Money laundering
Cash use that does not fit the customer’s activity
A customer deposits or withdraws more cash, or a larger share of their activity in cash, than their declared business or occupation, or customers in the same line of business, explain.
What it catches
A customer whose cash does not fit what they say they do: a consultancy or an online shop paying in large sums of cash, a salaried employee or a student depositing cash every week, a merchant whose customers normally pay by card taking most of its money in cash, or an agent or branch handling far more cash than others like it. Cash leaves no trail back to where it came from, so paying criminal proceeds into an account as the takings of a business is a long-standing way to launder them. The business may be real and the cash mixed into its genuine takings, or the business may exist mainly on paper.
Argentina, Ghana, the West African union, and Canada name the pattern in close to the same words; what each says is under By country.
The rule does not flag cash-heavy businesses as such: a market trader, a bus operator or a mobile-money agent handles cash by design. It flags cash that the customer’s own declared activity, or the activity of customers like them, does not explain. An analyst decides whether the explanation holds. Cash-heavy businesses are a separate matter: standard setters rate them as higher risk in themselves when the customer is risk-rated (the FATF lists “Business that are cash-intensive” among its customer risk factors, Interpretive Note to Recommendation 10, para 15(a); the EBA’s risk factor guidelines, paras 9.6 and 11.7; Ghana’s Guideline, Appendix D). That is why the rule gives cash-heavy activities peer groups and limits of their own rather than leaving them out.
How the rule works
Once a month (or on a rolling 30 days), add up each customer’s completed cash operations: cash paid in (at a branch, an agent, an ATM, or as a cash load to a wallet or card) and cash taken out (at an ATM, an agent or a branch), each in one currency, each separately. Compare each total, and the share of the customer’s money that moved in cash, with two references:
- The declared profile. What the customer said at onboarding, or what the institution set for them: their activity or sector, occupation, expected monthly amount and, where collected, how much of it would be cash. A customer in a sector that is marked as low-cash, or one whose cash goes well above the declared expected amount, is out of profile. This is the comparison Argentina’s monitoring article asks for: rules that check operations against each customer’s transactional profile (art. 34(a)), a profile built from the purpose and expected nature of the relationship and the customer’s economic and financial situation, as the customer provided it or the firm obtained it, and recalibrated against actual operations (art. 33).
- The peer group. Customers in the same activity or sector, segment and market, and for agents and branches, others in similar locations. A customer whose cash, or cash share, is above a high percentile of the peer group is out of line with businesses of its kind. The peer groups, the percentile line and the minimum group size work as in Peer-group outlier, applied here to cash and to the cash share. The percentile and the group size are computed over the group’s active customers: those with at least one completed transaction, cash or not, in the direction the version watches during the period, so a customer who used no cash counts with a cash share of zero. A customer is first judged at the end of their first full period. The EBA names this comparison for money remitters’ agents, among its distribution channel risk factors: agents with “unusual turnover patterns compared with other agents in similar locations, for example unusually high or low transaction sizes, unusually large cash transactions” (EBA/GL/2021/02, para 11.9).
Alert when the month’s cash is above a minimum for the segment and either reference says it is out of line. Run deposits and withdrawals as separate versions: Ghana’s red flag covers both.
Looks at
Every customer with cash operations, at the end of each month.
Measures
- Cash in: every completed cash deposit, agent cash-in and cash load in the month.
- Cash out: every completed cash withdrawal and agent cash-out in the month, as a separate version.
- Cash share: cash in as a share of all money the customer received in the month (cash out as a share of all money sent, for the withdrawal version).
Amounts are converted to one currency at a documented rate.
Compares with
- The declared profile: the customer’s declared activity or occupation, and their expected monthly amount and expected cash, where you hold them.
- The peer group: customers in the same activity or sector, segment and market; for agents and branches, others in similar locations.
Leaves out
- An agent’s own float and rebalancing, cash moved between the customer’s own accounts, fees and reversals.
- For the peer test, customers who were not open for the whole month: a new customer is first judged at the end of their first full month.
Alerts when
Cash for the month is at least your minimum for the segment, and any one of these is true:
- The customer’s declared activity is one where you expect little cash, and the cash share is above your limit for that activity.
- Cash is above the customer’s declared expected amount by more than your tolerance.
- Cash, or the cash share, is above the 99th percentile of the peer group, in a peer group of at least your minimum size.
How often
At most one alert per customer per month and version.
The alert shows
The customer, their declared activity, the month’s cash and cash share, the declared expected amount, and the peer group’s definition, size, median and 99th percentile.
Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.
Period A calendar month, or a rolling 30 days. Monthly matches how expected activity is usually declared and how cash reports are filed in several countries. Compare each month with the same month of past years where the business is seasonal.
Minimum cash Set per segment and currency from your own spread of monthly cash amounts. Without it, the share test fires on customers who paid in a little cash once in a month with almost no other activity.
Cash share limit Set per activity from what is normal for it in your market: near zero for activities that are paid by card or transfer, high for those paid in cash. No public source gives values; build them from your own peer groups.
Tolerance over the declared amount How far above the customer’s declared expected cash the month may go before it alerts. No public source gives a value. Start from your own data, and recalibrate the declared figure after the first months of real activity.
Peer line Start at the 99th percentile of the peer group’s monthly cash, or cash share, as in Peer-group outlier. Cash totals are skewed: a few customers handle far more cash than all the rest. A line at the mean plus a few standard deviations therefore flags a different share of customers than its maths suggests; a percentile line does not have that problem. The line flags about 1% of each group’s active customers in each version, every month, so set it to what your team can review. A higher percentile gives fewer alerts and misses customers just below the top; a lower one adds the ordinary biggest cash users. Test it on your own history.
Minimum group size Enough active customers that the group’s top 1% holds more than a handful of them. In a group of 100, only the single largest customer is above the 99th percentile; with about 500, about five are. Below 100, one customer or none is above it, depending on how the percentile is computed. Where a group is too small, drop the least important attribute and compare with the broader group, or rely on the declared-profile tests.
Common variants:
- Cash where the activity is not cash. Only the first test: a customer declared in an activity normally paid by card, transfer or cheque whose money arrives mostly in cash. Ghana’s red flags name “Unusually large cash deposits made by an individual or a business entity whose normal business is transacted by cheques and other non-cash instruments” (Appendix E, 2b).
- Peer test only. For customers with no usable declared profile: the method of Peer-group outlier, run on cash and on the cash share. It finds, for example, a merchant whose cash is far above what businesses of its kind take in cash.
- Individuals. The same tests on individuals, against their declared occupation and income: a salaried employee, a student or a pensioner paying in cash well beyond their declared income.
- Agents and branches. The institution’s own agents, tills or branches, judged only against other agents or branches and their own history, never against customers, with float and rebalancing left out. The EBA lists money remitters’ agents with unusually large cash transactions compared with other agents in similar locations among its distribution channel risk factors (para 11.9). Ghana’s red flags include branches “that tend to have far more cash transactions than usual, even after allowing for seasonal factors” (Appendix E, 2i), a comparison with the branch’s own usual level.
- Cash in, then out. Cash out of profile followed soon by transfers to a destination not linked to the customer (Ghana Appendix E, 2a). This overlaps with Rapid pass-through.
Data it needs
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| Field | Usually comes from | If it’s missing |
|---|---|---|
| Customer id | account or wallet | Required. Cash on several accounts or wallets of one customer must be added up per customer. |
| Transaction type or cash flag | ledger, agent or ATM network | Required. The rule must tell cash deposits, agent cash-in, cash loads and cash withdrawals from transfers. If agent cash-in is recorded as a generic “deposit”, the rule can’t see it. |
| Direction, amount, currency, timestamp, status | ledger | Required. Count completed operations; convert to one currency. |
| Declared activity or sector (business), occupation (individual) | onboarding (KYB/KYC) | Needed for the declared-profile test and to build peer groups. Free-text or “other” values make both weak; map them to a short list of activities. |
| Expected monthly amount and expected cash | onboarding, transactional profile | Needed for the tolerance test. Without it, only the sector and peer tests run. |
| Customer segment (individual, business, agent) | onboarding | Needed to set the minimum and to keep agents and businesses out of individuals’ peer groups. |
| Location or market (region, branch, agent site) | onboarding, agent register | Needed for peer groups of agents and branches, and for markets where cash use differs. |
| Depositor identity (who brought the cash) | branch or agent app | Optional. Shows third-party deposits. In Argentina the firm records the depositor’s identity document for cash deposits or payments of 20 SMVM or more (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 39(b)). |
Thresholds
Each row is a setting the rule needs. Set by law values come from the source named under “Where it comes from”. Suggested values are starting points: test them on your own history, then adjust.
| Parameter | Value | Type | Where it comes from |
|---|---|---|---|
| Period | a calendar month or a rolling 30 days | Suggested | Monthly sums are the common unit of expected activity and of cash reports (Argentina, art. 39(b)). A shorter period catches bursts but adds noise from seasonal businesses. |
| Peer line | above the 99th percentile of the peer group’s monthly cash or cash share | Suggested | A starting value, the method of Peer-group outlier. Cash totals are skewed, so a line at the mean plus a few standard deviations flags a different share than its maths suggests; a percentile does not. The line sets the alert volume: about 1% of each group’s active customers per version per month. Raise it for fewer alerts, lower it to reach further down. Test on your own history. |
| Minimum peer group size | enough active customers that the top 1% is more than a handful | Suggested | Arithmetic: in a group of 100, only the largest customer is above the 99th percentile; with about 500, about five are. Below the minimum, use the next broader group or the declared-profile tests. |
| Cash share limit per activity | set per activity from your own peer groups | Suggested | No public source gives values. |
| Tolerance over the declared expected cash | set from your own data | Suggested | No public source gives a value. Recalibrate the declared figure against real activity (Argentina, art. 33). |
| Minimum monthly cash | set per segment and currency from your own distribution | Suggested | No public source gives a value. |
| Argentina, cash depositor identification | 20 SMVM per cash deposit or payment | Set by law | UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 39(b). An identification line, not an alert threshold. |
| Argentina, monthly cash report | 2 SMVM or more a month: cash deposits received by an account holder (payment service providers), or cash deposits and payments (collection service providers) | Set by law | UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 39(b)(2) and (1). A report filed whatever the profile; the same monthly sum feeds this rule. |
By country
Argentina. Payment service providers and non-financial lenders must weigh “Actividades comerciales con uso intensivo de dinero en efectivo cuando ello no resulte ajustado a la actividad que desarrolla el cliente” (business activities with intensive use of cash where this does not fit the customer’s activity) in setting their alerts (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 34(b), circumstance 27), and may treat the same case as a sign of higher risk when rating the customer (art. 26(c)); a case left out of the rating must be justified. The circumstances are listed “a mero título enunciativo” (by way of example only) but “deberán valorarse especialmente” (shall be given special weight) (art. 34(b)). The resolution also requires automated rules that check operations against each customer’s transactional profile (art. 34(a)), a profile built from the purpose and expected nature of the relationship and the customer’s economic and financial situation, as the customer provided it or the firm obtained it, and recalibrated against actual operations (art. 33), “controles reforzados” (reinforced controls) on cash deposits and withdrawals by collection and payment service providers (art. 38), and measures to mitigate the risks of “aquellas actividades que operen altos volúmenes de dinero en efectivo” (activities that handle high volumes of cash), with enhanced due diligence where the firm’s risk analysis calls for it (art. 38). UIF Resolution 144/2026 changes this for individuals and undivided estates enrolled in the simplified income tax return regime of Law 27.799, enrolment checked through the tax agency’s validation service, large national taxpayers and the public officials of art. 38 bis of that law excluded (art. 4), for operations channelled through the formal financial system as art. 40 bis of that law requires, where the customer is not on Argentina’s terrorism register (RePET) or under UN freezing measures (arts. 5(b), 6 and 8). For those customers, “las operaciones de depósitos o pagos en efectivo no configurarán, por sí solas, un indicador suficiente de riesgo o sospecha” (cash deposits or payments will not, on their own, be a sufficient indicator of risk or suspicion), and the firm weighs them against what it knows of the customer, their transactional profile and the associated risk factors. Where the operation is outside the special simplified due diligence described next, the firm “deberá formarse un juicio razonable sobre la consistencia de la operación con el perfil del Cliente” (shall form a reasonable judgement on whether the operation is consistent with the customer’s profile), considering among other things the customer’s historical capacity to save and declared economic activity (art. 9): this rule’s comparison. Up to an annual amount tied to the tax evasion threshold of the tax criminal law (art. 11), a special simplified due diligence replaces the sector resolution’s identification, verification and monitoring rules for the covered operations (arts. 10 and 17). Ongoing monitoring of those operations is then limited to the annual threshold, keeping enrolment checked, new grounds for exclusion and suspicious operation reports (art. 16), and the firm need not ask for documents on the customer’s economic activity or proof of the source of funds, nor check the operation against the customer’s capacity to save (art. 15). The special regime does not apply to politically exposed persons, to customers dealing with jurisdictions under FATF increased monitoring or a call for action, where the firm documents a risk too high for it, or where there is suspicion (art. 14), and operations split to stay under the threshold are added together and take the customer out of it (art. 13). Firms have 60 calendar days from the resolution’s entry into force, on 4 November 2026, to adapt their procedures (art. 22).
Reporting deadline
Money laundering, within 24 hours of concluding that the operation is suspicious, and no later than 90 calendar days from the operation, performed or attempted; terrorist financing and proliferation financing, within 24 hours of the operation (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 36(c)).
Ghana. The red flags of the BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025 include “Unusually large cash deposits made by an individual or a business entity whose normal business is transacted by cheques and other non-cash instruments” (Appendix E, 2b), customers “depositing or withdrawing large amounts of cash with no apparent business source or in a manner inconsistent with the nature and volume of the business” (3e), “Significant increases in cash deposits of an individual or business entity without apparent cause”, particularly if the money then leaves within a short period for a destination not normally associated with the customer (2a), and branches “that tend to have far more cash transactions than usual, even after allowing for seasonal factors” (2i). A red flag is “not necessarily indicative of actual ML/TF/PF” if it is “consistent with a customer’s legitimate business”, but it “shall put AIs on enquiry and provoke further investigation to determine their true legal status” (Appendix E, introduction). Institutions licensed by the Bank of Ghana pay special attention to unusual patterns of transactions with no apparent economic or lawful purpose (2.8.2(1)), and consider “Business that are cash-intensive” among their customer risk factors (Appendix D).
Reporting deadline
Within 24 hours of the suspicion, attempted transactions included, whatever the amount (BoG/FIC AML/CFT/CPF Guideline 2025, 2.8.1(6) and 2.8.3(2)).
WAEMU (UEMOA). Besides the declaration of cash transactions at or above the threshold set by the competent authority, financial institutions “exercent une vigilance renforcée à l’égard des dépôts d’espèces” (exercise enhanced vigilance over cash deposits) and declare to the CENTIF “tout dépôt dont le montant, pour une opération unique ou pour plusieurs opérations paraissant liées, est inhabituel ou sans rapport avec l’activité en cause” (any deposit whose amount, for a single operation or for several operations that appear linked, is unusual or unrelated to the activity concerned) (Uniform Law, art. 72, third paragraph). This duty applies even to sectors whose cash deposits a ministerial order exempts from the threshold declaration (art. 72, second and third paragraphs). WAEMU (UEMOA in French) is the West African Economic and Monetary Union: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, the same eight states that form the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). The uniform law applies in each state through that state’s own act, which may number its articles differently; the article numbers here are the uniform law’s. The law of a single state is covered only where that state is named.
Reporting deadline
The uniform law sets no deadline for the art. 72 declaration. Where the deposit raises a suspicion, report to the CENTIF “immédiatement” (Loi uniforme 2023, art. 60). The law does not define “immédiatement”; it defines “sans délai” as at most 24 hours (art. 2, point 58). Check the expected timing with your CENTIF. Do not carry out an operation you suspect until the report is made, and then only if the CENTIF has not opposed it: an opposition blocks the operation for up to four days (arts. 61 and 65). If it has already gone through, inform the CENTIF “sans délai” (art. 61).
South Africa. Among the indicators of a suspicious or unusual transaction, the FIC’s Guidance Note 4B lists “Involvement of significant amounts of cash in circumstances that are difficult to explain” and “A transaction seems to be unusually large or otherwise inconsistent with the customer’s financial standing or usual pattern of activities” (GN4B para 42). Where the rule runs in an automated transaction monitoring system, FIC Directive 5 of 2019 requires the system’s detection methodology, “including algorithms, scenarios, threshold settings or rules” (this rule among them), to be documented (para 3.1.16) and, taken as a whole, “sufficient to address the associated money laundering and terrorist financing risks applicable to the reporter” (para 3.1.17), and sets the time limits for the system’s alerts given under the reporting deadline below (paras 2.1–2.3).
Reporting deadline
As soon as possible, and no later than 15 days excluding weekends and public holidays (FIC Act s.29; MLTF Control Regulations, reg. 24(3), via FIC Guidance Note 4B para 71). The 15 days run from when you became aware of the facts, which “may be, and in the majority of cases will be, before a suspicion is formed” (GN4B para 80), and an institution “may not add additional timeframes for its internal transactional monitoring alert system processes, and / or internal investigation and review processes to the prescribed reporting period” (GN4B para 81). Where the alert comes from an automated transaction monitoring system, the reporter “is deemed to have knowledge” of the possible suspicious activity when the alert is generated: the report is due “no later than 15 days after the alert has been generated”, and work on the alert must start within 48 hours, which the FIC counts as two days without weekends and public holidays, inside the 15 (FIC Directive 5 of 2019, paras 2.1–2.3; FIC PCC 45, paras 5–8).
Canada. FINTRAC’s indicators for financial entities, in the section on indicators surrounding transactions in relation to the person or entity profile, give as one example “an entity involved in an industry that is not normally cash-intensive receiving excessive cash deposits”. The same section lists “The transactional activity far exceeds the projected activity at the time of the account opening or the beginning of the relationship”, “The transactional activity is inconsistent with what is expected from a declared business”, and activity “inconsistent with the client’s apparent financial standing, their usual pattern of activities or occupational information (e.g. student, unemployed, social assistance, etc.)”.
Reporting deadline
File “as soon as practicable” after the measures that establish reasonable grounds to suspect (FINTRAC STR guidance, section 4).
EU. For money remitters, the EBA risk factor guidelines list among the distribution channel risk factors agents with “unusual turnover patterns compared with other agents in similar locations, for example unusually high or low transaction sizes, unusually large cash transactions” (EBA/GL/2021/02, para 11.9). Separately, they rate as higher risk a customer that “is a cash-intensive undertaking” (retail banks, para 9.6) or “owns or operates a business that handles large amounts of cash” (money remitters, para 11.7): factors for rating the customer, which is why cash-heavy activities need peer groups of their own here.
Reporting deadline
Report “promptly”, on your own initiative, including attempted transactions (Directive (EU) 2015/849, Art. 33(1), through each member state’s law). Refrain from carrying out a transaction you suspect until you have reported it; where that is impossible, inform the FIU “immediately afterwards” (Art. 35).
False positives and tuning
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Common innocent explanations: a shop, market stall, restaurant, transport operator or farm that is paid in cash; an agent or till collecting cash for many people; a seasonal peak (holidays, harvest, school fees); savings kept at home in cash, local or foreign currency, being brought into the system; a family member or employer depositing for the customer; a customer whose business changed since onboarding.
Typical causes of misfires:
- A wrong or stale declared activity. Activity codes picked from a long list at onboarding, “other”, or a business that has changed since: the rule then measures the quality of the profile, not the customer. Map activities to a short list, review the profile after the first months of real activity, and treat an alert caused by a wrong profile as a profile update, not a cleared alert.
- Cash-heavy activities flagged for being cash-heavy. The pattern is cash that does not fit the activity. Give cash-heavy activities their own peer groups and limits rather than excluding them: excluding them leaves unmonitored the businesses that regulators rate as higher risk.
- Markets where cash is normal. Where most people are paid in cash and mobile money is funded at agents, cash-in is the ordinary way to fund an account. Build peer groups per market and compare with them, not with a bank norm from elsewhere. In Argentina, for individuals enrolled in the simplified income tax regime and operations covered by it, cash deposits are not on their own enough for risk or suspicion, and below the regime’s annual threshold monitoring of those operations is limited to what UIF Resolution 144/2026 lists (arts. 9 and 16; see By country).
- Agents and tills paying for others. An agent’s own float top-ups and rebalancing look like large cash deposits, and a till collecting payments for many people looks like one heavy cash user. Exclude float movements, and judge agents against other agents.
- Seasonality. Monthly totals of seasonal businesses swing above their own average and their peers’ every year at the same time. Compare with the same month of past years, as Ghana’s red flag on branches asks (“even after allowing for seasonal factors”).
- Small or mixed peer groups. In a peer group of a few dozen customers the top percentile holds one customer or none, depending on how the percentile is computed, and the same one every month, and a group that mixes individuals and businesses puts the ordinary businesses at the top. Split by customer type first, merge small groups into a wider activity, or fall back on the declared-profile test.
- Cash not recorded as cash. Where agent cash-in or ATM deposits reach the ledger as generic deposits, the rule sees no cash at all. Check how each cash channel is recorded before trusting a quiet rule.
- No declared profile. Occupation, expected activity or expected cash are often not collected for retail customers. Without them only the peer test runs. Argentina’s art. 33 asks for a transactional profile built from the purpose of the relationship and the customer’s economic and financial situation, which is where expected amounts come from.
How to tune: build peer groups by activity, segment and market; set the minimum per segment and currency; run deposits and withdrawals as separate versions; exclude agent float and own-account movements; compare seasonal businesses with the same month of past years; and recalibrate declared profiles from real activity.
When it fires
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Analyst checklist:
- List the month’s cash operations: where the cash was paid in or taken out (branch, agent, ATM), the amounts, the denominations or currency where recorded, and who brought the cash.
- Read the customer’s declared activity, occupation, expected amount and expected cash. Check whether they are still accurate.
- Compare with the customer’s own past months and with the peer group. A sudden rise against their own history adds weight (see Sudden change from a customer’s baseline).
- Look at what happened to the cash: kept in the account, used for business payments, or sent on quickly to other people, abroad or to crypto (see Rapid pass-through).
- Look for amounts kept just under a reporting line (see Transaction structuring) and for many different people paying cash into the account (see Funnel account).
- Ask the customer to explain the source of the cash and, for a business, to show records that support it: sales records, invoices, a till or point-of-sale report. In Argentina, proof of the source of funds and documents on the customer’s activity are not required for operations under Resolution 144/2026’s special simplified due diligence (art. 15).
- Update the profile if the explanation holds; escalate when the customer cannot explain the cash, the records do not support it, or the cash leaves as fast as it arrives.
An alert is a reason to review, not a suspicion in itself: Ghana’s Guideline says a red flag is “not necessarily indicative of actual ML/TF/PF” if consistent with the customer’s legitimate business, and that it puts the institution on enquiry (Appendix E, introduction). Under the FATF standard, “All suspicious transactions, including attempted transactions, should be reported regardless of the amount of the transaction” (Interpretive Note to Recommendation 20, para 3). Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.
Related rules
- Cumulative amount over a period: adds up cash against a reporting line, whatever the customer’s profile.
- Large single transaction: one cash operation above a line.
- Transaction structuring: cash split to stay under a reporting line.
- Sudden change from a customer’s baseline: the customer against their own history, rather than against their declared activity or their peers.
- Rapid pass-through: cash paid in and sent on soon after.
- Funnel account: many people paying cash into one account.
- Peer-group outlier: the same peer comparison on all of a customer’s activity, not only cash; the peer test here uses its method.
Sources
12 sourcesHide
- Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 200/2024 (RESOL-2024-200-APN-UIF#MJ), 18 December 2024, Boletín Oficial no. 35571, 19 December 2024, arts. 26(c), 33, 34(a), 34(b) (circumstance 27), 36(c), 38 and 39(b). https://www.argentina.gob.ar/normativa/nacional/norma-407429/texto
- Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 144/2026 (RESOL-2026-144-APN-UIF#MJ), 2 November 2026, arts. 4, 5(b), 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 to 17 and 22. https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/rs-2026-106193828-apn-uifmj.pdf
- Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre (Ghana), Anti-Money Laundering / Combating the Financing of Terrorism / Combating Proliferation Financing of Weapons of Mass Destruction (AML/CFT/CPF) Guideline for Accountable Institutions, September 2025, published by the Bank of Ghana on 12 December 2025, 2.8.1(6), 2.8.2(1), 2.8.3(2), Appendix D (customer risk factors) and Appendix E (introduction; red flags 2a, 2b, 2i and 3e). https://www.bog.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/BOG-FIC-AML-GUIDELINE-2025-FINAL-5-TO-BE-PUBLISHED.pdf
- UEMOA, Loi uniforme relative à la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux, le financement du terrorisme et de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive (March 2023), arts. 2 (point 58), 60, 61, 65 and 72. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Loi-uniforme-LBCFTFP-Mars-2023-vf.pdf
- FIC South Africa, Guidance Note 4B on reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions and activities, 26 March 2019, para 42 (indicators), para 71 (reporting period, MLTF Control Regulations reg. 24(3)), paras 80 and 81 (when the period starts). https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019.03-Guidance-Guidance-Note-4B-STRs.pdf
- FIC South Africa, Directive 5 of 2019 on the usage of an automated transaction monitoring system for the detection and submission of regulatory reports, 29 March 2019, paras 2.1–2.3, 3.1.16 and 3.1.17. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2019-DIR-Directive-5-of-2019-ATMS.pdf
- FIC South Africa, Public Compliance Communication 45 on Directive 5 of 2019 in relation to the use of automated transaction monitoring systems, 20 March 2020, paras 5–8. https://www.fic.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/2020.03-PCC-PCC-45-On-Directive-5-of-2019-in-relation-to-the-use-of-ATMS.pdf
- FINTRAC, “Money laundering and terrorist financing indicators—Financial entities”, modified 24 November 2025: “ML/TF indicators surrounding the financial transactions in relation to the person/entity profile”. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/indicators-indicateurs/fin_mltf-eng
- FINTRAC, “Reporting suspicious transactions to FINTRAC”, modified 22 May 2025, section 4. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/str-dod/str-dod-eng
- EBA, “Guidelines on customer due diligence and the factors credit and financial institutions should consider when assessing the ML/TF risk” (EBA/GL/2021/02, consolidated with EBA/GL/2023/03), paras 9.6, 11.7 and 11.9. https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2023-11/EBA%20GL%202021%2002%20-%20consolidated%20%28amended%20by%20EBA%20GL%202023%2003%29_EN.pdf
- EU, Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, consolidated text of 30 June 2021, Art. 33(1) and Art. 35. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02015L0849-20210630
- FATF, The FATF Recommendations, October 2025 edition: Interpretive Note to Recommendation 10, para 15(a); Interpretive Note to Recommendation 20, para 3. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Fatf-recommendations.html
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The Fraud & AML Library is a practical reference, not legal advice. What binds is the regulator’s own text, which every rule and regulation page links.