Fraud

New beneficiary, high-value payment

A large first payment to a bank account, wallet, or card the customer has never paid before, or several new beneficiaries added in a short time.

A large first payment to a beneficiary the customer has never paid before, such as a bank account, wallet, or card, or several new beneficiaries added in a short time Customer Known beneficiary New beneficiary bank account, wallet, or card Large first payment or Several new beneficiaries added in a short time Customer New beneficiary New beneficiary New beneficiary

What it catches

A customer sends a large payment to a beneficiary (a bank account, wallet, mobile money number or card) they have never paid before. A second form of the rule catches a customer who adds several new beneficiaries in a short time.

Fraudsters do both. After an account takeover, the criminal adds their own beneficiary and empties the account. In an authorised push payment (APP) scam, the customer is talked into paying a new account themselves. FinCEN lists, as a red flag of email-compromise fraud, payment instructions to “a beneficiary with which the customer has no payment history or documented business relationship”, where the amount is similar to or larger than past payments to other beneficiaries. The FATF’s cyber-enabled fraud report lists requests for more payments right after a successful payment “to an account not previously used by the customer” (its example is a business paying its suppliers).

What it does not catch: a scam paid to an account the customer has paid before, amounts split below the floor, or fraud where the beneficiary was added long before the payment. Once a first payment to a new account has gone through, the further payments the FATF warns about are to a known account and do not fire; the small-then-large form of that sequence is Test transfer before a large transfer. Money a scam victim first moves to an account in their own name and then on to the criminal is missed if own accounts are excluded (see “What counts as a beneficiary” below). A customer paying a merchant with a newly added card of their own is not covered: the merchant, not the card, is the counterparty (see the card rules under Related rules). A known supplier whose bank details were changed is caught only if the rule keys on the account identifier, as below; a rule keyed on a saved-payee record would treat the changed account as an old beneficiary.

How the rule works

Form A, first payment above a floor: on each outgoing payment, check whether this customer has paid this counterparty identifier before, anywhere in their history. If not, and the amount is at or above the floor for the customer’s segment and market, alert.

Form B, many beneficiaries added: count the beneficiaries the customer created in a rolling window, across all rails together. At or above the count, alert.

The two forms are stronger together. A burst of new beneficiaries followed by a large payment to one of them, within 24 hours of a new device or a password or phone number change, is the classic takeover sequence. Neither form needs those signals; where you have them, use them to raise the alert’s priority (see Account takeover).

Looks at

  • Form A: every payment a customer sends.
  • Form B: every beneficiary a customer adds.

Alerts when form A: first payment

Both of these are true:

  1. The customer has never paid this beneficiary’s account, wallet or card before. Every earlier payment in the customer’s whole history counts, completed or still pending.
  2. The payment, converted to one reference currency, is at or above the floor for the customer’s segment and market: USD 500 to 5,000 equivalent for consumers, higher, from each account’s own history for business accounts.

Alerts when form B: many added

The customer has added 3 to 10 beneficiaries or more in the last 24 to 48 hours, this one included, counting all payment methods together.

The alert shows

Which form fired, “first payment to new beneficiary” or “many beneficiaries added”, with the payment or the beneficiary that set it off.

Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.

Data it needs

ShowHide
FieldUsually comes fromIf it’s missing
Counterparty identifier on every outgoing payment (account number or IBAN, wallet address, mobile money number, card fingerprint for payouts to a card)Payment instructionForm A cannot run. Normalise the format per identifier type (spaces, separators) so the same account matches itself, and check for each type whether letter case matters before changing it.
Full payment history per customerYour ledger, backfilled“Never paid before” really means “not seen by the monitoring system”. Run in observation mode until the history is long enough (see Thresholds).
Amount, currency, marketPayment instructionConvert to one reference currency and set the floor per market.
Customer segment (consumer, business)Onboarding dataUse one floor and expect noise from business accounts.
Beneficiary-created event: customer, rail, beneficiary id, timestampBeneficiary management (saved payees)Form B cannot run. Paid beneficiaries alone are not enough: a never-paid beneficiary is part of the signal.
Login, device and contact-change events (optional)Session and profile dataYou lose the takeover combination; the rule still runs on payments.

Compute “first time” from history. Do not rely on a flag your client sends (“new payee”): if the client stops sending it, the rule goes silent without any error.

Thresholds

Each row is a setting the rule needs. Each value is a starting point: test it on your own history, then adjust.

ParameterStarting pointWhere it comes from
Form A amount floor, consumersUSD 500 to 5,000 equivalent, set per marketThe lower end suits products whose typical payments are small, the upper end products with larger tickets. Set it per market and currency from your own distribution of completed outgoing payments, then tune on the first month’s alerts. A single USD floor across markets with different price levels floods the cheaper market.
Form A amount floor, business accountsHigher, from each account’s own historyBusinesses pay new suppliers routinely. Use each account’s own payment history as the baseline, or a separate, higher floor set from your business customers’ own payments.
Form B new beneficiaries3 to 10 within 24 to 48 hoursA lower count or longer window catches slower set-ups but adds customers who simply pay several people. Lower in consumer products, higher where customers pay many people (payroll, marketplaces).
Optional: combination window for raising priority (new device or profile change, new beneficiary, payment)Within 24 hoursNeither form needs it; use it where you have device and profile events. A longer window catches slower takeovers but pairs more unrelated events. Set it from the timing of your own confirmed takeover cases.
History needed before “first time” is meaningfulAt least your customers’ longest normal payment cycle; for annual bills, about 12 monthsLarge payments that recur once a year (annual subscriptions, broker deposits) look new until the history covers a full year (see False positives). Shorter history turns the rule into “first time seen”.

No regulator sets a number for this rule. The sources below name the pattern or require monitoring for it; none sets a threshold.

By country

  • Nigeria. No Nigerian text names a payment to a new beneficiary, but the CBN requires the fraud monitoring this rule is part of. Its March 2026 instant payment circular requires every institution offering instant payments to “implement and activate Enterprise Fraud Monitoring for both inflows and outflows to facilitate fraud detection and restriction of suspicious transactions”, from 1 July 2026 (PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/001, item 3). Its Baseline Standards for Automated AML Solutions (March 2026) require a solution that is also used for fraud monitoring to monitor activities “across relevant channels (e.g. cards, e-channels, deposits, lending) in real time or near real time to detect unusual patterns indicative of fraud” (BSD/DIR/PUB/LAB/019/002, section 5.6(a)(i)). The CBN’s draft guidelines on authorised push payment fraud (an exposure draft dated November 2025, not yet final) describe the scam form of this pattern: a customer induced, coerced or misled into authorising a payment “to a third party’s account or wallet” (section 4.0(i)). The draft requires an early warning system for APP fraud whose alerts “shall be promptly examined” (section 6.0(vii)), and makes a customer eligible for reimbursement where, among other conditions, the institution “failed to implement appropriate fraud detection, warning, or verification protocols, that could have prevented the transaction” (section 8.1(iv)). A suspicious transaction is reported within 24 hours (see the reporting deadline below). For stablecoin issuers and virtual asset service providers (VASPs) licensed or authorised by the CBN, its Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria (in force 5 November 2026) require fraud monitoring of “suspicious device, access, wallet and transaction patterns”, with fraud alerts promptly investigated, that works “alongside the AML/CFT/CPF monitoring and sanctions systems required by Section 26” (section 37.13), without naming a new beneficiary. For a transfer of USD/EUR 1,000 or more, or its naira equivalent, to or from an unhosted wallet, the provider takes “reasonable measures to verify that its customer owns or controls the unhosted wallet, such as a message-signing or micro-transfer test” (sections 26.14.3 and 26.15.2). That check is a verification step this rule does not perform. A wallet verified this way proves that whoever operates the account controls it, not that the account holder does: after a takeover the criminal passes the same check. Rank a verified wallet lower; do not exclude it, least of all when it was verified soon after a new device or a password or phone change.

    Reporting deadline

    Report to the NFIU immediately, with a written report within 24 hours (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.7(1)–(2)). The NFIU’s December 2024 STR guidelines start the 24 hours once the transaction is found suspicious, after an examination of no more than 72 hours, and require written reasons for every alert closed as not suspicious (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, Part Six, para 2).

  • EU. The EBA and ECB’s 2025 payment fraud report found that most fraudulent credit transfers come from manipulating the payer, not from criminals issuing payments themselves: the share rose from 65% to 74% by value between 2023 and 2024 (section 3.2). Under the strong customer authentication standards, a payer who creates or amends a list of trusted beneficiaries must pass strong authentication, and later payments to a payee on that list may skip it (Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389, art. 13). The report found that credit transfers made under this trusted-beneficiaries exemption, and at times those between accounts owned by the same user, had higher fraud rates than credit transfers overall, though still low (section 4). A payee being on the customer’s trusted list, or an account being the customer’s own, is not proof that the payment is safe. Verification of Payee, which the Instant Payments Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2024/886) requires payment service providers to offer, has applied in euro-area Member States since 9 October 2025 and applies in the other Member States from 9 July 2027 (ECB).

    Reporting deadline

    Inform the national FIU “promptly” (Directive (EU) 2015/849, art. 33(1)). The directive sets no number of hours; your member state’s law may.

  • West Africa (GIABA). GIABA’s 2025 typology report on cybercrime in West Africa lists as indicators an established corporate client asking for a payment “to a suspicious ‘first time’ beneficiary”, and a corporate client changing “the payee account details (e.g., IBAN code) for a known beneficiary”.

  • United States. FinCEN’s email-compromise advisory (FIN-2016-A003) lists as a red flag payment to a beneficiary with which the customer has “no payment history or documented business relationship”. Its 2019 update (FIN-2019-A005), which replaces the 2016 SAR filing section, asks filers to reference the 2019 advisory, use the key terms “BEC FRAUD” (business victims) or “EAC FRAUD” (individual victims) in the narrative, and select SAR field 42 (cyber event). Its elder exploitation advisory (FIN-2022-A002) lists “uncharacteristic attempts to wire large sums of money” and an older customer who transfers money “interstate or abroad to recipients with whom they have no in-person relationship”, where the explanation seems suspicious or points to a scam or money mule scheme. For elder exploitation, FinCEN asks for the key term “EFE FIN-2022-A002” in SAR field 2 and the narrative, and the Elder Financial Exploitation checkbox (SAR field 38(d)).

    Reporting deadline

    No later than 30 calendar days after initial detection (31 CFR 1020.320(b)(3) for banks, 1022.320(b)(3) for money services businesses). A bank that has identified no suspect may take 30 more days to identify one, never more than 60 days in all (1020.320(b)(3)).

  • Kenya.

    Reporting deadline

    Within two days after the suspicion arose (POCAMLA s.44(2), as replaced by the AML/CFT Laws (Amendment) Act 2023, Act No. 10 of 2023).

  • WAEMU (UEMOA).

    Reporting deadline

    Report to the CENTIF “immédiatement” (Loi uniforme 2023, art. 60). “Immédiatement” is not defined; the law defines “sans délai” as at most 24 hours (art. 2, point 58). Do not carry out an operation you suspect until the report is made; if it has already gone through, inform the CENTIF “sans délai” (art. 61). WAEMU (UEMOA in French) is the West African Economic and Monetary Union: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, the same eight states that form the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). The BCEAO’s instructions and the Council of Ministers’ decisions cited here apply in all eight. The uniform law applies in each state through that state’s own act, which may number its articles differently. The law of a single state is covered only where that state is named.

  • Canada.

    Reporting deadline

    File “as soon as practicable” after the measures that establish reasonable grounds to suspect (FINTRAC STR guidance, section 4).

False positives and tuning

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Common innocent explanations: a first rent or deposit payment, a car or property purchase, school fees, a new supplier, a family emergency, a new customer’s first transfer. Businesses add many payees when they set up payroll.

Typical causes of misfires:

  • Onboarding waves. Every new customer’s first payment is a first payment. A burst of sign-ups (a launch or a campaign) produces a burst of first payments that can make up most alerts on the day. Each alert is a real first payment, and nothing tells a risky case apart from routine onboarding. Group the day’s alerts from the same source (the same referral or campaign) into one case rather than capping them, since a cap drops alerts no one reviews, and treat a brand-new customer’s first payment under a new-account rule instead.
  • Short history. With little history loaded, everyone looks new. Large payments that recur once a year (annual subscriptions, broker deposits) stay “first seen” long after go-live. Say “first time seen” until the history covers the payment cycle.
  • A dead input. A rule that reads a “new payee” flag sent by the client goes silent, with no error, if the client stops sending it. Compute novelty from history.
  • Retries and payouts that fail. A payment that fails and is tried again to the same new beneficiary is a first payment each time, and a rule that runs when the payment is created alerts on payouts that later fail. Fold retries to the same identifier into one alert and record the payment’s final status on it. Do not drop failed attempts: the reporting duty covers attempted transactions too (see When it fires).
  • Overlap with a high-value rule. If the first-payment floor is above your generic high-value floor, this rule adds no new alerts, only a label on alerts you already get. Use it to raise priority, or raise the generic floor.
  • Counting per rail. Counting new beneficiaries per payment type misses a customer who adds a few through each of several payment methods. Count across rails.
  • What counts as a beneficiary. Decide explicitly how to treat peer-to-peer recipients created at payment time, edited or re-saved beneficiaries, and the customer’s own accounts and wallets. Exclude an own account only when its ownership is verified (an account linked through your own onboarding, or a payee-name check that matches), never on a similar name. An account in the customer’s own name can still carry fraud: in the EU, payments between a user’s own accounts at times had a higher fraud rate than credit transfers overall (EBA and ECB, section 4), and FinCEN describes scam victims persuaded to open accounts in their own name that are then used to move other victims’ money (FIN-2022-A002). Rank payouts to unverified own-name accounts lower rather than excluding them.
  • Verification micro-transfers. Verification micro-transfers do not count as earlier payments when deciding whether a beneficiary is new. A small test payment sent to check that an account or wallet belongs to the customer would otherwise make the large transfer that follows a payment to a known beneficiary.
  • Added just before use is normal. Many customers create a beneficiary minutes before paying it. “Added then paid soon” is weak alone; it matters with a new device, a password or phone number change, or a login from a new location.

When it fires

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Analyst checklist:

  1. Did the customer start this? Look for a new device, new location, password reset, phone or email change, or SIM change in the days before. Confirm with the customer through a contact detail on file before the session, not one supplied in it.
  2. Does the beneficiary’s name match the account holder at the receiving institution (verification of payee where available)?
  3. Is the same beneficiary paid by other customers, or reported by them? That points to a mule account (see shared identifiers).
  4. Ask for the purpose and the relationship. Watch for urgency, secrecy, investment or “safe account” stories, and an older customer taking instructions from someone else (FinCEN FIN-2022-A002 behavioural red flags).
  5. If it looks like takeover: secure the account, stop or recall the payment, and tell the receiving institution.

The FATF notes that a single indicator “may not alone warrant suspicion”. File a suspicious transaction report when the review gives grounds to suspect, within your FIU’s deadline. A payment that failed or was stopped can still need one: the duty covers attempted transactions in the UEMOA zone (“tentatives d’opérations”, Loi uniforme 2023, art. 60), the EU (“including attempted transactions”, Directive (EU) 2015/849, art. 33(1)) and the United States (“conducted or attempted”, 31 CFR 1020.320(a)(2) and 1022.320(a)(2)). In the United States, use the FinCEN key terms, SAR fields and checkbox given under By country. Each country’s reporting deadline is there too.

Sources

18 sourcesHide
  1. FinCEN, Advisory to Financial Institutions on E-Mail Compromise Fraud Schemes, FIN-2016-A003, 6 September 2016, section “BEC and EAC Fraud Red Flags”: “E-mailed transaction instructions direct payment to a beneficiary with which the customer has no payment history or documented business relationship, and the payment is in an amount similar to or in excess of payments sent to beneficiaries whom the customer has historically paid”. Supports the pattern. https://www.fincen.gov/resources/advisories/fincen-advisory-fin-2016-a003
  2. FinCEN, Updated Advisory on Email Compromise Fraud Schemes Targeting Vulnerable Business Processes, FIN-2019-A005, 16 July 2019, section “Suspicious Activity Reporting”: “FinCEN requests that financial institutions reference this advisory and include the following key terms in the SAR narrative”, “BEC FRAUD” when businesses or organizations are the scheme victims, “EAC FRAUD” when individuals are the scheme victims, and “select SAR field 42 (Cyber event)”. Footnote 19, on the part “Information for U.S. Financial Institutions” that contains it: “This section supersedes the information for financial institutions in the 2016 BEC Advisory”; page 1: “The red flags from the 2016 BEC Advisory remain relevant”. Supports the reporting duty. https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2019-07-16/Updated%20BEC%20Advisory%20FINAL%20508.pdf
  3. FATF, INTERPOL and Egmont Group, Illicit Financial Flows from Cyber-Enabled Fraud, November 2023, Annex A “Customer transaction instructions and remarks”: requests for additional payments “immediately following a successful payment to an account not previously used by the customer”; Annex A preamble: “The existence of a single indicator … may not alone warrant suspicion”; Annex B lists multi-factor authentication for “adding or activating beneficiaries”. Supports the pattern. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/illicit-financial-flows-cyber-enabled-fraud.html
  4. FinCEN, Advisory on Elder Financial Exploitation, FIN-2022-A002, 15 June 2022, “Financial Red Flags”: “Uncharacteristic attempts to wire large sums of money”; “An older customer receives and transfers money interstate or abroad to recipients with whom they have no in-person relationship, and the explanation seems suspicious or indicative of a scam or money mule scheme”; p. 5, a victim set up “in the victim’s own name” to move other victims’ payments; “SAR Filing Instructions”: key term “EFE FIN-2022-A002” in SAR field 2 and the narrative, and the Elder Financial Exploitation checkbox (SAR Field 38(d)). Supports the pattern for older customers and the reporting duty. https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/advisory/2022-06-15/FinCEN%20Advisory%20Elder%20Financial%20Exploitation%20FINAL%20508.pdf
  5. EBA and ECB, 2025 Report on Payment Fraud, EBA/REP/2025/40, December 2025, section 3.2 (“from 65% to 74% in value terms”) and section 4, p. 28 (“the exemptions for trusted beneficiaries and, at times, the exemptions for payments between accounts owned by the same user and TRA, had a higher fraud rate than for all credit transfers”; “while overall low”). Supports the EU context. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/intro/publications/pdf/ecb.ebaecb202512.en.pdf
  6. GIABA, Typologies of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Linked to Cybercrime in West Africa, Regional Report, May 2025, chapter 4, “Indicators” (pp. 43–44): “The corporate client with an established relationship requests a payment to be made to a suspicious ‘first time’ beneficiary”; “Corporate client with an established relationship changes the payee account details (e.g., IBAN code) for a known beneficiary”. Supports the pattern. https://www.giaba.org/typologies/3495__typologies-of-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-linked-to-cybercrime-in-west-africa.html
  7. Loi uniforme relative à la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux, le financement du terrorisme et de la prolifération (UEMOA), March 2023, BCEAO copy, arts. 60–61: “Les personnes assujetties sont tenues de déclarer immédiatement à la CENTIF”; art. 2, point 58: “Sans délai : un délai maximal de 24 heures”. Supports the reporting duty. https://www.bceao.int/sites/default/files/2025-02/Loi-uniforme-LBCFTFP-Mars-2023-vf.pdf
  8. Nigeria, Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s. 7(2): “shall within 24 hours after the transaction referred to in subsection (1) … report the suspicious transaction and actions taken to the Unit”; NFIU, Guidelines for the Identification, Verification and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions …, STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, 13 December 2024, Part on “The period for forming a suspicion”: “once a transaction is termed suspicious … it is only then that the 24-hour period for the report to NFIU is activated”, examination “not later than 72 hours”. Supports the reporting duty. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/LawsAndRegulations and https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance
  9. Kenya, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism Financing Laws (Amendment) Act 2023 (No. 10 of 2023), replacing POCAMLA s. 44(2): “within two days after the suspicion arose”. Supports the reporting duty. https://brs.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/AntiMoneyLaunderingandCombatingofTerrorismFinancingLawsAmendmentAct2023.pdf
  10. FINTRAC, Reporting suspicious transactions to FINTRAC, section 4: “You must submit the Suspicious Transaction Report to FINTRAC as soon as practicable after you have completed measures …”. Supports the reporting duty. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/str-dod/str-dod-eng
  11. Central Bank of Nigeria, Additional Functionalities for Instant Payment, circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/001, 12 March 2026, item 3: “All FIs shall implement and activate Enterprise Fraud Monitoring for both inflows and outflows to facilitate fraud detection and restriction of suspicious transactions”; “Implementation of the above provisions shall take effect from July 1, 2026”. Supports the duty to monitor. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/IP%20Circular.pdf
  12. Central Bank of Nigeria, Baseline Standards for Automated Anti-Money Laundering, Combating the Financing of Terrorism and Countering Proliferation Financing Solutions, circular BSD/DIR/PUB/LAB/019/002, 10 March 2026, section 5.6(a)(i): “Monitor activities across relevant channels (e.g. cards, e-channels, deposits, lending) in real time or near real time to detect unusual patterns indicative of fraud”, applying “Where the AML Solution is also used for fraud monitoring” (section 5.6). Supports the duty to monitor. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/CBN%20issues%20Baseline%20Standards%20for%20Automated%20Anti-Money%20Laundering%20Solution.pdf
  13. Central Bank of Nigeria, Draft Guidelines for Handling Authorised Push Payment Fraud (exposure draft), November 2025, section 4.0(i): “Inducement, coercion or misleading of a user/customer into authorising a payment … to a third party’s account or wallet”; section 6.0(vii): “All EWS alerts and triggers shall be promptly examined”; section 8.1(iv): “The financial institution failed to implement appropriate fraud detection, warning, or verification protocols, that could have prevented the transaction”. A draft, not in force. Supports the pattern (scam form). https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2025/CCD/Exposure%20draft%20of%20the%20Guidelines%20for%20Handling%20Authorised%20Push%20Payment%20Fraud.pdf
  14. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389 (regulatory technical standards for strong customer authentication), 27 November 2017, art. 13 “Trusted beneficiaries”: strong customer authentication “where a payer creates or amends a list of trusted beneficiaries”; providers “shall be allowed not to apply” it “where the payer initiates a payment transaction and the payee is included in a list of trusted beneficiaries previously created by the payer”. Text as adopted. Supports the EU context. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eur/2018/389/article/13/adopted
  15. European Central Bank, Instant Payments Regulation (web page), “Verification of payee” (Article 5c) and Table 1: verification of payee from 9 October 2025 in euro-area Member States and 9 July 2027 in non-euro-area Member States. Supports the EU context. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/retail/instant_payments/html/instant_payments_regulation.en.html
  16. Directive (EU) 2015/849, art. 33(1): obliged entities inform the FIU “promptly”; “All suspicious transactions, including attempted transactions, shall be reported”. Text as adopted. Supports the reporting duty. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eudr/2015/849/article/33/adopted
  17. 31 CFR 1020.320(a)(2) and (b)(3) (banks) and 1022.320(a)(2) and (b)(3) (money services businesses): transactions “conducted or attempted”; file “no later than 30 calendar days after the date of initial detection”; for banks with no suspect identified, an additional 30 days, “In no case shall reporting be delayed more than 60 calendar days after the date of initial detection”. Supports the reporting duty. https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/31/1020.320 and https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/31/1022.320
  18. Central Bank of Nigeria, Payments System Policy Department, Regulations for the Operations of Non-Security Virtual Assets in Nigeria, November 2026, issued by circular PSP/DIR/PUB/CIR/001/004 of 5 November 2026, in force that day (circular, section 4.0); sections 26.14.3, 26.15.2 and 37.13. https://www.cbn.gov.ng/Out/2026/CCD/REGULATIONS%20FOR%20THE%20OPERATIONS%20OF%20NON-SECURITY%20VIRTUAL%20ASSETS%20IN%20NIGERIA.pdf

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