Crypto
Chain-hopping and cross-chain bridge use
Virtual assets are moved from one blockchain or asset to another, through a bridge, a swap, or an exchange, in quick succession, in a way that breaks the trail of where the funds came from or where they go.
What it catches
Funds in virtual assets that are moved from one blockchain to another, or swapped from one asset into another, often several times in a row and fast, so that the trail of where they came from or where they go is hard to follow. The moves can go through a cross-chain bridge (a protocol that moves or represents an asset from one blockchain on another), a decentralised exchange or swap service, or a centralised exchange used as a hop: deposit on one network, convert, withdraw on another. Each hop starts a new transaction history on a different ledger, and blockchain analytics can lose the thread at a bridge, so funds tied to a theft, a scam or a sanctioned party can arrive looking clean.
Standard setters describe it in close terms. The FATF defines chain-hopping as “moving from one VA into another, often in rapid succession and with the aim of evading attempts to track these movements” (Targeted Update, June 2022, footnote 55). FinCEN describes it as shifting “the trail of transactions from the blockchain of one virtual currency to the blockchain of another virtual currency, often in rapid succession” (FIN-2021-A004, footnote 8). The US Treasury’s assessment of decentralised finance says illicit actors “can also chain-hop, exchanging virtual assets on one blockchain for virtual assets on another, which could be done through a DEX or aggregator or by interacting directly with a cross-chain bridge”, and that this can make it harder “for service providers to detect if incoming funds are tied to illicit activity” (April 2023, p.17). The FATF’s July 2026 update notes that stolen assets “can be rapidly moved and fragmented through stablecoins, DEXs, bridges and multiple VASPs, making tracing and freezing more difficult” (para 34), and asks VASPs to “detect rapid transfer of VAs using transactions monitoring and blockchain analytics tools” and to assess the risks of DeFi activity, “including exposure to protocols, bridges, mixers, cross-chain tools” (Recommendations for the Private Sector, 6(ii) and (iv)).
The rule finds the movement, not the crime. Most people who move assets between networks do it to save fees, to use an application on another chain, or because the wallet they are paying supports only one network. What makes a hop worth review is what surrounds it: speed with no trading purpose, several hops in a row, a privacy coin along the way, or a source or destination on the far side of the bridge that is tied to illicit activity.
How the rule works
The rule has two forms, which use different data. Run the first on your own ledger; the second needs a blockchain analytics provider that labels bridges and swap services and can trace across them.
Run it on every customer who holds crypto with you, individuals and business clients alike: a business can move funds through a chain of hops as well as a person can, and businesses whose trade is moving value between networks get their own segment (see False positives and tuning). Leave out an intermediary’s or partner’s own settlement and delivery legs, made on behalf of its users: they are how it serves its users, not a customer’s funds hopping. Where those users are your customers too, run the rule on their own legs.
Form A, a hop through your platform. At each crypto withdrawal, look back over a short window. If the customer’s crypto came in on one network or as one asset and is now leaving on another network or as another asset, and what leaves that way is close to what came in (most of it, and not much more), the customer has used you as one hop of a chain. A second trigger counts, over a day, how many networks the customer’s funds crossed, counting only funds that came in on one network and left on another: several networks in a day, with little else happening, is the many-hops shape. FinCEN’s red flag describes the change-of-asset form: a customer “receives CVC from an external wallet, and immediately initiates multiple, rapid trades among multiple CVCs, especially AECs, with no apparent related purpose, followed by a transaction off the platform” (FIN-2021-A004, p.8).
Form B, a bridge on the path. At each crypto deposit and withdrawal, ask the analytics provider for the path on the other side. Alert when the funds crossed a bridge or a swap service within a few hops before arriving, or go to one straight after leaving, and something on the path makes the hop look like an attempt to hide: a source or destination tied to illicit activity, sanctions or a mixer beyond the bridge, a privacy coin, or a trail the provider cannot follow across the bridge.
Looks at
Every crypto withdrawal a customer makes, individual or business (Form A), and every crypto deposit and withdrawal the analytics provider can trace (Form B).
Measures
- Form A, money in: the customer’s completed crypto deposits in the hop-through window, with the network and asset of each.
- Form A, money out: this withdrawal and the customer’s other crypto withdrawals in the window after the first of those deposits, counting only those that leave on another network or as another asset than the deposits came in on.
- Form A, networks crossed: the distinct networks the customer’s deposits and withdrawals used in the network-count window, counted only when at least one withdrawal left on a network that none of the window’s deposits came in on.
- Form B, the path: the bridges and swap services within a few hops of the deposit or withdrawal address, and what the provider says about the addresses beyond them.
Amounts are converted to one currency at a documented rate. Each transaction is placed in a window by the time it happened, not the time it reached the monitoring system.
Leaves out
- Your own movements: hot and cold wallet transfers, rebalancing between your own networks, and network migrations or token swaps that you or the issuer run for every holder.
- Withdrawals on another network made while the network the customer deposited on was suspended or retired on your platform.
- The same asset under two names on one network (a wrapped and a native form counted as two assets).
- Paired legs of one conversion: a purchase and a sale of the same amount booked together, as when a conversion is routed through a second asset. Nothing leaves.
- An intermediary’s or partner’s own settlement and delivery legs, made on behalf of its users.
Alerts when
Any of these is true:
- Form A, hop through: the withdrawal leaves on a different network or as a different asset from the deposits in the window, money in is at least your minimum for the segment, and money out is at least most of money in and no more than a little over money in.
- Form A, many networks: the customer’s funds crossed at least several networks in the network-count window, and money in is at least your minimum.
- Form B, bridge with a reason to look: a bridge or swap service is on the path, and beyond it there is an address tied to illicit activity, sanctions or a mixer, a privacy coin, or a trail the provider cannot follow.
How often
At most one hop-through alert per customer per hop-through window, and one many-networks alert per customer per network-count window; a Form B alert on every deposit or withdrawal that meets it.
Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.
Hop-through window How far back to look for the deposits a withdrawal may be passing on. The regulators’ red flags say “immediately” and give no number. A starting value: 15 minutes to 24 hours. A short window catches the quick hop with fewer coincidences; a longer one catches slower hops and more ordinary activity. Test it on your own data.
Network-count window The period over which networks crossed are counted. A starting value: 24 hours.
Minimum money in Set per customer segment and asset from your own spread of deposit sizes. Without it, the rule fires on small moves between networks to save fees.
Lowest share that leaves How much of what came in has to leave on another network or as another asset. A starting value: 80–95%. Conversion and network fees bring money out below money in, so keep it at 95% or below.
Highest share that leaves The most that money out on another network or asset may be, against money in, and still count as those deposits passing through. A starting value: 100–120%. Without it, a small deposit followed by a much larger, unrelated withdrawal fires. Raise it for assets whose price moves a lot within the window.
Networks crossed How many distinct networks the customer’s funds have to cross in the network-count window. A starting value: 3 or more.
Hops How far from the customer’s address a bridge or swap service can be and still count. Start at 1 to 3 hops: a bridge used straight before a deposit or straight after a withdrawal is the clearest case.
Common variants:
- Swap and leave. Crypto deposited, converted on your platform into one or more other assets, then withdrawn, with no other trading. The FATF lists depositing at an exchange and then often immediately “converting the VAs to multiple types of VAs, again incurring additional transaction fees, but without logical business explanation (e.g. portfolio diversification)” (Red Flag Indicators, September 2020, p.6). The EBA lists, among customers who exchange crypto-assets to or from official currencies, one who “withdraws crypto-assets from a CASP to a self-hosted address immediately after depositing crypto-assets or exchanging for different crypto-assets in a CASP” (EBA/GL/2024/01, Guideline 21.5(b)(xi)(h)).
- Same asset, different network. A stablecoin deposited on one network and withdrawn on another: the exchange is doing the bridge’s work. Common and mostly innocent; give it a higher minimum than a change of asset.
- Privacy coin on the path. A hop into or out of a privacy coin at any step. The FATF lists “Transactions by a customer involving more than one type of VA, despite additional transaction fees, and especially those VAs that provide higher anonymity” (Red Flag Indicators, para 13, p.9). It overlaps with mixer and privacy-coin screening.
- Bridge to another network. A bridge used straight before a deposit or straight after a withdrawal, to move the funds onto another network. Among the customer behaviours that “may contribute to increasing risk”, the EBA lists, under “When exchanging crypto-assets to official currencies and vice versa”, a customer who “uses protocols that connect two blockchains, to exchange crypto-assets to other crypto-assets on a different network” (EBA/GL/2024/01, Guideline 21.5(b)(xi)(f)).
Data it needs
ShowHide
| Field | Usually comes from | If it’s missing |
|---|---|---|
| Customer id | account | Required. Deposits, conversions and withdrawals must sit on the same id. |
| Direction, transaction type | ledger | Required. Conversions must be told apart from deposits and withdrawals, and your own wallet movements from customers’. |
| Asset | ledger | Required for Form A. Normalise names, so a wrapped and a native form of one asset on one network are not read as a change of asset. |
| Network (chain) | ledger or wallet system | Required for Form A, on each of the customer’s own deposits and withdrawals. Without it, a stablecoin moved from one network to another looks like no change at all. A network recorded only on your own settlement or delivery legs, or only inside an asset’s display name, does not show the customer’s hop. |
| Amount and timestamp | ledger | Required. Convert amounts to one currency at a documented rate. Use the time the transaction happened, not the time it reached the monitoring system. |
| Customer’s deposit address and withdrawal address, transaction hash | wallet system | Required for Form B: the analytics provider traces from them. |
| Address attribution (bridge, swap service, mixer, illicit source, sanctions) and cross-chain tracing | blockchain analytics provider | Required for Form B. Without bridge labels the rule sees a bridge as an ordinary wallet; without cross-chain tracing it cannot see the other side. |
| Customer segment, profile and history | onboarding and ledger | Needed to set the minimum and to tell traders, market makers and businesses from retail customers. |
| Proof that a withdrawal address is the customer’s own | wallet ownership checks | Useful when reviewing: a hop to the customer’s own self-hosted wallet reads differently from one to a third party. |
Thresholds
No regulator sets a number for this pattern: the red flags say “immediately”, “rapid succession” or “a very short period of time”. The values below are starting points to test on your own data. Set by law values come from the source named under “Where it comes from”.
| Parameter | Value | Type | Where it comes from |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hop-through window | 15 minutes to 24 hours | Suggested | Starting value. A short window catches the “immediately” of the red flags with fewer coincidences; a longer one catches slower hops and more ordinary activity. |
| Network-count window | 24 hours | Suggested | Starting value. |
| Networks crossed in the network-count window | 3 or more | Suggested | Starting value. Two networks in a day is ordinary for anyone who moves a stablecoin to save fees. |
| Lowest share that leaves on another network or as another asset | 80% to 95% | Suggested | Starting value, as for a pass-through on one asset. Lower catches partial hops but adds ordinary trading. Fees bring money out below money in, so keep it at 95% or below. |
| Highest share that leaves on another network or as another asset | 100% to 120% | Suggested | Starting value. Stops a small deposit followed by a much larger, unrelated withdrawal from firing. Raise it for assets whose price moves a lot within the window. The cost: a hop folded into a larger withdrawal from an existing balance is missed by this trigger; the network count and Form B can still see it. |
| Hops between the customer’s address and a bridge or swap service | 1 to 3 | Suggested | Starting value. More hops add bridges the customer never used. |
| Minimum money in | set per segment and asset from your own distribution of deposit sizes | Suggested | No public source gives a value. Without one, small moves to save fees dominate. |
| Nigeria: alert review | within five business days; 24 hours where the alert indicates a possible sanctions match or terrorist financing | Set by law | CBN Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, section 26.7.2. A time limit to review an alert, not a detection threshold. |
By country
Nigeria. For stablecoin issuers and virtual asset service providers licensed or authorised by the CBN, its Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria (in force 5 November 2026) require “an automated transaction monitoring system, supported by blockchain analytics, configured to detect and generate alerts for” (section 26.7.1), among other patterns, “cross-chain bridging or chain-hopping activity that may obscure the origin or destination of funds” (26.7.1(f)). Each alert is reviewed and its disposition documented within five business days, or within 24 hours where it indicates a possible sanctions match or terrorist financing (26.7.2), and the system is calibrated and tested at least annually and whenever products, customers or risks change materially (26.7.3). Enhanced due diligence measures “shall include, as appropriate”, among others, “analysing the transaction path using blockchain analytics” (26.3.12), and a licensee assesses the risks of any new “blockchain network, bridge, smart-contract function” before using it (26.1.4). A suspicious transaction report includes “wallet addresses, transaction hashes, counterparty VASP details” (26.9.3), and the duty to report applies whatever the amount and whether the transaction was completed, attempted, rejected, suspended or abandoned (26.9.2).
Reporting deadline
Report to the NFIU “promptly, and in any case within twenty-four (24) hours of forming the suspicion” (CBN Virtual Assets Regulations, section 26.9.1). The Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 requires a report immediately, with a written report within 24 hours (s.7(1)–(2)); the NFIU’s December 2024 STR guidelines start the 24 hours once the transaction is found suspicious, after an examination of no more than 72 hours, and require written reasons for every alert closed as not suspicious (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, Part Six, para 2).
United States. FinCEN’s ransomware advisory lists as a red flag: “A customer receives CVC from an external wallet, and immediately initiates multiple, rapid trades among multiple CVCs, especially AECs, with no apparent related purpose, followed by a transaction off the platform. This may be indicative of attempts to break the chain of custody on the respective blockchains or further obfuscate the transaction” (FIN-2021-A004, 8 November 2021, p.8), and names chain hopping among the ways ransomware proceeds are laundered (p.3). Its March 2022 alert on Russian sanctions evasion repeats the red flag, without the reference to AECs (FIN-2022-Alert001, p.5). The Treasury’s 2023 risk assessment of decentralised finance describes chain-hopping through DEXs and cross-chain bridges (pp.16–17) and says users can obscure tracing “through the use of mixers, cross-chain bridges, or anonymity-enhanced cryptocurrencies (AECs)” (p.33); it states that it does not “establish any new supervisory expectations” (p.6).
Reporting deadline
No later than 30 calendar days after initial detection (31 CFR 1020.320(b)(3) for banks, 1022.320(b)(3) for money services businesses). A bank that has identified no suspect may take 30 more days to identify one, never more than 60 days in all (1020.320(b)(3)); the rule for money services businesses has no such extension.
EU. The EBA’s risk factor guidelines for crypto-asset service providers list, among customer factors that “may contribute to increasing risk”, two that apply “When exchanging crypto-assets to official currencies and vice versa”: a customer who “uses protocols that connect two blockchains, to exchange crypto-assets to other crypto-assets on a different network, such as Monero, Zcash or similar” and one who “withdraws crypto-assets from a CASP to a self-hosted address immediately after depositing crypto-assets or exchanging for different crypto-assets in a CASP” (EBA/GL/2024/01, Guideline 21.5(b)(xi)(f) and (h), applicable from 30 December 2024). The same guidelines ask providers to apply “advanced analytics tools” to transactions on a risk-sensitive basis, as a supplement to standard transaction monitoring, to “trace the history of transactions and to identify potential links with criminal activities, persons or entities” (Guideline 21.13).
Reporting deadline
Inform the national FIU “promptly” (Directive (EU) 2015/849, art. 33(1)). The directive sets no number of hours; your member state’s law may.
Canada. FINTRAC’s virtual currency indicators include “High volume and frequency of transfers between different types of VCs” (Money laundering and terrorist financing indicators: Virtual currency transactions).
Reporting deadline
File “as soon as practicable” after the measures that establish reasonable grounds to suspect (FINTRAC STR guidance, section 4).
False positives and tuning
ShowHide
Common innocent explanations: moving a stablecoin to a cheaper or faster network, or to the one network the recipient’s wallet supports; moving funds to another chain to use an application there, and back; traders and market makers rebalancing across chains and exchanges; arbitrage between venues; payment firms, OTC desks and other virtual asset businesses whose job is to move value between networks; a customer consolidating holdings into one asset.
Typical causes of misfires:
- Your own movements. Hot and cold wallet transfers, rebalancing between your own networks, and migrations where an issuer moves an asset to a new chain for every holder look like hops. List them and exclude them.
- One asset under two names. A wrapped and a native form of the same asset, or a bridged stablecoin and its native version, counted as different assets. Normalise asset identifiers per network before comparing.
- Businesses that hop by design. Market makers, payment firms and other virtual asset businesses move between networks all day. Give them their own segment, judged against their declared flows.
- Fee-driven network changes. A stablecoin in on one network and out on another is the commonest hop and mostly innocent. Give a change of network on the same asset a higher minimum than a change of asset.
- Networks you suspended or retired. When deposits or withdrawals on a network are suspended (maintenance, congestion, a network being retired), customers have to withdraw on another one, and the rule fires for everyone affected. Exclude withdrawals on another network made while the customer’s deposit network was unavailable.
- Paired legs of one conversion. A conversion routed through a second asset can be booked as a purchase and a sale of the same amount at the same time. Read one leg at a time, the purchase looks like an asset leaving, though nothing left. Net such pairs before comparing.
- A small deposit, a large withdrawal. “Most of money in” is also met when a much larger, unrelated withdrawal follows a small deposit. Bound the share from above as well as below.
- Many coins, nothing moved. A customer who deposits or buys several coins in a day, each on its own network, or a business delivering coins to its buyers on each coin’s own network, uses several networks with no hop. Count networks only where funds came in on one network and left on another.
- Late records. Transactions that reach the monitoring system late or in batches, days after they happened, pair with the wrong legs in a window measured on arrival. Measure windows on each transaction’s own time, and check a window again when late records arrive.
- Labels that are missing or wrong. An unlabelled bridge looks like an ordinary wallet and is missed; a DEX aggregator labelled as a bridge adds noise. Ask the provider which bridges and networks it covers, and check its coverage of the networks you support.
- A clean result after a bridge. A screening result says less about funds that just crossed a bridge: the provider may not have followed them across. Treat “no exposure found” on such funds as unknown, not clean.
How to tune: exclude your own movements and suspended networks; net paired legs; normalise asset names; segment by customer type; set the minimum per segment and asset; keep the share that leaves within a band; keep the hop-through window short and the network count over a day, both on each transaction’s own time; in Form B, alert on the bridge only when something beyond it gives a reason; and measure on a full window of history before switching it on.
When it fires
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Analyst checklist:
- Rebuild the path on your platform: each deposit, conversion and withdrawal, with its network, asset, address, transaction hash and time.
- Ask the analytics provider to trace beyond the bridge or swap in both directions: what the funds were before they reached you and what they become after they leave. Look for theft, scams, sanctions, mixers and privacy coins.
- Check whether the withdrawal address is the customer’s own (earlier use, proof of ownership) or a third party’s.
- Compare with the customer’s profile and history: trading activity, usual networks and assets, account age, declared purpose. A new account or a first use of these networks is a stronger signal.
- Ask the customer why the funds moved across networks or assets.
- Escalate when funds on the far side of the bridge are tied to illicit activity, a privacy coin sits on the path, several hops happened within minutes with no trading purpose, or the customer cannot explain the moves.
An alert is a reason to review, not a suspicion in itself: the NFIU’s 2024 STR guidelines say alerts from a transaction monitoring system are “considered unusual” and “should not be automatically regarded as suspicious” (Part Three). Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.
Related rules
- Rapid pass-through: its “Crypto in, crypto out” variant is the same shape on one asset and one network.
- Transaction velocity: many transactions in a short time, which several fast hops also produce.
- Internal watchlist match and Sanctions screening: wallet addresses on the far side of a bridge that are already listed.
- New account activity: hops on an account that was just opened.
- Mixer, tumbler, and privacy-coin exposure: the other way of breaking the trail, often used in the same chain of hops.
- Unhosted wallet exposure: hops that start or end at a self-hosted wallet.
- Transfers with unlicensed or high-risk counterparty VASPs: a hop through another exchange that does not apply the same controls.
Sources
14 sourcesHide
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Payments System Policy Department, Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, November 2026, issued by circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004 of 5 November 2026, in force that day; sections 26.1.4, 26.3.12, 26.7.1(f), 26.7.2, 26.7.3, 26.9.1–26.9.3. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/REGULATIONS%20FOR%20THE%20OPERATIONS%20OF%20NON-SECURITY%20VIRTUAL%20ASSETS%20IN%20NIGERIA.pdf
- Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 (Nigeria), s.7(1)–(2). https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/LawsAndRegulations
- NFIU, “Guidelines for the Identification, Verification and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions Related to ML/FT/PF for Financial Institutions”, STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, 13 December 2024, Part Three and Part Six para 2. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance
- FinCEN, Advisory on Ransomware and the Use of the Financial System to Facilitate Ransom Payments, FIN-2021-A004, 8 November 2021, p.3 and footnote 8; “Financial Red Flag Indicators of Ransomware and Associated Payments”, p.8. https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2021-11-08/FinCEN%20Ransomware%20Advisory_FINAL_508_.pdf
- FinCEN, FinCEN Advises Increased Vigilance for Potential Russian Sanctions Evasion Attempts, FIN-2022-Alert001, 7 March 2022, “Select Red Flag Indicators”, p.5. https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/FinCEN%20Alert%20Russian%20Sanctions%20Evasion%20FINAL%20508.pdf
- U.S. Department of the Treasury, Illicit Finance Risk Assessment of Decentralized Finance, April 2023, p.6, “Money Laundering” pp.16–17, p.33. https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/DeFi-Risk-Full-Review.pdf
- 31 CFR 1020.320(b)(3) (banks) and 1022.320(b)(3) (money services businesses), reports of suspicious transactions. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-X
- EBA, Guidelines amending Guidelines EBA/2021/02 on customer due diligence and the factors credit and financial institutions should consider when assessing the money laundering and terrorist financing risk associated with individual business relationships and occasional transactions (EBA/GL/2024/01), 16 January 2024, applicable from 30 December 2024; Guideline 21.5(b)(xi)(f) and (h), 21.13. https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2024-01/a3e89f4f-fbf3-4bd6-9e07-35f3243555b3/Final%20Amending%20%20Guidelines%20on%20MLTF%20Risk%20Factors.pdf
- Directive (EU) 2015/849, art. 33(1). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2015/849/oj
- FINTRAC, “Money laundering and terrorist financing indicators—Virtual currency transactions”, published June 2021, modified 19 November 2021. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/indicators-indicateurs/vc_mltf-eng
- FINTRAC, “Reporting suspicious transactions to FINTRAC”, section 4. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/str-dod/str-dod-eng
- FATF, Targeted Update on Implementation of the FATF Standards on Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers, June 2022, footnote 55 (to para 43), p.22. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/Targeted-Update-Implementation-FATF%20Standards-Virtual%20Assets-VASPs.pdf
- FATF, Targeted Update on Implementation of the FATF Standards on Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers, July 2026, “Recommendations for the Private Sector”, item 6(ii) and (iv) (p.5); para 34 (p.20). https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/targeted-updated-virtualassets-vasps-2026.html
- FATF, “Virtual Assets: Red Flag Indicators of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing”, September 2020, “Red flag indicators related to transactions”, p.6; “Red Flag Indicators Related to Anonymity”, para 13, p.9. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Virtual-Assets-Red-Flag-Indicators.pdf
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