Crypto
Unhosted wallet exposure (self-hosted wallets)
A customer moves a large share of their crypto to or from wallets that no regulated provider holds, or sends or receives a transfer above the legal threshold from such a wallet without proof that the wallet is theirs.
What it catches
An unhosted wallet, also called a self-hosted or non-custodial wallet, is a crypto address whose keys no exchange, custodian or other regulated provider holds for its user. When a customer sends crypto to such a wallet, or receives it from one, there is no provider on the other side that has identified the person behind it and no Travel Rule message to say who that person is. The provider serving the customer is the only regulated party in the transfer.
Regulators ask for two things about these transfers. First, to know how much of a customer’s activity goes through unhosted wallets and to apply enhanced due diligence to customers with a lot of it: Nigeria’s CBN names “customers with significant exposure to unhosted wallets” among the cases for enhanced due diligence, and the FATF tells providers to “collect data on their unhosted wallet transfers, and monitor and assess that information” (Updated Guidance, para 296). Second, above a set amount, to check that the unhosted wallet belongs to the customer, “such as a message-signing or micro-transfer test” (CBN), or, where it belongs to someone else, who that person is. The EU requires the check, by one of several methods, for transfers of more than EUR 1,000.
The risk is real but the signal is weak on its own. Self-custody is a normal and often prudent choice: the FATF itself notes that “the use of a hardware or paper wallet may be legitimate as a way to secure VAs against thefts” (Red Flag Indicators, para 13). The rule measures exposure and enforces the ownership check; the analyst decides what the exposure means.
How the rule works
The rule has two parts. They share the same data and usually run together.
- Exposure. Over a look-back window, add up the value of the customer’s crypto transfers to and from unhosted wallets and compare it with all their transfers to and from addresses outside the platform. Alert when the share and the amount are both above levels set in your risk assessment. This answers “which customers have significant exposure” and feeds enhanced due diligence.
- Ownership not proven. When a transfer to or from an unhosted wallet reaches the legal threshold and the address is not on the customer’s list of wallets they have proven are theirs, hold it until the customer proves ownership or the transfer is reviewed. This is a gate, checked on each transfer. If the address turns out to belong to someone else, no proof of ownership will come: identify that person from reliable, independent sources instead and apply your risk measures to the transfer (in the EU, EBA Travel Rule Guidelines, para 89).
Whether an address is unhosted is decided first, before either part runs: from blockchain analytics or a Travel Rule network that can attribute the address to a provider, and failing that from the customer’s own declaration (EBA Travel Rule Guidelines, paras 77–78). An address that stays unknown counts with the unhosted ones in the exposure share. For the ownership check, the customer is asked first: an address they show to be at a provider leaves the gate, and that provider is identified instead.
Looks at
Every crypto transfer a customer sends to, or receives from, an address outside the platform. Outgoing transfers are checked when they are initiated; incoming ones before the funds are made available to the customer.
Sorts
- Hosted: the address belongs to another exchange or regulated provider.
- Unhosted: no provider holds it.
- Unknown: it can’t be attributed yet. For exposure, count it with the unhosted ones until it is, and keep the count of unknowns visible. For the ownership check, ask the customer what it is first.
Measures
- Unhosted value: the completed transfers to and from unhosted addresses in the look-back window, plus the one being checked.
- External value: all completed transfers to and from addresses outside the platform in the same window.
Both are valued in one currency at the time of each transfer.
Leaves out
- Transfers between the customer’s own accounts on the platform, and the platform’s own movements between its hot and cold wallets.
Alerts when
Either of these is true:
- Exposure: unhosted value is at least your share of external value, and at least your minimum for the segment.
- Ownership not proven: the transfer is with an unhosted address, its value is at or above the legal threshold, and the address is not on the customer’s list of proven wallets. Hold the transfer until ownership is proven, the person who holds the wallet is identified, or the alert is reviewed.
How often
Exposure: at most one alert per customer per look-back window. Ownership: once per new address; a proven address is not checked again unless its risk changes. The EU allows this (EBA Travel Rule Guidelines, para 86); Nigeria’s rule does not say, so write your choice into your procedures.
Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.
Look-back window How far back to measure exposure. No regulator sets it. Match it to how often you review customer risk, and test it on your own data.
Share of unhosted value The level above which exposure counts as significant. Nigeria leaves it to the institution’s risk assessment and any guidance the CBN issues (section 26.3.11(e)); no public source gives a number. Write the level and the reasoning into the risk assessment, since that is what an examiner will ask for.
Minimum unhosted value Set per customer segment and currency, from your own spread of transfer sizes. Without it, a customer who made one small withdrawal to a personal wallet shows 100% exposure.
Legal threshold Nigeria: USD/EUR 1,000 or its naira equivalent, “equal to or above” (CBN sections 26.15.2 and 26.14.3). EU: “exceeding EUR 1 000” (Regulation (EU) 2023/1113, arts. 14(5) and 16(2)); the EBA asks providers to check whether a transfer “amounts to or exceeds EUR 1 000” (Travel Rule Guidelines, para 81). South Africa sets no ownership check and no amount: its Directive 9 asks for risk-based policies on unhosted-wallet transfers (para 8). Where no law sets one, you can still apply the check from an amount set in your risk assessment.
Common variants:
- Just under the ownership threshold. Repeated transfers to or from unhosted addresses that stay just below the amount at which ownership must be proven. The EBA lists customers “frequently receiving or transferring such amounts of crypto-assets from self-hosted addresses, which are just below the EUR 1 000 threshold” as a higher-risk factor (EBA/GL/2024/01, Guideline 21.5(b)(vii)). See Transaction structuring.
- Many unhosted addresses. One customer sending to or receiving from many different unhosted addresses with no evident reason (“multiple self-hosted addresses … without an apparent economic rationale”, Guideline 21.5(b)(xv)(b)).
- Straight out to a private wallet. Crypto deposited, or exchanged on the platform, and withdrawn at once to an unhosted wallet. The FATF lists “withdrawing the VAs from a VASP immediately to a private wallet”, which “effectively turns the exchange/VASP into an ML mixer” (Virtual Assets Red Flag Indicators, p.6); the EBA lists a withdrawal to a self-hosted address “immediately after depositing crypto-assets or exchanging for different crypto-assets” (Guideline 21.5(b)(xi)(h)). See Rapid pass-through.
- Change in exposure. A customer whose unhosted share jumps compared with their own history, rather than one who has always used a personal wallet. See Sudden change from baseline.
- Proven wallet, new risk. An address already proven as the customer’s that later receives funds from risky sources, or is used by other customers. The EBA expects a provider that skips the check for proven addresses to watch for “changes in the ML/TF risk of the self-hosted address and its ownership or controllership” and to remove the address from the list when they appear (EBA Travel Rule Guidelines, para 86).
Data it needs
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| Field | Usually comes from | If it’s missing |
|---|---|---|
| Customer id | account | Required. |
| Direction (in or out) | ledger | Required. Exposure counts both directions; incoming transfers from unhosted wallets are as much in scope as withdrawals. |
| Amount, asset and network | transfer record | Required. |
| Value in one currency at the time of the transfer | price feed | Required for the threshold and the share. The EU values a transfer with “the exchange rate of the crypto-asset being transferred … at the time of the transfer, and regardless of any transaction fees” (EBA Travel Rule Guidelines, para 82). Nigeria does not say which rate or which of USD or EUR applies; write your choice into the risk assessment. |
| Timestamp and status | transfer record | Required. Hold the outgoing transfer at initiation; check incoming ones before the funds are released. |
| Counterparty address | the transfer itself (destination on withdrawals, source on deposits) | Required. On deposits the source address is often not stored, though it can be read from the transaction on the chain. Without it, incoming exposure is invisible. |
| Wallet type (hosted, unhosted, unknown) and the provider behind a hosted address | blockchain analytics, Travel Rule network, customer declaration | Required. Without it, the rule can’t tell a withdrawal to another exchange from one to a personal wallet. |
| Ownership proof per address (method, date, result) | wallet verification step | Required for the ownership part. Without it, every transfer at the threshold alerts. |
| Originator or beneficiary name for the unhosted side | the customer, at the time of the transfer | Collected for every unhosted transfer in Nigeria and the EU; in South Africa the CASP “should obtain information from their client regarding the identity of the person holding the unhosted wallet” (FIC PCC 61, para 4.27). Needed to tell a customer’s own wallet from a third party’s. |
| Customer segment | onboarding | Needed to set the minimum per segment. |
Thresholds
Each row is a setting the rule needs. Set by law values come from the source named under “Where it comes from”. Suggested values are starting points: test them on your own history, then adjust.
| Parameter | Value | Type | Where it comes from |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ownership check, Nigeria | USD/EUR 1,000 or its naira equivalent, equal to or above | Set by law | CBN Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, section 26.15.2, applying the threshold of section 26.14.3. The Regulations do not say which of the two currencies or which exchange rate applies. |
| Ownership check, EU | exceeding EUR 1,000 | Set by law | Regulation (EU) 2023/1113, arts. 14(5) (to a self-hosted address) and 16(2) (from one). The EBA asks providers to determine whether a transfer “amounts to or exceeds EUR 1 000”, so a transfer of exactly EUR 1,000 is checked too. The amount is judged when the transfer is ordered, or when it is received, at the crypto-asset’s euro value then, fees left out (EBA Travel Rule Guidelines, paras 81–82). |
| Ownership check, South Africa | none set by law | Set by law | FIC Directive 9, paras 8.2–8.4, asks for risk-based policies and procedures for unhosted-wallet transfers; it sets no ownership check and no amount. |
| Significant exposure (share and window) | set in your risk assessment | Suggested | Nigeria leaves “significant” to “the institution’s risk assessment and any guidance issued by the Bank” (section 26.3.11(e)). No public source gives a value. |
| Minimum unhosted value | set per segment and currency from your own distribution of transfer sizes | Suggested | No public source gives a value. Without a minimum, one small personal withdrawal reads as full exposure. |
| Alert review, Nigeria | five business days; 24 hours for a possible sanctions or terrorist financing match | Set by law | CBN Regulations, section 26.7.2. |
By country
Nigeria. The CBN’s Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria (in force 5 November 2026) bind licensed stablecoin issuers and licensed or authorised VASPs. An unhosted wallet is one “in respect of which no Licensee, VASP, financial institution or other regulated intermediary holds, administers or exercises Control over the virtual assets, private keys or other means of access on behalf of the owner or user” (Section 1). Enhanced due diligence applies to “customers with significant exposure to unhosted wallets, as determined by the institution’s risk assessment and any guidance issued by the Bank” (section 26.3.11(e)). For every transfer to or from an unhosted wallet the VASP obtains the Travel Rule information “from its customer” (section 26.15.1). “For transfers equal to or above the threshold in 26.14.3”, USD/EUR 1,000 or its naira equivalent, it “shall take reasonable measures to verify that its customer owns or controls the unhosted wallet, such as a message-signing or micro-transfer test” (section 26.15.2), and it assesses and mitigates the risks of unhosted-wallet transfers, with measures that “may include blockchain analytics screening of the wallet and its transaction history, enhanced due diligence, transaction limits, and refusing or suspending the transfer” (section 26.15.3). Proving the wallet also matters for foreign-exchange rules: value transferred to an unhosted wallet is a cross-border virtual asset transaction “unless the Licensee has verified under Section 26.14 that the wallet is controlled by its customer or by another person resident in Nigeria” (section 11.10.1(c)). That includes transfers below the threshold, where section 26.15.2 asks for no check: unless the wallet was verified anyway, they count as cross-border. A wallet held by someone other than the customer is cross-border unless that person is verified as resident in Nigeria. No one may route a transaction through an unhosted wallet to avoid the cross-border rules (section 11.10.15). A provider that finishes verifying a customer’s identity after the relationship has begun may allow no withdrawal or “transfer to an external wallet”, hosted or not, until verification is completed (section 26.3.9(d)). Monitoring alerts are reviewed and their outcome documented within five business days, or 24 hours for a possible sanctions or terrorist financing match (section 26.7.2).
Reporting deadline
Report to the NFIU “promptly, and in any case within twenty-four (24) hours of forming the suspicion”, whatever the amount and whether the transaction was completed, attempted, rejected, suspended or abandoned (CBN Regulations, sections 26.9.1–26.9.2). The Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 requires an immediate report and a written report within 24 hours after the transaction (s.7(1)–(2)).
South Africa. FIC Directive 9 of 2024 (in operation 30 April 2025) binds crypto asset service providers that send or receive crypto asset transfers. It defines an unhosted wallet as “a type of crypto wallet where the user has exclusive control of the private keys” (para 2.1.8) and requires them to “develop, document, maintain and implement effective risk-based policies and procedures for the treatment of crypto asset transfers that involve unhosted wallets” (para 8.2), including how “further information on the unhosted wallet is obtained” where the risk is higher (para 8.3), as part of their Risk Management and Compliance Programme (para 8.4). It sets no amount for unhosted wallets. The FIC’s guidance on Directive 9 (PCC 61, 30 March 2026) lists among the factors that make a transfer higher risk and call for enhanced measures “The funds are coming from or going to an unhosted wallet” (para 3.12.5). “Monitoring tools should assess or analyse the levels of volume and value transfer to or from unhosted wallets, as higher levels of transfers may indicate heightened risks of ML, TF, and PF” (para 4.8), and “The CASP must monitor client transactions to determine patterns of transfers to or from unhosted wallets”, against a full client profile (para 4.31). “The CASP should apply enhanced due diligence on its client that requests the CASP to process transfers to unhosted wallets” and “should consider whether the circumstances give rise for the need to file a suspicious activity or transaction report” (para 4.28).
Reporting deadline
As soon as possible, and no later than 15 days excluding weekends and public holidays (FIC Act s.29; MLTF Control Regulations, reg. 24(3), via FIC Guidance Note 4B para 71). The 15 days run from when you became aware of the facts, which “may be, and in the majority of cases will be, before a suspicion is formed” (GN4B para 80).
EU. The Transfer of Funds Regulation, Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 (applying from 30 December 2024), defines a “self-hosted address” as one not linked to a crypto-asset service provider or a similar provider outside the Union (art. 3, point 20). For a transfer to such an address, the originator’s provider “shall obtain and hold” the originator and beneficiary information and, “in the case of a transfer of an amount exceeding EUR 1 000 to a self-hosted address, … shall take adequate measures to assess whether that address is owned or controlled by the originator” (art. 14(5)); art. 16(2) sets the same for transfers received from a self-hosted address. The AML Directive, as amended by the same Regulation, has Member States require crypto-asset service providers to “identify and assess the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing associated with transfers of crypto-assets directed to or originating from a self-hosted address” and to apply mitigating measures, among them “enhanced ongoing monitoring of those transactions” (Directive (EU) 2015/849, art. 19a(1)). From 10 July 2027 Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 applies in the Directive’s place and sets the same duty on crypto-asset service providers directly (arts. 40(1) and 90). The EBA’s Travel Rule Guidelines say how: decide whether the other end is self-hosted with “blockchain analytics, third-party data providers and identifiers used by messaging systems”, or else ask the customer (paras 77–78); prove ownership with at least one method, among them a predefined small amount sent from and to the address, or a message signed with the address’s key (para 83); record a proven address and “may not need to re-apply the measures” to it while watching for changes in its risk (para 86). Where the address turns out to be “owned or controlled by a third person instead of the CASP’s customer”, the provider verifies that person’s identity from reliable and independent sources, such as blockchain analytics, third-party data, recognised authorities’ data and public information (para 89). The EBA’s risk factor guidelines list a product that allows transactions with self-hosted addresses as a factor that may increase risk (EBA/GL/2024/01, Guideline 21.3(d)(i)), together with the customer behaviours in Common variants above (Guideline 21.5(b)), and ask providers to “apply advanced analytics tools to assess the risk associated with transactions, particularly transactions involving self-hosted addresses” (Guideline 21.13).
Reporting deadline
Inform the national FIU “promptly” (Directive (EU) 2015/849, art. 33(1)). The directive sets no number of hours; your member state’s law may.
False positives and tuning
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Common innocent explanations: a customer who keeps savings in a hardware wallet and moves them to the exchange to trade; a customer paying or being paid by a merchant or freelancer client who uses a personal wallet; use of decentralised finance, where funds go to a smart contract that analytics may class as unhosted; a customer moving funds between their own wallets on several networks.
Typical causes of misfires:
- Addresses that can’t be attributed. Deposit addresses of small or new exchanges, payment processors and smart contracts are often missing from attribution data and read as unhosted. Keep “unknown” separate from “unhosted” in the alert so the analyst can see how much of the exposure is only unattributed, and re-attribute before escalating.
- Exchange deposit addresses. Exchanges usually send from shared hot wallets but receive at a deposit address of each user’s own, so a deposit address looks exactly like a personal wallet. A shortcut that treats addresses used by many customers as exchanges works on incoming transfers and fails on outgoing ones; without attribution, outgoing exposure is overstated.
- The customer’s own wallets. Customers often move their own funds between the platform and wallets they hold. Prove ownership once per address and record it, so the ownership part fires only on new addresses. Wallets that generate a new receiving address for each payment defeat a per-address list; group addresses by wallet where your analytics can.
- The ownership test itself. A micro-transfer test is a small transfer followed by a large one, which a rule that looks for a test transfer before a large transfer alerts on. Exclude proven tests from that rule.
- One small transfer. A share measured on little activity swings to 100% on a single withdrawal. Set a minimum unhosted value per segment.
- A share that no longer sorts. Where crypto is mostly a way out of the platform, almost everyone who uses it has a share near 100%, and the share stops telling customers apart. The minimum amount and where the money came from do.
- Values in the wrong currency. A threshold in USD or EUR compared with an amount in tokens, or converted at the wrong time, alerts on the wrong transfers or misses the right ones. Value each transfer at the time it happens, at a documented rate.
- Business customers. Merchants, payment platforms and market makers move funds to and from many addresses by design. Judge them against their declared business, in their own segment.
How to tune: attribute addresses before measuring; keep unknowns visible; record proven addresses and re-check them when their risk changes; set the share, window and minimum in the risk assessment per segment; and look at the direction as well as the share, since money arriving from unhosted wallets and money leaving to them call for different questions.
Two things you may already hold help sort the alerts:
- The name the customer gave a saved wallet. Their own name, “me”, or an exchange’s name is a declaration already on file. Use it to sort before alerting, but “mine” covers the customer’s exchange account as well as a personal wallet, and it is not proof of ownership.
- Who paid in before the money left. Several unrelated payers, then a quick transfer out to one private wallet, is the shape of collecting for others (see Funnel account). The customer’s own salary or income going to their own wallet is not.
When it fires
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Analyst checklist:
- List the customer’s unhosted transfers in the window: addresses, amounts, directions, networks, and how many addresses are only unattributed.
- Screen each address and its recent history with blockchain analytics: links to sanctioned addresses, mixers, darknet markets, scams or stolen funds (see Sanctions screening and Internal watchlist match).
- Check whether the addresses are proven as the customer’s. If not, ask the customer to prove them (signed message or small test transfer) and to say who holds any address that isn’t theirs. For an address held by someone else, verify who that person is from reliable, independent sources and weigh the transfer as a payment to or from a third party (the rules differ by country; see By country).
- Check whether other customers send to or receive from the same addresses (see Shared identifiers across customers): one personal wallet fed by many customers is a consolidation point.
- Compare with the customer’s declared purpose, source of funds and expected activity, and with their own past exposure.
- Apply enhanced due diligence where exposure is significant; hold or refuse transfers to addresses the customer can’t explain; report where the explanation does not hold.
The FATF asks that “Countries should require their VASPs or other obliged entities to implement mechanisms to ensure effective scrutiny of such transfers, in particular to meet their STR and sanctions implementation obligations” (Updated Guidance, para 204), and accepts that “A VASP may choose to impose additional limitations, controls, or prohibitions on transactions with unhosted wallets in line with their risk analysis” (para 297). An alert is a reason to review, not a suspicion in itself. Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.
Related rules
- Rapid pass-through: crypto deposited and sent straight on, often to a private wallet.
- Test transfer before a large transfer: the same shape as a micro-transfer ownership test; exclude proven tests.
- Transaction structuring: transfers kept just under the ownership threshold.
- Shared identifiers across customers: one unhosted address used by several customers.
- Sanctions screening and Internal watchlist match: screening the unhosted address itself.
- Sudden change from baseline: a jump in a customer’s unhosted share.
- Funnel account: many payers into one account, then out to a private wallet.
- Missing originator or beneficiary information (Travel Rule): the information to collect from the customer on every unhosted transfer.
- Transfers with unlicensed or high-risk counterparty VASPs: the other side is a provider, but one without a licence or under weak supervision.
- Mixer, tumbler, and privacy-coin exposure: an unhosted address linked to a mixer.
- Chain-hopping and cross-chain bridge use: hops that start or end at a self-hosted wallet.
- Unlicensed virtual asset business (crypto trading through an ordinary account): a customer trading crypto for others, whose crypto legs may run through wallets no regulated provider holds.
Sources
12 sourcesHide
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Payments System Policy Department, Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, November 2026, issued by circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004 of 5 November 2026, in force that day; Section 1 (“Unhosted Wallet”), sections 11.10.1(c), 11.10.15, 26.3.9(d), 26.3.11(e), 26.7.2, 26.9.1–26.9.2, 26.14.3 and 26.15.1–26.15.3. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/REGULATIONS%20FOR%20THE%20OPERATIONS%20OF%20NON-SECURITY%20VIRTUAL%20ASSETS%20IN%20NIGERIA.pdf
- Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 (Nigeria), s.7(1)–(2). https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/LawsAndRegulations
- FIC South Africa, Directive 9 concerning the implementation of the “Travel Rule” relating to crypto asset transfers in accordance with the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations, Government Gazette No. 51556, Notice 5543, 15 November 2024, in operation 30 April 2025; paras 2.1.8 and 8.1–8.4. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Directive-9-Travel-rule-relating-to-crypto-asset-transfers.pdf
- FIC South Africa, Public Compliance Communication 61 of 2026 (PCC 61) on providing guidance concerning the implementation of the “travel rule” relating to crypto asset transfers as directed by Directive 9 of 2024, which came into effect on 30 April 2025, 30 March 2026, paras 3.12.5, 4.8, 4.27, 4.28 and 4.31. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/2026.3-PCC-_Travel-Rule-for-CASPS.pdf
- FIC South Africa, Guidance Note 4B on reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions and activities, 26 March 2019, paras 71 and 80. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019.03-Guidance-Guidance-Note-4B-STRs.pdf
- Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on information accompanying transfers of funds and certain crypto-assets (recast), OJ L 150, 9.6.2023; arts. 3 (point 20), 14(5), 16(2), and art. 38 inserting art. 19a into Directive (EU) 2015/849. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1113/oj
- EBA, Guidelines on information requirements in relation to transfers of funds and certain crypto-assets transfers under Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 (‘Travel Rule Guidelines’), EBA/GL/2024/11, 4 July 2024, section 4.8, paras 77–78, 81–86 and 89. https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2024-07/6de6e9b9-0ed9-49cd-985d-c0834b5b4356/Travel%20Rule%20Guidelines.pdf
- EBA, Guidelines amending Guidelines EBA/2021/02 on customer due diligence and the ML/TF risk factors, EBA/GL/2024/01, 16 January 2024, Guidelines 21.3(d)(i), 21.5(b)(vii), (xi)(h) and (xv)(b), and 21.13. https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2024-01/a3e89f4f-fbf3-4bd6-9e07-35f3243555b3/Final%20Amending%20%20Guidelines%20on%20MLTF%20Risk%20Factors.pdf
- FATF, Updated Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers, October 2021, paras 204 and 295–297. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/guidance/Updated-Guidance-VA-VASP.pdf
- FATF, Virtual Assets: Red Flag Indicators of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, September 2020, p.6 (red flags related to transactions) and para 13, p.9 (anonymity). https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Virtual-Assets-Red-Flag-Indicators.pdf
- Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, art. 33(1). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32015L0849
- Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, arts. 40 and 90 (applies from 10 July 2027). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1624/oj
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