Screening
Sanctions screening
Customers, their owners, and the other party to a payment checked against sanctions lists at onboarding, when the lists change, and before a payment goes out.
What it catches
A customer, a customer’s owner or director, or the other party to a payment whose name matches a person or entity on a sanctions list (the UN Security Council Consolidated List, and the national and regional lists that apply to you). Sanctioned persons use ordinary accounts, wallets and beneficiaries to move or receive money; dealing with them is a legal breach in itself, whatever the amount. Unlike most rules in this library, the obligation here is not to judge whether activity is suspicious but to find the person, freeze, and report.
It also catches an organisation that is not on any list but is owned or controlled by a listed person, or acts on their behalf. The freeze covers its funds too: Nigeria’s law extends it to funds “wholly or jointly owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by designated persons or entities” (TPPA 2022 s.54(2)(b)), and in the UK such entities “may not be designated in their own right, so their names may not appear on the sanctions list. However, those entities are similarly subject to financial sanctions” (OFSI general guidance, chapter 4). So a match on an owner or director is a match on the organisation, once the ownership or control test of your country is met (see “Thresholds”).
How the rule works
Each name you hold is compared with the list entries using a name-matching algorithm that tolerates spelling, transliteration and word-order differences (“fuzzy matching”). Wallet addresses, where the lists carry them, are compared exactly. A candidate match is then checked against the other identifiers on the list entry, such as date of birth, nationality and country. A detail that rules the person out clears it; agreement strengthens it. What remains goes to an analyst, and a payment involving a possible match is held until the analyst decides.
Screening runs at five points: when a customer is onboarded, when a list changes (the whole customer base, not only new customers), when a customer’s identifying data changes, when a beneficiary is added, and on each outgoing payment before the funds leave.
Runs when
- A customer is onboarded.
- A customer’s identifying details change.
- A sanctions list changes. Every customer is screened again, not only new ones.
- A beneficiary is added.
- A payment is started, before the money leaves.
Screens
The customer, their beneficial owners and directors, and the other party to a payment, with the banks or wallet providers on both sides and the payment’s reference text.
Every name held for each of them is compared with the lists that apply to you, as a person or as an organisation. For crypto transfers, the wallet addresses on both sides are compared with the addresses the lists carry.
Keeps a match only if
All of these are true:
- The names are close enough: the match score is at or above your match threshold.
- The match does not rest on a weak alias, a broad or generic name that the list itself marks as weak.
- No detail rules it out: a date of birth that differs from every date the entry gives (some give several, or only a year), or a different nationality, country or ID number. An exact or near-exact name match with only one detail against it is kept for an analyst.
Alerts when
At least one match is kept. The alert shows who was screened, the possible matches, the list, and the details that were compared. A match on an owner or director is raised on the organisation too.
Holds
If a payment started the check, the payment is held until an analyst decides the alert.
Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.
Lists that apply to you The sanctions lists you are bound by in each country you operate in, starting with the UN Consolidated List. See “By country” below.
Match threshold How close a name must be to count as a possible match. Start in the upper band of your tool’s scale, then set your own by testing: scores do not carry over between tools.
Data it needs
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| Field | Usually comes from | If it’s missing |
|---|---|---|
| Full legal name, and every other name the customer gives | KYC at onboarding | The customer can’t be screened. Treat “not screened” as its own state, never as “clear”. |
| Date of birth | KYC, ID document | Matches can’t be cleared on age, so alert volume rises. Screen anyway; re-screen when the date of birth arrives. |
| Nationality, country of residence | KYC | Same as date of birth: less clearing power. |
| Person or organisation | Customer type | Organisations should be screened against organisation entries; mixing the two adds noise. |
| Beneficial owners and directors (names, dates of birth) | Business onboarding, company and beneficial ownership registers | An organisation owned or controlled by a listed person passes as clear. |
| Wallet address (crypto transfers) | Transfer instruction, travel-rule data | Addresses the lists carry are missed. |
| Counterparty name (beneficiary or sender) | Payment instruction, saved beneficiary | Without it only your own customers are screened, not who they pay. |
| Counterparty bank or wallet provider (BIC, institution name) | Payment instruction | Institution-level sanctions are missed. |
| Payment reference / free text | Payment instruction | Names mentioned only in the reference are missed. |
| Event time | Your system | Needed to prove you screened before the payment executed and within the deadline after a list change. |
Thresholds
Each row is a setting the rule needs. Set by law and Standard values come from the source named under “Where it comes from”. Suggested values are starting points: test them on your own history, then adjust.
| Parameter | Value | Type | Where it comes from |
|---|---|---|---|
| Name-match strictness | The upper band of your tool’s scale. Scores do not transfer between tools, so set your own floor by testing. | Suggested | EBA/GL/2024/15 para 24(a) asks you to set it by measuring true positives at different match percentages. Moves with: how name-dense the lists are, whether you hold date of birth, and the list (see “By country”). |
| Identifiers used to clear a match | Date of birth (every date the entry gives), nationality, country, ID number, residence, when both sides carry them | Standard | EBA/GL/2024/15 para 34 (additional information to use “when in doubt about the trueness of a match”: identification data, residence, nationalities); OFAC FAQ 5, Step 3 (compare dates of birth, ID numbers, nationality and addresses). In Nigeria, the CBN lists the identifiers a confirmed match must agree on (TFS guidance, December 2022, §4.2.2). |
| Weak aliases | Not screened, or screened only exactly | Suggested | Wolfsberg Sanctions Screening Guidance (2019), §6.3: “It is not expected, nor is it typically productive, to screen against weak aliases.” OFAC FAQ 5, Step 3: “Some listed aliases may be classified by OFAC as ‘weak aliases’”, and a screening tool may leave them out as a risk-based decision. UN entries mark them “Low quality a.k.a.”. In the EU, EBA/GL/2024/15 para 17(c) expects aliases on the lists to be screened and asks you to justify any choice not to, in your restrictive measures exposure assessment. |
| Ownership that puts an unlisted organisation under the freeze | United States: owned 50 percent or more in the aggregate by one or more blocked persons (ownership only). EU: owned or controlled, under the EU Council’s criteria. Nigeria, Kenya, UK: owned or controlled, directly or indirectly. | Set by law | OFAC FAQ 399 (“applies to entities owned 50 percent or more in the aggregate by one or more blocked persons”) and FAQ 398 (ownership, not control); EBA/GL/2024/15 paras 36–37; TPPA 2022 s.54(2)(b); Kenya TFS Notice No. 10 of 2026 §§3.2(ii), 3.3(ii); OFSI general guidance, chapter 4. |
| Apply a list change to existing customers | Within 24 hours where the law sets a limit; “without delay” elsewhere | Set by law | UEMOA: BCEAO Instruction 001-03-2025, art. 6 (art. 15 for bureaux de change) and art. 2, point 23 (“sans délai” = 24 hours at most). Nigeria: CBN TFS guidance (December 2022) §4.2 (screen “immediately and without delay” to freeze “within 24 hours”, and screen “their entire customer base”); TPPA 2022 s.54(1) and (5) (freeze “immediately”, meaning “not later than 24 hours”). FATF Glossary: “without delay” means “ideally, within a matter of hours of a designation”. Argentina: the RePET is checked “en forma permanente” (continuously), and a match is frozen “sin demora e inaudita parte” (without delay and without notice to the party) (UIF Resolution 200/2024 art. 8(b); Resolution 207/2025 art. 3). |
| Screening point for payments | Before the funds are made available to the payee | Standard | EBA/GL/2024/15 para 19; Wolfsberg (2019) §5.3. |
| Value floor | None. Any amount. | Standard | FATF R.6 and R.7 apply to “funds or other assets”, with no minimum. |
By country
UN and FATF (everywhere). FATF Recommendations 6 and 7 require countries to freeze “without delay” the assets of persons designated by the UN Security Council, and Recommendation 16 requires institutions processing payments to “take freezing action and … prohibit conducting transactions with designated persons and entities”. The UN Consolidated List is “an amalgamation of all Committee-specific sanctions lists” (FIC South Africa, TFS manual §1.5).
Nigeria. Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.54 for terrorism designations and s.61, with the same duties, for proliferation-financing designations. On publication of the UN Consolidated List and the Nigeria Sanctions List, financial institutions must “immediately, identify and freeze, without prior notice” the designated person’s funds and report to the Nigeria Sanctions Committee, report assets frozen and actions taken “including attempted transactions”, “immediately file a Suspicious Transactions Report to the NFIU”, and “report as a Suspicious Transactions Report to the NFIU, all cases of name matching in financial transactions prior to or after receipt of the Nigerian Sanctions List” (s.54(1)(a)–(d)). The freeze extends to funds owned or controlled by designated persons, directly or indirectly, and to persons acting on their behalf (s.54(2)). “Immediately” means “not later than 24 hours” (s.54(5)), and institutions must monitor accounts and transactions against both lists (s.54(6)). The CBN’s guidance on targeted financial sanctions (December 2022) sets the procedure. Screen at onboarding, on an occasional transaction, “before carrying out any transaction” and when KYC changes, and screen the entire customer base so a freeze lands “within 24 hours” (§4.2). A confirmed match is one that matches “all the key identifiers”; it is frozen and reported to the Sanctions Committee within 24 hours (§4.2.2). A false positive needs no sanctions measures, but the evidence is kept (§4.2.3). A potential match the institution cannot resolve is suspended and reported to the Sanctions Committee, and stays suspended until it answers (§4.2.4). Neither text defines “name matching”; the CBN repeats the duty under confirmed matches (§4.2.2). Agree with your MLRO and supervisor which matches it covers. The national list is the Nigeria Sanctions List (nigsac.gov.ng). For stablecoin issuers and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) licensed by the CBN, its Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria (in force 5 November 2026) extend screening to wallets: customers, beneficial owners, representatives, “counterparties and wallet addresses” are screened “at onboarding, before processing each transaction and whenever the lists are updated” against the UN Security Council Consolidated List and the Nigeria Sanctions List (section 26.8.1). Once the licensee identifies virtual assets or funds owned or controlled by a designated person, or by someone acting for one, they are frozen “without delay and without prior notice” and reported to the Nigeria Sanctions Committee and the NFIU, “including any attempted transactions” (section 26.8.2). A licensee documents whether to screen the OFAC, EU and UK lists, and a match on them triggers enhanced due diligence (section 26.8.4). The monitoring system alerts on wallets on a sanctions list (section 26.7.1(b)), and an alert on a possible sanctions match is reviewed “within twenty-four (24) hours” (section 26.7.2). Virtual asset transfers screen the originator, beneficiary and wallet addresses (section 26.14.11), and a stablecoin issuer monitors every wallet holding its stablecoin, “whether or not the holder is its customer” (section 26.19.1). A bank issuing deposit money tokens screens before transfers involving persons “not appropriately identified or verified” (section 46.2).
Reporting deadline
Freeze and report to the Sanctions Committee within 24 hours, file an STR with the NFIU immediately, and report name matches to the NFIU as STRs (TPPA 2022 ss.54, 61; CBN TFS guidance §4.2.2).
Kenya. The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012 and the POT (Implementation of UNSC Resolutions) Regulations 2024. TFS notices circulated through the Financial Reporting Centre instruct reporting institutions to keep funds frozen without prior notice and to report frozen assets and actions taken, including attempted transactions, to the Counter Financing of Terrorism Inter-Ministerial Committee “within twenty-four hours” (TFS Notice No. 10 of 2026, §§3.2, 3.5). An STR under POCAMLA s.44 is separate (§3.6), and is due “within two days after the suspicion arose” (s.44(2), as amended by Act No. 10 of 2023).
Reporting deadline
Report frozen assets within 24 hours (TFS notices) and file any STR within two days after the suspicion arose (POCAMLA s.44(2), as replaced by the AML/CFT Laws (Amendment) Act 2023).
South Africa. FIC Act ss.26A–26C. The FIC’s TFS list replicates the UN list and “is updated within 24 hours upon changes made by the UNSC”. Screening “should be done during the client take-on process, on an ongoing basis and when the UNSC adopts new TFS measures”. Relying on a commercial screening tool “would not be a defence” against a criminal charge. Where it is unclear whether a client matches, an institution “may request the assistance of the FIC through a public query process”, which does not replace its reporting obligation. A terrorist property report under s.28A is due “as soon as possible but no later than five days”; an STR under s.29 within 15 working days (FIC TFS manual, October 2023, §§2.1, 2.4, 2.5, 2.9).
Reporting deadline
Terrorist property report within 5 days (FIC), and any STR as soon as possible and no later than 15 days excluding weekends and public holidays (FIC Act s.29; MLTF Control Regulations, reg. 24(3), via FIC Guidance Note 4B para 71).
Ghana. Institutions licensed by the Bank of Ghana screen customers “at onboarding and against all domestic, international sanctions lists and internal list developed by the AI”, and screen existing customers “based on transaction patterns and the receipt of new international sanctions list” from the UN Security Council, OFAC, the EU, His Majesty’s Treasury, the African Union and ECOWAS (set by law, BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.4.2(8) and (9)). “Terrorist screening is not a risk-based due diligence measure and must be carried out regardless of the customer’s risk profile”, against lists kept up to date (2.9(6)). Policies must provide for “Continuous risk-based screening of customer records”, “Immediate screening of one-off or occasional transactions before the transaction is completed”, and screening of payment messages and of the payment details on wire transfers (2.9(7)); payment instructions are screened “prior to their execution” (2.10(3)). When a designated person or entity has funds with the institution, or tries to transact, the institution reports to the FIC immediately (2.9(2)), does not enter into or continue the transaction, and keeps the funds frozen (2.9(3)). The automated monitoring tool must be “Embedded with sanction screening tools” (2.8.6.1(5)(iv)). VASPs freeze and refuse transactions with wallets, addresses, persons or entities on the OFAC Specially Designated Nationals list and report to the FIC within 24 hours (2.6.4(11)).
WAEMU (UEMOA). BCEAO Instruction 001-03-2025 (18 March 2025), art. 6: the institution’s information system must allow “le filtrage en temps réel des clients et des transactions” and must apply changes to targeted financial sanctions “sans délai”, defined (art. 2, point 23) as 24 hours at most, under art. 89 of the Loi uniforme LBC/FT/FP. Art. 6 is in the instruction’s Title I, which binds credit institutions, financial companies, microfinance institutions, e-money institutions, payment institutions and fintechs (art. 3); licensed bureaux de change have the same 24-hour duty for their own information system (art. 15). The Loi uniforme (2023 text, as adopted by each member state): freeze “immédiatement … sans en informer au préalable leurs titulaires” (art. 89); notify the CENTIF immediately and declare frozen assets and measures taken, “y compris les tentatives d’opérations”, to the competent authority (art. 90); suspend a customer’s order in favour of a designated person and inform the competent authority “sans délai” (art. 91). WAEMU (UEMOA in French) is the West African Economic and Monetary Union: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, the same eight states that form the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). The BCEAO’s instructions and the Council of Ministers’ decisions cited here apply in all eight. The uniform law applies in each state through that state’s own act, which may number its articles differently. The law of a single state is covered only where that state is named.
Reporting deadline
Freeze immediately, notify the CENTIF immediately, suspend the order and inform the competent authority without delay (Loi uniforme arts. 89–91).
EU and France. EBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2024/15, applicable from 30 December 2025, for PSPs and crypto-asset service providers: screen the whole customer base regularly and on trigger events (a new or changed designation, onboarding, a change of name, residence or nationality, reasonable grounds to suspect circumvention); screen beneficial owners; screen all parties to a transfer, their institutions, the free text and, for crypto-assets, listed wallet addresses, before the funds reach the payee; calibrate fuzzy matching and document why; assess whether an organisation is owned or controlled by a designated person under the EU Council’s criteria (paras 15–21, 24, 36–37). For SEPA instant credit transfers, Regulation (EU) 2024/886 replaces per-transaction screening against EU targeted sanctions with at least daily screening of your own customers (EBA/GL/2024/15 para 19 and the final report’s feedback section). That prohibition is “without prejudice to” screening against national measures, such as France’s, and EU measures that are not targeted financial sanctions; and a payment’s details may still be checked where the daily customer screening cannot cover the payee (same feedback section, citing the Commission’s answer to question 166). In France, the DG Trésor’s national register of asset freezes includes UN, EU and purely French measures, which apply “sans délai” (Code monétaire et financier, art. L562-4); the DG Trésor asks you to keep a record of every search, including those with no result.
United States. OFAC FAQ 5 (updated 9 September 2026) sets out how to judge a name match: review the full list entry, ask whether “only the first or last name match”, compare dates of birth, ID numbers and nationalities, and report blocked or rejected transactions to OFAC within 10 business days (Step 6; 31 CFR 501.603 for blocked property, 501.604 for rejected transactions). Entities owned 50 percent or more in the aggregate by blocked persons are blocked too (FAQ 399). OFAC may add digital currency addresses to the SDN List, and those listings are “not likely to be exhaustive” (FAQ 562).
Reporting deadline
Blocked or rejected transaction reports within 10 business days (OFAC FAQ 5; 31 CFR 501.603, 501.604).
United Kingdom. Since 28 January 2026 the UK Sanctions List is the only source of UK designations; the OFSI Consolidated List has closed (gov.uk). Relevant firms, which include money transmitters, cryptoasset exchange providers and custodian wallet providers, must “inform OFSI as soon as practicable if they know or reasonably suspect a person is a designated person”, and for a customer state the funds held for them; a suspicious activity report to the NCA “does not meet your reporting obligations under financial sanctions” (OFSI, UK financial sanctions general guidance, updated 12 May 2026, §§5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.9).
Reporting deadline
Inform OFSI as soon as practicable (OFSI general guidance §5.1.1).
Argentina. Payment service providers and non-financial lenders must make sure customers and beneficial owners are not on the RePET, the public register of persons and entities linked to terrorism and its financing, “antes de iniciar la relación comercial” (before starting the business relationship), and must check it “en forma permanente” (continuously) (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 8(a) and (b)). The Compliance Officer checks it against “candidatos a clientes, clientes, beneficiarios finales y destinatarios de transferencias internacionales” (prospective customers, customers, beneficial owners and recipients of international transfers) (art. 12(m)). Where the assets of an operation belong to, or are controlled by, a person designated by the UN Security Council under Resolution 1267 (1999) or by the national executive, or a designated person carries out the operation or receives it, the firm freezes the assets involved “sin demora e inaudita parte” (without delay and without notice to the party), informs the UIF immediately and files a terrorist financing report within 24 hours of the operation (UIF Resolution 207/2025, arts. 1 to 3). UIF Resolution 3/2026 does the same for persons designated under the UN proliferation resolutions and requires the UN sanctions lists to be checked “regular y periódicamente” (regularly and periodically) (arts. 2 to 4).
Reporting deadline
Freeze without delay and without notice to the party, inform the UIF immediately and file a terrorist financing report within 24 hours of the operation (UIF Resolution 207/2025, arts. 1 to 3; Resolution 3/2026 for proliferation designations).
Mexico. SHCP makes the Lista de Personas Bloqueadas (Blocked Persons List) and its updates available to fintech institutions (crowdfunding and e-money institutions, ITFs) through the CNBV; it can include persons on lists derived from UN Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001) and later ones, persons named by foreign authorities under Mexico’s agreements, and persons Mexican authorities link to terrorist financing or money laundering (SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, arts. 60 and 61). Institutions must identify clients, and anyone acting on their behalf, who are on the list, and the operations they have carried out, carry out or intend to carry out (art. 60). On a match they must “Suspender de manera inmediata” (suspend immediately) every act, operation or service with the client, send an unusual-operation report within 24 hours with the legend “Lista de Personas Bloqueadas”, and tell the client in writing of the grounds and of its right to be heard within ten business days (art. 62); they resume at once when the person is removed (art. 64). Operations for a listed client are an unusual-operation circumstance (art. 70(XIV)), operations before the list was notified, or by third parties for a listed person, go on a 24-hour report (art. 73), and the automated system must alert on operations intended with listed persons (art. 56(XIII)). Staff must not tell clients or third parties what the list contains, beyond that notice (art. 58).
Reporting deadline
Suspend at once and send an unusual-operation report within 24 hours with the legend “Lista de Personas Bloqueadas” (SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, art. 62).
False positives and tuning
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- Common names against name-dense lists. The largest source of noise. Very common given names and patronymics, especially transliterated ones, appear in many entries across several large lists. With a loose name score, alerts cluster at the lowest passing score, each customer matching several unrelated listed people. Raising the floor removes most of them and keeps exact matches. The CBN describes the mechanism: a false positive arises “due to the common nature of the name or due to ambiguous identifying data”, and “due to prevalence of some names, FIs may find various potential matches” (TFS guidance, December 2022, §§4.2.3, 4.2.4).
- The same namesake on every re-screen. Re-screening the whole base on every list change raises the same cleared namesakes each time. Keep a documented list of matches an analyst has cleared, tied to the list entry and the customer data that cleared them, and review it when that entry or the customer’s data changes (EBA/GL/2024/15 para 13; Wolfsberg (2019) §6, “Whitelisting”). Screen a repeated name once, not once per record: where a platform passes its own business name as the customer name on every end user it serves, one list match becomes an alert for every end user.
- Contradictions are only as good as the data on both sides. List entries can give several dates of birth, only a year, or a date amended after listing (the UN amended the date of birth of one entry on 8 July 2026, as circulated in Kenya’s TFS Notice No. 10 of 2026), and a customer’s own date of birth can be wrong. Compare against every date the entry gives, send an exact or near-exact name match with one contradicting detail to an analyst rather than clearing it automatically, and re-screen when an entry is amended, not only when names are added.
- Which lists are in the bundle. Some “sanctions” data collections also include export-control, trade and national terrorism lists. A common practice failure is screening against all of them at the same strictness. Export-control entries can carry generic aliases (such as a common first name repeated twice) and no date of birth or nationality, so they match customers exactly and cannot be cleared. Decide list by list which to screen, how strictly, and with which aliases. Wolfsberg (2019) §6 treats exact versus fuzzy per list as a decision you document.
- Name order. Local records often reorder names. A strict setting that only fires on exact matches can miss a listed person who signs up with their names in a different order, including on your own national list. If you tighten globally, consider a looser match on the lists most relevant to your market and accept the extra review.
- Date of birth as a gate removes screening. If date of birth is held for only a minority of customers, requiring it before screening leaves most customers unscreened. Use it to clear contradicting matches, not as a precondition.
- Screening before the identifiers arrive. Where onboarding sends the name first and the date of birth minutes later, screening at the first event cannot use the date of birth. Re-screen when identifying data changes (this is also an EBA trigger event).
- Data that isn’t the customer’s name. A second person’s name stored in a customer name field gets screened as if it were the customer. A crypto beneficiary “name” is often the customer’s own label for an address, not anyone’s legal name. Internal test accounts and short business names or acronyms match organisation entries.
- Beneficiaries carry less data. Saved beneficiaries usually have a name and a country but no date of birth, so beneficiary screening is name-led and noisier than customer screening. Budget review time for it.
- Measure before you switch. Screening depends on the list as it stood on the day, so past alerts are a poor guide to new settings. Replay a sample of real customers through the exact settings, or run the new settings in shadow next to the old ones, and classify every hit before switching.
When it fires
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- Open the full list entry, not only the matched name: all aliases, every date and place of birth, nationality, ID numbers, addresses, the list and the programme, and when the entry was last amended.
- Compare each identifier with what you hold (OFAC FAQ 5, Step 3; EBA/GL/2024/15 para 34). A date of birth or nationality that differs from everything the entry gives usually clears the match; one difference on an otherwise exact name match deserves a second look, since list dates can be approximate or amended and your own data can be wrong. If you hold too little to decide, ask the customer for it (ID document, date of birth) before releasing any held payment; the CBN expects institutions to “obtain additional information and identification documents from the customer” (TFS guidance §4.2.3). The EBA asks PSPs to “refrain from providing financial services to a party to a transfer before coming to an informed decision” (EBA/GL/2024/15 para 35).
- If the match is on an owner, director or controller, assess whether the organisation is owned or controlled by the listed person under your country’s test (see “Thresholds”). If it is, treat it as a match on the organisation.
- Record the decision and the evidence, whichever way it goes.
- On a match you cannot resolve: hold the payment or the service and do not release it until you have decided. Where an authority takes queries, refer it: in Nigeria the transaction stays suspended and the case goes to the Sanctions Committee (CBN TFS guidance §4.2.4); in South Africa, the FIC’s public query process (TFS manual §2.5).
- On a confirmed match: freeze without prior notice, do not process the payment, escalate to the MLRO, and report under your country’s rules. Each country’s deadlines are under By country.
- Don’t warn the customer before a freeze, and never disclose a suspicious transaction report. Asking for identity documents to resolve a match is normal.
Related rules
- PEP screening: the same matching problem, different lists and a different obligation.
- High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch: country-level exposure, including comprehensively sanctioned countries.
- Blacklist / internal watchlist match: exact matching on your own lists of accounts and wallets.
- Adverse media screening (negative news): the same names checked against published news rather than official lists.
- Mixer, tumbler, and privacy-coin exposure: exposure to mixers found with blockchain analytics; a mixer on a sanctions list is a match for this rule.
- Missing originator or beneficiary information (Travel Rule): makes sure a transfer carries the names and wallet addresses screened here.
- Transfers with unlicensed or high-risk counterparty VASPs: the due diligence on a counterparty crypto provider, which includes screening it, its owners and its wallet addresses.
- Chain-hopping and cross-chain bridge use: crypto moved across networks or assets, where the address on the far side of a bridge can be a sanctioned one.
- Unhosted wallet exposure (self-hosted wallets): a transfer with a self-hosted wallet, whose address is screened like any other party’s.
Sources
25 sourcesHide
Primary:
- FATF, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation (The FATF Recommendations), October 2025 edition. Recommendations 6, 7 and 16; Interpretive Note to R.6, para 6(a)–(d); Glossary, “Without delay”. The FATF updated R.6 again in June 2026 to add a humanitarian exemption (FIC South Africa, notice of 22 June 2026); check paragraph numbers against the current edition. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Fatf-recommendations.html (copy read: https://www.cr.gov.hk/en/compliance/aml_cft/FATF/FATF_Recommendations.pdf)
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Financial Policy and Regulation Department, Guidance on Targeted Financial Sanctions related to Terrorism and Terrorism Financing, December 2022, §§4.2–4.3. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2022/FPRD/TFS%20TERRORISM%20AND%20TERRORISM%20FINANCING.pdf
- Financial Intelligence Centre (South Africa), Targeted Financial Sanctions Manual, October 2023, §§1.5, 2.1, 2.4, 2.5, 2.9. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Targeted-financial-sanctions-manual-.pdf
- Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act, 2022 (Act No. 15 of 2022), ss.54 and 61. Published by the NFIU: https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/LawsAndRegulations (copy read: https://p.placbillstrack.org/9th/upload/Terrorism-Prevention-and-Prohibition-Act-2022.pdf)
- Securities and Exchange Commission Nigeria, Circular on designation of ten individuals and three entities by the Nigeria Sanctions Committee, 10 November 2022 (ref. NSC/SEC/MON/AML/CFT/112022/02), citing TPPA 2022 ss.49 and 54. https://www.sec.gov.ng/for-investors/keep-track-of-circulars/circular-on-designation-of-ten-individuals-and-three-entities-by-the-national-sanctions-committee-and-addition-to-the-nigeria-sanctions-list/
- Financial Reporting Centre (Kenya), Targeted Financial Sanctions Notice No. 10 of 2026, 9 July 2026, §§1.1, 3.2–3.6 and Annex 1. https://lsk.or.ke/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/TFS-NOTICE-NO.-10-OF-2026.pdf (copy on the Law Society of Kenya site; the FRC’s list page is https://www.frc.go.ke/?page_id=193)
- BCEAO, Instruction n°001-03-2025 du 18 mars 2025 on AML/CFT/CPF organisation, internal control and compliance of financial institutions, art. 2, point 23, art. 3, art. 6, art. 15. Published by the BCEAO: https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-04/Instruction%20n%C2%B0001-03-2025%20du%2018%20mars%2025%20portant%20modalit%C3%A9s%20de%20mise%20en%20oeuvre%20par%20les%20IF%20de%20leurs%20obligations%20en%20mati%C3%A8re%20de%20lutte%20contre%20le%20blanchiment%20de%20capitaux.pdf (same file on the Commission Bancaire’s site: https://www.cb-umoa.org/sites/default/files/2025-08/Instruction%20n%C2%B0001-03-2025%20du%2018%20mars%2025%20portant%20modalit%C3%A9s%20de%20mise%20en%20oeuvre%20par%20les%20IF%20de%20leurs%20obligations%20en%20mati%C3%A8re%20de%20lutte%20contre%20le%20blanchiment%20de%20capitaux.pdf )
- UMOA, Loi uniforme relative à la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux, le financement du terrorisme et de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive (2023 text), arts. 89–91. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Loi-uniforme-LBCFTFP-Mars-2023-vf.pdf
- European Banking Authority, Final Report on Guidelines on internal policies, procedures and controls to ensure the implementation of Union and national restrictive measures (EBA/GL/2024/14 and EBA/GL/2024/15), 14 November 2024; EBA/GL/2024/15 paras 13, 15–25, 34–37, and the feedback section “Interaction with Regulation (EU) 2024/886”. https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2024-11/eaeae49d-81a5-4154-8af9-5014f6ee8881/Final%20Report%20Guidelines%20restrictive%20measures%20.pdf
- U.S. Treasury, OFAC, FAQ 5, “When screening for sanctions, how do I determine if I have a valid match to a name on one of OFAC’s lists?”, updated 9 September 2026. https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/topic/1591
- U.S. Treasury, OFAC, FAQs 398 and 399 (the 50 Percent Rule). https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/topic/1521
- U.S. Treasury, OFAC, FAQ 562, “How will OFAC identify digital currency-related information on the SDN List?”, 19 March 2018. https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/562
- Code of Federal Regulations, 31 CFR 501.603 (reports of blocked property) and 501.604 (reports of rejected transactions). https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/31/501.603 and https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/31/501.604
- UK Government, Financial sanctions: consolidated list of targets (notice of closure), updated 28 January 2026. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/financial-sanctions-consolidated-list-of-targets
- OFSI (HM Treasury), UK financial sanctions general guidance, updated 12 May 2026, chapter 4 (ownership and control) and §§5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.9. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/financial-sanctions-general-guidance/uk-financial-sanctions-general-guidance
- Direction générale du Trésor (France), Registre national des gels. https://gels-avoirs.dgtresor.gouv.fr/
- Kenya, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism Financing Laws (Amendment) Act, 2023 (Act No. 10 of 2023), amending POCAMLA s.44(2). https://brs.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/AntiMoneyLaunderingandCombatingofTerrorismFinancingLawsAmendmentAct2023.pdf
- FIC South Africa, Guidance Note 4B on reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions and activities, 26 March 2019, para 71 (reporting period, MLTF Control Regulations reg. 24(3)) and para 80 (when the period starts). https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019.03-Guidance-Guidance-Note-4B-STRs.pdf
- Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 200/2024 (RESOL-2024-200-APN-UIF#MJ), 18 December 2024, Boletín Oficial no. 35571, 19 December 2024, arts. 8(a) and (b), 12(m), 22(i) and 23(j). https://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/405000-409999/407429/norma.htm
- Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 207/2025 (RESOL-2025-207-APN-UIF#MJ), 3 November 2025, Boletín Oficial 4 November 2025, arts. 1 to 3. https://www.argentina.gob.ar/normativa/nacional/norma-419735/texto
- Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 3/2026 (RESOL-2026-3-APN-UIF#MJ), 7 January 2026, Boletín Oficial 8 January 2026, arts. 2 to 4. https://www.argentina.gob.ar/normativa/nacional/resoluci%C3%B3n-3-2026-422247/texto
- Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Mexico), “Disposiciones de carácter general a que se refiere el Artículo 58 de la Ley para Regular las Instituciones de Tecnología Financiera”, DOF 10 September 2018, arts. 56(XIII), 58, 60 to 62, 64, 70(XIV) and 73. https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5537449&fecha=10/09/2018 (accessed 2026-11-12).
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Payments System Policy Department, Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, November 2026, issued by circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004 of 5 November 2026, in force that day (circular, section 4.0); sections 26.7.1(b), 26.7.2, 26.8.1, 26.8.2, 26.8.4, 26.14.11, 26.19.1 and 46.2. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/REGULATIONS%20FOR%20THE%20OPERATIONS%20OF%20NON-SECURITY%20VIRTUAL%20ASSETS%20IN%20NIGERIA.pdf
Standard setter (industry):
- The Wolfsberg Group, Wolfsberg Guidance on Sanctions Screening, 2019, §§3.1, 4.2, 5.3, 6, 6.3. https://wolfsberg-group.org/ (copy read: https://eimf.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Wolfsberg-Guidance-on-Sanctions-Screening.pdf)
- Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism / Combating Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Accountable Institutions, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 12 December 2025, 2.4.2(8)–(9), 2.6.4(11), 2.8.6.1(5)(iv), 2.9(2), (3), (6), (7) and 2.10(3). https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/BOG-FIC-AML-GUIDELINE-2025-FINAL-5-TO-BE-PUBLISHED.pdf
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