Money laundering
Activity in a high-risk area inside the country (border zones)
Operations at agents, merchants, ATMs, or branches inside an area of the country that the law or your own risk assessment treats as higher risk, such as a border zone, that are out of line with what is usual for the customer or the area.
What it catches
Operations carried out in an area inside one country that the law, or the institution’s own risk assessment, treats as higher risk: a border zone, a port of entry, a district with high crime. Groups that smuggle drugs, people or goods across a land border have to place and move cash where they operate, and the agents, exchange offices, merchants and ATMs near the border are where it can enter the financial system. Argentina, the United States, and Mexico name border zones in their law or guidance; what each says is under By country.
The rule is about where inside one country an operation happens. Exposure to a foreign country is a different rule: High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch.
Being in the area is not a signal on its own. Most people who live and trade in a border town are ordinary customers. Where the law names such an area, as Argentina’s does, it asks for operations that are high-volume and out of line with usual practice, not for every operation in the zone.
How the rule works
Two forms, depending on what the law asks for.
Form A, unusual volume in the area (monitoring). Keep a dated list of the areas you treat as higher risk: those set by law (in Argentina, the Border Security Zone) and those your own risk assessment ranks higher. Tag each operation with the area it took place in. Where there is an outlet, the place is clear: the address of the agent, merchant, ATM or branch where it happened. Where there is none, as for operations made in an app, use the device’s location where you hold it, or else the customer’s declared area of activity or address, labelled as a stand-in and kept apart from operation places. The Argentine resolution does not say how to place an operation (see By country). For each customer, add up the operations in listed areas over a window. Alert when the total is above a minimum for the customer’s segment and out of line with what is usual: above the customer’s own history, or above what similar customers in the same area do over the same period. Where you acquire merchants or run an agent network, the merchant or the agent is your customer (in Argentina, the adhered merchant is the customer of the acceptor, acquirer or aggregator, UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 2(f)): compare its volume with its declared expected turnover and with peers in the same area.
Form B, an area reporting line (threshold). Where an authority sets a lower reporting line for an area, flag every operation at a location in the area that meets it, for the report. The US southwest border order is one: in the order in force from 3 September 2026 to 1 March 2027, each cash transaction of $1,000 to $10,000 at a covered business, taken one by one; the order does not change the rule that cash transactions are added together only when they exceed $10,000 in a day (FinCEN FAQs 8 and 14). The amount tested is the cash physically handed over, not the face value of the instrument: a $1,010 cheque cashed for $990 after a fee is not reported, while a $990 cashier’s cheque bought with $1,010 in cash is (FAQ 15). The order leaves out transactions between the covered business and a commercial bank (para 8) and the Postal Service’s sales of postage and philatelic products (para 5), and a refund of a money transfer is not a separate transaction (FAQ 16). Watch for cash split to stay just under $1,000: FinCEN “encourages the voluntary filing of SARs where appropriate to report transactions conducted to evade the $1,000 reporting threshold imposed by the Order” (Federal Register document 2026-18194, Supplementary Information, I. Background).
The card below is form A.
Looks at
Every operation that has a place: cash in and out at agents, card payments at merchants, ATM withdrawals, branch operations, and operations in an app placed by the device’s location or, failing that, by the customer’s declared area of activity, labelled as a stand-in.
Counts as in the area
An operation whose place falls inside an area on your dated list of higher-risk areas.
Measures
The customer’s operations in listed areas in the look-back window, converted to one currency.
Alerts when
Both of these are true:
- The total is at least your minimum for the segment.
- The total is out of line with what is usual: for this customer, judged by its own history and declared expected volume, and for similar customers in the same area over the same period.
How often
At most one alert per customer per look-back window.
Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.
Area list The areas you treat as higher risk, each with its source and the date you took it: areas set by law (in Argentina, the Border Security Zone of Decree 253/2018; in the United States, the ZIP codes of a geographic targeting order) and areas your own risk assessment ranks higher. Re-check it whenever the law or the order changes: a US targeting order lasts at most 180 days unless renewed.
Look-back window No public source gives a value. Use the period your customers’ transactional profiles are set on, and test it on your own data.
Minimum Set per segment and currency from your own spread of amounts in the area. No public source gives a value. Without one, the rule fires on small totals that are only “high” against a quiet history.
Out of line with usual How far above the customer’s own history, or above peers in the same area, counts as out of line. No public source gives a value. Compare with peers over the same period, so that a rise across a whole town does not fire on everyone in it.
Common variants:
- Merchant or agent in the area. The volume of a merchant or agent located in a listed area, against its declared expected turnover, its sector and other merchants or agents in the same area.
- Customer from elsewhere operating in the area. A customer whose address is far from the area but whose cash operations concentrate at agents or ATMs inside it.
- Tighter settings in the area. Instead of a rule of its own, lower the thresholds of other rules (large single transaction, cumulative amount over a period, transaction structuring) for operations in listed areas.
Data it needs
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| Field | Usually comes from | If it’s missing |
|---|---|---|
| Place of the operation (address, postcode or district of the agent, merchant, ATM or branch) | Agent and merchant onboarding, terminal and ATM records | Required. Without it the rule cannot place the operation. Keep the outlet’s address, not only the registered office’s. |
| Area of each place | Your area list, mapped to the location codes you hold | Required. Areas set by law rarely follow postcodes or districts (see “False positives”). |
| Device location | Your app, where the customer allows it | Optional, for operations made in an app. An IP address is often too coarse to place an operation inside a district. Without it, an app operation is placed by the customer’s declared area of activity or address, labelled as a stand-in. |
| Customer id and segment (individual, business, merchant, agent) | Core system, KYC or KYB | Required. The segment sets the minimum and the peer group. |
| Amount, currency, timestamp | Ledger or payment event | Required. Convert to one currency before adding up. For form B, the amount of cash physically handed over, after fees, not the instrument’s face value. |
| Payment method (cash, card, transfer) | Ledger | Needed for form B, which in the US order covers cash only, and to weigh cash apart from electronic payments. |
| Customer’s residential address, declared activity and expected volume | Onboarding, transactional profile | Needed to judge what is usual for the customer, to find customers operating far from home, and to place app operations that have no device location. |
| History of at least one full window | Ledger | Without it every customer looks new and every total looks out of line. |
Thresholds
Each row is a setting the rule needs. Set by law values come from the source named under “Where it comes from”. Suggested values are starting points: test them on your own history, then adjust. Where there is no public value, set it from your own data.
| Parameter | Value | Type | Where it comes from |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States, southwest border: cash transactions to report | $1,000 or more, but not more than $10,000, each transaction, at a money services business located in a listed ZIP code | Set by law | FinCEN geographic targeting order, Federal Register document 2026-18194, paras 1 to 3. In force from 3 September 2026 to 1 March 2027 unless renewed (section C). |
| United States: time to file the report under the order | Within 30 days after the transaction | Set by law | Same order, para 5 (instead of the usual 15 days for a currency transaction report, FinCEN FAQ 3). |
| Argentina: “volumen elevado” (high volume) | No number in the resolution | — | UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 34(b), circumstance 13, sets no amount. Set it from your own data. |
| Minimum per segment | Set per segment and currency from your own spread of amounts in the area | Suggested | No public source gives a value. |
| Out of line with usual | Set from the customer’s own history and from peers in the same area | Suggested | No public source gives a value. |
| Look-back window | The period your transactional profiles are set on | Suggested | No public source gives a value. Test it on your own data. |
By country
Argentina. Payment service providers and non-financial lenders must weigh, when setting alerts, “Operaciones de volumen elevado situadas en la Zona de Seguridad de Fronteras establecidas por el Decreto N° 253/18, que no guarden relación con las prácticas usuales” (high-volume operations located in the Border Security Zone set by Decree 253/18, out of line with usual practice) (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 34(b), circumstance 13); the circumstances are listed by way of example but “deberán valorarse especialmente” (shall be given special weight) (art. 34(b)). The zone is defined in Annex I of Decree 253/2018 (art. 1). The decree redrew that zone “de acuerdo con criterios actuales para la lucha contra el narcotráfico, la trata de personas, el contrabando y otros delitos trasnacionales” (in line with current criteria for fighting drug trafficking, human trafficking, smuggling and other transnational crimes) (Decree 253/2018, recitals). Its land part runs through sixteen provinces, from Entre Ríos to Tierra del Fuego, and there is a maritime-only part in Santa Cruz, Chubut and Río Negro. Its inner line follows national and provincial roads, rivers, a railway, parallels, straight lines between named places and some limits between departments, so it does not match whole departments. It takes in all of Misiones except the municipal area of Posadas, and all of Tierra del Fuego except Ushuaia; it leaves out the municipal areas of Formosa and Río Gallegos, and Rawson from the maritime part; and “Los ejidos municipales de aquellas localidades divididas por el trazado de límite de cualquiera de las dos Zonas establecidas, deberán ser consideradas totalmente incluidas en dichas Zonas” (the municipal areas of places divided by the boundary of either zone are to be treated as wholly inside it) (Annex I, A, B and VII). The decree approves the official maps drawn by the Instituto Geográfico Nacional, one per province (art. 4). The same resolution makes “Zona geográfica” a risk factor of the firm’s self-assessment, “tanto a nivel nacional como internacional” (at both national and international level), taking into account crime rates and the economic and socio-demographic features of the areas; that factor “comprende las zonas en las que opera el Sujeto Obligado, así como aquellas vinculadas al proceso de la operación” (covers the areas where the obligated subject operates and those linked to the process of the operation) (art. 4(d)). The “zona geográfica donde opera” (geographic area where the customer operates) is one of the factors of each customer’s risk rating (art. 26). The resolution does not say where an operation is “situada”: an operation at an agent, merchant, ATM or branch inside the zone is the clear case, and for operations with no outlet, the customer’s declared area of activity is a defensible stand-in, labelled as such. For an acceptor, acquirer or aggregator, the customer is the adhered merchant, not the cardholder (art. 2(f)).
Reporting deadline
Money laundering, within 24 hours of concluding that the operation is suspicious, and no later than 90 calendar days from the operation, performed or attempted; terrorist financing and proliferation financing, within 24 hours of the operation (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 36(c)).
United States. FinCEN first published a geographic targeting order for the southwest border in March 2025 and has renewed it, with changes, since; the values here are those of the order in force from 3 September 2026 to 1 March 2027. That order, issued under 31 U.S.C. 5326 and 31 CFR 1010.370, requires money services businesses located in listed ZIP codes of Cameron, El Paso, Hidalgo, Maverick and Webb counties in Texas and of Bernalillo, Doña Ana and San Juan counties in New Mexico to report each “deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency or other payment or transfer, by, through, or to the Covered Business which involves a transaction in currency, of $1,000 or more, but not more than $10,000”, and to verify the identity of the person presenting it before concluding it (Federal Register document 2026-18194, paras 1 to 3 and 7). FinCEN’s reason: these businesses operate “in a region where drug cartels engaged in drug, human, and weapons trafficking intensively operate and need to move illicit cash domestically and across the border” (FinCEN, FAQs on the southwest border order, 2 September 2026, question 2). The order runs from 3 September 2026 to 1 March 2027 (section C); a targeting order lasts at most 180 days and lapses unless renewed, and the ZIP codes can change from one order to the next. While court injunctions against the March 2025 order remain in force, the money services businesses they protect are outside it (para 1). It covers only the services that make a business a money services business, not, for example, its sales of goods (FAQ 10), and covers the cash leg of a virtual currency transaction (FAQ 17). A covered business must pass the order on to each of its agents located in the area (section G). For banks, the FFIEC examination manual’s quantity-of-risk matrix rates risk moderate where “The bank is located in an HIDTA or an HIFCA” or has “some fund transfers or account relationships that involve HIDTAs or HIFCAs”, and high where it is located in both or “A large number of fund transfers or account relationships involve HIDTAs or HIFCAs” (High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas and High Intensity Financial Crime Areas) (Appendix J). The manual’s risk assessment section looks at “the domestic and international geographic locations where the bank conducts or transacts business” and says the monitoring system “should be risk-based to incorporate any necessary additional screening for higher-risk products, services, customers, and geographic locations as identified by the bank’s BSA/AML risk assessment”.
Reporting deadline
Report under the targeting order: within 30 days after the transaction (the order, para 5). Suspicious transaction report: no later than 30 calendar days after initial detection (31 CFR 1020.320(b)(3) for banks, 1022.320(b)(3) for money services businesses). A bank that has identified no suspect may take 30 more days to identify one, never more than 60 days in all (1020.320(b)(3)); the rule for money services businesses has no such extension.
Mexico. A fintech institution’s risk assessment must consider, among its risk elements, “Países o áreas geográficas” (countries or geographic areas) (SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, art. 4(I)(c)). The CNBV’s methodology guide lists, as indicators for domestic geographic areas, “Incidencia delictiva” (crime incidence), “Nivel de marginación” (level of deprivation) and “Lugares de frontera o con puertos de entrada y salida internacionales” (border places or places with international ports of entry and exit), and, among the areas that may carry a higher risk, “Las áreas geográficas nacionales identificadas por el Sujeto Supervisado como de mayor Riesgo debido a su experiencia previa u otros factores (zonas con altos índices de delincuencia o de marginación, zonas fronterizas, puertos de entrada y salida internacionales, centros financieros importantes, etc.)” (the domestic areas the supervised entity identifies as higher risk from its past experience or other factors: areas with high crime or deprivation, border zones, international ports of entry and exit, major financial centres) (CNBV guide, 2019, section C.I.1, pp. 5 and 7). The guide is one of the guides that institutions “podrán considerar” (may take into account), not a binding rule (SHCP provisions, art. 9). Mexico sets no list of areas and no threshold for them: the areas come from the institution’s own assessment. A fintech institution may take or pay out cash only with a CNBV authorisation (Fintech Law, art. 45), so few of its operations have an outlet to place them by; most are placed by the device’s location or the customer’s declared area (see How the rule works).
Reporting deadline
The Communication and Control Committee rules on an unusual operation within 60 calendar days of its detection, and the report goes to SHCP, through the CNBV, within 3 business days of the end of that session; within 24 hours of the alert or staff notice where there are signs or concrete facts that the funds could come from illicit activities or be used for terrorist financing or money laundering (SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, arts. 69 and 73).
False positives and tuning
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Common innocent explanations: people who live and work in the area; shops, transport firms and farms in a border region whose business is cash-heavy; trade across the border that rises and falls with the exchange rate, harvests and holidays; a merchant or agent that has grown or opened a new outlet; a customer who has moved to the area.
Typical causes of misfires:
- Location alone. A rule that fires on any operation in a listed area flags everyone who lives there. The Argentine circumstance asks for high volume out of line with usual practice; the area narrows where to look, and the volume test decides.
- The whole area moves at once. Seasonal trade and exchange-rate swings can lift a whole border town’s volumes together. Compare each customer with peers in the same area over the same period, not only with its own past.
- Area boundaries that do not match your codes. Argentina’s Border Security Zone follows roads, rivers and departmental limits, so a department or a postcode can lie partly inside it, and some cities inside the line are left out. The US order lists ZIP codes, not whole counties. Map each agent, merchant and ATM to the area from the official text or map, record how each doubtful place was decided, and do not stand in a county or department for the listed area.
- The place you hold is not where the operation happened. A merchant’s registered office is not its outlet; agents move; app operations without a device location have no place of their own, and the customer’s declared area or address standing in for one says where the customer lives or works, not where the money moved. Say which place each operation is tagged with, and keep stand-ins apart from operation places.
- Stale lists. Area lists change: Decree 253/2018 replaced the 1994 delimitation, and each US targeting order lasts at most 180 days and lapses unless renewed; the southwest border order was “renewed, with modifications” on 2 September 2026 (FinCEN FAQs). Keep the source and date with the list, and check it on each renewal.
- Broad designations. An area that covers most of your customers in a region tells you little on its own. Argentina’s Border Security Zone also has a maritime part along the Patagonian coast, so it takes in coastal and port towns whose ordinary trade has nothing to do with a land border. Combine the area with volume against the usual, or use it to tighten other rules’ settings.
How to tune: place operations by the outlet, ATM or agent, not by the customer’s address; map the area from its official text; compare with the customer’s history and with peers in the same area and period; set the minimum per segment; give merchants and agents their own segment, judged against their declared expected turnover; and keep the area list dated and sourced.
When it fires
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Analyst checklist:
- Confirm the place the operation was tagged with, which source puts that place in the area, and the date of the list.
- Compare the total with the customer’s own history, declared activity and expected volume, and with similar customers in the same area over the same period.
- Look at the operations: cash or electronic, round amounts, many cash operations at several agents or just under a reporting line (see Transaction structuring), who the counterparties are, and whether money crosses the border (see High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch).
- For a merchant or agent: compare with its declared turnover, sector and outlet, and with other merchants or agents nearby.
- Ask the customer about the source of the cash, the reason for the activity in the area, and any change in its business.
- Escalate when the volume can’t be explained by the customer’s activity or the area’s ordinary business.
An alert is a reason to review, not a suspicion in itself. In Argentina’s terms, an alert identifies a possible unusual operation, which is analysed and recorded; an unusual operation the analysis cannot justify becomes a suspicious operation to report (UIF Resolution 200/2024, arts. 2(n), 2(l), 34 to 36). Form B is different: the US order’s report is filed for every covered transaction, whatever the explanation, and a suspicious transaction report is still filed where it applies. Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.
Related rules
- High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch: foreign countries; this rule covers areas inside one country.
- Sudden change from a customer’s baseline: the same comparison with the customer’s own history, without the area.
- Cumulative amount over a period and Large single transaction: amounts that can be set lower for listed areas.
- Transaction structuring (smurfing): cash split to stay under an area’s reporting line.
Sources
11 sourcesHide
- Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 200/2024 (RESOL-2024-200-APN-UIF#MJ), 18 December 2024, Boletín Oficial no. 35571, 19 December 2024, arts. 2(f), 2(l), 2(n), 4(d), 26, 34(b) (circumstance 13) and 36(c). Text on Argentina.gob.ar (Ministerio de Justicia, legislation database), licensed CC BY 4.0. https://www.argentina.gob.ar/normativa/nacional/resoluci%C3%B3n-200-2024-407429/texto
- Presidencia de la Nación (Argentina), Ministerio de Seguridad, Decreto 253/2018, Zonas de Seguridad de Fronteras. Apruébase Cartografía Oficial. Facultades, 27 March 2018, Boletín Oficial no. 33841, 28 March 2018, p. 12: recitals and arts. 1 and 4. Text on Argentina.gob.ar, licensed CC BY 4.0. https://www.argentina.gob.ar/normativa/nacional/norma-308249/texto
- Decreto 253/2018, Annex I (IF-2018-12720620-APN-UCG#MSG), “Descripción”, parts A, B (I to VI) and VII. Argentina.gob.ar, licensed CC BY 4.0. https://www.argentina.gob.ar/normativa/308249_dec253-1_pdf/archivo
- FinCEN, Geographic Targeting Order Imposing Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements on Certain Money Services Businesses Along the Southwest Border, 2 September 2026, Federal Register document 2026-18194, published 4 September 2026: Supplementary Information, I. Background; II. Geographic Targeting Order, paras 1 to 3, 5, 7 and 8, and sections C and G. https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2026-18194
- FinCEN, Frequently Asked Questions: Issuance of a Geographic Targeting Order Imposing Additional Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements on Certain Money Services Businesses Along the Southwest Border, 2 September 2026, preamble and questions 1, 2, 3, 8, 10, 14, 15, 16 and 17. https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/2026-03/SWB-GTO-FAQs.pdf
- 31 CFR 1022.320(b)(3) (money services businesses) and 1020.320(b)(3) (banks), suspicious activity report deadlines. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-X/part-1022/subpart-C/section-1022.320
- FFIEC, BSA/AML Examination Manual, “BSA/AML Risk Assessment”. https://bsaaml.ffiec.gov/manual/BSAAMLRiskAssessment/01
- FFIEC, BSA/AML Examination Manual, “Appendix J – Quantity of Risk Matrix”. https://bsaaml.ffiec.gov/manual/Appendices/11
- Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Mexico), Disposiciones de carácter general a que se refiere el Artículo 58 de la Ley para Regular las Instituciones de Tecnología Financiera, DOF 10 September 2018, arts. 4(I)(c), 9, 69 and 73. https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5537449&fecha=10/09/2018
- Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (Mexico), Guía para la elaboración de una metodología de evaluación de riesgos en materia de prevención de operaciones con recursos de procedencia ilícita y financiamiento al terrorismo, 6 September 2019, section C.I.1 (table of risk elements, p. 5; “Países o áreas geográficas”, item d), p. 7). https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/491487/Guia_para_la_Metodologia_de_Evaluacion_2019.pdf
- Ley para Regular las Instituciones de Tecnología Financiera (Mexico), DOF 9 March 2018, art. 45. https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5515623&fecha=09/03/2018
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