Money laundering

Transaction structuring (smurfing)

Several payments kept below a reporting line, by or for one customer, that together reach it within a short window.

Six payments in a short window, each kept below a reporting line, which stacked together reach it Reporting line Within a short window Each payment Together, they reach it

What it catches

A customer splits a sum into smaller payments so that no single payment reaches the amount at which the institution must report it or identify the customer. When several people make the payments for one beneficiary, it is often called smurfing. Some laws prohibit structuring in itself, whatever the source of the money: the United States makes it a criminal offence (31 U.S.C. 5324(a)(3)), South Africa makes it an offence to conduct two or more transactions to avoid a reporting duty (Financial Intelligence Centre Act 2001, s.64(1)), and Nigeria prohibits conducting transactions separately with intent to avoid the duty to report (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.2(2)). Regulators in Canada, France, Argentina and Mexico also name it as grounds for suspicion or extra scrutiny (see By country). On fintech rails it often shows up as many small credits into a new account, or as repayments and top-ups kept just under a line.

The rule does not prove intent. It finds the pattern, and an analyst decides whether there is an innocent explanation. The pattern alone is not a reason to report: in the US, FinCEN states that payments at or near the reporting line do not by themselves require a suspicious activity report (see United States under By country).

How the rule works

Group a customer’s completed payments by direction (money in and money out are counted separately) over a window. Leave out the customer’s own internal movements and remove duplicate events first. Then test one of three variants:

  • A. Sum under the line. The payments in the window add up to the reporting line or more, and none of them would have been reported on its own. This is the closest to the legal definition, and it does not overlap with a large-transaction rule.
  • B. Repeated near-line payments. Several payments in the window each fall in a band just below the line, none of them reportable on its own.
  • C. Near-identical amounts. Several payments in the window have almost the same amount, and their total is above a minimum. This variant is weaker. It also catches automated splitting below thresholds that the institution does not publish, but it produces more false positives (see below).

Looks at

Every completed payment of a customer, together with the customer’s other completed payments in the same direction (money in or money out) in the window up to and including it.

Alerts when A: sum under the line

All of these are true, within 24 hours to 30 days:

  1. The payments add up to the local legal line or more.
  2. None of them would be reported on its own.
  3. There are at least two of them.

It alerts once for the window.

Alerts when B: near‑line payments

3 to 5 or more payments within 24 hours to 7 days are each at least 20%–90% of the line but not reportable on their own under the local legal line.

Alerts when C: near‑identical amounts

All of these are true:

  1. There are 3 to 5 or more payments within 24 hours to 7 days.
  2. Their amounts are almost the same.
  3. Together they add up to at least your minimum total.

Ignores

  • Payments that did not complete.
  • The customer’s own movements: currency conversions, card unloads, refunds and fees.
  • Repeat copies of the same payment: each real payment counts once.

Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.

The grouping key is the customer: the beneficiary for money in, the sender for money out. To catch smurfing by several people, the same test can run per beneficiary or counterparty across customers, which needs the links that a shared-identifier rule builds.

Data it needs

ShowHide
FieldUsually comes fromIf it’s missing
Amount and currencythe ledger or payment eventRequired. Compare amounts in one currency, with a fixed rate source.
Timestampthe payment eventRequired.
Customer idthe account or walletRequired.
Customer type (individual or company)onboarding (KYC/KYB)Some lines differ by type (Nigeria). Without it, use the lower line and expect more alerts.
Direction (in or out)the ledgerRequired. Mixing directions adds money in and money out together, so a round trip counts twice.
Transaction typethe ledgerNeeded to drop own-account movements. Without it, expect many false positives on wallets.
Statusthe payment processorCount completed payments only. Failed retries inflate counts.
Counterparty idpayment detailsNeeded for the split-to-one-beneficiary form and for smurfing across customers.
Event or payment idthe source systemNeeded to remove duplicates. If the source system re-sends a payment under a new id, sums are inflated (see below).

Thresholds

Each row is a setting the rule needs. Set by law values come from the source named under “Where it comes from”. Suggested values are starting points: test them on your own history, then adjust.

ParameterValueTypeWhere it comes from
Reporting linethe local legal line for a single payment, by customer type, payment type (cash or transfer) and currency. Where the law reports only amounts above a figure, a payment of exactly that figure is under the lineSet by lawSee By country
Window, variant A24 hours to 30 days; where the law adds payments up over a period (one business day for US cash, 24 hours in Canada, a calendar month for France’s COSI), choose a window longer than the law’s. Splitting across those periods is the behaviour you are looking for, so a rule that only looks inside the legal period misses itSuggestedThe legal windows: 31 CFR 1010.313(b); PCMLTFR ss.126–129; ACPR-Tracfin guidelines paras 201 and 204. The US definition of structuring covers transactions “on one or more days” (31 CFR 1010.100(xx)). Within the range, a shorter window catches fast splitting with fewer alerts; a longer one catches slower splitting and fires more
Count, variants B and C3 to 5 payments in 24 hours to 7 daysSuggestedA lower count catches smaller splits but fires on ordinary repeat payments. Lower it for new accounts, higher for business accounts
Near-line band, variant Beach payment between 20% and 90% of the reporting line (the lower bound) and the largest amount not reported on its own (the upper bound)SuggestedPayments just under the line are the classic sign; a wider band also catches splitting into smaller parts. A narrow band (90%+) is quieter but misses splitting into halves or thirds
Minimum total, variant Cset from your own amount distribution so that repeated micro-payments cannot fireSuggestedNo public source gives a value. Without a minimum, near-identical tiny payouts can make up most alerts

By country

  • Nigeria. A financial institution reports to the NFIU, within seven days, “any single transaction, lodgment or transfer of funds in excess of” ₦5,000,000 for an individual or ₦10,000,000 for a body corporate (set by law, MLPPA 2022 s.11(1)). This covers transfers, not only cash. Section 2(2) says a person “shall not conduct two or more transactions separately” with one or more institutions with intent to “(a) avoid the duty to report a transaction which should be reported under this Act; and (b) breach the duty to disclose information under this act by any other means.” Set the line by customer type. For stablecoin issuers and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) licensed by the CBN, its Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria (in force 5 November 2026) require the automated monitoring system to alert on “structuring to avoid reporting thresholds” among the virtual asset typologies (section 26.7.1(c)), and say that transactions “that appear to be linked or structured to avoid an applicable reporting threshold shall be reported individually and aggregated” against the threshold (section 26.11.2). Due diligence applies to occasional transactions of USD/EUR 1,000 or more “whether conducted as a single operation or in several operations that appear to be linked” (section 26.3.2(b)); the Regulations do not say whether the USD or the EUR figure applies, or which rate converts it to naira, so the licensee sets both and writes them down. On P2P services no person may “structure, split, route, facilitate or use a P2P transaction or series of transactions” to get around CBN oversight, limits, AML or sanctions controls or reporting (section 10.6.4), and the provider must identify structuring and “transaction splitting” (section 10.7.5). For cross-border transactions a licensee “shall monitor for” transactions structured, split or routed to avoid Section 11.10, report them to the CBN and file an STR where required (section 11.10.15).

    Reporting deadline

    Report to the NFIU immediately, with a written report within 24 hours (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.7(1)–(2)). The NFIU’s December 2024 STR guidelines start the 24 hours once the transaction is found suspicious, after an examination of no more than 72 hours, and require written reasons for every alert closed as not suspicious (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, Part Six, para 2).

  • WAEMU (UEMOA). Cash transactions of 15,000,000 FCFA or more must be declared to the CENTIF, “qu’il s’agisse d’une opération unique ou de plusieurs opérations qui apparaissent liées” (whether a single operation or several that appear linked) (set by law, Uniform Law art. 72; Council of Ministers Decision n°021 of 21/12/2023, art. 8). Several cash transactions totalling more than 9,000,000 FCFA, by or for the same person, within one day “ou selon une fréquence inhabituelle” (or at an unusual frequency), trigger identification and verification (set by law, Decision 021/2023, art. 3). Linked operations count together by law, so a structuring rule here also protects the threshold report. BCEAO Instruction 001-03-2025 (18 March 2025), whose Title I binds credit institutions, financial companies, microfinance institutions, e-money institutions, payment institutions and fintechs in the eight member states (art. 3), requires their information system to allow “le suivi des mouvements sur les comptes et la génération des alertes” (the monitoring of account movements and the generation of alerts) and “l’identification des transactions à caractère suspect ou inhabituel” (the identification of suspicious or unusual transactions), and “le recensement des opérations effectuées par un même client, qu’il soit occasionnel ou habituel” (a record of the operations carried out by the same customer, whether occasional or regular), which is the record a rule needs to add up linked operations. The system’s effectiveness is reviewed at least once a year (art. 6). Licensed bureaux de change must have a system that allows the same record of a customer’s operations and the identification of suspicious or unusual transactions (art. 15). WAEMU (UEMOA in French) is the West African Economic and Monetary Union: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, the same eight states that form the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). The BCEAO’s instructions and the Council of Ministers’ decisions cited here apply in all eight. The uniform law applies in each state through that state’s own act, which may number its articles differently. The law of a single state is covered only where that state is named.

    Reporting deadline

    Report to the CENTIF “immédiatement” (Loi uniforme 2023, art. 60). The law defines “sans délai” as at most 24 hours (art. 2, point 58); “immédiatement” is not defined, and a cautious reading treats 24 hours as the outer limit. Do not carry out an operation you suspect until the report is made, and then only if the CENTIF does not oppose it: an opposition blocks the operation for up to four days (arts. 61 and 65). If it has already gone through, inform the CENTIF “sans délai” (art. 61).

  • South Africa. Cash above R49,999.99 is reported under section 28 of the FIC Act (set by law, Regulation 22B as substituted by Government Notice 2638, 14 October 2022, in force 14 November 2022). The same notice deleted “or series of cash transactions” from Regulation 24(4), so the cash threshold report is now per transaction. Institutions authorised to send money across the border report every electronic transfer into or out of South Africa above R19,999.99, each transfer on its own, with no adding-up (set by law, FIC Act s.31; FIC Guidance Note 9, paras 9–14). Conducting two or more transactions “with the purpose, in whole or in part, of avoiding giving rise to a reporting duty” is an offence (FIC Act s.64(1)), and a transaction or series “conducted for the purpose of avoiding giving rise to a reporting duty” is a ground for a suspicious or unusual transaction report (FIC Act s.29(1)(b)(iii)). Guidance Note 9’s own example is a client who sends R4,900 to the same recipient every day for five days: no transfer report is due, but the institution should consider a suspicious transaction report (para 33, example 7). Where the rule runs in an automated transaction monitoring system, FIC Directive 5 of 2019 requires the system’s detection methodology, “including algorithms, scenarios, threshold settings or rules” (this rule among them), to be documented (para 3.1.16) and, taken as a whole, “sufficient to address the associated money laundering and terrorist financing risks applicable to the reporter” (para 3.1.17), and sets the time limits for the system’s alerts given under the reporting deadline below (paras 2.1–2.3).

    Reporting deadline

    As soon as possible, and no later than 15 days excluding weekends and public holidays (FIC Act s.29; MLTF Control Regulations, reg. 24(3), via FIC Guidance Note 4B para 71). The 15 days run from when you became aware of the facts, which “may be, and in the majority of cases will be, before a suspicion is formed” (GN4B para 80), and an institution “may not add additional timeframes for its internal transactional monitoring alert system processes, and / or internal investigation and review processes to the prescribed reporting period” (GN4B para 81). Where the alert comes from an automated transaction monitoring system, the reporter “is deemed to have knowledge” of the possible suspicious activity when the alert is generated: the report is due “no later than 15 days after the alert has been generated”, and work on the alert must start within 48 hours, which the FIC counts as two days without weekends and public holidays, inside the 15 (FIC Directive 5 of 2019, paras 2.1–2.3; FIC PCC 45, paras 5–8).

  • Kenya. A reporting institution files reports on “all cash transactions exceeding US$ 15,000 or its equivalent in any other currency” (set by law, POCAMLA Fourth Schedule, s.44(6), as substituted by the AML and CFT Laws (Amendment) Act 2023, in force 15 September 2023). The Schedule does not say whether linked cash transactions are added together, so a structuring rule here serves the suspicious transaction report, not the cash report.

    Reporting deadline

    Within two days after the suspicion arose (POCAMLA s.44(2), as replaced by the AML/CFT Laws (Amendment) Act 2023, Act No. 10 of 2023).

  • Ghana. Institutions licensed by the Bank of Ghana report to the FIC every day “all cash transactions within Ghana in any currency and with a threshold of GHS50,000.00 for banks and GHS20,000.00 for specialized deposit-taking institutions (or its foreign currency equivalent)”, and report electronic transactions “with a threshold of $1,000.00 or its Cedi equivalent for both individuals and business entities” (set by law, BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.8.5.1 and 2.8.5.2(3); the FIC may change either line in consultation with the BoG). The FIC’s own Report Types page gives the cash line as “any deposit or withdrawal amounting to GH¢50,000.00 or more” for the banking and securities sectors, and the transfer report for commercial banks (“All inward and outward transfers exceeding US$1000.00”). The Guideline does not say whether a transaction of exactly the line amount is reported, and the two texts differ on who reports and on what. Where the two differ this library follows the Guideline, which the BoG and the FIC issued under sections 52 and 61 of Act 1044 in binding terms and dated September 2025, over the undated page. For the near-line band (see Thresholds), this library reads the cash line as including the amount itself and the transfer line as excluding it, as the FIC’s page words them: a cash payment of exactly GHS50,000.00 is reported on its own, a transfer of exactly $1,000.00 is not. That is the library’s reading; the Guideline does not settle it. Foreign exchange bureaux report “all sales and purchases of foreign currencies with a threshold of Twenty Thousand Ghana Cedis (GHS20,000.00) or its foreign currency equivalent” under their own guideline (BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline for Foreign Exchange Bureaux 2025, 3.7(1)), which the library reads like the cash line, and their red flags include amounts “just below the stipulated reporting threshold by the Bank of Ghana” (Appendix C, d). Due diligence applies to occasional transactions “carried out in a single operation or several operations that appear to be linked” (2.4.1(1)), and identity is verified “when series of linked transactions take place” (3.4(1)). The Guideline’s red flags include “Transaction activity involving amounts that are just below the stipulated reporting threshold or enquiries that appear to test an institution’s own internal monitoring threshold or controls” (Appendix E, 1d), many small cash deposits whose “overall total is quite significant” (2d), and payouts “by multiple cheques, each below the prescribed reporting threshold” (3l). Where monitoring of low-risk customers is reduced to transactions above a threshold, systems must “identify linked transactions which, when aggregated, exceed the threshold” (3.8.1.1(d)).

    Reporting deadline

    Within 24 hours of forming the suspicion, attempted transactions included, whatever the amount (FIC Ghana, “Report Types”; BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.8.1(6) and 2.8.3(2)).

  • Canada. Cash and virtual currency receipts of CAD 10,000 or more are reported, and so are international electronic funds transfers of CAD 10,000 or more, sent or received. In each case two or more amounts that total CAD 10,000 within 24 consecutive hours count as one when they are by or for the same person or for the same beneficiary (set by law, PCMLTFR ss.126–129; FINTRAC 24-hour rule guidance, which asks you to define a static 24-hour window). FINTRAC’s STR guidance lists a person who “structures their amounts to avoid client identification or reporting thresholds” among the facts from which suspicion may arise.

    Reporting deadline

    File “as soon as practicable” after the measures that establish reasonable grounds to suspect (FINTRAC STR guidance, section 4).

  • United States. Cash transactions of more than USD 10,000 are reported (31 CFR 1010.311, set by law). Structuring of cash is defined in 31 CFR 1010.100(xx), and the transactions “need not exceed the $10,000 reporting threshold at any single financial institution on any single day” to count. For transfers, the line is USD 3,000: banks and other financial institutions keep records of every funds transfer of USD 3,000 or more and pass the sender’s details on with it (set by law, 31 CFR 1020.410(a), 1010.410(e)–(f)). The criminal offence in 31 U.S.C. 5324(a) also covers evading recordkeeping requirements made under section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1829b), which provides for these funds-transfer records.

    Reporting deadline

    No later than 30 calendar days after initial detection; a bank that has not identified a suspect may take 30 more days, never more than 60 in all (31 CFR 1020.320(b)(3) for banks, 1022.320 for money services businesses). A bank files for amounts of at least USD 5,000 and a money services business from USD 2,000; a transaction “designed to evade” Bank Secrecy Act requirements is itself a ground to file (31 CFR 1020.320(a)(2)(ii)). FinCEN states that “the mere presence of a transaction or series of transactions by or on behalf of the same person at or near the $10,000 CTR threshold is not information sufficient to require the filing of a SAR”: file when you know, suspect or have reason to suspect the payments are designed to evade reporting (FinCEN SAR FAQs, 9 October 2025, question 1).

  • France. Tracfin receives systematic reports (COSI) for cash deposits or withdrawals above €10,000 cumulated over a calendar month, and for money transfers to or from abroad funded by cash or e-money from €1,000 per operation or €2,000 cumulated per client per calendar month (set by law, ACPR-Tracfin joint guidelines, paras 199, 201 and 204, citing CMF R.561-31-1 and R.561-31-2). The same guidelines ask institutions to watch operations whose amounts, single or cumulated, stay under the COSI thresholds “pour, selon toute vraisemblance, échapper à ce dispositif” (para 196).

  • Argentina. Among the circumstances to weigh in alerts: “Cuando transacciones de similar naturaleza, cuantía, modalidad o simultaneidad, hagan presumir que se trata de una operación fraccionada a los efectos de evitar la aplicación de los controles de monitoreo y/o alerta” (where transactions similar in nature, amount, method or timing suggest an operation split up to avoid monitoring or alert controls) (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 34(b), circumstance 5). The lines a customer may split under are the firm’s own alert lines, the 20 SMVM cash identification line and the 2 SMVM monthly cash reports (art. 39(b)); SMVM is the monthly minimum wage (Salario Mínimo, Vital y Móvil). For public bodies, withdrawals made “de manera fraccionada con el aparente propósito de evitar los controles de monitoreo y/o alerta” (in split amounts, with the apparent aim of avoiding monitoring or alert controls) get special attention (art. 34(d)), and cash deposits and withdrawals need reinforced controls (art. 38). Under UIF Resolution 144/2026, the firm adds up the structured operations of a customer in the simplified income tax regime, and a pattern that looks like deliberate splitting to stay under that regime’s thresholds takes the customer out of its special simplified due diligence (art. 13).

    Reporting deadline

    Money laundering, within 24 hours of concluding that the operation is suspicious, and no later than 90 calendar days from the operation, performed or attempted; terrorist financing and proliferation financing, within 24 hours of the operation (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 36(c)).

  • Mexico. Fintech institutions (crowdfunding and e-money institutions, ITFs) report each quarter every cash operation of USD 5,000 or more, converted at the Banxico rate of the previous banking day (set by law, SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, arts. 2(XXIV) and 66); taking cash at all needs a CNBV authorisation (Fintech Law, art. 45). The provisions also set a quarterly report of every foreign-currency cash operation of USD 500 or more and a monthly report of every international transfer of USD 1,000 or more (arts. 67 and 68), but as of 12 November 2026 no official format for those two reports had been published in the DOF, and under the provisions’ third transitory article they are due only once one is issued. They must follow and group each client’s operations “con independencia del monto” (whatever the amount), with stricter mechanisms once a client’s operations in a calendar month reach 12,500 UDIs (unidades de inversión, investment units whose peso value Banco de México publishes) for crowdfunding or 7,500 UDIs for e-money (set by law, art. 43). Operations in one account in one calendar month adding up to USD 5,500 or more are an unusual-operation circumstance where they are out of profile or “se pueda inferir de su estructuración una posible intención de fraccionar las Operaciones para evitar ser detectadas” (their structure suggests an intention to split them to avoid detection) (art. 70(IV)), and so is a client who tries to evade the reporting parameters (art. 70(VIII)); the automated system must detect the art. 70(IV) operations (art. 56(VI)). These provisions cover fintech institutions only; banks and other sectors have their own provisions and amounts.

    Reporting deadline

    The Communication and Control Committee rules on an unusual operation within 60 calendar days of its detection, and the report goes to SHCP, through the CNBV, within 3 business days of the end of that session; within 24 hours of the alert or staff notice where there are signs or concrete facts that the funds could come from illicit activities or be used for terrorist financing or money laundering (SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, arts. 69 and 73).

False positives and tuning

ShowHide

Common innocent explanations: instalments on a large loan, a salary or rent paid in parts, a small business banking its daily takings, a customer paying several invoices to one supplier, and products sold at a fixed price.

Typical causes of misfires:

  • Own-account movements counted as incoming money. Currency conversions inside a wallet, card balances unloaded back to the wallet, refunds and fees can make up most of the alerts. Excluding the institution’s own internal transaction types removes most of them. List these types before go-live.
  • Fixed prices produce identical amounts. A product sold at a fixed price gives the same amount every time, so a near-identical-amount rule fires on ordinary purchases. Add a minimum total, and exclude known price points.
  • Micro-payments. Repeated tiny payouts and automated top-up loops from business integrations fire variant C with no money-laundering value. A minimum total removes them. Segment business accounts separately.
  • Business clients trading in tranches. Trading and business clients often split one large order into several near-equal tranches a few minutes apart, every time they trade. A minimum total does not remove them because the amounts are large. Compare a business client’s burst with its own history before alerting.
  • Product limits. Where a channel caps a single payment, a customer who needs to send more makes several payments at the cap to the same beneficiary. Exclude amounts equal to a known product limit, or require a higher count for them.
  • Duplicate events. If the source system re-sends the same payment under a new id, counts and sums grow. A sum-under-the-line rule then flags customers who do not reach the line on real money once duplicates are removed. Deduplicate on a stable payment id, and ask the data provider to keep the id when it re-sends.
  • Overlap with the large-transaction rule. Without the “none would be reported alone” condition, the rule mostly re-alerts on customers that a large-single-transaction rule already flagged. With it, the two rules cover different behaviour.
  • Large borrowers repaying normally. Repayments on a large loan in ordinary instalments can cross the line in a month. Compare against the repayment schedule where you have it.
  • Mixed currencies. Similarity and sums computed on raw amounts in different currencies are meaningless. Convert to one currency at a documented rate.

How to tune: segment by customer type (individual, business, platform or API customer), give new accounts a lower count, and keep a list of the institution’s own internal transaction types to exclude. Measure the alert rate on at least one full window of history before going live.

When it fires

ShowHide

Analyst checklist:

  1. List every payment in the window, and the days around it, including payments below the band.
  2. Check whether the amounts cluster just under the line, whether they come from or go to the same counterparty, and whether other customers share the same device, beneficiary or funding source.
  3. Compare the total with the customer’s declared income, business activity and past behaviour.
  4. Ask the customer for the purpose of the payments and evidence of the source of funds (invoices, payslips, loan schedule).
  5. Escalate when there is no economic reason, the explanation keeps changing, or the customer asks how to avoid being reported.

A suspicious transaction report has no minimum amount where the law sets none (Ghana’s FIC states there is no threshold). Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.

Where the linked payments also cross a threshold that the law aggregates (UEMOA linked operations, US cash in one business day, Canada’s 24-hour rule for cash, virtual currency and international transfers, France’s monthly COSI, Argentina’s monthly 2 SMVM cash reports), the threshold report is still due. A suspicious transaction report does not replace it. In Mexico, a client’s monthly total reaching the art. 43 amounts (12,500 or 7,500 UDIs) calls for stricter monitoring and a register of the client’s operations, not a report.

Sources

30 sourcesHide
  1. United States Code, 31 U.S.C. 5324(a), evading the reporting requirements of section 5313(a) and the recordkeeping requirements made under section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act; (a)(3), “structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in structuring, any transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions”. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/5324 (current text, accessed 2026-11-12).
  2. 31 CFR 1010.100(xx), definition of structuring (“one or more transactions in currency”); 31 CFR 1010.311 (CTR, more than USD 10,000); 31 CFR 1010.313(b) (aggregation per business day). https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/31/1010.100 (accessed 2026-11-12).
  3. 31 CFR 1020.320(a)(2) and (b)(3) (bank SAR: USD 5,000, 30 calendar days, up to 60 if no suspect is identified, transactions designed to evade); 31 CFR 1022.320(a)(2) and (b)(3) (MSB SAR: USD 2,000, 30 calendar days). https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/31/1020.320 (accessed 2026-11-12).
  4. FinCEN, “Notice to Customers: A CTR Reference Guide”, including worked examples of structuring. https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/CTRPamphletBW.pdf (accessed 2026-11-01).
  5. Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 (Nigeria), Act No. 14, Official Gazette No. 90 Vol. 109, 13 May 2022: s.2(2), s.7(1)–(2), s.11(1). Copy published by the NFIU: https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/LawsAndRegulations (accessed 2026-11-01).
  6. Union Monétaire Ouest Africaine, Loi uniforme relative à la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux, le financement du terrorisme et de la prolifération (BCEAO, March 2023 text), arts. 2 (point 58), 17 i), 60, 61, 72. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Loi-uniforme-LBCFTFP-Mars-2023-vf.pdf
  7. Décision n°021 du 21/12/2023/CM/UMOA fixant les montants des seuils pour la mise en œuvre de la loi uniforme, arts. 3 and 8. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2024-01/D%C3%A9cision%20N%C2%B021%20du%2021%20d%C3%A9cembre%202023%20fixant%20les%20montants%20seuils%20pour%20la%20mise%20en%20oeuvre%20de%20la%20loi%20uniforme%20relative%20%C3%A0%20la%20LBCFTFP.pdf (official scan; listed at https://www.bceao.int/fr/reglementations/decision-ndeg021-du-21122023cmumoa-fixant-les-montants-des-seuils-pour-la-mise-en)
  8. South Africa, Government Notice 2638, Government Gazette No. 47302, 14 October 2022, Amendments to the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Control Regulations (Regulations 22B and 24(4)), in force 14 November 2022. https://www.treasury.gov.za/legislation/GovernmentNotices/47302%2014-10%20NationalGovernment%20CTR%20Notice.pdf
  9. Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (South Africa), Government Gazette No. 22886, 3 December 2001: s.29(1)(b)(iii) and s.64. https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/a38-010.pdf. Section 64 became s.64(1) when the General Laws (Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Terrorism Financing) Amendment Act 22 of 2022, s.45, added s.64(2) (administrative sanction for institutions): https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/202212/47815anti-moneylaunderingact22of2022.pdf (accessed 2026-11-12).
  10. Financial Intelligence Centre Ghana, “Report Types” (CTR, STR, ECTR). https://fic.gov.gh/report-types.html (undated page, accessed 2026-11-12).
  11. FINTRAC, “Reporting transactions to FINTRAC: The 24-hour rule”, updated 23 October 2023, sections 2–3. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/24hour/1-eng
  12. FINTRAC, “Reporting suspicious transactions to FINTRAC”, modified 22 May 2025 (“Examples of how suspicion may arise”; “as soon as practicable”). https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/str-dod/str-dod-eng
  13. ACPR and Tracfin, “Lignes directrices conjointes … relatives aux obligations de vigilance sur les opérations et aux obligations de déclaration et d’information à Tracfin”, published 23 April 2025 (texts updated to 22 January 2025), paras 194–204. https://acpr.banque-france.fr/system/files/2025-04/20250423_Lignes_directrices_obligations_Tracfin.pdf
  14. Kenya, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism Financing Laws (Amendment) Act 2023 (Act No. 10 of 2023), Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 148, 1 September 2023, substituting POCAMLA s.44(2) and the Fourth Schedule (reporting threshold). https://brs.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/AntiMoneyLaunderingandCombatingofTerrorismFinancingLawsAmendmentAct2023.pdf
  15. FIC South Africa, Guidance Note 4B on reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions and activities, 26 March 2019, para 71 (reporting period, MLTF Control Regulations reg. 24(3)), para 80 (when the period starts) and para 81 (no time added for internal alert review). https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019.03-Guidance-Guidance-Note-4B-STRs.pdf
  16. NFIU, “Guidance to Reporting Institutions on Preparing a Complete Suspicious Transaction / Activity Report and Filing Electronically to the NFIU”, Guidance Note VOL.01/001, May 2023, Introduction. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance?filePath=C%3A%5CNFIU%5Cwwwroot%5Cdocuments%5C2oSF_AEG7DE&fileName=2023%20NFIU%20Guidelines%20on%20STR%20Filing&handler=PreviewFile (accessed 2026-11-12).
  17. NFIU, “Guidelines for the Identification, Verification and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions Related to ML/FT/PF for Financial Institutions”, STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, 13 December 2024, Part Three paras 1–2 and Part Six para 2. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance?filePath=C%3A%5Cinetpub%5Cwwwroot%5CNFIU%5Cwwwroot%5Cdocuments%5CN_BRWMBQ&fileName=Guidelines%20for%20the%20Identification%2C%20Verification%20and%20Reporting%20of%20Suspicious%20Transactions&handler=PreviewFile (accessed 2026-11-12).
  18. Canada, Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations, SOR/2002-184, ss.126–129 (“within 24 consecutive hours”; s.127 international EFTs initiated, s.128 EFTs finally received). https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-2002-184/FullText.html (accessed 2026-11-12).
  19. 31 CFR 1020.410(a) (banks, “a funds transfer in the amount of $3,000 or more”) and 31 CFR 1010.410(e)–(f) (other financial institutions, “a transmittal of funds in the amount of $3,000 or more”). https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/31/1020.410 and https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/31/1010.410 (accessed 2026-11-12). Section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. 1829b(b)(2)–(3) (funds transfer records). https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/1829b
  20. FinCEN, Federal Reserve, FDIC, NCUA and OCC, “Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Suspicious Activity Reporting Requirements”, 9 October 2025, question 1. https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/2025-10/SAR-FAQs-October-2025.pdf (accessed 2026-11-12).
  21. FIC South Africa, Guidance Note 9 on international funds transfer reporting in terms of section 31 of the FIC Act, 17 November 2023, paras 9–14 and 33 (example 7). https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/2023.11-GN-Guidance-note-9.pdf (accessed 2026-11-12).
  22. Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 200/2024 (RESOL-2024-200-APN-UIF#MJ), 18 December 2024, Boletín Oficial no. 35571, 19 December 2024, arts. 34(b) circumstance 5, 34(d), 38 and 39(b); art. 36(c) (report deadlines). https://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/405000-409999/407429/norma.htm
  23. Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 144/2026 (RESOL-2026-144-APN-UIF#MJ), 2 November 2026, art. 13. https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/rs-2026-106193828-apn-uifmj.pdf
  24. Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Mexico), “Disposiciones de carácter general a que se refiere el Artículo 58 de la Ley para Regular las Instituciones de Tecnología Financiera”, DOF 10 September 2018, arts. 2(XXIV), 43, 56(VI), 66 to 68, 70(IV) and 70(VIII), and third transitory article; arts. 69 and 73 (report deadlines). https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5537449&fecha=10/09/2018 (accessed 2026-11-12). With: Ley para Regular las Instituciones de Tecnología Financiera, DOF 9 March 2018, art. 45, https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5515623&fecha=09/03/2018 (accessed 2026-11-12).
  25. FIC South Africa, Directive 5 of 2019 on the usage of an automated transaction monitoring system for the detection and submission of regulatory reports, 29 March 2019, paras 2.1–2.3, 3.1.16 and 3.1.17. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019-DIR-Directive-5-of-2019-ATMS.pdf
  26. FIC South Africa, Public Compliance Communication 45 on Directive 5 of 2019 in relation to the use of automated transaction monitoring systems, 20 March 2020, paras 5–8. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2020.03-PCC-PCC-45-On-Directive-5-of-2019-in-relation-to-the-use-of-ATMS.pdf
  27. BCEAO, Instruction n°001-03-2025 du 18 mars 2025 on AML/CFT/CPF organisation, internal control and compliance of financial institutions, arts. 3, 6 and 15. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-04/Instruction%20n%C2%B0001-03-2025%20du%2018%20mars%2025%20portant%20modalit%C3%A9s%20de%20mise%20en%20oeuvre%20par%20les%20IF%20de%20leurs%20obligations%20en%20mati%C3%A8re%20de%20lutte%20contre%20le%20blanchiment%20de%20capitaux.pdf
  28. Central Bank of Nigeria, Payments System Policy Department, Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, November 2026, issued by circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004 of 5 November 2026, in force that day (circular, section 4.0); sections 10.6.4, 10.7.5, 11.10.15, 26.3.2(b), 26.7.1(c) and 26.11.2. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/REGULATIONS%20FOR%20THE%20OPERATIONS%20OF%20NON-SECURITY%20VIRTUAL%20ASSETS%20IN%20NIGERIA.pdf
  29. Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism / Combating Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Accountable Institutions, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 12 December 2025, 2.4.1(1), 2.8.5.1, 2.8.5.2(3), 3.4(1), 3.8.1.1(d) and Appendix E, red flags 1d, 2d and 3l. https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/BOG-FIC-AML-GUIDELINE-2025-FINAL-5-TO-BE-PUBLISHED.pdf
  30. Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism & Combating the Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Foreign Exchange Bureaux, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 8 January 2026, 3.7(1) and Appendix C, red flag d. https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/AML-CFT-CPF-Guidelines-for-Foreign-Exchange-Bureaus-2025-1.pdf

Ask us

A question about this rule?

A person at Archer reads every question and answers by email.

The Fraud & AML Library is a practical reference, not legal advice. What binds is the regulator’s own text, which every rule and regulation page links.

Get new rules and regulation changes by email

When we add a rule or a regulation changes, we’ll email you.

You can unsubscribe at any time. Privacy policy