Money laundering

Traveller’s cheques bought and quickly cashed

Traveller’s cheques bought in a large amount are cashed or deposited soon after the purchase, or cheques bought by others are cashed by one person, with no travel or business reason to explain it.

Traveller’s cheques bought in a large amount are cashed or deposited soon after, or cheques bought by others are cashed by one person Bought in a large amount Soon after Cashed or deposited or Buyer Buyer Buyer One person cashes or deposits them

What it catches

Someone buys a large amount of traveller’s cheques and turns them back into cash or a bank deposit soon after the purchase, or one person cashes or deposits cheques that other people bought. A traveller’s cheque exists to carry value on a trip and is cashed bit by bit while travelling. Bought and cashed at once, it only turns cash or card credit into a paper instrument and back, which puts distance between the money and its source. Collected by one beneficiary, it lets the buyer pay someone without a transfer in either name. Argentina’s financial intelligence unit lists both shapes among the circumstances to weigh when setting alerts: the purchase of a large amount of traveller’s cheques presented for payment “por parte del comprador en un período de tiempo irrazonablemente corto o, por parte de un único beneficiario sin motivo que lo explique” (by the buyer within an unreasonably short time or by a single beneficiary without a reason that explains it) (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 34(b), circumstance 22).

The cases regulators describe match. In a handful of reports filed by one credit card issuer, FinCEN described traveller’s cheques “purchased in bulk with a credit card, then deposited within a short period of time”, typically no more than a day or two after the purchase (published in 2002). FinCEN also reported bulk sales of sequentially numbered cheques to one or two people, later negotiated with dealers in goods such as diamonds or precious metals. AUSTRAC’s review of the reports it received on traveller’s cheques lists customers “cashing numerous traveller’s cheques in a single day or in large batches over a short period”, cheques cashed and then “immediately” transferred offshore or into an account, and batches cashed offshore that were all or mostly sequentially numbered.

Who this still applies to. Few firms still sell traveller’s cheques. AUSTRAC found in 2018 that sales in Australia had fallen by 90 per cent between 2012 and 2016 and that two financial institutions still sold them, and expected the decline to continue as travellers move to travel money cards. It rated the overall money laundering and terrorist financing risk of traveller’s cheques as low, on 27 suspicious matter reports over two years, all of them about cashing. The rule matters to those that still issue, sell or cash them: issuers, the banks and exchange houses that sell them as agents, and the banks, exchange houses and money services businesses that cash them. Argentina, the United States and Canada still name issuers of traveller’s cheques, and in some cases those who sell or cash them, among the businesses their anti-money laundering laws cover (By country), and Mexico’s covers those, other than financial entities, that issue or sell them as a business (LFPIORPI art. 17, fracción III). Only the issuer sees both ends: AUSTRAC notes that the firm that cashes a cheque is rarely the one that sold it. A seller or a casher alone can run half of the rule (see the variants).

The instruments that replaced them. FATF describes prepaid cards as an alternative to traveller’s cheques, and AUSTRAC calls travel money cards “highly vulnerable to criminal misuse”. The same logic, value bought and turned back into cash or a deposit soon after, or collected by someone other than the buyer, appears in regulators’ red flags for prepaid cards and money orders (variants below). Where no source describes the pattern for an instrument, this page does not claim it.

The rule finds the shape, not the crime. Travellers do cash cheques soon after buying them, and some people use traveller’s cheques for reasons that have nothing to do with travel. An analyst decides which is which.

How the rule works

Match each cheque presented for payment, by its serial number, to the sale it came from. Then run two tests. The first adds up, for each buyer, the cheques from their purchases that came back for payment within a short window of the purchase, whoever presented them: an issuer often sees only the bank that presented a cheque, not the person it paid, so the test also catches cheques the buyer handed on. The second adds up, for each presenter (the person, business or account that cashed or deposited the cheques), the cheques bought by someone else that they presented in a window, and from how many buyers.

Looks at

Every traveller’s cheque presented for payment (cashed, deposited or cleared), matched by serial number to the sale it came from.

Measures

  • Cashed soon after purchase: for each buyer, the face value of cheques from their purchases presented within the purchase-to-payment window. Purchases by the same buyer within the grouping period count as one purchase.
  • Collected by one beneficiary: for each presenter, the face value of cheques bought by other people that they presented in the presenter window, and the number of different buyers.

Amounts are converted to one currency at a documented rate.

Leaves out

  • Banks and exchange houses that present cheques on behalf of the people who cashed them with them: look through to the person who was paid.
  • Replacement cheques for lost or stolen ones, as new purchases: once linked to the original sale, a replacement counts under that sale.

Alerts when

Either of these is true:

  1. A buyer’s cheques worth at least your minimum amount were presented within the purchase-to-payment window.
  2. A presenter presented cheques bought by other people worth at least your minimum amount in the presenter window. A business you know accepts traveller’s cheques as payment in its normal trade is tested in its own segment, against a minimum set from its usual volume.

How often

At most one alert per purchase for the first test, and one per presenter per presenter window for the second.

Highlighted values are settings you choose. Hover over one, tap it or tab to it for a suggested value.

Common variants:

  • Seller only. A seller that never sees the cheques come back can still flag the purchase: large purchases “not consistent with known travel plans” (FINTRAC), bulk orders, and blocks of sequentially numbered cheques sold to one or two people (FinCEN).
  • Casher only. A bank, exchange house or money services business that cashes cheques can flag numerous cheques cashed in a single day or in large batches over a short period, all or most of them sequentially numbered, or cashed and then moved straight offshore or into an account (AUSTRAC).
  • Bought on a credit card. Cheques bought in bulk with a credit card and deposited within a day or two (FinCEN, a handful of reports from one credit card issuer). In those cases the card issuer also issued the cheques, so it saw both the purchase and the deposit.
  • Prepaid cards. The same test with a load in place of a purchase and an ATM withdrawal in place of cashing. Among its red flags for new payment methods, FATF lists “Multiple loading or funding of the same accounts, followed by ATM withdrawals shortly afterwards, over a short period of time” and an account “only used for withdrawals, and not for POS or online purchases”, and notes that prepaid cards “can allow funding in one country and cash withdrawals in another”. FATF adds that “cash withdrawals in foreign jurisdictions will be expected where the product is a prepaid traveller card” and that red flags “should therefore not be applied unthinkingly, but tailored to the product’s characteristics”: on a travel money card, weigh withdrawals in the country where the card was loaded. For card accounts this overlaps with Rapid pass-through.
  • Money orders. FinCEN’s examiners are told to look, in an issuer’s records of cleared money orders, for a customer “purchasing money orders at various agent locations and then depositing them on the same day”, and for runs of consecutively numbered money orders clearing together.
  • Vouchers. Where vouchers are sold without identifying the buyer, neither test can run. What a voucher issuer can count is one redeemer combining many vouchers sold at several outlets: FATF describes a third party who bought cash vouchers at several outlets, such as petrol stations and kiosks (“The purchase was anonymous without identification of the buyer”), and sent their codes to the person instructing him, who spent them online, and notes that “several vouchers for smaller amounts –also if purchased at different locations- can be used jointly and combined” (case 10).

Data it needs

ShowHide
FieldUsually comes fromIf it’s missing
Buyer idsale record (seller or issuer)Required. Without it, neither test can tell the buyer from the presenter.
Purchase date and timesale recordRequired for the first test.
Amount and currencysale and payment recordsRequired. Convert to one currency before adding up.
Serial numberssale record and cleared-item recordRequired. The serial number is the only link between a sale and the cheque that comes back. FinCEN’s examiners ask issuers for the first and last numbers sold to each customer.
Payment method (cash, card, account)sale recordNeeded for the credit-card variant and to give cash purchases more weight.
Payment date and timecleared-item or cashing recordRequired for the first test.
Presenter id and type (individual, merchant, exchange house, bank)cashing or clearing recordRequired for the second test. Where a bank or exchange house presents for its customer, you need the customer it paid, or the test only sees the bank.
Country and place of paymentcashing or clearing recordNeeded to tell cashing at home from cashing abroad and to rank by place.
Buyer’s profile (occupation, declared travel)onboarding or sale recordNeeded by the analyst to judge the alert.

Thresholds

Each row is a setting the rule needs. Set by law values come from the source named under “Where it comes from”. Suggested values are starting points: test them on your own history, then adjust.

ParameterValueTypeWhere it comes from
Purchase-to-payment window1 to 2 days, as a starting valueSuggestedA handful of reports from one credit card issuer, described in FinCEN’s SAR Activity Review in 2002, where cheques bought in bulk by credit card were deposited “typically no more than a day or two following the purchase”. It describes those cases, not the pattern; no source sets a window for cash purchases. A longer window catches slower cash-outs but adds ordinary travel spending; trip length and cashing abroad rather than at home move it.
Grouping period1 day, as a starting valueSuggestedLengthen it to a few days to catch purchases spread over several dates and places to stay under a record line, as in FinCEN’s 2004 interpretive release.
Presenter windowset from your own dataSuggestedNo public source gives a value.
Minimum amountset per currency from your own spread of purchase sizesSuggestedNo source defines a large purchase. The legal lines below are record and report lines, not a definition of “large”, but they are a natural floor.
United States, record of a cash purchaseUSD 3,000 to 10,000 in currency, purchases on one business day added together when an employee knows of themSet by law31 CFR 1010.415(a)–(b).
United States, suspicious activity report by an issuer or sellerUSD 2,000; USD 5,000 when an issuer finds the activity by reviewing its records of cleared chequesSet by law31 CFR 1022.320(a)(1)–(3).
United States, suspicious activity report by a bankUSD 5,000Set by law31 CFR 1020.320(a)(2).
Canada, record of an issuanceCAD 3,000 or more received for issuing traveller’s cheques, money orders or similar instrumentsSet by lawFINTRAC, record keeping requirements for money services businesses.

By country

  • Argentina. UIF Resolution 200/2024 covers issuers of traveller’s cheques (art. 2(j)); their customers include the holders of the cheques and the merchants that accept or exchange them (art. 2(f), points 3 and 4). Among the circumstances that “deberán valorarse especialmente” (shall be given special weight) in setting alerts and controls is the “Adquisición de una suma elevada de cheques de viajero y presentación al cobro por parte del comprador en un período de tiempo irrazonablemente corto o, por parte de un único beneficiario sin motivo que lo explique” (purchase of a large amount of traveller’s cheques and their presentation for payment by the buyer within an unreasonably short time or by a single beneficiary without a reason that explains it) (art. 34(b), circumstance 22). The next circumstance is a traveller’s cheque presented for payment “por parte de una persona física o jurídica cuya actividad no justifique la posesión del mismo” (by a natural or legal person whose activity does not justify holding it) (art. 34(b), circumstance 23). The resolution sets no amount or time for either.

    Reporting deadline

    Money laundering, within 24 hours of concluding that the operation is suspicious, and no later than 90 calendar days from the operation, performed or attempted; terrorist financing and proliferation financing, within 24 hours of the operation (UIF Resolution 200/2024, art. 36(c)).

  • United States. Issuers and sellers of traveller’s cheques (above USD 1,000 to any person on any day), and businesses that cash them above the same amount, are money services businesses under the Bank Secrecy Act regulations (31 CFR 1010.100(ff)(2)–(3)). FinCEN’s 2004 interpretive release on foreign agents describes bulk sales of sequentially numbered traveller’s cheques to one or two individuals, structured across dates and places, with illegible signatures or no beneficiary, then negotiated with dealers in goods, and says a money services business’s review of the transactions conducted through its foreign agents and counterparties should let it identify and report “bulk sales or purchases of sequentially numbered instruments” (Interpretive Release 2004-1, 69 FR 74439). FinCEN’s SAR Activity Review reported cheques bought in bulk with a credit card and deposited within a day or two (Issue 4, August 2002, p.31). FinCEN’s examination manual tells examiners to analyse an issuer’s daily records of cleared money orders and traveller’s cheques, by serial number, for suspicious patterns at USD 5,000 and above (December 2008, p.95). A cash purchase of USD 3,000 to 10,000 must be recorded with the buyer’s identity and the serial numbers (31 CFR 1010.415). Issuers and sellers report suspicious transactions of at least USD 2,000, and an issuer that finds them by reviewing cleared cheques reports those of at least USD 5,000 (31 CFR 1022.320(a)(1)–(3)); check cashers are not among the businesses this duty names. Banks that sell or cash them report under their own rule, at USD 5,000 (31 CFR 1020.320(a)(2)).

    Reporting deadline

    For a money services business that must report, no later than 30 calendar days after the initial detection of facts that may be a basis for a report (31 CFR 1022.320(b)(3)); for a bank, the same 30 days, which may be extended by another 30 to identify a suspect if none was identified, never beyond 60 days from the initial detection (31 CFR 1020.320(b)(3)). Where a violation needs immediate attention, such as ongoing money laundering, either must also notify law enforcement by telephone at once (same paragraphs).

  • Canada. Issuing or redeeming traveller’s cheques makes a business a money services business under FINTRAC’s rules. FINTRAC’s indicators for money services businesses, which name issuers of traveller’s cheques, include “Client makes large purchases of traveller’s cheques not consistent with known travel plans”, “Client makes purchases of money orders in large volumes” and “Client requests that a cheque or money order be made out to the bearer”. A business that receives CAD 3,000 or more for issuing traveller’s cheques, money orders or similar instruments must keep a record of it.

    Reporting deadline

    File “as soon as practicable” after the measures that establish reasonable grounds to suspect (FINTRAC STR guidance, section 4).

False positives and tuning

ShowHide

Common innocent explanations: a traveller who cashes most of the cheques at the start of a trip, for example to pay a deposit or a large purchase abroad; customers who use traveller’s cheques to speculate on exchange rates, to move their money when migrating (often people without a bank account), or to pay an overseas vendor for a large item (AUSTRAC lists all three as lawful reasons described by the firms it consulted); hotels, shops and exchange houses that accept traveller’s cheques in their normal trade and so present cheques bought by many people.

Typical causes of misfires:

  • The buyer’s own trip. A short window catches travellers who cash everything on arrival. Compare the place of payment with the buyer’s declared destination, and weigh cashing in the country of purchase more than cashing abroad.
  • Businesses that accept cheques as payment. For the second test, a merchant or exchange house that takes traveller’s cheques from the public will always present cheques bought by others. Give known acceptors their own segment, with a minimum set from their usual volume, rather than leaving them out: in FinCEN’s 2004 case the cheques were negotiated with dealers in goods that took them as payment, so leaving acceptors out drops exactly that route.
  • Presenting banks. When a bank or exchange house cashes a cheque and presents it to the issuer, the presenter on the issuer’s record is the bank. Without the identity of the person it paid, the second test only measures the bank’s volume.
  • Unlinked replacements. A cheque reported lost and replaced carries a new serial number. Unless the replacement is linked to the original sale, it looks like a cheque with no purchase, or like a new purchase cashed at once. Linked, it counts under the original sale, so a buyer who cashes both the originals and the replacements still shows.
  • Scam victims and counterfeits. People who were sent cheques in the mail, for example as advance pay for a job applied for online, cash cheques bought by others, and AUSTRAC reports such cheques turning out to be counterfeit. A counterfeit or tampered cheque reaches the issuer as a cheque with no sale, or matched to the wrong one. This is fraud, not laundering: send it to the fraud process.
  • Purchases split across days or sellers. A buyer who spreads purchases over several days or several outlets to stay under a record line passes a per-purchase test. Add a buyer’s purchases over a few days, and see Transaction structuring.
  • Mixed currencies. Cheques are sold and cashed in several currencies. Convert both sides to one currency before adding up.

How to tune: run the first test at the issuer, where sales and cleared cheques meet by serial number; segment presenters into individuals, accepting merchants and presenting institutions; set the minimum per currency; and keep the window short in the country of purchase and longer abroad.

When it fires

ShowHide

Analyst checklist:

  1. Pull the sale: buyer, identity document, date, place, payment method (cash, card, account), and the serial numbers. Check whether the cheques were bought as one block of consecutive numbers.
  2. Pull every cheque from that sale that has come back: who presented it, where, when, and whether it was cashed or deposited, and to whose account.
  3. Check the cheques themselves where you can: missing signatures or countersignatures, illegible names, or a payee left blank are FinCEN red flags. Counterfeit or tampered cheques, such as one whose original signature was removed and signed over, are fraud (AUSTRAC): send them to the fraud process.
  4. Compare with what the buyer said about the trip, and with the buyer’s occupation and income. For the second test, ask whether the presenter’s activity explains holding cheques bought by others (Argentina’s circumstance 23).
  5. Look for other purchases by the same buyer, or by people linked to them, just under the record line, and for the same presenter cashing cheques from several buyers (see Shared identifiers across customers).
  6. Escalate when the purchase was in cash or on credit with no travel, the cheques were cashed at once in the country of purchase or moved straight on, or one person collected cheques from several unrelated buyers without a business reason.

An alert is a reason to review, not a suspicion in itself. Each country’s reporting deadline is under By country.

Sources

14 sourcesHide
  1. Unidad de Información Financiera (Argentina), Resolución 200/2024 (RESOL-2024-200-APN-UIF#MJ), 18 December 2024, Boletín Oficial no. 35571, 19 December 2024, art. 2(f) points 3 and 4, art. 2(j), art. 34(b) circumstances 22 and 23, art. 36(c). https://www.argentina.gob.ar/normativa/nacional/norma-407429/texto
  2. FinCEN, Interpretive Release 2004-1: Anti-Money Laundering Program Requirements for Money Services Businesses With Respect to Foreign Agents or Foreign Counterparties, Federal Register vol. 69 no. 239, 14 December 2004, pp. 74439–74441. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2004-12-14/pdf/04-27287.pdf
  3. FinCEN, The SAR Activity Review: Trends, Tips & Issues, Issue 4, August 2002, “Use of Monetary Instruments in Credit Card Account Activity”, p.31. https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/sar_tti_04.pdf
  4. FinCEN, The SAR Activity Review: Trends, Tips & Issues, Issue 3, October 2001, “Use of Travelers Checks to Disguise Identities”, pp.21–22. https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/sar_tti_03.pdf
  5. FinCEN, Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual for Money Services Businesses, December 2008, Recordkeeping examination procedures, step 4, p.69; Suspicious Activity Reporting – Examination Procedures, step 15, p.95. https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/MSB_Exam_Manual.pdf
  6. FinCEN, Money Laundering Prevention: A Money Services Business Guide, “What Should MSBs Look For?”, pp.18 and 22. https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/prevention_guide.pdf
  7. 31 CFR 1010.100(ff)(2)–(3) (money services business), 1010.415 (purchases of bank checks and drafts, cashier’s checks, money orders and traveler’s checks) and 1022.320(a)(1)–(3) and (b)(3) (reports by money services businesses of suspicious transactions), 1020.320(a)(2) and (b)(3) (reports by banks of suspicious transactions), eCFR, read 12 November 2026. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-X/part-1022/subpart-C/section-1022.320
  8. FINTRAC, “Money laundering and terrorist financing indicators—Money services businesses”, modified 24 November 2025, “ML/TF indicators specific to MSBs”. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/indicators-indicateurs/msb_mltf-eng
  9. FINTRAC, “Record keeping requirements for money services businesses and foreign money services businesses”, modified 9 September 2025, “Issuance of traveller’s cheques, money orders or other similar negotiable instruments”. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/recordkeeping-document/record/msb-eng
  10. FINTRAC, “Reporting suspicious transactions to FINTRAC”, modified 22 May 2025, section 4. https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/guidance-directives/transaction-operation/str-dod/str-dod-eng
  11. Ley Federal para la Prevención e Identificación de Operaciones con Recursos de Procedencia Ilícita (Mexico), DOF 17 October 2012, last amended DOF 16 July 2025, art. 17 fracción III. https://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LFPIORPI.pdf
  12. AUSTRAC, Traveller’s cheques: money laundering and terrorism financing risk assessment, June 2018, pp.3, 5, 6 and 9. © AUSTRAC for the Commonwealth of Australia 2018, used under AUSTRAC’s Creative Commons licence. https://www.austrac.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-06/travellers-cheques-risk-assessment.pdf
  13. FATF, Money Laundering Using New Payment Methods, October 2010, para 40 (p.16), para 138 and red flags (pp.47–48), case 10. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/ML%20using%20New%20Payment%20Methods.pdf
  14. FATF, Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach: Prepaid Cards, Mobile Payments and Internet-Based Payment Services, June 2013, para 52. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Rba-npps-2013.html

Ask us

A question about this rule?

A person at Archer reads every question and answers by email.

The Fraud & AML Library is a practical reference, not legal advice. What binds is the regulator’s own text, which every rule and regulation page links.

Get new rules and regulation changes by email

When we add a rule or a regulation changes, we’ll email you.

You can unsubscribe at any time. Privacy policy