution has never checked.
Criminals move funds to providers that ask few questions. The FATF lists, among its red flags for virtual assets, funds that “originate from, or are sent to, an exchange that is not registered in the jurisdiction where either the customer or exchange is located”, a customer who “sends funds to VASPs operating in jurisdictions that have no VA regulation, or have not implemented AML/CFT controls”, and “Receiving funds from or sending funds to VASPs whose CDD or know-your-customer (KYC) processes are demonstrably weak or non-existent”. The FATF standard itself requires VASPs to be “licensed or registered”, at a minimum where they are created (Interpretive Note to Recommendation 15, para 3), and applies its correspondent banking measures, Recommendation 13, to them (para 7). Not every transfer between two VASPs is a correspondent relationship: in the FATF’s guidance on virtual assets, such a relationship “is characterised by its on-going, repetitive nature”, and “One-off transactions … are not correspondent relationships” (Updated Guidance, 2021, para 165 and note 42). A transfer still needs counterparty due diligence: “A VASP would also need to conduct due diligence on their counterparty VASP before they transmit the required information to avoid dealing with illicit actors or sanctioned actors unknowingly” (para 196; see also para 169).
The rule is a check at the time of the transfer, not the due diligence itself. The due diligence on each counterparty (who owns it, where it is licensed, how good its controls are) is done once and reviewed; the rule makes sure no transfer goes to or comes from a counterparty that has not passed it, or whose standing has changed since.
How the rule works
For each transfer with a hosted wallet, find out which provider is on the other side, then look it up in your counterparty register. The provider is known from the Travel Rule message (its name or identifier), from blockchain analytics that attribute the wallet address to a service, or, where neither works, from the customer. A transfer whose other end is a wallet the customer or someone else controls directly (an unhosted wallet) is not for this rule.
Looks at
Every virtual asset transfer a customer sends or receives where the other side is another provider: an outgoing transfer before it is sent, an incoming one before the assets are made available to the customer.
Finds
- The counterparty: the legal entity on the other side, from the Travel Rule message, from blockchain analytics or from the customer.
- Its record in your counterparty register: your decision on it, its licence or registration and regulator, its country, its risk rating and when it was last reviewed.
- Regulators’ lists of unauthorised or non-compliant operators, where your regulator publishes one.
Leaves out
- Transfers between your own wallets, and transfers with unhosted wallets (another rule covers them).
- Services your blockchain analytics classify as mixers or other anonymity services (another rule covers them).
Alerts when
Any of these is true:
- The counterparty is not licensed or registered where it has to be, or is on a regulator’s list of unauthorised operators. Hold or refuse the transfer.
- The counterparty is a provider but is not in your register, or its review is overdue. Hold the transfer until the due diligence is done.
- The counterparty is rated high risk, operates from a country that does not effectively license VASPs, or its licence cannot be verified.
- No provider can be identified on a transfer that the analytics show went to or came from a service.
How often
On every transfer. Group the alerts into one case per customer and counterparty, so a customer who uses the same platform many times is reviewed once.
Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.
Counterparty register One entry per legal entity you transfer with, not per brand: an exchange may operate through several companies, licensed in different countries. Record the licence or registration, the regulator, the countries where it operates, your decision (approved, restricted, blocked), the risk rating and the review date. Check licences against the regulators’ own public registers.
Review interval No regulator cited here sets a number of months. The laws ask for review “on an ongoing basis”, “periodically” or “on a regular basis”, and whenever new risks emerge; the FATF expects providers to “refresh their counterparty due diligence information periodically or when risk emerges from the relationship”, not for every transfer. Set the interval from the risk rating: shorter for higher-risk counterparties, and an immediate review when a licence is withdrawn or the counterparty is named in an enforcement action.
High risk Your own rating from the due diligence: where the counterparty is licensed and supervised, the quality of its AML controls and its Travel Rule capability, its owners, adverse news, and how it answers your information requests. Under Nigeria’s rules a VASP from a country that does not effectively license VASPs, or whose status cannot be verified, is higher-risk by law.
Common variants:
- Unknown counterparty. The analytics place the address at a service, but no provider can be named. Hold the transfer and ask. The EBA’s Travel Rule guidelines say that where the customer’s answer shows the transfer goes to or from another provider, the institution “should take the necessary steps to accurately identify the counterparty CASP”, before the transfer is initiated or before the assets are made available to the beneficiary (EBA/GL/2024/11, paras 78–79).
- Nested provider. The counterparty is licensed, but it serves another provider or that provider’s customers (a broker or a smaller exchange using its accounts for liquidity and trading). The risk is the underlying provider’s. Attribute the flows to it where the analytics can, and judge them against that provider. The FATF counts “nested services (providing accounts to smaller VASPs for access to liquidity and trading pairs)” among correspondent relationships (Updated Guidance, 2021, para 165), and the EBA lists a wholesale provider’s weak control over a nested service among the factors that may increase risk (EBA/GL/2024/01, Guideline 21.3(f)). Nigeria’s rules require enhanced due diligence on the underlying provider, and to “restrict, suspend or terminate the nested relationship where the risks cannot be adequately mitigated or the required information cannot be obtained” (CBN VA Regulations, 26.16.4).
- Indirect exposure. The customer’s incoming funds came, a few transfers back, from an unlicensed or high-risk provider. Blockchain analytics trace this. Alert when such funds make up more than a set share of the transfer’s value within a set number of hops; set both with your analytics provider and test them on your own transfers. Among the FATF’s red flags is a customer whose source of wealth is “disproportionately drawn from VAs originating from other VASPs that lack AML/CFT controls”.
- Counterparty that fails to send Travel Rule information. The alert on the missing information belongs to the Travel Rule rule (see Related rules); its results per counterparty feed this rule’s risk rating, so that repeated gaps from one provider raise it. The EBA asks institutions to consider how a counterparty’s repeated failure to provide the information affects its risk and, where appropriate, to monitor in real time all transfers received from it (EBA/GL/2024/11, para 72).
Data it needs
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| Field | Usually comes from | If it’s missing |
|---|---|---|
| Counterparty provider: name, legal entity and identifier (for example its LEI) | Travel Rule message; blockchain analytics attribution of the address; the customer | Required. Without it the rule can only alert on “unknown”, which is every transfer. |
| Counterparty wallet address and network | the transfer itself | Required for attribution. Store it for incoming transfers too: an incoming transfer without the sending address can’t be attributed. |
| Hosted or unhosted | Travel Rule exchange or analytics | Needed to send unhosted wallets to their own rule. |
| Register entry: decision, licence or registration, regulator, countries of operation, risk rating, last review date | your counterparty due diligence | Required. A register that holds only names can’t tell licensed from unlicensed. |
| Regulators’ lists of unauthorised or non-compliant operators, with their websites and known addresses | regulators’ websites | Needed for the first alert where a regulator publishes such a list. |
| Direction, amount, asset, timestamp | the transfer | Required. |
| Cross-border flag (the counterparty or the other customer outside your country) | Travel Rule data, the counterparty’s country | Needed where the law sets extra conditions on cross-border transfers (Nigeria, below). |
| Underlying provider, for nested services | analytics attribution, the counterparty’s own information | Needed for the nested variant. |
Thresholds
Each row is a setting the rule needs. Set by law values come from the source named under “Where it comes from”.
| Parameter | Value | Type | Where it comes from |
|---|---|---|---|
| Minimum amount | None: every transfer to or from another provider | Set by law | Nigeria: due diligence “Before establishing a relationship with, or transferring virtual assets to or from, another VASP” (CBN VA Regulations, 26.16.1), and every cross-border virtual asset transaction only with licensed or registered counterparties (11.10.9(b)). South Africa, outgoing transfers only: the Travel Rule applies to a transfer of “any value above zero” (FIC Directive 9, para 2.1.9), and the sending provider identifies the counterparty before it sends the information (para 4.7). |
| Alert review time (Nigeria) | five business days, or 24 hours where the alert indicates a possible sanctions match or terrorist financing | Set by law | CBN VA Regulations, 26.7.2, for alerts of the automated monitoring system of 26.7.1. |
| Counterparty review interval | no number set | Set by law | “on an ongoing basis” (CBN VA Regulations, 26.16.1); “periodically or when it identifies that money laundering, terrorist financing or proliferation financing risk emerges from the relationship” (FIC Directive 9, para 4.7.3); “on a regular basis or when new risks emerge” (Directive (EU) 2015/849, art. 19b(1)). The FATF expects providers to “refresh their counterparty due diligence information periodically or when risk emerges from the relationship” (Updated Guidance, 2021, para 196). Set your own interval from the risk rating. |
By country
FATF (everywhere). VASPs “should be required to be licensed or registered”, at a minimum in the jurisdiction where they are created; countries “may also require VASPs that offer products and/or services to customers in, or conduct operations from, their jurisdiction to be licensed or registered in this jurisdiction” (Interpretive Note to Recommendation 15, para 3). The preventive measures of Recommendations 10 to 21 apply to VASPs (para 7), among them Recommendation 13, which for correspondent relationships asks for information on the respondent, an assessment of its AML/CFT controls, senior management approval, and no relationship with shell banks. The FATF’s 2021 guidance on virtual assets applies Recommendation 13 to ongoing, cross-border relationships in which one VASP provides services to another, nested services included, but not to one-off transactions (paras 165–167 and note 42); “Recommendation 13 does not apply to the domestic equivalent of correspondent relationships”, where risk-based due diligence applies instead (para 168). Counterparty due diligence for the Travel Rule (Recommendation 16) “is distinct from the obligations applicable to cross-border correspondent relationships”: “it is possible for transfers of VA for or on behalf of another person to occur between VASPs, even in the absence of a correspondent relationship or any other relationships” (para 169). The sending VASP identifies the provider on the other side and checks it before it transmits the required information; “VASPs do not need to undertake the counterparty VASP due diligence process for every individual VA transfer when dealing with VASPs for which they have previously conducted counterparty due diligence”, and should “refresh their counterparty due diligence information periodically or when risk emerges from the relationship” (para 196). The guidance adds that no technically proven means is known of identifying the VASP behind a wallet from its address alone (para 197(a), quoted under False positives and tuning), and asks countries to keep reliable sources of information such as “a regulated institutions list”, preferably machine-readable, to help VASPs identify their counterparties (para 198). The FATF’s 2020 red flags for virtual assets name transfers with exchanges not registered where the customer or the exchange is located, with VASPs in jurisdictions without VA regulation or AML/CFT controls, and with VASPs whose CDD or KYC is “demonstrably weak or non-existent” (pp. 10, 15 and 17).
Ghana. As the Bank of Ghana and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) describe the Virtual Asset Service Providers Act, 2025 (Act 1154), providers of virtual asset services will need a licence or a registration from one of the two, depending on the activity, and the SEC is to license exchanges, trading platforms and brokers among others (Bank of Ghana press release, 22 December 2025; SEC press release SEC/PR/001/12/2025, 29 December 2025). Existing operators get time to comply once the law takes effect (Bank of Ghana, FAQ on the Act, February 2026, Q12). In August 2026 the SEC published the list of providers admitted to its virtual asset sandbox, which began in March 2026, with each one’s pilot activity, and said the sandbox would support the finalisation of its rules on licensing and registration by activity (SEC Public Notice SEC/PN/001/08/2026, 19 August 2026). On 13 November 2026 the Bank of Ghana’s virtual assets page still announced its application process for the end of the third quarter of 2026. Before the Act, in July 2025, the Bank of Ghana asked every VASP serving residents of Ghana, online platforms included, to register with it by 15 August 2025, as a preliminary step to identify and assess them, and warned that “Registration does not constitute a licence to operate, nor does it imply legal recognition or approval” (Notice BG/GOV/SEC/2025/18, 10 July 2025). Record what a Ghana counterparty holds (a 2025 registration, admission to the SEC’s sandbox, a licence) as exactly that, and check it with the regulator for its activity. In June 2026 the Bank of Ghana said that certain crypto platforms run wallets in foreign currencies, mainly US dollars, for users in Ghana without the authorisation the payments and foreign exchange laws require, and directed banks, payment service providers and other regulated institutions to stop supporting them (Notice BG/GOV/SEC/2026/14, 12 June 2026). It names no platform.
Reporting deadline
Within 24 hours of the suspicion, attempted transactions included, whatever the amount (BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.8.1(6) and 2.8.3(2)).
Nigeria. Under the CBN’s Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria (in force 5 November 2026), the counterparty due diligence clauses (26.16.1 to 26.16.6) bind VASPs licensed or authorised by the CBN, among them banks and other financial institutions offering virtual asset services under an Approval to Extend Permitted Activities, which “shall, in addition, comply with Sections 26.14 to 26.16” (26.1). Stablecoin issuers licensed by the CBN are bound by the enhanced due diligence clause (26.3.11(f)), the list of unauthorised persons (26.16.8) and, as Licensees, the cross-border clause (11.10.9(b)). “Before establishing a relationship with, or transferring virtual assets to or from, another VASP, and on an ongoing basis”, the provider conducts counterparty due diligence, including to “confirm that the counterparty is licensed or registered and supervised for AML/CFT/CPF purposes in the jurisdiction(s) where it operates” (26.16.1(b)). It “shall not enter into or continue a relationship with a shell bank, a shell VASP, or an unlicensed or unregistered VASP, and shall satisfy itself that its counterparties do not permit their services to be used by such entities” (26.16.5). It “shall treat as higher-risk, and apply enhanced counterparty due diligence to, a VASP incorporated or operating in a jurisdiction that does not effectively license or register VASPs, or whose licensing or supervisory status cannot be verified” (26.16.6). Enhanced due diligence applies to “transactions involving … high-risk counterparty VASPs” (26.3.11(f)). Where a counterparty serves another VASP or its customers, enhanced counterparty due diligence includes “monitoring indirect and third-party exposures arising through the relationship” (26.16.4). Cross-border virtual asset transactions are carried out only “with counterparties that are licensed or registered, and supervised for AML/CFT/CPF purposes, in their jurisdiction under Section 26.16” (11.10.9(b)); a transfer between a licensee and a VASP outside Nigeria is cross-border (11.10.1(b)). The CBN publishes “a list of unauthorised persons” (52.7, under 52.6); a provider “shall not provide services, including Naira on-ramp or off-ramp, settlement, liquidity or account services, to or for the benefit of a person named on the list”, and reports to the CBN, and where appropriate the NFIU, any attempt by that person, or by one it reasonably suspects of carrying on a regulated activity without authorisation, to obtain such services (26.16.8). Where the rule runs in the automated monitoring system the Regulations require (26.7.1), each alert is reviewed and its disposition documented within five business days, or 24 hours where it indicates a possible sanctions match or terrorist financing (26.7.2). A suspicious transaction report includes “counterparty VASP details” (26.9.3).
Reporting deadline
Report to the NFIU “promptly, and in any case within twenty-four (24) hours of forming the suspicion”, whether the transaction was “completed, attempted, rejected, suspended or abandoned” (CBN VA Regulations, 26.9.1–26.9.2). The Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 requires a report to the NFIU immediately and a written report within 24 hours (s.7(1)–(2)); the NFIU’s December 2024 STR guidelines start the 24 hours once the transaction is found suspicious, after an examination of no more than 72 hours, and require written reasons for every alert closed as not suspicious (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, Part Six, para 2).
South Africa. FIC Directive 9 of 2024, in force since 30 April 2025, binds accountable institutions that are crypto asset service providers (para 3). Before it transmits the Travel Rule information to another crypto asset service provider, the ordering provider must “identify the counterpart crypto asset service provider to which it will transmit the information” and conduct due diligence on it “to determine whether the counterpart can reasonably be expected to protect the confidentiality of information transmitted to it” and “to avoid dealing with an illicit actor or an entity that is identified pursuant to a Resolution of the United Nations Security Council” (para 4.7.1–4.7.2). The due diligence need not be repeated for each transfer with a counterparty already checked, but must be done again “whenever there is a suspicion of money laundering, terrorist financing or proliferation financing against the counterpart”, and updated “periodically or when it identifies that money laundering, terrorist financing or proliferation financing risk emerges from the relationship” (para 4.7.2–4.7.3). The ordering provider “may not execute a crypto asset transfer if it cannot comply” with these requirements (para 4.8). These duties bind the sending provider only: the Directive’s sections on intermediary and recipient providers hold no counterparty due diligence (sections 5 and 6). And the due diligence it asks for is about confidentiality and illicit or designated actors; it does not ask whether the counterpart is licensed.
Reporting deadline
Suspicious transaction report: as soon as possible, and no later than 15 days excluding weekends and public holidays (FIC Act s.29; MLTF Control Regulations, reg. 24(3), via FIC Guidance Note 4B para 71). The 15 days run from when you became aware of the facts, which “may be, and in the majority of cases will be, before a suspicion is formed” (GN4B para 80), and an institution “may not add additional timeframes for its internal transactional monitoring alert system processes, and / or internal investigation and review processes to the prescribed reporting period” (GN4B para 81). Where the alert comes from an automated transaction monitoring system, the reporter “is deemed to have knowledge” of the possible suspicious activity when the alert is generated: the report is due “no later than 15 days after the alert has been generated”, and work on the alert must start within 48 hours, which the FIC counts as two days without weekends and public holidays, inside the 15 (FIC Directive 5 of 2019, paras 2.1–2.3; FIC PCC 45, paras 5–8).
EU. Since 30 December 2024, through each member state’s law, crypto-asset service providers in a cross-border correspondent relationship with a respondent not established in the Union that provides similar services, “including transfers of crypto-assets”, must, among other measures, “determine if the respondent entity is licensed or registered”, assess its AML/CFT controls and obtain senior management approval, and update the due diligence “on a regular basis or when new risks emerge” (Directive (EU) 2015/849, art. 19b(1), inserted by Regulation (EU) 2023/1113, art. 38). The EBA’s risk factor guidelines list among the factors that “may contribute to increasing risk” a product that allows transactions with crypto-asset accounts or addresses managed by a provider not authorised under the MiCA Regulation, or by one subject to an AML/CFT regime “less robust than the regime envisaged in Directive (EU) 2015/849” (EBA/GL/2024/01, Guideline 21.3(d)(ii) with 9.20), and count it as lower risk when the account or address is hosted by a provider regulated under MiCA in a low-risk jurisdiction (21.8(a)); they ask crypto-asset service providers to apply advanced analytics tools to transactions on a risk-sensitive basis (21.13). For correspondent relationships, the same guidelines name as a higher-risk sign a respondent doing business on behalf of or with crypto-asset providers that are not regulated under MiCA and are bound by a less robust AML/CFT regime, or by none (Guideline 8.6(d)(iii)), and ask the correspondent to assess the respondent’s AML/CFT controls on their substance, its transaction monitoring tools included, rather than only obtain a copy of its policies (8.17(c)). Banks with a crypto-asset provider as a customer determine whether it is “registered or licensed in an EU/EEA Member State or a non-EU country” (9.21(d)). The AMLR asks the AMLA for guidelines, by 10 July 2027, that include the minimum action a crypto-asset service provider takes once it finds that a respondent is not registered or licensed (Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, art. 37(3)). Within the EU, crypto-asset services may be provided only by authorised providers (Regulation (EU) 2023/1114, art. 59(1)). ESMA publishes a register of authorised crypto-asset service providers (art. 109(1)(d)) and a non-exhaustive, machine-readable register of entities providing crypto-asset services without authorisation (art. 110(1) and (3)): a provider missing from the second is not thereby authorised, so check authorisation against the first or the national competent authority’s register. From 10 July 2027 the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation replaces the directive’s rule (Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, arts. 37 and 90) and forbids correspondent relationships with a “shell institution” (art. 39(1)), which for crypto-asset service providers means an entity on that ESMA register or a “third country entity providing crypto-asset services without being licensed or registered nor subject to AML/CFT supervision there” (art. 2(1), point 23(b)).
Reporting deadline
Inform the FIU “promptly”, on your own initiative; “All suspicious transactions, including attempted transactions, shall be reported” (Directive (EU) 2015/849, art. 33(1), through each member state’s law).
False positives and tuning
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Common innocent explanations: a large, licensed exchange whose new deposit address the analytics have not yet attributed; a provider licensed where it is based but serving customers in a country where it needs no licence of its own; a provider that has just been licensed, before your register was updated; a customer moving funds to an account in their own name at a reputable platform abroad.
Typical causes of misfires:
- Attribution gaps. Analytics attribute an address to a service only once they have seen it. New deposit addresses of a known exchange come up as unknown. The FATF says it “is not aware of any technically proven means of identifying the VASP that manages the beneficiary wallet exhaustively, precisely, and accurately in all circumstances and from the VA address alone” (Updated Guidance, 2021, para 197(a)). Check the analytics’ answer before treating “unknown” as “unlicensed”, and feed resolved cases back as attributions.
- Brand versus legal entity. One exchange brand often runs several companies, licensed in different countries. A licence check on the brand passes or fails all of them at once. Record and check the legal entity that actually receives the transfer.
- Stale registers. Licences are granted, suspended and withdrawn. A register checked at onboarding and never again either blocks providers that have since been licensed or lets through ones that have lost their licence. Refresh against the regulators’ public registers on a schedule, and when the regulator publishes changes.
- Hot wallets that look like hubs. An exchange’s withdrawal wallet pays many unrelated customers. Until it is attributed to the exchange, rules that look for one sender funding many customers fire on it, and this rule sees it as an unknown counterparty. Attribute such wallets first.
- Analytics labels are not licences. A label such as “exchange” or “high-risk exchange” says what a service does or how it behaves, not whether it is licensed where it operates. Use the labels to find the counterparty and to rate it; take the licence status from the regulator’s register.
- Countries without a licensing regime. Where the counterparty’s country does not license VASPs, the law treats it as higher risk; it does not forbid the transfer. Route these to enhanced due diligence rather than refusing them by default, unless your own policy or law says otherwise.
- Your own wallets and liquidity providers. Transfers between your hot and cold wallets, or to the providers you use for liquidity and settlement, are counterparty transfers too: keep those providers in the register with current due diligence, and exclude only your own wallets.
How to tune: start from a register that holds every counterparty you already transfer with; resolve unknowns before going live; check licences against regulators’ registers, not against labels; give “unlicensed” and “on a regulator’s list” a hold or refusal, and “high risk” or “status cannot be verified” a review; group repeated alerts per customer and counterparty.
When it fires
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Analyst checklist:
- Confirm who the counterparty is: the legal entity, not the brand, from the Travel Rule message, the analytics and the customer’s answer.
- Check its status on the regulator’s register in each country where it operates, and on any list of unauthorised operators.
- Before refusing or returning anything, screen the counterparty, its owners and the wallet addresses against sanctions lists (see Sanctions screening), and decide whether the transfer is suspicious. Assets of a designated person may have to be frozen rather than sent back (for virtual asset transfers the FATF applies the duties of “taking freezing action and prohibiting transactions with designated persons and entities”, Interpretive Note to Recommendation 15, para 7(b)), and a refused or returned transfer may still have to be reported (under By country).
- If it is unlicensed where it must be licensed, or on a list of unauthorised operators: refuse or return the transfer as your policy and the law require, and record it. In Nigeria, report attempts by listed or suspected unauthorised operators to the CBN, and where appropriate the NFIU (26.16.8).
- If it is not in your register: start the due diligence (ownership, licence and supervision, AML/CFT and sanctions controls, Travel Rule capability) and keep the transfer on hold until it is done.
- If it is rated high risk: apply enhanced due diligence to the transaction and the customer, and ask the customer the purpose of the transfer and their relationship with the platform.
- Look at the customer’s other transfers. Repeated use of unlicensed platforms, or many counterparties, may mean the customer is running a virtual asset business without disclosing it.
- Escalate when the customer cannot explain the use of the platform, the counterparty is linked to illicit activity or sanctions, or the funds trace back to such sources.
An alert is a reason to review, not a suspicion in itself: the NFIU’s 2024 STR guidelines call monitoring alerts “unusual” and say they “should not be automatically regarded as suspicious” (Part Three, paras 1–2). Under the FATF standard, suspicious transactions are reported regardless of amount, attempted transactions included (Interpretive Note to Recommendation 20, para 3). Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.
Related rules
- High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch: the counterparty’s country, rather than its licence.
- Sanctions screening: the counterparty, its owners and its wallet addresses against sanctions lists.
- Internal watchlist match: the same match against your own block lists and a regulator’s list of unauthorised operators, for your own customers and their wallet addresses; this rule applies it to the provider on the other side of a transfer.
- Funnel account: many counterparties into one account, one sign of a customer running an undisclosed virtual asset business.
- Rapid pass-through: crypto deposited and withdrawn at once, often to another provider.
- Missing originator or beneficiary information (Travel Rule): the identified counterparty whose transfers arrive without the originator or beneficiary information, or that repeatedly fails to send it; its results per counterparty feed this rule’s risk rating.
- Unhosted wallet exposure (self-hosted wallets): the transfers this rule leaves out, where no provider is on the other side.
- Mixer, tumbler, and privacy-coin exposure: exposure to anonymity services, which analytics find the same way. A service the analytics classify as a mixer goes to that rule, not this one.
- Unlicensed virtual asset business (crypto trading through an ordinary account): a customer who is itself acting as an unlicensed provider.
- Adverse media screening (negative news): news of the counterparty provider’s reputation, regulatory history or investigations, part of the due diligence on it.
- Chain-hopping and cross-chain bridge use: a hop through another exchange on the way from one network or asset to another.
Sources
24 sourcesHide
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Payments System Policy Department, Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, November 2026, issued by circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004 of 5 November 2026, in force that day (circular, section 4.0); sections 11.10.1(b), 11.10.9(b), 26.1, 26.3.11(f), 26.7.1, 26.7.2, 26.9.1–26.9.3, 26.16.1, 26.16.4, 26.16.5, 26.16.6, 26.16.8, 52.6 and 52.7. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/REGULATIONS%20FOR%20THE%20OPERATIONS%20OF%20NON-SECURITY%20VIRTUAL%20ASSETS%20IN%20NIGERIA.pdf
- Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 (Nigeria), s.7(1)–(2). https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/LawsAndRegulations
- NFIU, “Guidelines for the Identification, Verification and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions Related to ML/FT/PF for Financial Institutions”, STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, 13 December 2024, Part Three paras 1–2 and Part Six para 2. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance
- FIC South Africa, Directive 9 concerning the implementation of the “Travel Rule” relating to crypto asset transfers in accordance with the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations, 15 November 2024 (Government Gazette No. 51556, Notice 5543), paras 2.1.9, 3, 4.7, 4.8 and 9.1, and sections 5 and 6. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Directive-9-Travel-rule-relating-to-crypto-asset-transfers.pdf
- FIC South Africa, Guidance Note 4B on reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions and activities, 26 March 2019, paras 71, 80 and 81. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019.03-Guidance-Guidance-Note-4B-STRs.pdf
- FIC South Africa, Directive 5 of 2019 on the usage of an automated transaction monitoring system for the detection and submission of regulatory reports, 29 March 2019, paras 2.1–2.3. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019-DIR-Directive-5-of-2019-ATMS.pdf
- FIC South Africa, Public Compliance Communication 45 on Directive 5 of 2019 in relation to the use of automated transaction monitoring systems, 20 March 2020, paras 5–8. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2020.03-PCC-PCC-45-On-Directive-5-of-2019-in-relation-to-the-use-of-ATMS.pdf
- Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 on information accompanying transfers of funds and certain crypto-assets, 31 May 2023, art. 38(4) (inserting art. 19b into Directive (EU) 2015/849) and art. 40 (applies from 30 December 2024). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32023R1113
- Directive (EU) 2015/849 (fourth anti-money laundering directive), art. 33(1). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32015L0849
- Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 (Anti-Money Laundering Regulation), 31 May 2024, art. 2(1) point 23(b), art. 37 (including 37(3)), arts. 39 and 90. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32024R1624
- Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 on markets in crypto-assets (MiCA), arts. 59(1), 109(1)(d) and 110(1) and (3). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32023R1114
- EBA, Guidelines amending Guidelines EBA/2021/02 on customer due diligence and the factors credit and financial institutions should consider when assessing the money laundering and terrorist financing risk (EBA/GL/2024/01), 16 January 2024, applicable from 30 December 2024: Guidelines 8.6(d)(iii), 8.17(c), 9.20, 9.21(d), 21.3(d)(ii), 21.3(f), 21.8(a) and 21.13. https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2024-01/a3e89f4f-fbf3-4bd6-9e07-35f3243555b3/Final%20Amending%20%20Guidelines%20on%20MLTF%20Risk%20Factors.pdf
- EBA, Guidelines on information requirements in relation to transfers of funds and certain crypto-assets transfers under Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 (“Travel Rule Guidelines”, EBA/GL/2024/11), 4 July 2024, paras 72 and 77–79. https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2024-07/6de6e9b9-0ed9-49cd-985d-c0834b5b4356/Travel%20Rule%20Guidelines.pdf
- FATF, The FATF Recommendations, October 2025 edition (the June 2026 update changed R.6 only): Recommendation 13; Interpretive Note to Recommendation 15, paras 3, 7 and 7(b) (pp. 78–79); Interpretive Note to Recommendation 20, para 3. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Fatf-recommendations.html
- FATF, “Virtual Assets: Red Flag Indicators of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing”, September 2020: red flags related to anonymity (p. 10), the source of funds or wealth (p. 15) and geographical risks (para 16, p. 17). https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Virtual-Assets-Red-Flag-Indicators.pdf
- FATF, Updated Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers, October 2021, paras 165–169 (pp. 53–54) and 196–198 (pp. 62–63). https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/guidance/Updated-Guidance-VA-VASP.pdf
- Bank of Ghana, Notice No. BG/GOV/SEC/2026/14, “Supervisory directive regarding support for fiat USD wallet services in Ghana”, 12 June 2026. https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/SUPERVISORY-DIRECTIVE-REGARDING-SUPPORT-FOR-FIAT-USD-WALLET-SERVICES-IN-GHANA-BG-GOV-SEC-2026-14.pdf
- Bank of Ghana, Notice No. BG/GOV/SEC/2025/18, “Mandatory registration of virtual asset service providers operating in Ghana”, 10 July 2025. https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/NOTICE-NO.-BG-GOV-SEC-2025-18-NOTICE-ON-MANDATORY-REGISTRATION-OF-VIRTUAL-ASSET-SERVICE-PROVIDERS-OPERATING-IN-GHANA.pdf
- Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism / Combating Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Accountable Institutions, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 12 December 2025, 2.8.1(6) and 2.8.3(2). https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/BOG-FIC-AML-GUIDELINE-2025-FINAL-5-TO-BE-PUBLISHED.pdf
- Bank of Ghana, “Press release: Passage of the Virtual Asset Service Providers Bill”, 22 December 2025. https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/PRESS-RELEASE-PASSAGE-OF-THE-VIRTUAL-ASSET-SERVICE-PROVIDERS-BILL221225-1.pdf
- Securities and Exchange Commission, Ghana, “Press release: Passage of the Virtual Asset Service Providers Bill” (Notice No. SEC/PR/001/12/2025), 29 December 2025. https://sec.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/Press-Release/PRESS%20RELEASE-VASP%20BILL%20PASSAGE%20NOTICE%20NO.SECPR001122025.pdf
- Bank of Ghana, Frequently Asked Questions: The Virtual Asset Service Providers Act, February 2026, Q12. https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/VASP-Act-FAQs.pdf
- Securities and Exchange Commission, Ghana, Public Notice SEC/PN/001/08/2026, “Full list of virtual asset sandbox participants”, 19 August 2026, published on the SEC’s website.
- Bank of Ghana, “Virtual Assets” page, “Application Process” (read 13 November 2026). https://www.bog.gov.gh/virtual-assets/
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