Screening
Blacklist / internal watchlist match
A customer, beneficiary, sender, account number, wallet, phone, device, email, or card that is already on your own list of confirmed bad actors, or on a list shared by peers, the FIU, or law enforcement.
What it catches
Someone you already know to be a problem coming back. The identifier can belong to your own customer or to the other party to a payment: a former customer you exited for fraud or money laundering, a confirmed fraudster, a mule account that received victims’ money, a beneficiary account or wallet that scam victims paid, a device, phone number, email address or card used in a confirmed case. The rule checks each new sign-up, beneficiary and payment against those lists and stops or reviews a match.
The lists come from your own investigations and from outside: requests from the FIU or law enforcement, industry schemes, and peers. Nigeria runs an industry watch-list keyed on the Bank Verification Number, which banks and other financial institutions must check “as transactions occur” (CBN BVN and Watch-list Framework 2021, §1.5.3(xiii)). France has run a national file of IBANs reported for fraud risk, kept by the Banque de France and fed by payment service providers, since 7 May 2026. For virtual assets, the FATF lists as a red flag “depositing funds from VA addresses that have been identified as holding stolen funds, or VA addresses linked to the holders of stolen funds” (FATF VA red flags, 2020, p.6).
This page covers exact matching, after cleaning up the format, on lists you hold or receive. Official sanctions lists, and the fuzzy name matching they need, are on the sanctions screening page. Where a sanctions designation itself gives an account number or wallet address, you can match it exactly with the mechanics on this page, but a hit is a sanctions hit: freeze and report as the sanctions screening page describes, not the review steps below. Finding new links between customers that nobody has listed yet is the shared identifiers rule.
What it does not catch: a bad actor who has not been listed yet, one who comes back with new identifiers, or a value that was listed in a different format and never cleaned up. A list keyed on one identifier only reaches the accounts that carry it: Nigeria’s industry watch-list works by BVN, and Tier 1 accounts and wallets are outside the framework’s BVN linkage and watch-list penalties (CBN 2021, §§1.5.3(i)–(iv), 3.1.1).
How the rule works
Keep one list per identifier type, each value stored in a single normal form. On each event, put the identifiers in that form and look them up. A hit means “this exact value is on the list”. It is not a judgement on the person, so it goes to an analyst, or stops the payment while an analyst decides.
When to check:
- Sign-up and changes to identity data: the customer’s ID number, phone, email, device and bank account against the lists. This catches exited customers who come back.
- Beneficiary added: the account, wallet or phone against the lists, before the first payment.
- Outgoing payment initiated: the beneficiary’s identifier, before the funds leave. A check after completion can only report.
- Incoming payment: the sender’s identifier, where the rail supplies it.
- Login or session: the device against device lists, where you hold them.
Two uses of a list:
- Block list: stop the payment or onboarding and review. Use it for entries with established evidence.
- Watchlist: let the activity through but raise the customer’s risk, send alerts to review, or apply enhanced monitoring. Use it for suspicion that is not yet established, or for a short listing while you contact the owner (Nigeria’s temporary watch-list, below).
Looks at
- A customer is onboarded, or changes their identity details.
- A beneficiary is added.
- A payment is started.
- A payment is received.
- A customer logs in.
Compares
Every identifier on the event, whether it belongs to the customer, the beneficiary or the sender, with your list for that type of identifier: account number or IBAN, wallet, phone, email, device, card, national ID number, and any other type you keep.
The identifier is first put in the same standard form as the list. Each type has its own clean-up rules, never one for all. Then only an exact match counts.
Alerts when
The identifier matches an entry that is still active on the list. There is no minimum amount, except that an incoming payment below a small amount you set from a listed sender can be recorded instead of alerted.
If the entry is past the review date you set for it, the alert still opens and the entry goes to the list’s owner for review. An overdue review does not switch the entry off.
Holds
If the entry is on a block list and the event is an onboarding, a new beneficiary or a payment being started, it is held until an analyst decides.
If the entry is on a watchlist, nothing is held: the alert goes to review and the customer’s risk is raised.
A payment received has already arrived: the match is recorded (see “When it fires”).
The alert shows
The customer, whose identifier matched (the customer’s, the beneficiary’s or the sender’s), the type of identifier, and the reason and source recorded on the list entry.
Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.
Review date When each list entry must be looked at again. Put a review date on every entry, set by why it was added, and remove entries that are no longer needed.
Small amount for incoming matches None for onboarding, beneficiaries and outgoing payments. For incoming transfers, a small amount in your currency, so that the tiny or zero-value transfers anyone can send to any wallet are recorded rather than alerted (see “False positives”).
The list itself. The rule is only as good as the list behind it. For every entry, record:
- Who added it and on what evidence: an investigation, a confirmed fraud report, an FIU or law-enforcement request, a peer or industry alert. One named owner for each list. Nigeria’s framework requires a breach to be investigated before watch-listing, the customer to be notified and heard, and the request to be signed by the Chief Audit Executive (CBN 2021, §§1.5.3(ix), 2.1, 2.2).
- A reason and a date. Entries with no recorded reason cannot be reviewed, defended or removed.
- A review date and a way out. Entries whose basis has gone (an error, a resolved dispute, the end of a set term) must come off. The CBN watch-list has fixed terms and both automatic and manual delisting (§§2.5–2.7). Under Nigeria’s Data Protection Act 2023, personal data must be “retained for not longer than is necessary” and kept “accurate, complete, not misleading” (s.24(1)(d)–(e)), and data subjects may ask for correction or deletion of data that is “inaccurate, out of date, incomplete, or misleading” (s.34(1)(c)).
- An audit trail of every change, for supervisors and for disputes. NIBSS must “keep audit trail of activities on the Watch-list” (CBN 2021, §1.5.2(xi)).
- A legal basis for keeping and sharing it. A list of suspected fraudsters is personal data, often about offences. The FATF’s 2022 report on private-sector information sharing summarises the data protection principles that commonly apply, with differences between jurisdictions: a lawful basis, use limited to the stated purpose, accuracy, limited retention, and no decision with a significant adverse effect “made solely on the basis of the automated processing of the personal data” unless the law allows it with safeguards. Nigeria’s Act gives the same right not to be subject to a decision “based solely on automated processing” (s.37).
Data it needs
ShowHide
| Field | Usually comes from | If it’s missing |
|---|---|---|
| Customer identifiers (national ID, phone, email, device, bank account) | KYC, onboarding, login events | Returning customers who were exited cannot be recognised. |
| Beneficiary identifier (IBAN, or bank code with account number; wallet address; phone) | Saved beneficiary, payment instruction | Outgoing payments to listed accounts are missed. Without the bank code, a domestic account number can match another person’s account at another bank. |
| Sender identifier on incoming payments (account, IBAN, wallet, phone) | Payment rail data, wallet provider | The inbound rule cannot match, and it goes quiet without an error. |
| Direction and event type | Ledger, payment events | The rule cannot tell your customer from the other party, so it may check the wrong one. |
| Event at initiation, and the status of failed or blocked attempts | Payment processor | Without an initiation event the rule can only report after the money has gone. Without failed attempts, a stopped payment to a listed account leaves no trace. |
| Identifier type | Your data model | Normalisation depends on the type (see “False positives”). |
| Per entry: reason, source, added by, date added, review date, status | The list itself | Entries can’t be reviewed or removed, and a hit can’t be explained to the analyst. |
Thresholds
Each row is a setting the rule needs. Set by law values come from the source named under “Where it comes from”. Suggested values are starting points: test them on your own history, then adjust.
| Parameter | Value | Type | Where it comes from |
|---|---|---|---|
| Match tolerance | Exact, after putting both sides in one normal form per identifier type | Suggested | Exact matching is the point of the rule: a hit on a full account identifier (an IBAN, or a bank code with the account number) or a wallet address means the same instrument. Fuzzy matching belongs on names (sanctions and PEP screening), not on identifiers. Moves with: the formats your data arrives in. |
| Amount floor | None: any amount, failed attempts included | Suggested | The list entry is the risk, not the amount. The FATF standard covers attempted transactions in suspicious transaction reporting (Interpretive Note to R.20, para 3). Moves with: tiny or zero-value incoming transfers from a listed wallet (see “False positives”). |
| Nigeria: time on the institution’s temporary watch-list for a BVN implicated in suspected fraudulent transactions reported by a financial institution | At most 24 hours, during which the owner is contacted | Set by law | CBN circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/002, 12 March 2026, para (a), in force from 1 May 2026. |
| Nigeria: confirmed breach to the industry watch-list | Investigate within 1 month; notify the customer within 5 business days of establishing a breach, with 3 business days to present evidence; report the BVN to NIBSS within 1 business day of the breach (our reading: once the breach is established after the investigation and the customer’s hearing); for another bank’s customer, that bank’s Chief Audit Executive investigates within 1 month and asks for the listing within 2 business days of confirming the breach | Set by law | CBN 2021, §§1.5.3(vi), (x)–(xi), 2.1, 2.2. |
| Nigeria: time on the industry watch-list | 5 years (breach without monetary value); 10 years (with monetary value, or a repeat listing) | Set by law | CBN 2021, §3.1.1, Table 2. |
| Review of your own entries | A review date on every entry, set by why it was added; remove entries no longer needed | Suggested | NDPA 2023 s.24(1)(d) (no longer than necessary). As an example of a set term, an industry incident register described by the FATF deletes entries when they are no longer needed, and after 8 years at most (FATF 2022, Box 4.4). |
| Keeping the records behind a list entry and an exit | Nigeria: at least 5 years after the relationship ends; UEMOA: 10 years after it ends | Set by law | MLPPA 2022 s.8(1)(b); Loi uniforme UMOA 2023, art. 23. The FATF standard behind both is at least 5 years (R.11). |
By country
Nigeria. The CBN’s Regulatory Framework for BVN Operations and Watch-list (October 2021) runs an industry watch-list of BVNs of “individuals that have been confirmed to be involved in breaches”, including receipt of fraudulent proceeds, misuse of identity and “any other fraudulent infraction” (§2.0, Appendix I). Participants report breaches to NIBSS “within 1 business day of breach”, integrate their systems “for online identification/verification of watch-listed individuals as transactions occur”, and apply the sanctions grid (§1.5.3(vi), (xiii), (xiv)). The framework does not say how the one business day fits with the one-month investigation and the customer’s hearing that come before a listing (§§2.1–2.2); our reading is that it runs once the breach is established after them. To list another bank’s customer, a participant notifies that bank’s Chief Audit Executive, who investigates within one month and, once the breach is confirmed, asks for the listing within two business days (§1.5.3(x)–(xi)). Not every listed breach is fraud: the list of breaches includes duplicate enrolment and refusing to cooperate in reversing a wrong or duplicated credit (Appendix I), and an “individual at large”, after 72 hours without contact, has a category of its own with Post-No-Debit on all linked accounts (Tables 1–2, category 99). A watch-listed customer “shall not be allowed to enter new relationship with any participant”, “shall not reference accounts, access or guarantee credit facilities”, and if an existing relationship continues, is barred from electronic channels, though legitimate inflows may be allowed (§3.1.1). A March 2026 addendum, addressed to all banks, other financial institutions and payment service providers, requires financial institutions to “establish and maintain a temporary watchlist for BVNs implicated in suspected fraudulent transaction(s) reported by a financial institution”: a BVN may stay on it for at most 24 hours, during which the owner is contacted for clarification (para (a)). The same addendum grants access to the BVN databases “exclusively” to CBN-licensed financial institutions, unless the CBN approves otherwise (para (d)); both take effect from 1 May 2026. Watch-listed BVNs are validated through the BVN database (2021 framework, §1.5.2(x)), so a business without a CBN licence has no access of its own to that check unless the CBN approves it. The CBN’s Baseline Standards for Automated AML Solutions (10 March 2026) require the solution to “permit inclusion and management of institution-specific internal watch-lists” (section 5.3(a)(v)) and, where it is also used for fraud monitoring, to “interface with relevant fraud registries, internal blacklists and external databases for cross-verification and screening” (section 5.6(a)(iv)); they define real-time screening as evaluating a customer or transaction against watchlists “before the transaction is authorised or onboarding process is considered completed” (Glossary). Full compliance is due 18 months after issue for deposit money banks and 24 months for other financial institutions. A domestic account number is unique only within its institution (“10 digits which is unique within each deposit taking institution”, NUBAN standards, §4), so list it with the bank code. The 2021 framework requires all participants to comply with data protection law (§1.11(vi)), and the Data Protection Act 2023 limits retention and requires accuracy (s.24) and gives the right to correction (s.34) and against solely automated decisions (s.37). For staff, the CBN keeps a separate “Black Book”: individuals blacklisted for fraud and similar offences are barred from employment in any financial institution (Revised Guidelines for Blacklisting, March 2024, §3). For stablecoin issuers and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) licensed by the CBN, its Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria (in force 5 November 2026) require the automated monitoring system to alert on “transactions involving wallet addresses on its deny-list” (section 26.7.1(b)). A stablecoin issuer keeps a deny-list of wallets linked to designated persons, sanctions evasion, fraud or other unlawful activity and freezes or blocks them where required (sections 26.19.1 and 26.19.2). No licensee may serve a person on the CBN’s list of unauthorised operators (section 52.6), and an attempt by such a person to obtain services is reported to the CBN and, where appropriate, the NFIU (section 26.16.8).
Reporting deadline
Report to the NFIU immediately, with a written report within 24 hours (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.7(1)–(2)). The NFIU’s December 2024 STR guidelines start the 24 hours once the transaction is found suspicious, after an examination of no more than 72 hours, and require written reasons for every alert closed as not suspicious (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, Part Six, para 2).
WAEMU (UEMOA). The Uniform Law requires documents on customers’ identity and on the analyses made during due diligence to be kept for ten years after the relationship ends (art. 23). Disclosing the existence or content of a suspicious transaction report to the owner of the funds or to third parties is prohibited (art. 63). The CENTIF can oppose the execution of an operation covered by a suspicious transaction report for up to four days; a court can extend this by no more than 24 hours or order the funds provisionally sequestered (art. 65). An FIU stop is therefore time-limited: record its end date on the list entry. WAEMU (UEMOA in French) is the West African Economic and Monetary Union: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, the same eight states that form the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). The BCEAO’s instructions and the Council of Ministers’ decisions cited here apply in all eight. The uniform law applies in each state through that state’s own act, which may number its articles differently. The law of a single state is covered only where that state is named.
Reporting deadline
Report to the CENTIF “immédiatement” (Loi uniforme 2023, art. 60). The law defines “sans délai” as at most 24 hours (art. 2, point 58); “immédiatement” is not defined, and our reading is to treat 24 hours as the outer limit. Do not carry out an operation you suspect until the report is made; if it has already gone through, inform the CENTIF “sans délai” (art. 61).
South Africa. The FIC can issue an intervention order under s.34 of the FIC Act, in writing, not to proceed with a transaction or any other transaction involving the affected funds, for the period stated in the order (FIC Guidance Note 4B, paras 48–49). “A person involved in the making of a report may not inform anyone, including the customer or any other person associated with a reported transaction, of the contents of a suspicious transaction or activity report or even the fact that such a report has been made” (GN4B paras 56–57).
Reporting deadline
As soon as possible, and no later than 15 days excluding weekends and public holidays (FIC Act s.29; MLTF Control Regulations, reg. 24(3), via FIC Guidance Note 4B para 71). The 15 days run from when you became aware of the facts, which “may be, and in the majority of cases will be, before a suspicion is formed” (GN4B para 80).
Ghana. Customers are screened at onboarding “against all domestic, international sanctions lists and internal list developed by the AI” (set by law, BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.4.2(8)), so an institution licensed by the Bank of Ghana screens new customers against its own internal list as well as the official ones.
Reporting deadline
Within 24 hours of the suspicion, attempted transactions included, whatever the amount (BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.8.1(6) and 2.8.3(2)).
Kenya. A list of bad actors is personal data under the Data Protection Act 2019. Data must be “collected for explicit, specified and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner incompatible with those purposes”, kept “accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date”, with inaccurate data “erased or rectified without delay”, and held “for no longer than is necessary” (s.25(c), (f), (g)). A data subject has “a right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing” that produces legal effects or significantly affects them, unless the decision is needed for a contract, authorised by a law with safeguards, or based on consent (s.35(1)–(2)).
Reporting deadline
Within two days after the suspicion arose (POCAMLA s.44(2), as replaced by the AML/CFT Laws (Amendment) Act 2023, Act No. 10 of 2023).
France. Since 7 May 2026 the national file of accounts reported for fraud risk (fichier national des comptes signalés pour risque de fraude, FNC-RF), created under the law of 6 November 2025 to strengthen the fight against bank fraud, lets payment service providers share their reports of IBANs that may be used by fraudsters. The Banque de France keeps it; no names are recorded, only IBANs, and data are held for a limited time (Banque de France, 7 May 2026). Once an IBAN is reported, the whole banking community can be informed and “adapter en conséquence ses procédures de contrôle préalables à l’exécution d’un virement” (DG Trésor, 12 May 2026), that is, check the beneficiary before the transfer is executed. An IBAN-level list held by your institution is the same idea at a smaller scale. Where a list records offences, suspected or established, the GDPR allows the processing only under the control of official authority or where Union or Member State law authorises it with appropriate safeguards (art. 10); in France the Loi Informatique et Libertés names who may process such data, among them a person preparing or pursuing legal action as a victim, “pour une durée strictement proportionnée à ces finalités” (art. 46, 3°). A decision with legal or similarly significant effects may not rest solely on automated processing outside the exceptions of GDPR art. 22(2); the French law allows the contract and explicit-consent cases, with the person able to ask for the rules of the processing (LIL art. 47).
FATF (everywhere). On information sharing, the FATF notes that sharing “alerts or information about customers who are refused or exited due to ML/TF concerns can prevent arbitrage of the financial system by criminals”, and warns of the risks: tipping-off, data protection, de-risking, and “moral hazard where a financial institution would regard a potentially suspicious customer as suspicious before proper due diligence is done” (FATF Guidance on private sector information sharing, 2017, paras 72–74).
Argentina. A circumstance to weigh in alerts: “Toma de conocimiento que indique que un cliente está siendo investigado o procesado por delitos de lavado de activos y financiamiento del terrorismo, u otros relacionados” (information indicating that a customer is being investigated or prosecuted for money laundering, terrorist financing or related offences) (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 34(b), circumstance 10). An internal list is one way to bring that knowledge into monitoring; the resolution does not prescribe one.
Reporting deadline
Money laundering, within 24 hours of concluding that the operation is suspicious, and no later than 90 calendar days from the operation, performed or attempted; terrorist financing and proliferation financing, within 24 hours of the operation (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 36(c)).
False positives and tuning
ShowHide
An exact match on a clean list is right about the identifier; it says nothing yet about the person. Misfires come from two directions: matches that should have happened and didn’t, because of the data or the rule’s design, and hits on values that were never specific to one bad actor.
Typical causes of misfires:
- Format differences hide matches. A list stored in one format and payments arriving in another never match: IBANs with and without spaces, phone numbers with and without the country code or leading zero, email addresses in different case. Normalise both the list and the incoming value per identifier type: IBANs and account numbers in upper case without spaces, a domestic account number always together with its bank code (see Nigeria under By country), phones in one international format, email addresses in lower case. Do not apply one rule to everything. Base58 addresses use both upper and lower case, and the case is part of the address: keep them exactly as given. Bech32 addresses (bc1…) are written in lower case, and a mixed-case one is invalid (BIP-173). Ethereum-style addresses can be lower-cased: their mixed case is an optional checksum (EIP-55).
- Untested directions. An inbound check must read the sender’s identifier, and not every rail or integration supplies it. Test every list rule with a value you know is listed, in each direction, and again after any change to the data feed: a rule that cannot match reports no alerts.
- Identifiers that are shared by design. A payment platform’s collection account, an exchange’s deposit address, an agent’s phone, a family’s shared phone or device: put one on a list and every honest user of it is hit. Keep such values off block lists, or list them only together with a second condition, such as the name on the account.
- Recycled phone numbers. Mobile operators reassign numbers that stay inactive, so an old phone entry can hit the number’s next subscriber. Keep the date each phone entry was listed, check hits on old phone entries against the name and ID number, and give phone entries a shorter review date than account or wallet entries. In Nigeria, the NCC’s Telecoms Identity Risk Management System is meant to let service providers “verify mobile numbers that have been recycled, swapped, barred” before granting access, starting with churned, recycled and swapped numbers (NCC consultation paper, February 2026).
- Unsolicited inbound transfers. Anyone can send a tiny or zero-value transfer to any wallet address, without the owner’s involvement. If the sender is a listed wallet, every recipient matches without having dealt with it. Decide whether inbound matches below a small amount alert or are only recorded.
- Stale or unexplained entries. Entries with no recorded reason, or never reviewed, keep firing after the basis has gone: an error, a dispute settled in the customer’s favour, an FIU stop that has expired. Lists derived from a status, such as unpaid loans, must drop the entry when the status changes.
- Lists fed by rule outcomes. A list that adds every rejected customer automatically grows from the rules’ own decisions rather than from reviewed fraud, and each listing can cause the next. Add entries only after a review, record which rule and what evidence put each one there, and never let a list match or a network rule write to the list it reads.
- Matching contacts as if they were the customer. Match the customer’s own identifiers against the list. Checking the phone of a contact person or reference turns an exact-match rule into a network rule; keep those links in a separate network rule that goes to review, not to a block.
- Lists written into rule logic. A list typed into a rule as text has no owner, reason or review date, and changes only when someone edits the rule. Substring matching (“contains”) also hits unrelated values that happen to contain the listed text. Keep lists as data and match whole values.
- An empty or unmaintained list. A rule over a list that is never filled cannot fire, and its silence looks like good news. Track how many entries each list gains and loses, and who adds them.
- Credit lists are not fraud lists. A list of defaulted borrowers is a credit-risk tool with its own purpose and legal basis. Mixing it into a fraud block list makes every late payer look like a fraudster and widens the purpose for which the data was collected (NDPA 2023 s.24(1)(b)).
- Acting on a hit without review. A wrong entry acted on without review becomes a wrong refusal or exit, and an exit can be reported onward. Review the hit, then decide. Among the data protection principles summarised in the FATF’s 2022 report on information sharing is that decisions with a significant adverse impact should not rest solely on automated processing, and the Dutch industry incident register it describes requires every hit to be reviewed by both the institution that searched and the one that added the entry (FATF 2022, Box 4.4).
How to tune: one list per identifier type in a normal form, with owner, reason, source and review date on every entry; entries added after a review, never automatically by another rule’s decision; checks at sign-up, beneficiary creation and payment initiation, in both directions, on the customer’s own identifiers; a test with a known listed value after every change to the data feed; shared-by-design identifiers kept off block lists; and periodic review that removes what is no longer justified.
When it fires
ShowHide
Analyst checklist:
- Open the list entry: why it was added, by whom, from which source, when, and whether it is still within its review date. An entry with no reason or an expired basis is a reason to fix the list, not to act on the customer. On an industry list, read the category and the breach: Nigeria’s watch-list also holds breaches that are not fraud, such as duplicate enrolment (CBN 2021, Appendix I).
- Confirm the match is the same value, not a formatting accident, and that the identifier is not shared by design (a platform, exchange or agent account).
- Work out the customer’s role: is the customer the listed person, paying a listed beneficiary, or receiving money from a listed sender? A customer paying a listed beneficiary may be a victim of a scam rather than part of it: contact them before the payment leaves, unless you suspect the customer, in which case mind step 7.
- Look at the customer’s other activity and connections: other listed identifiers, other customers sharing the same identifiers (see Shared identifiers across customers).
- Decide: release, hold, refuse the relationship or payment, or exit. If you cannot complete due diligence, the FATF standard is not to open the account or carry out the transaction, or to end the relationship, and to consider a suspicious transaction report (Recommendation 10). In Nigeria, follow the watch-list framework’s investigation, notification and fair-hearing steps before an industry watch-listing; once a breach is established, the account is placed on Post-No-Debit while the customer is heard (CBN 2021, §§2.1–2.2).
- Add to your list what the case confirms (new identifiers of the same actor), with reason and evidence. Report to industry schemes where the law requires it (Nigeria: within one business day of the breach, which we read as once the breach is established after the investigation and hearing; see By country).
- Do not tip off. Telling a customer they have been watch-listed, where a framework requires it, is not the same as telling them a suspicious transaction report has been filed, which is prohibited (FATF Recommendation 21; Interpretive Note to R.10, paras 2–3; UEMOA art. 63; FIC GN4B paras 56–57).
A list hit is a reason to review, not a suspicion in itself: the NFIU’s 2024 STR guidelines call monitoring alerts “unusual” and say they “should not be automatically regarded as suspicious” (Part Three, paras 1–2). Under the FATF standard, suspicious transactions are reported regardless of amount, attempted transactions included (Interpretive Note to Recommendation 20, para 3). Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.
Related rules
- Sanctions screening: official sanctions lists and fuzzy name matching; this rule is exact matching on your own and shared lists.
- PEP screening: list screening for a different risk and a different obligation.
- Shared identifiers across customers: finds links nobody has listed yet; a listed identifier that also sits on other customers points to a network.
- Account takeover: a listed device or phone appearing on an existing customer’s account.
- New account activity: a listed identifier at sign-up can be an exited customer coming back.
- Chain-hopping and cross-chain bridge use: crypto moved across networks or assets, where a listed address can sit on the far side of a bridge.
- Mixer, tumbler, and privacy-coin exposure: mixer exposure found with blockchain analytics, including mixers nobody listed and exposure a few hops away.
- Missing originator or beneficiary information (Travel Rule): makes sure a transfer carries the names, accounts and wallet addresses this rule matches.
- Unhosted wallet exposure (self-hosted wallets): transfers with wallets no regulated provider holds, whose addresses can be matched here.
- Transfers with unlicensed or high-risk counterparty VASPs: the same kind of match applied to the crypto provider on the other side of a transfer, including a regulator’s list of unauthorised operators.
Sources
26 sourcesHide
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Revised Regulatory Framework for Bank Verification Number (BVN) Operations and Watch-list for the Nigerian Banking Industry, October 2021 (circular PSM/DIR/CON/INM/013/149): §§1.5.2(x)–(xi), 1.5.3(i)–(iv), (vi), (ix)–(xi), (xiii), (xiv), 1.11(vi), 2.0–2.7, 3.1.1, Tables 1–2, Appendix I. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2021/CCD/REVISED%20REGULATORY%20FRAMEWORK%20FOR%20BANK%20VERIFICATION%20NUMBER%20(BVN)%20OPERATIONS%20AND%20WATCH-LIST%20FOR%20THE%20NIGERIAN%20BANKING%20INDUSTRY%20121021%20FINAL.pdf
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Addendum to the Revised Regulatory Framework for Bank Verification Number Operations and Watch-List for the Nigerian Banking Industry, circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/002, 12 March 2026, para (a) “Temporary Watch-list” and para (d) “Access to BVN Data”, in force from 1 May 2026. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/BVN%20Circular.pdf
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Revised Guidelines for Blacklisting for Banks and Other Financial Institutions in Nigeria, March 2024, §§3–4. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2024/BSD/Revised%20Guidelines%20for%20Blacklisting%20for%20Banks%20and%20Other%20Financial%20Institutions%20in%20Nigeria%20-%20FINAL.pdf
- Nigeria Data Protection Act, 2023, ss.24(1), 34(1)(c), 37. Gazetted text as published by the Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre: https://placng.org/i/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Nigeria-Data-Protection-Act-2023.pdf
- FATF, Guidance on Private Sector Information Sharing, November 2017, paras 72–74. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfgeneral/Guidance-information-sharing.html
- FATF, Partnering in the Fight Against Financial Crime: Data Protection, Technology and Private Sector Information Sharing, July 2022, section on data protection and privacy principles (pp.16–17) and Box 4.4 (pp.30–32). https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Digitaltransformation/Partnering-in-the-fight-against-financial-crime.html
- FATF, Virtual Assets: Red Flag Indicators of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, September 2020, p.6 (“Accepting funds suspected as stolen or fraudulent”) and p.10. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Virtual-Assets-Red-Flag-Indicators.pdf
- FATF, The FATF Recommendations, October 2025 edition (R.10, R.11, R.20 and R.21 were not changed by the June 2026 update): Recommendation 10, Interpretive Note to R.10 paras 2–3, Recommendation 11, Interpretive Note to R.20 para 3, Recommendation 21. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Fatf-recommendations.html
- UEMOA, Loi uniforme relative à la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux, le financement du terrorisme et de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive (March 2023), arts. 2 (point 58), 23, 60, 61, 63 and 65. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Loi-uniforme-LBCFTFP-Mars-2023-vf.pdf
- FIC South Africa, Guidance Note 4B on reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions and activities, 26 March 2019, paras 48–49 (intervention orders, FIC Act s.34), 56–57 (tipping off), 71 (reporting period, MLTF Control Regulations reg. 24(3)) and 80 (when the period starts). https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019.03-Guidance-Guidance-Note-4B-STRs.pdf
- Banque de France, press release “Lancement de la plateforme des IBAN suspects : un nouvel outil-clé de lutte contre la fraude aux paiements”, 7 May 2026. https://www.banque-france.fr/fr/communiques-de-presse/lancement-de-la-plateforme-des-iban-suspects-un-nouvel-outil-cle-de-lutte-contre-la-fraude-aux
- Direction générale du Trésor, “Lancement du fichier national des comptes signalés pour risque de fraude”, 12 May 2026. https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/2026/05/11/lancement-du-fichier-national-des-comptes-signales-pour-risque-de-fraude-un-nouveau-rempart-contre-la-fraude-aux-virements
- Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 (Nigeria), s.7(1)–(2) and s.8(1)(b). https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/LawsAndRegulations
- NFIU, “Guidelines for the Identification, Verification and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions Related to ML/FT/PF for Financial Institutions”, STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, 13 December 2024, Part Three paras 1–2 and Part Six para 2. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance
- Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism Financing Laws (Amendment) Act, 2023 (Kenya, Act No. 10 of 2023), Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 148, 1 September 2023, amending POCAMLA s.44(2). https://brs.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/AntiMoneyLaunderingandCombatingofTerrorismFinancingLawsAmendmentAct2023.pdf
- Ethereum Improvement Proposal 55, “Mixed-case checksum address encoding” (status Final). https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-55
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Revised Standards on Nigeria Uniform Bank Account Number (NUBAN) for Banks and Other Financial Institutions (2019 standards, published 2020), §4 “Uniqueness and usage of NUBAN”. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2020/PSMD/REVISED%20STANDARDS%20ON%20NIGERIA%20UNIFORM%20BANK%20ACCOUNT%20NUMBER%20(NUBAN)%20FOR%20BANKS%20AND%20OTHER%20FINANCIAL%20INSTITUTIONS%20.pdf
- The Data Protection Act, 2019 (Kenya, No. 24 of 2019), Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 181, 11 November 2019, ss.25(c), (f), (g) and 35(1)–(2). https://www.odpc.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/TheDataProtectionAct__No24of2019.pdf
- Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 173, “Base32 address format for native v0-16 witness outputs” (Bech32), section on uppercase and lowercase. https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0173.mediawiki
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Baseline Standards for Automated Anti-Money Laundering, Combating the Financing of Terrorism and Countering Proliferation Financing Solutions, circular BSD/DIR/PUB/LAB/019/002, 10 March 2026, sections 5.3(a)(v) and 5.6(a)(iv), Glossary (“Real-Time (for screening)”), and the covering circular (compliance deadlines). https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/CBN%20issues%20Baseline%20Standards%20for%20Automated%20Anti-Money%20Laundering%20Solution.pdf
- Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation), arts. 10 and 22, French text as published by the CNIL. https://www.cnil.fr/fr/reglement-europeen-protection-donnees/chapitre2 and https://www.cnil.fr/fr/reglement-europeen-protection-donnees/chapitre3
- Loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés, arts. 46 and 47, consolidated text as published by the CNIL. https://www.cnil.fr/fr/la-loi-informatique-et-libertes
- Nigerian Communications Commission, Stakeholders Consultation Process for the Telecoms Identity Risks Management Platform, February 2026, section 1 “Background” (objectives and first phase). https://ncc.gov.ng/sites/default/files/2026-02/Consultation-Paper-on-Telecoms-Identity-Risk-Management-System-%28TIRMS%29.pdf
- Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 200/2024 (RESOL-2024-200-APN-UIF#MJ), 18 December 2024, Boletín Oficial no. 35571, 19 December 2024, art. 34(b), circumstance 10; art. 36(c) (report deadlines). https://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/405000-409999/407429/norma.htm
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Payments System Policy Department, Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, November 2026, issued by circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004 of 5 November 2026, in force that day (circular, section 4.0); sections 26.7.1(b), 26.16.8, 26.19.1, 26.19.2 and 52.6. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/REGULATIONS%20FOR%20THE%20OPERATIONS%20OF%20NON-SECURITY%20VIRTUAL%20ASSETS%20IN%20NIGERIA.pdf
- Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism / Combating Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Accountable Institutions, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 12 December 2025, 2.4.2(8). https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/BOG-FIC-AML-GUIDELINE-2025-FINAL-5-TO-BE-PUBLISHED.pdf
Ask us
A question about this rule?
A person at Archer reads every question and answers by email.
Got it. Where should we send the answer?
We’ll use your email to answer you. Privacy policy
Thanks. We’ve got your question.
The Fraud & AML Library is a practical reference, not legal advice. What binds is the regulator’s own text, which every rule and regulation page links.