Money laundering
Refused or failed identity verification, and false KYC data
A customer refuses or ignores a request for identification data or documents, fails a document, face, or registry check, or gives identity data that disagree with each other or with the registry.
What it catches
A customer whose identity cannot be established, or whose identity data look false. Three shapes: the customer refuses, or never answers, a request for identification data or documents; a check on what they gave fails (a document that looks altered, a face that does not match the document, an ID number the issuing registry returns with another name or date of birth); or the data they gave disagree with each other or with other records, such as a date of birth that differs from the one already verified.
Regulators name the pattern in close to the same words. Mexico’s provisions for fintech institutions list as a circumstance for judging an operation unusual “Si los Clientes se niegan a proporcionar los datos o documentos de identificación conforme a las presentes Disposiciones, o se presuma o detecte que los datos o documentación presentados pudieran ser falsos” (whether clients refuse to provide identification data or documents, or it is presumed or detected that the data or documents provided may be false). Argentina’s UIF lists customers who “se nieguen a proporcionar información, datos o documentos requeridos” (refuse to provide information, data or documents requested) or whose information “se encuentre alterada o apócrifa” (is altered or forged). FINTRAC’s indicators include an identification document that “cannot be authenticated”, and “inconsistencies in the identification documents or different identifiers provided by the client, such as name, address, date of birth or phone number”. Under the FATF standard, an institution that “is unable to comply with the applicable requirements” of customer due diligence “should be required not to open the account, commence business relations or perform the transaction; or should be required to terminate the business relationship; and should consider making a suspicious transactions report in relation to the customer” (Recommendation 10).
The rule finds the event, not the crime. Many refusals and failures have plain causes: a blurred photo, a registry that was down, a number typed into the wrong field, a customer who has no identity document at all, a name spelt two ways. An analyst decides which is which.
How the rule works
The rule listens to the identity-verification process rather than to payments. Each request for identification data or documents (at onboarding, at a periodic refresh, after an alert) and each verification check (document, face, registry) is an event; the rule fires on the event that shows a refusal, a substantive failure or a contradiction, and holds the customer’s outgoing payments for review where the law requires verification before operations.
Looks at
Every request to a customer for identification data or documents, every identity check result with its reason, and every change to the identity data on file.
Leaves out
- Checks that failed for technical reasons (an unreadable photo, glare, a timed-out session, a registry that did not answer) or on an expired document: those ask the customer to try again or for a current document.
- A registry “not found” result, and the same number typed into two different ID fields: ask for the right number before counting a failure.
- A failure followed soon after by a pass on the same document: an ordinary retry or a corrected mistake.
- Name differences that are only formatting: accents, letter case, word order, a missing second surname, an initial instead of a name, a transliteration.
Alerts when
Any of these is true:
- Refused: the customer declines a request for identification data or documents, or has not answered it by the deadline although the request reached them.
- Failed: a document, face or registry check returns a substantive failure: an altered or counterfeit document, a spoofed selfie, a face not matching the document, or a name or date of birth not matching what the identity registry holds for that number.
- Inconsistent: a date of birth, name or ID number that differs from the one already verified, or from what the registry returns.
How often
One alert per customer per request, check or changed field. A new alert only when a new refusal, failure or contradiction appears.
Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.
Deadline The date your request gave the customer to answer. Set it in your policy, by risk and channel. Where a law sets one, use it: Ghana’s guideline gives 90 days to obtain identification evidence.
Common variants:
- Refused or unanswered request. A request for data or documents at onboarding, at a periodic refresh or during an investigation that the customer declines or lets lapse. Argentina’s UIF counts it “con constancia de su pedido” (with a record of the request), so log each request, its deadline and how it reached the customer.
- Failed document or face check. A document flagged as altered, counterfeit or not matching its template, or a selfie that does not match the document photo. Argentina requires the electronic means used for remote onboarding to be protected “frente a fraudes por ataques físicos y digitales” (against fraud by physical and digital attacks).
- Registry mismatch. An ID number that the issuing registry returns for another person, or with a name or date of birth that does not match the customer’s: in Nigeria a BVN or NIN check, which the CBN describes as “confirming that presented identity credentials are linked to a registered record” and says does not, alone, constitute complete verification. A number the registry does not return at all is often mistyped (see False positives).
- Data that change. A date of birth, name or ID number that differs from the one already verified, or, in FINTRAC’s words, a client who “displays a pattern of name variations from one transaction to another or uses aliases”.
- Funding account in another name. An account the customer pays in from that is held in another name: see Third-party funding and payment account name mismatch.
- Many tries, many identities. Repeated sign-up or verification attempts with different identities from the same device or phone: see Shared identifiers across customers.
Data it needs
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| Field | Usually comes from | If it’s missing |
|---|---|---|
| Customer id | core system | Required. Requests and check results must sit on the same id as the account. |
| Identification request: sent, delivered, answered, declined, due date, channel | KYC case or messaging tool | Required for the refused form. Without a due date, “unanswered” can’t be told from “not yet due”; without delivery, it can’t be told from “never received”. |
| Verification check: every attempt, with type, result, reason code, timestamp | identity verification provider | Required for the failed form. Without a reason code, technical failures (blur, timeout) and substantive ones (tampering, face mismatch) look the same. If only passes are reported, a customer who gave up, one who failed and one who refused look the same. |
| Registry check result (national ID, tax ID, bank verification number) | national identity database or its provider | Needed for the registry form. |
| Name, date of birth, ID numbers, with their history and which values were verified | onboarding and profile updates | Required for the inconsistent form. Without the history of edits, a changed date of birth looks like a first value. |
| All the customer’s names (birth name, transliterated name, second surname), kept apart from relatives’ and contacts’ names | onboarding | Needed to avoid false mismatches. |
| Customer segment (individual, business, agent) | onboarding (KYC/KYB) | Needed to set deadlines and to handle accounts run by a business for its staff or clients. |
Thresholds
Each row is a setting the rule needs. Set by law values come from the source named under “Where it comes from”. Suggested values are starting points: test them on your own history, then adjust.
| Parameter | Value | Type | Where it comes from |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deadline to answer a request | the date your request gave | Suggested | No public source gives a general value. Set it in your policy by risk and channel; a shorter deadline catches evasion sooner but adds customers who simply missed the message. South Africa’s FIC expects the compliance programme to say at which point verification is taken as impossible (Revised Guidance Note 7A, para 137). |
| Ghana: time to obtain identification evidence | 90 days from first contact; for a customer who cannot reasonably produce identity evidence, a 90-day deferral to obtain the Ghana Card, then up to 30 more days before deciding to end the relationship | Set by law | BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 3.6(2)(i) and (4) and 3.8.1.2(3)(iv)–(v). |
By country
Mexico. For fintech institutions (crowdfunding and e-money institutions, ITFs), a client who refuses identification data or documents, or whose data or documents are presumed or detected to be false, is an unusual-operation circumstance: “Si los Clientes se niegan a proporcionar los datos o documentos de identificación conforme a las presentes Disposiciones, o se presuma o detecte que los datos o documentación presentados pudieran ser falsos” (SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, art. 70(VI)). ITFs must “validar los datos y verificar la autenticidad de los documentos obtenidos de manera digital” (validate the data and verify the authenticity of the digitally obtained documents) that prospective clients give to prove their identity; for operations classed as low risk this may follow account opening, but the client is told it cannot carry out operations until validation and verification are complete (art. 23). When doubts arise “acerca de la veracidad, autenticidad o exactitud de los datos o documentos proporcionados por el Cliente” (about the truth, authenticity or accuracy of the data or documents the client provided), the ITF must re-verify them, update the file, move the client to a higher risk grade according to the result and, where applicable, report an unusual operation (art. 26); where those doubts concern the client’s transactional behaviour, the client’s operations get enhanced follow-up and, where applicable, go to the Communication and Control Committee (art. 42). These provisions cover fintech institutions only.
Reporting deadline
The Communication and Control Committee rules on an unusual operation within 60 calendar days of its detection, and the report goes to SHCP, through the CNBV, within 3 business days of the end of that session; within 24 hours of the alert or staff notice where there are signs or concrete facts that the funds could come from illicit activities or be used for terrorist financing or money laundering (SHCP provisions under art. 58 of the Fintech Law, arts. 69 and 73).
Argentina. Payment service providers and non-financial lenders must weigh, among the circumstances in alerts: “Cuando los clientes se nieguen a proporcionar información, datos o documentos requeridos por el Sujeto Obligado, con constancia de su pedido, o bien cuando se detecte que la información suministrada por los mismos se encuentre alterada o apócrifa” (where customers refuse to provide information, data or documents requested, with a record of the request, or the information they provided is found to be altered or forged), identity theft (circumstance 9), and “discrepancias entre la información aportada por el cliente y la información detectada por los sistemas de monitoreo” (discrepancies between the information the customer gave and what the monitoring systems detect) (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 34(b), circumstances 6, 9 and 18). The absence or impossibility of identification bars starting the relationship, or continuing it, and calls for an additional analysis of whether to file a suspicious transaction report; accounts may not be opened or kept open “bajo nombres falsos/supuestos” (under false or assumed names) (art. 21). In remote onboarding the firm is responsible for verifying the authenticity of the information or documents provided, before the customer starts to operate (art. 25).
Reporting deadline
Money laundering, within 24 hours of concluding that the operation is suspicious, and no later than 90 calendar days from the operation, performed or attempted; terrorist financing and proliferation financing, within 24 hours of the operation (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 36(c)).
Ghana. Customer due diligence is carried out again where “There are doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data” (BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.4.1(1)(e)). An institution unable to perform customer due diligence “shall not open the account, commence business or perform the transaction” and shall file a suspicious activity or transaction report with the FIC within twenty-four hours (2.4.6). Identification evidence is obtained within 90 days of first contact; where the customer does not supply it, the institution discontinues the activity, and “The failure or refusal by an applicant (prospective customer) to provide satisfactory identification evidence within a reasonable time frame of ninety (90) days may lead to a suspicion that the applicant is engaged in ML/TF/PF”, so the institution files a report (3.6(2) and (4)). Read with 2.4.6, the 24-hour report for a customer who does not supply the evidence falls due once the 90 days pass, not at the first request. Business may start before identification is complete, but no money is paid out to a third party until it is (3.6(3)). The Guideline’s red flags include “Minimal, vague or fictitious information on the transaction provided by a customer that the AI is not in a position to verify” and “Lack of reference or identification in support of an account opening application by a person who is unable or unwilling to provide the required documentation” (Appendix E, 3a and 3b). Financially or socially disadvantaged people “shall not be excluded from opening accounts or obtaining other financial services merely because they do not possess evidence to identify themselves”: a guarantor’s statement and a deferral can stand in (3.8.1.2).
Reporting deadline
Within 24 hours of the suspicion, attempted transactions included, whatever the amount (BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.8.1(6) and 2.8.3(2)); within 24 hours where customer due diligence cannot be completed (2.4.6).
Nigeria. The CBN’s baseline standards for automated AML solutions ask institutions to onboard, where feasible, with real-time data checks against the BVN and NIN databases, “confirming that presented identity credentials are linked to a registered record”, and warn that such checks “do not, in isolation, constitute complete customer verification” (CBN Baseline Standards 2026, section 5.2(b)(i)). For licensed stablecoin issuers and licensed or authorised virtual asset service providers (VASPs), the CBN’s virtual asset regulations require due diligence again “when it has doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data” (section 26.3.2(d)), list the NIN and, where the customer holds one, the BVN among the data to obtain and verify (26.3.4(d)), and provide: “Where a Licensed Issuer or licensed or authorised VASP is unable to comply with the relevant CDD measures, it shall not open the account, commence the business relationship or perform the transaction, or shall terminate the business relationship, and shall consider filing a suspicious transaction report with the NFIU in relation to the customer” (26.3.14). Carrying out, or attempting to carry out, “under a false identity” any of the transactions covered by sections 2 to 6 of the Act is an offence (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.19(1)(c)). The NFIU’s 2023 fraud typologies report describes bank accounts opened with forged identity documents to take the proceeds of another person’s shares and dividends, in one case in the victim’s own name (Case Studies 33 and 34).
Reporting deadline
Report to the NFIU immediately, with a written report within 24 hours (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.7(1)–(2)). The NFIU’s December 2024 STR guidelines start the 24 hours once the transaction is found suspicious, after an examination of no more than 72 hours, and require written reasons for every alert closed as not suspicious (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, Part Six, para 2).
Kenya. The CBK’s guidance on customer due diligence lists among the occasions for due diligence “When there is doubt about veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer information including identification data”, and says verification “helps ensure that the customer is an actual person and not using false or stolen identities” (CBK Guidance on Customer Due Diligence, effective 1 September 2025, 3.2(e) and 3.3). Where a customer is unable to provide evidence to support due diligence, the institution does not open the account, start the relationship or perform the transaction, ends any relationship already started, and files a suspicious transaction report with the Financial Reporting Centre (section 5.1, on regulation 25(2) of the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Regulations 2023).
Reporting deadline
Within two days after the suspicion arose (POCAMLA s.44(2), as replaced by the AML/CFT Laws (Amendment) Act 2023, Act No. 10 of 2023). The Financial Reporting Centre’s 2025 guidance still gives two days from forming the suspicion (Guidance notes to TCSPs, section 3.1).
South Africa. When an accountable institution, after the first transaction or once the relationship is established, “doubts the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained information which the institution is required to verify”, it “must repeat the steps contemplated in sections 21 and 21B” to the extent necessary to confirm that information (Financial Intelligence Centre Act 2001, s.21D). If it is unable to “establish and verify the identity of a client or other relevant person”, it “may not establish a business relationship or conclude a single transaction with a client”, may not conclude a transaction in an existing relationship, or must terminate the relationship, “and consider making a report under section 29 of this Act” (s.21E). The FIC’s guidance allows time to put things right: “There may be circumstances where it is reasonable to delay discontinuing a business relationship while the institution facilitates the client’s efforts to rectify the failure”, but “Where a client refuses to provide requested documentation or information the business relationship should be discontinued once the client has been informed of the potential implications and given time to respond accordingly” (Revised Guidance Note 7A, para 135). Institutions “should give special consideration to whether the circumstances that prevent them from conducting CDD are suspicious or unusual” (para 136), and their compliance programme must say “at which point the conclusion will be reached that the institution is not able to conduct appropriate CDD” (para 137).
Reporting deadline
As soon as possible, and no later than 15 days excluding weekends and public holidays (FIC Act s.29; MLTF Control Regulations, reg. 24(3), via FIC Guidance Note 4B para 71). The 15 days run from when you became aware of the facts, which “may be, and in the majority of cases will be, before a suspicion is formed” (GN4B para 80), and an institution “may not add additional timeframes for its internal transactional monitoring alert system processes, and / or internal investigation and review processes to the prescribed reporting period” (GN4B para 81). Where the alert comes from an automated transaction monitoring system, the reporter “is deemed to have knowledge” of the possible suspicious activity when the alert is generated: the report is due “no later than 15 days after the alert has been generated”, and work on the alert must start within 48 hours, which the FIC counts as two days without weekends and public holidays, inside the 15 (FIC Directive 5 of 2019, paras 2.1–2.3; FIC PCC 45, paras 5–8).
WAEMU (UEMOA). When a financial institution cannot meet its customer due diligence obligations, it does not open the account, refuses an occasional operation, or ends the relationship with an existing account holder, and “Dans tous les cas, l’institution financière fait une déclaration d’opération suspecte concernant le client” (in every case, the financial institution files a suspicious transaction report on the customer) (Loi uniforme 2023, art. 25). WAEMU (UEMOA in French) is the West African Economic and Monetary Union: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, the same eight states that form the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). The BCEAO’s instructions and the Council of Ministers’ decisions cited here apply in all eight. The uniform law applies in each state through that state’s own act, which may number its articles differently. The law of a single state is covered only where that state is named.
Reporting deadline
Report to the CENTIF “immédiatement” (Loi uniforme 2023, art. 60). The law does not define “immédiatement”; it defines “sans délai” as at most 24 hours (art. 2, point 58). Check the expected timing with your CENTIF. Do not carry out an operation you suspect until the report is made, and then only if the CENTIF has not opposed it: an opposition blocks the operation for up to four days (arts. 61 and 65). If it has already gone through, inform the CENTIF “sans délai” (art. 61). Each member state enacts the uniform law in its own national text; the article numbers here are the uniform law’s.
Canada. FINTRAC’s indicators related to identifying the person or entity include: “There is an inability to properly identify the client or there are questions surrounding the client’s identity”; “When opening an account, the client refuses or tries to avoid providing information required by the financial institution, or provides information that is misleading, vague, or difficult to verify”; “The identification document presented by the client cannot be authenticated”; “There are inconsistencies in the identification documents or different identifiers provided by the client, such as name, address, date of birth or phone number”; and “Client produces seemingly false information or identification that appears to be counterfeited, altered or inaccurate”.
Reporting deadline
File “as soon as practicable” after the measures that establish reasonable grounds to suspect (FINTRAC STR guidance, section 4).
EU. The EBA risk factor guidelines ask whether the firm has “any doubts about the veracity or accuracy of the customer’s or beneficial owner’s identity”, and also whether the customer has “legitimate reasons for being unable to provide robust evidence of their identity, perhaps because they are an asylum seeker” (EBA/GL/2021/02, Guideline 2, customer risk factors). Firms “should not enter into a business relationship if they are unable to comply with their CDD requirements”, and should end an existing one or suspend transactions until it can be ended (para 4.66). For money remitters, a customer who “provides inconsistent biographical data or identification documents containing inconsistent information” increases risk (para 11.7); for retail banks, so does a customer who “is reluctant to provide CDD information or appears deliberately to avoid face-to-face contact” (para 9.6).
False positives and tuning
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Common innocent explanations: a photo that was blurred, cropped or caught glare; a registry or provider that timed out; an expired document; a number typed into the wrong field; a request sent to an old email address or phone number; a customer who has no identity document, such as an asylum seeker or a person outside the formal economy; a name written with or without a second surname, accents or a middle name, or transliterated differently; a married or birth name; a nickname typed at sign-up.
Typical causes of misfires:
- Counting every rejection. If the provider’s result has no reason code, an unreadable photo looks like a forged document. Read each outcome by its reason, not by its event: some providers send image-quality errors, system errors and outcomes such as an expired document or a photocopy through the same rejection channel as a spoof. Counting every rejection, rather than the substantive ones, multiplies the alerts. Map each reason to alert, retry or ask for a current document before going live; an expired document is not a forged one. Capture quality checks at the point of upload remove most retries.
- Mistyped numbers. A customer who types the same number into two different ID fields, or a digit wrong, gets a “not found” from the registry or another person’s name back. That is a data-entry error, not a false identity: check for it, and ask for the right number before counting the failure.
- Corrections and retries. A name or date-of-birth mismatch fixed minutes later, with a pass on the same document, is a typing correction. Honest customers also change ID numbers between attempts, often to fix a number typed in the wrong field, so a change of details between attempts says little on its own. Look at how far the new value is from the old: one character changed is usually a correction; two unrelated ID numbers on one customer in a short time is a stronger signal.
- The registry is wrong. National ID and bank-verification databases hold misspelt names and wrong birth dates, and two registries can disagree about the same person. A mismatch with the registry is a reason to look at the document, not proof the customer lied.
- Exact name matching. Comparing names character by character flags most people whose names have accents, two surnames or a transliteration. Normalise (case, accents, spacing, word order), compare against every name on file, and use a similarity score rather than equality.
- What the name fields hold. A relative’s or emergency contact’s name can be stored next to the customer’s, and the name typed at sign-up is often a nickname or short form. Compare with the name returned by the registry or read from the verified document, and keep other people’s names out of the comparison.
- Placeholder data. Partners or channels that onboard customers on someone else’s behalf sometimes fill fields with placeholders: a fixed date of birth, the partner’s own name. Every customer of that channel then looks inconsistent. Find those values and treat them as missing, not as false.
- Success-only events. If the identity steps report only success, a customer who gave up, one who failed and one who refused all look the same. Before switching on the refused or failed forms, get an event for every attempt, with its result and reason, and a record of each request and its deadline. Without them, the rule measures your sign-up funnel.
- Second accounts. People who stop verifying often start again under a new account with the same phone or ID number and finish there. Before treating an unfinished verification as a refusal, look for that second account; the finding is then the duplicate account, not a refusal.
- Customers who cannot, not will not. Lacking an identity document is not refusing one. Regulators expect a route for them: Ghana’s guarantor statement and deferral, and the EBA’s question about asylum seekers. Give these customers a separate status so the rule does not count them as refusals.
- Requests that never arrived. An unanswered request is only a refusal if it reached the customer. Record the channel and whether it was delivered, and resend on a second channel before alerting.
- Bulk refresh campaigns. A periodic review or remediation campaign that sends many requests at once produces a wave of “unanswered” alerts on one deadline, many of them from dormant or little-used accounts rather than evasion. Stagger the deadlines and route dormant accounts separately.
- Verification outcome not reaching monitoring. A customer who never finished verification, or was rejected, and can still transact or borrow means the step is not required on that route or its result is not reaching the monitoring system. Send it as an event and act on it. Show the verdict to whoever reviews other rules’ alerts too: an analyst who clears a customer as clean after another alert, without seeing that verification rejected them for a spoof or a face mismatch, silences the signal. Where payments are blocked until verification passes, look for activity after a rejection in failed attempts, logins and new accounts, not in completed payments; the payment that fails when the rejection arrives is usually the one that triggered the check.
How to tune: start with substantive failures and explicit refusals, which are few and clear; add unanswered requests once delivery is tracked; add the inconsistency checks one field at a time, measuring how many alerts each adds; and normalise names before switching on any name comparison.
When it fires
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Analyst checklist:
- Read what failed and why: the request, its deadline and whether it was delivered, or the check’s reason code and images. Separate technical failures from substantive ones, and look for a pass that followed.
- Compare the data with earlier submissions and with the registry: name, date of birth, ID numbers, photo.
- Check whether the device, phone, email or funding account appears on other customers (see Shared identifiers across customers), and whether contact details were changed just before (see Account takeover).
- Check that the request reached the customer, then ask again, saying what is needed and by when. For a customer who cannot provide a document, use the alternative evidence your policy allows.
- Restrict as the law requires: no operations until verification is complete where it was deferred (Mexico, art. 23), no payment to third parties until identification is complete (Ghana, 3.6(3)), and do not open the account, perform the transaction or continue the relationship where due diligence cannot be completed (FATF Recommendation 10; see By country).
- Re-verify, update the file and raise the customer’s risk grade where the review warrants it.
- Escalate when a document is altered, the identity belongs to someone else, or the customer refuses without a reason.
An alert is a reason to review, not a suspicion in itself: the NFIU’s 2024 STR guidelines call monitoring alerts “unusual” and say they “should not be automatically regarded as suspicious” (Part Three, paras 1–2). Some laws make the report itself mandatory when due diligence cannot be completed (Ghana, Kenya, WAEMU); others ask the institution to consider one (FATF Recommendation 10, South Africa, Nigeria’s virtual asset regulations). Under the FATF standard, “All suspicious transactions, including attempted transactions, should be reported regardless of the amount of the transaction” (Interpretive Note to Recommendation 20, para 3). Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.
Related rules
- Shared identifiers across customers: the same phone, device or account behind several identities, which is how identity farms and repeat applicants show up.
- Third-party funding and payment account name mismatch: a payment account in another name, or a repeat outside funder.
- Account takeover: changes to contact details before a payout; a change to name or date of birth is this rule’s.
- New account activity: what the account does after a weak or deferred verification.
- Funnel account: money from many people into one account, often opened with borrowed or false identities.
- Sanctions screening and PEP screening: both depend on a true name and date of birth.
Sources
21 sourcesHide
- Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Mexico), “Disposiciones de carácter general a que se refiere el Artículo 58 de la Ley para Regular las Instituciones de Tecnología Financiera”, DOF 10 September 2018, arts. 23, 26, 42 and 70(VI); arts. 69 and 73 (report deadlines). https://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5537449&fecha=10/09/2018 (accessed 2026-11-12).
- Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 200/2024 (RESOL-2024-200-APN-UIF#MJ), 18 December 2024, Boletín Oficial no. 35571, 19 December 2024, arts. 21, 25 and 34(b), circumstances 6, 9 and 18; art. 36(c) (report deadlines). https://www.argentina.gob.ar/normativa/nacional/norma-407429/texto
- Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism / Combating Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Accountable Institutions, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 12 December 2025, 2.4.1(1)(e), 2.4.6, 3.6, 3.8.1.2, Appendix E red flags 3a and 3b; 2.8.1(6) and 2.8.3(2) (report deadline). https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/BOG-FIC-AML-GUIDELINE-2025-FINAL-5-TO-BE-PUBLISHED.pdf
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Baseline Standards for Automated Anti-Money Laundering, Combating the Financing of Terrorism and Countering Proliferation Financing Solutions, circular BSD/DIR/PUB/LAB/019/002, 10 March 2026, section 5.2(b)(i). https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/CBN%20issues%20Baseline%20Standards%20for%20Automated%20Anti-Money%20Laundering%20Solution.pdf
- Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 (Nigeria), s.7(1)–(2) and s.19(1)(c). https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/LawsAndRegulations
- NFIU, “Money Laundering Typologies Through Fraud in Nigeria”, December 2023, Case Studies 33 and 34, pp.55–56. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng (Trends & Typologies)
- NFIU, “Guidelines for the Identification, Verification and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions Related to ML/FT/PF for Financial Institutions”, STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, 13 December 2024, Part Three paras 1–2 and Part Six para 2. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance
- Central Bank of Kenya, Guidance on Customer Due Diligence (CDD), August 2025, effective 1 September 2025, sections 3.2(e), 3.3 and 5.1. https://www.centralbank.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Guidance-on-Customer-Due-Diligence.pdf
- Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism Financing Laws (Amendment) Act, 2023 (Kenya, Act No. 10 of 2023), Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 148, 1 September 2023, amending POCAMLA s.44(2). https://brs.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/AntiMoneyLaunderingandCombatingofTerrorismFinancingLawsAmendmentAct2023.pdf
- Financial Reporting Centre (Kenya), “Guidance notes to TCSPs on AML/CFT/CPF 2025”, December 2025, section 3.1. https://www.frc.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/TCSP-Guidance.pdf
- Financial Intelligence Centre Act 2001 (South Africa, Act 38 of 2001, as amended), ss.21D, 21E and 29. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Financial-Intelligence-Centre-Act-2001-Act-38-of-2001.pdf
- FIC South Africa, Guidance Note 4B on reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions and activities, 26 March 2019, paras 71, 80 and 81. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019.03-Guidance-Guidance-Note-4B-STRs.pdf
- FIC South Africa, Directive 5 of 2019 on the usage of an automated transaction monitoring system for the detection and submission of regulatory reports, 29 March 2019, paras 2.1–2.3. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019-DIR-Directive-5-of-2019-ATMS.pdf
- FIC South Africa, Public Compliance Communication 45 on Directive 5 of 2019 in relation to the use of automated transaction monitoring systems, 20 March 2020, paras 5–8. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2020.03-PCC-PCC-45-On-Directive-5-of-2019-in-relation-to-the-use-of-ATMS.pdf
- UEMOA, Loi uniforme relative à la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux, le financement du terrorisme et de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive (March 2023), arts. 2 (point 58), 25, 60, 61 and 65. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Loi-uniforme-LBCFTFP-Mars-2023-vf.pdf
- FINTRAC, “Money laundering and terrorist financing indicators—Financial entities”, modified 24 November 2025: “ML/TF indicators related to identifying the person or entity”. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/indicators-indicateurs/fin_mltf-eng
- FINTRAC, “Reporting suspicious transactions to FINTRAC”, modified 22 May 2025, section 4. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/str-dod/str-dod-eng
- EBA, “Guidelines on customer due diligence and the factors credit and financial institutions should consider when assessing the ML/TF risk” (EBA/GL/2021/02, consolidated with EBA/GL/2023/03), Guideline 2 (customer risk factors), paras 4.66, 9.6 and 11.7. https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2023-11/EBA%20GL%202021%2002%20-%20consolidated%20%28amended%20by%20EBA%20GL%202023%2003%29_EN.pdf
- FATF, The FATF Recommendations, October 2025 edition: Recommendation 10; Interpretive Note to Recommendation 20, para 3. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Fatf-recommendations.html
- Financial Intelligence Centre (South Africa), Revised Guidance Note 7A on the implementation of various aspects of the FIC Act, 1 September 2025, paras 135–137. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Revised-Guidance-Note-7A-%E2%80%93-Implementation-of-various-aspects-of-the-FIC-Act.pdf
- Central Bank of Nigeria, Payments System Policy Department, Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, November 2026, issued by circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004 of 5 November 2026, in force that day (circular, section 4.0); sections 26.3.2(d), 26.3.4(d) and 26.3.14. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/REGULATIONS%20FOR%20THE%20OPERATIONS%20OF%20NON-SECURITY%20VIRTUAL%20ASSETS%20IN%20NIGERIA.pdf
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