Money laundering

Cross-border transfer chains (layering through several countries)

Money that arrives from one country and leaves for another soon after, or a customer whose transfers reach many countries at once, with no reason that fits what is known of them.

Money arrives from one country and leaves for another soon after, or a customer’s transfers reach many countries at once, with no reason that fits what is known of the customer No reason that fits the customer Country A Customer Soon after Country B or Customer Many countries at once Country B Country C Country D

What it catches

Money that moves through several countries in quick succession, or a customer who sends or receives transfers across several countries at once, with no reason that fits what is known of the customer. Spreading a trail across borders is a layering step: each country holds only part of the record, so the money is harder to follow. FINTRAC puts it plainly: “transactions passing through multiple accounts and/or jurisdictions increase the difficulty for reporting entities and law enforcement to trace illicit funds”. FATF, INTERPOL and the Egmont Group report that the proceeds of cyber-enabled fraud “can be laundered quickly through a network of accounts, which often span across multiple jurisdictions and financial institutions”, that they “may then be further laundered through the financial systems of other third-party jurisdictions”, and that money mule networks “may span across multiple jurisdictions”. Argentina’s Financial Intelligence Unit lists the pattern among the circumstances its payment providers must weigh when they set alerts: “operaciones secuenciales o transferencias electrónicas simultáneas entre distintas jurisdicciones, sin razón aparente” (sequential operations or simultaneous electronic transfers between different jurisdictions, without apparent reason).

One institution usually sees one link of the chain: the account where money arrives from one country and leaves for another, or the customer whose transfers fan out over several countries in a day. That link is what the rule looks for.

Most cross-border activity is ordinary: remittances, families living in two countries, businesses paying foreign suppliers. The rule only works against what is expected of each customer, and an analyst decides.

How the rule works

Two forms, matching the two shapes in Argentina’s text:

  • Chain (sequential). Money arrives from a foreign country and most of it leaves soon after for a different foreign country. The account is the middle link of a chain that touches at least three jurisdictions: where the money came from, the account’s own, and where it went.
  • Spread (simultaneous). In a short window, the customer sends money to, or receives money from, counterparties in many different countries.

In both forms a country only weighs against the customer when it is not among the countries expected for them: the ones declared at onboarding (residence, nationality, business locations, declared payment corridors) and the ones they have used regularly before. That is the “without apparent reason” of the Argentine text.

Two neighbouring patterns have their own records. The high-risk exit variant of Rapid pass-through alerts on money passed on abroad wherever it came from. With the same window, share and minimum, a chain alert is therefore usually one of its alerts too: the chain form is the narrower case where money from one foreign country leaves for another and a country doesn’t fit the customer. It raises alerts of its own in two cases: when money the customer received from inside the country lowers pass-through’s share passed on, and when you hold the counterparty’s own country, so that a payment to a person abroad who holds an account in your country counts as leaving for their country. Where your data carries only the country of each account’s bank or provider, run the pass-through variant and show the countries on its cases; the chain form then mostly narrows those alerts rather than finding new ones. The spread form has no counterpart there. High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch covers a payment to or from a listed country, and a customer’s own country fields that disagree. This rule counts countries and their order whatever any list says, since a chain can run entirely through countries on no list.

Looks at

Every transfer, payout or mobile money transfer a customer sends or receives where the other side’s country is known. The chain form counts only the other sides in another country, checked when a payment out is initiated where you can. The spread form counts every counterparty country, the customer’s own included, checked when a payment goes out and when one comes in.

Counts as the other side’s country

The counterparty’s own country where the payment carries it (originator or beneficiary information), otherwise the country of the counterparty’s bank, wallet provider or exchange. Card purchases at merchants are left out.

Alerts when chain

All of these are true:

  1. Money in from foreign countries in the look-back window is at least your minimum for the segment.
  2. Money out in the same window, after the first of those credits, to foreign countries other than the ones it came from is at least 80–95% of that money in.
  3. At least one of the countries on either side is not among the customer’s expected countries.

Alerts when spread

Both of these are true:

  1. Within 24 hours, the customer’s transfers in and out reach counterparties in at least 4 different countries, the customer’s own included.
  2. At least one of them is not among the customer’s expected countries.

How often

At most one alert per customer for each form per window.

Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.

Common variants:

  • Chain across your own customers. Where you serve customers in several countries, follow the money from one of your customers to another across borders. When several of your own accounts in different countries pass the same money on within days, you see more of the chain than any single link shows, and you hold every record of it.
  • Chain through crypto. Fiat in from one country, converted, and sent to an exchange or wallet provider in another. The other side’s country comes from the originator and beneficiary information that travels with the transfer; a wallet on its own has no country.
  • Small amounts to many countries. The spread form where every payment is small, each below your identification or reporting threshold. It overlaps Transaction structuring.
  • Money in from several foreign senders, out to one country. A spread on the way in and a chain on the way out. It overlaps Funnel account.

Data it needs

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FieldUsually comes fromIf it’s missing
Customer idaccount or walletRequired. Both legs of a chain must sit on the same id.
Direction (in or out), amount, currency, timestampledger or payment eventRequired. Convert amounts to one currency before comparing money in with money out.
Transaction typeledgerNeeded to keep card purchases, fees and currency conversions out of the count.
Counterparty’s countryoriginator and beneficiary information in the payment message (wire transfers, Travel Rule data for crypto)Where the payment carries it, it is the best country to use. Many domestic rails and mobile money transfers don’t.
Counterparty institution’s countryBIC, IBAN prefix, routing code, mobile money operator, the counterparty exchange’s jurisdictionThe fallback when the counterparty’s own country is missing. It is where the money sits, not where the person lives (see False positives). Without either field, the rule can’t run on that rail.
Customer’s residence, nationality and declared countries of business or corridorsonboarding (KYC/KYB)Needed for the expected countries. Without them, every foreign payment looks unexplained.
Customer’s past counterparty countriesyour own historyNeeded for the learned part of the expected countries. A history shorter than the period you use makes every new customer look unusual.
Customer segment (individual, business, remitter, platform)onboarding (KYC/KYB)Needed to give businesses that pay abroad by design their own minimum and count.
Counterparty id and its link to your other customerspayment detailsNeeded for the chain across your own customers.

Thresholds

Each row is a setting the rule needs. Each value is a starting point: test it on your own history, then adjust. Where there is no public value, set it from your own data.

ParameterStarting pointWhere it comes from
Share passed on (chain)80% to 95%The US bank examiners’ red flag describes transfers of which “all or most” are wired on almost at once to another city or country (FFIEC, Appendix F); it gives no number. Lower catches partial onward transfers but adds ordinary spending abroad; higher misses chains that keep a little back.
Window, chain, instant rails (mobile money, instant transfers, crypto)3 to 6 hoursFor rails where money can leave within minutes. A shorter window catches faster chains with fewer coincidences.
Window, chain, bank transfers24 to 72 hoursFor slower rails. A longer window catches chains through correspondent banks but adds ordinary payments abroad. Set it from your own data.
Window, spread24 hoursA starting value. A longer window catches slower spreads but adds customers who pay in several countries over a month.
Number of countries, spread4A starting value, counting every counterparty country, the customer’s own included; counting only foreign countries makes 4 stricter. Lower for segments that rarely pay abroad; higher, in their own segment, for remitters, payment platforms and importers.
Minimum money in (chain)set per segment and currency from your own distribution of incoming foreign paymentsNo public source gives a value. Without a floor, the rule mostly catches small family transfers.
Period for the learned expected countriesNo public value; set it from your own dataLong enough to cover a customer’s normal yearly pattern, such as seasonal trade or holidays.

By country

  • Argentina. Resolution 200/2024 of the Unidad de Información Financiera binds payment service providers and non-financial lenders. Among the circumstances they “deberán valorarse especialmente” (shall give special weight) when setting alerts and controls is “La realización de operaciones secuenciales o transferencias electrónicas simultáneas entre distintas jurisdicciones, sin razón aparente” (sequential operations or simultaneous electronic transfers between different jurisdictions, without apparent reason) (art. 34(b), circumstance 1). The firm’s geographic risk analysis covers the areas where it operates and “aquellas vinculadas al proceso de la operación” (those linked to the course of the operation) (art. 4(d)).

    Reporting deadline

    Money laundering, within 24 hours of concluding that the operation is suspicious, and no later than 90 calendar days from the operation, performed or attempted; terrorist financing and proliferation financing, within 24 hours of the operation (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 36(c)).

  • Canada. FINTRAC’s indicators for financial entities open their wire transfer section with the pattern: “it is increasingly easier to transfer funds to, from or through multiple jurisdictions (municipal, national or international) in a rapid fashion. This presents an increased ML/TF risk as transactions passing through multiple accounts and/or jurisdictions increase the difficulty for reporting entities and law enforcement to trace illicit funds.” The section’s indicators include “Funds are deposited or received into several accounts and then consolidated into one before transferring the funds outside the country”, “Immediately after transferred funds have cleared, the client moves funds, to another account or to another person or entity” and “Client attempts to specify the routing of an international wire transfer”; the indicators on non-Canadian jurisdictions add “Client makes frequent overseas transfers, not in line with their financial profile.”

    Reporting deadline

    File “as soon as practicable” after the measures that establish reasonable grounds to suspect (FINTRAC STR guidance, section 4).

  • United States. The FFIEC’s red flags for bank examiners include, under funds transfers: “Many small, incoming transfers of funds are received, or deposits are made using checks and money orders. Almost immediately, all or most of the transfers or deposits are wired to another city or country in a manner inconsistent with the customer’s business or history” (FFIEC BSA/AML Examination Manual, Appendix F, “Funds Transfers”). For foreign non-bank financial institutions, they flag “Multiple wire transfers initiated by foreign nonbank financial institutions that direct U.S. banks to remit funds to other jurisdictions that bear no apparent business relationship with that foreign nonbank financial institution” (Appendix F, “Bulk Currency Shipments”).

    Reporting deadline

    No later than 30 calendar days after the initial detection of facts that may constitute a basis for filing a SAR. A bank that has not identified a suspect may take 30 more days to identify one, but never more than 60 days after initial detection (31 CFR 1020.320(b)(3); 1022.320(b)(3) for money services businesses, 30 days). Ongoing money laundering schemes also need an immediate telephone call to law enforcement.

  • Nigeria. The NFIU’s 2023 report on money laundering typologies through fraud gives, among the indicators of a case where the proceeds of fraud against victims abroad were moved through accounts in Ireland to settle trade invoices for a Nigerian company: “The criminals conduct international transactions involving multiple countries, including China and Germany, to further complicate the money trail and evade detection” (Case Study 32).

    Reporting deadline

    Report to the NFIU immediately, with a written report “within 24 hours after the transaction” (Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022, s.7(1)–(2)). The NFIU’s December 2024 STR guidelines start the 24 hours once the transaction is found suspicious, after an examination of no more than 72 hours, and require written reasons for every alert closed as not suspicious (STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, Part Six, para 2).

  • EU. The EBA’s risk factor guidelines name the pattern among the factors that raise risk; they are factors for assessing risk, not a monitoring requirement. For crypto-asset service providers, a customer who “Displays behaviour and patterns, which are unusual because they involve unexplained transfers to/from distributed ledger addresses or crypto-assets accounts in multiple jurisdictions with no apparent business or lawful purpose” (Guideline 21.5(b)(x), added by EBA/GL/2024/01, applying from 30 December 2024). For money remitters: “transfers are made from one or more payers in different countries to a local payee” (EBA/GL/2021/02, Guideline 11.5). For any transaction: “How complex is the transaction and does it involve multiple parties or multiple jurisdictions, for example in the case of certain trade finance transactions?” (EBA/GL/2021/02, Title I, Guideline 2, products, services and transactions risk factors).

    Reporting deadline

    Inform the FIU “promptly” (Directive (EU) 2015/849, art. 33(1)(a), which each member state’s law transposes).

False positives and tuning

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Common innocent explanations: a remittance from a relative abroad sent on to family in a third country; a worker paid from abroad who supports family at home; an importer paying suppliers in several countries in one day; a freelancer paid by foreign platforms; a student or traveller moving money between their own accounts in two countries; relatives in several countries sending money on the same day for a funeral, a wedding or a medical bill.

Typical causes of misfires:

  • Businesses that are cross-border by design. For a remittance company, a payment platform, a currency exchange or a marketplace that pays sellers abroad, money in from one country and out to another is the product. Segment first, and judge these customers against their declared corridors and volumes, not against an individual’s.
  • Families and workers across borders. Many individuals have two or three countries that recur every month. Learn each customer’s usual countries and alert on new ones, not on the familiar pair.
  • An account number’s country is not the person’s. An IBAN carries the country of the institution that issued it. E-money institutions and virtual IBANs give customers account numbers from another country, so a payer who lives in one country can send from an IBAN of another, and one payer can show up as two or three countries depending on the app they pay from. Use the counterparty’s own country when the payment carries it, and read an institution’s country as where the money sits. Where only institution countries exist, count a country from accounts at retail banks, and put e-money and payment processor account numbers into one bucket instead of counting each as a country.
  • Intermediaries count as countries. Money that arrives through a payment processor, a correspondent bank or a settlement partner can carry that intermediary’s country instead of the payer’s. Counting it adds countries the money never really passed through. Use originator and beneficiary information where it travels with the payment.
  • Missing country fields. Domestic rails, mobile money transfers and wallet-to-wallet crypto often carry no counterparty country. The rule then stays silent on those rails without saying so. Measure how often each country field is filled, per rail, before switching the rule on, and derive what you can (phone number prefix, BIC, IBAN, the counterparty exchange’s jurisdiction) with the caveats above.
  • Single payment areas. Within a payment area such as SEPA, or a monetary union such as WAEMU, payments between member countries are routine. Decide whether the spread form counts the area as one jurisdiction, and record why.
  • The customer’s own accounts abroad. Transfers between accounts in the customer’s own name in different countries are often innocent, but the US red flags list “Funds transfers are sent or received from the same person to or from different accounts”. Don’t drop them; give them their own tier.
  • A declared residence that is out of date. Customers move and don’t update their profile. Compare the declared residence with where the customer spends with their card before treating the countries of their payments as unexpected.
  • Spreads made only of money coming in. Several payers, or one payer using apps registered in different countries, can make a spread on the way in: often a collection or a funnel. Check where the money goes next; money passed on to one beneficiary is the case to review, and Funnel account looks at it directly.
  • Exits to a country the money also came from. The chain form leaves out exits to any country the money came from, so money in from two countries that leaves for one of them is missed, even when part of it crosses a third border. Where that matters, match each exit with the credits it passes on and compare their countries.
  • Counting rules left implicit. Decide what the home country is: the customer’s residence, or your institution’s country. Under residence, a payout to the customer’s own account at a provider abroad counts as foreign; under your institution’s country, a payout to a provider in that same country is domestic. The two readings give different counts. Use one country code list across all rails: two rails that write the same country differently double the count.

How to tune: segment by customer type; build each customer’s expected countries from onboarding data and history; prefer the counterparty’s own country over the institution’s; decide what the home country is; measure country field coverage per rail; exclude card purchases at merchants; and load a full history period before going live.

When it fires

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  1. Rebuild the chain: list the payments in and out in the window and a few days around it, with the country, institution and rail of each counterparty. Note which countries came from which field.
  2. Compare the countries with what the customer declared (residence, nationality, business, corridors) and with their history.
  3. Check whether the senders and beneficiaries are the customer, their relatives or their business partners, and whether money that left comes back later from yet another country (see Round-tripping among related accounts).
  4. Check whether the counterparties also pay or receive from other customers (see Shared identifiers across customers), and whether any country is on a high-risk list (see High-risk jurisdictions and country mismatch); screen every party (see Sanctions screening).
  5. Note whether the customer asked for a particular routing of an international transfer, which FINTRAC lists as an indicator in itself.
  6. Ask the customer for the purpose of the payments and documents that support it: invoices, contracts, proof of the family relationship.
  7. Escalate when the customer cannot explain why the money crosses those countries, the counterparties have no visible link to the customer, or the senders are victims of reported fraud.

An alert is a reason to review, not a suspicion in itself: the NFIU’s 2024 STR guidelines call monitoring alerts “unusual” and say they “should not be automatically regarded as suspicious” (Part Three, paras 1–2). Under the FATF standard, “All suspicious transactions, including attempted transactions, should be reported regardless of the amount of the transaction” (Interpretive Note to Recommendation 20, para 3). Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.

Sources

13 sourcesHide
  1. Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 200/2024 (RESOL-2024-200-APN-UIF#MJ), 18 December 2024, Boletín Oficial no. 35571, 19 December 2024, art. 4(d), art. 34(b) (chapeau and circumstance 1), art. 36(c) (report deadlines). https://www.argentina.gob.ar/normativa/nacional/norma-407429/texto
  2. FATF, INTERPOL and Egmont Group, “Illicit Financial Flows from Cyber-Enabled Fraud”, November 2023, Executive Summary (p.3), para 8 (p.8) and para 26 (p.19). https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Illicit-financial-flows-cyber-enabled-fraud.pdf
  3. FINTRAC, “Money laundering and terrorist financing indicators—Financial entities”, modified 24 November 2025: “ML/TF indicators involving wire transfers (including electronic funds transfers)” and “ML/TF indicators related to transactions that involve non-Canadian jurisdictions”. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/indicators-indicateurs/fin_mltf-eng
  4. FFIEC, Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual, Appendix F, “Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing ‘Red Flags’”: “Funds Transfers” and “Bulk Currency Shipments”. https://bsaaml.ffiec.gov/manual/Appendices/07
  5. NFIU, “Money Laundering Typologies Through Fraud in Nigeria”, December 2023, Case Study 32 (pp.54–55). https://www.nfiu.gov.ng (Trends & Typologies)
  6. European Banking Authority, “Guidelines on customer due diligence and the factors credit and financial institutions should consider when assessing the ML/TF risk” (EBA/GL/2021/02, consolidated with EBA/GL/2023/03), Title I, Guideline 2, products, services and transactions risk factors (complexity), p.21; Guideline 11.5 (money remitters). https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2023-11/EBA%20GL%202021%2002%20-%20consolidated%20%28amended%20by%20EBA%20GL%202023%2003%29_EN.pdf
  7. European Banking Authority, “Guidelines amending Guidelines EBA/2021/02 on customer due diligence and the factors credit and financial institutions should consider when assessing the money laundering and terrorist financing risk …” (EBA/GL/2024/01), Final Report, 16 January 2024, applying from 30 December 2024: Guideline 21.5(b)(x) (crypto-asset service providers), pp.24–25. https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2024-01/a3e89f4f-fbf3-4bd6-9e07-35f3243555b3/Final%20Amending%20%20Guidelines%20on%20MLTF%20Risk%20Factors.pdf
  8. NFIU, “Guidelines for the Identification, Verification and Reporting of Suspicious Transactions Related to ML/FT/PF for Financial Institutions”, STR-NFIU-2024-A0001, 13 December 2024, Part Three paras 1–2 and Part Six para 2. https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/AdvisoryAndGuidance
  9. FATF, The FATF Recommendations, October 2025 edition: Interpretive Note to Recommendation 20, para 3. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Fatf-recommendations.html

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